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Chapter 1
Introduction
From 1965 to 1968, American and South Vietnamese forces killed several of their 
enemies for every m an they lost. 'Body counts' and 'kill ratios,' the American 
command's central measurement for the war's progress, suggested that victory 
must be nigh. But they were not winning the war in any m eaningful sense.
Killing enemy troops, and civilians as well, proved useless in the absence of a 
viable South Vietnamese nation, and the regime was nearly w ithout political 
influence in the countryside where the bulk of the population lived. In 1967 
military and civilian officials began to put new emphasis on efforts to win 
influence among the rural population through local security schemes combined 
with social, political, and economic programs. This diverse effort constituted the 
'nation building’ campaign. However, the National Liberation Front (NLF) 
largely dictated socioeconomic and military terms in most South Vietnamese 
villages, and such rural programs were rarely practicable, until a decision in Hanoi 
made them  so.
On the evening of 29-30 January 1968, troops of the NLF and the North 
Vietnamese (People's Army of Vietnam, or PAVN) attacked nearly  every major 
town, city, and military installation in South Vietnam. This commenced Tet Mau 
Than, the Tet Offensive of 1968. Two more offensives followed in March and 
August. By the end of the year the NLF, as opposed to N orth Vietnamese troops, 
had done the bulk of the fighting and dying. Known by its enemies as the Viet 
Cong (VC), it never regained its pre-1968 military strength. The guerrilla, or low 
intensity conflict in the lowland villages, increasingly gave w ay to a conventional 
war fought mainly in sparsely inhabited piedm ont or highland regions.
As a result of this bloodletting, rural programs suddenly became feasible
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after 1968. The resulting nation building campaign w as one of history's most
intensive foreign inspired efforts to develop a thriving economy and polity.
Ironically, the commencement of the most intensive phase of this campaign
preceded, by only a few m onths, America's decision to w ithdraw  gradually from
Vietnam. The U.S. governm ent had assured its people in 1967 that the
communist enemy was on its knees and that victory was within reach. W hatever
its military results, the Tet Offensive had proved otherwise and the U.S. was
running out of time. U nder immense pressure from a disillusioned public,
Richard Nixon began pulling U.S. troops out and 'Vietnamizing' the war. Thus,
while the 1968 offensives proved a significant military victory for the South
Vietnamese and Americans, it was a devastating political defeat. When the next
Northern offensive came in 1972 it was no longer a question of whether South
Vietnam would fall, bu t when.
Because the United States failed to preserve South Vietnam, and because
historians and observers generally see the offensives of 1968 as the real
denouement of American involvement, conventional w isdom  has until recently
relegated the entire 1968-1972 period, along with the nation building effort, to
scholarly obscurity. These are perhaps the greatest gaps in the literature of the
American w ar in Vietnam. Neil Sheehan's A  Bright Shining Lie, perhaps the
most widely read and influential book on America's involvement in Vietnam, is
a salient example of this bias.1 In reviewing the book, the international historian
R. B. Smith chided Sheehan for barely touching on nation building policy.
The three years 1969,1970, and 1971, indeed, are disposed of in a mere 
thirty pages-quite rem arkable in a book of nearly 800 pages. The 
reason is not hard to find. Sheehan. . . long since concluded that the 
American enterprise in Vietnam was doomed after the Tet Offensive 
and the M arch decisions of 1968. The genuine achievements of the 
U.S.-Vietnamese collaboration after the crisis of 1968 hold no interest 
for him. . . . That interpretation may, indeed, prove valid in the end, 
but, w ithout a detailed study of the later period itself. . . it cannot be
1 Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York, 1988).
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taken for granted.'2
Not everyone shares the conventional wisdom. So dim inished were NLF 
military forces after 1968, so robust was the economic growth in critical sectors and 
regions, that m any Americans and South Vietnamese were m oved to declare that 
nation building had succeeded. It is savage irony, according to the revisionist 
view, that just as U.S.-inspired programs had achieved the basis for an 
economically prosperous and politically unified South Vietnam, just as two 
decades of investment in blood and treasure had begun to pay off, W ashington DC 
caved into public pressure and deserted its ally. William Colby, the former chief of 
CORDS, was particularly infuriated about the scholarly treatm ent of the post-1968 
period: vthe historical record given to most Americans is similar to w hat we would 
know if histories of World War II stopped before Stalingrad.'3
Though Vietnam revisionists have not proved their case, they have rightly 
focused attention on critical issues. In the absence of a reasonably resilient, 
cohesive polity in South Vietnam, there was little to win. Nonetheless, in the 
seven years since R. B. Smith's call for rigorous scholarship on these issues, little 
has emerged. Perhaps scholars perceive the American war as ten years of 
unrem itting combat, which suggests that no real economic developm ent can have 
taken place. Few realize that most provinces in South Vietnam experienced only 
low intensity conflict, and many were virtually post conflict regions.
Evidence from nation building in South Vietnam should inform both the 
historical debate about the American w ar and studies of Third W orld 
development, especially foreign-inspired or imposed development globally, bu t as 
yet it does not. Because of the depth and length of the U.S. commitment, the 
economic, military, social, and political interplay between the United States and
R.B. Smith, review of Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in 
Vietnam, in The American Historical Review 95, no. 4 (October 1990).
3 William E. Colby, 'Vietnam after McNamara/ Washington Post, 27 April 1995.
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South Vietnam is especially revealing about development in general and about 
American attitudes toward the developing world during a vital phase of the Cold 
War. Because of the sheer variety of development program s and approaches the 
Americans ventured, this period is im portant to the literature of Development 
Studies. The American nation building campaign in South Vietnam, after all, 
represents one of the largest and most intensive efforts by an industrialized nation 
to impose development on another country. This study is the first to analyze in 
any depth the m ost im portant elements of that nation building campaign: rural 
economic development in cultural, political, and security context. Thus, this study 
fills a void both in the literature of the American w ar in Vietnam, and in the 
history of U .S./Third W orld relations.
In a 1984 collection, political scientist and former U.S. intelligence analyst 
Allen Goodman asserted that nation building accomplished 'a  great deal toward 
the m odernization of South Vietnam and the destruction of the Viet Cong.'4 In 
the same book, historian George Herring asked the rhetorical question, could 
South Vietnam have survived? H erring believed that the question could not be 
answered because 'w e need to know a great deal more about the actual progress of 
[nation building], the strength of the ARVN, and the solidity of Thieu's 
governm ent.'5
More than a decade later, this study brings to bear sufficient evidence 
regarding economic, political, and social conditions in rural South Vietnam to 
answer Herring's questions definitively. It has long been clear that the nation 
building effort failed to achieve its political goal, that of establishing a polity 
capable of w ithstanding the reunification efforts of the North. The author 
reemphasizes that conventional w isdom  with new perspectives and evidence on 
the strength of the National Liberation Front. The m ost prim ary contribution of
4 Allen Goodman 'The Dynamics of the United States-South Vietnamese Alliance: What Went 
Wrong,’ in Vietnam as History, 91
5 George C. Herring, 'The Nixon Strategy in Vietnam,’ in Vietnam as History, 57.
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this study, however, is the startling find that the nation building effort achieved 
some remarkable and potentially sustainable economic successes. The w ay those 
successes were achieved, as well as their social and political consequences, are both 
surprising and revealing, both for historians, and for economic developm ent 
specialists.
1.1 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Nation building is a dangerously deceptive term because its meaning seems self 
evident, but is not. W hen President Lyndon Johnson declared, 'W e are in 
Vietnam because the American people have promised to help the people of South 
Vietnam preserve their independence and build their nation,' he did not feel 
compelled to provide a definition.6 The term, still vaguely defined, rem ained in 
common usage among aid agencies and governments alike until 1995, w hen the 
U .S./U N Somalia debacle drove it from favor. The anointed term for the m oment 
is a contemporary form of American Civil War era nomenclature, 'post-conflict 
reconstruction.'
During wartime, a debate over the meanings of nation and thus nation 
building m ust have seemed academic to policy makers. The goal, similar to that 
in Korea, was the eradication of the internal communist threat and the unification 
of a new country so that it could defend itself against the communist regime in the 
North. Time w as short, people were dying, the situation called for developm ent 
in a hurry and under duress. Dozens of South Vietnamese and American agencies 
to which nation building meant different things ran a rattletrap campaign 
consisting of a plethora of programs designed to 'w in  hearts and m inds,’ or at least 
to keep them from the communists. It implied and evoked a great deal and 
therein lay a critical problem. The term both reflected and added to the lack of
6 Richard Critchfield, Villages (New York, 1983), 66.
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unification in the effort. We shall return to that. To discern the problems the 
term may have caused for development program s, however, it is first necessary to 
examine the concepts of 'nation ' and 'nation  building.'
Social scientists have long debated the m eaning of 'nation.' It is easily 
confused w ith the far narrower concept of 'state.' Political scientist Ernest Gellner 
offered a concise definition of the state as 'a n  institution(s) specifically concerned 
with the maintenance of order.'7 Nation presents far graver difficulties for 
definition. Gellner argued that nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy in 
which shared identity is the central element. In this view, two people are of the 
same nation if and only if they share, and recognize one another as sharing, the 
same culture (where culture means a system of ideas and signs and associations 
and ways of behaving and communicating). The nation, in other words, is an 
artifact of people's convictions and loyalties and solidarities.8 According to both 
Gellner and sociologist Karl Deutsch, economic intercourse plays a central role in 
establishing these social and political connections.9 A definition of nation, then, 
combines this shared identity, awareness, and sense of solidarity among people 
with two more prosaic elements: a defined territory and a state, or governing 
entity.10
The Saigon government fitted the definition of state proffered above, and 
had a defined territory and the recognition of most of the w orld 's governments.
But no prevalent shared identity, solidarity, or sense of the governm ent's 
legitimacy, and hence, no nation, existed in South Vietnam. The very term  nation 
building implies that the United States w as aware of this. Indeed, in 1968, a United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) report stated that South
7 Earnest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY, 1983), 5.
8 Ibid., 5-7.
9 Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of 
Nationality (New York, 1953), 75. See Elie Kedourie, who criticizes Gellner for overemphasizing 
the role of economics, Nationalism (Oxford, 1993), 147.
10 Ibid. See also Leonard Tivey, Introduction, in The Nation State: The Foundation of Modem Politics, 
ed. Martin Robinson (Oxford, 1981), 6.
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Vietnam had never been a nation in its present configuration. It lacked the 
requisite 'civic unity.'11 Building some sort of shared identity and civic unity, in 
part through a communications net along which political discourse and economic 
intercourse m ight travel, was the monumental task the Americans helped to plan 
and manage for their allies in Saigon. (That they attempted this w ith a dictatorial 
governm ent was, given U.S. rhetoric about democracy and self determination, an 
irony of which American planners were acutely aware). Defining the task as the 
American planners perceived it, however, would be futile w ithout exploring the 
Vietnamese sense of nation.
1.1 (i) The Vietnamese Nation Imagined
It is axiomatic that the Vietnamese perceive their nation largely in terms of 
its centuries-long struggle to overcome Chinese domination. The scholar Hue- 
Tam Ho Tai p u t it succinctly: 'Vietnam, as a people, a nation, and a culture had 
been forged over two millennia of resistance against Chinese dom ination.'12 
Ethnic Vietnamese trace their roots to a group of Viet tribes living south of the 
Yangtse river about 500 B.C. The Nam Viets, or South Viets, m igrated southward 
to the Red River delta followed closely by ethnic Han, the dom inant ethnic group 
of China. By 258 B.C. the Han had conquered all the Nam Viet tribes of the Red 
River delta.13 For the next two millennia the Vietnamese periodically violently 
resisted or lived under and paid tribute to Chinese rulers. One of the key elements
of this Vietnamese sense of nationhood is the idea of distinctiveness, that they,
11 'The USAID Program and Vietnamese Reality,' Staff Study, June 1968, USAID PN-ARE-177, p. 6, 
United States Agency for International Development, Reference Room, Rosslyn, Virginia (hereafter 
USAID followed by document number).
12 Hue-Tam Ho Tai, Radicalism and the Origins of the Vietnamese Revolution (Cambridge, MA, 
1992), 2. See also D.R. Sardesai, Vietnam: The Struggle for National Identity (Boulder, 1992), 17, 
and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London, 1983), 143. For a concise history of Vietnamese-Chinese relations up to the 20th century, see 
King C. Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954 (Princeton, 1969), 3-32.
13 Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: the Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of 
South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA, 1966), 2.
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alone among the Viet clans and hundreds of other ethnic groups, resisted 
assimilation into the M iddle Kingdom. Beginning w ith the Trung sisters, who led 
a force against the Chinese in A.D. 39, and ending w ith Ho Chi Minh, who resisted 
domination by the Japanese, the French, and finally the Americans, Vietnamese 
national heroes are independence fighters. Ethnic Vietnamese, then, have a 
powerful sense of shared identity. As R. B. Smith pu t it, however, a nation must 
be an institutional fact as well as a psychological fact.14 And while Vietnamese 
tend to perceive themselves as one nation, historically they have often been 
institutionally divided.15
In order to create a nation in the South, the Saigon governm ent had to 
encourage a sense of shared culture and national identity in a disunified fragment 
of a country. Not only had South Vietnam never been been a nation, the Mekong 
region had been only relatively recently settled by ethnic Vietnamese. Saigon was 
a new city, a provincial outpost of the ancient imperial capitals at Hue and Hanoi. 
And several sects had set up mini-states complete w ith military forces. Moreover, 
the Saigon government was tainted by its highly visible dependence on American 
power. And finally, it was American money and American theories—foreign 
money and foreign theories—that would dominate the effort to create this new 
nation in the South. Historian Michael Tolle, w ho served w ith the USAID in 
Vietnam, argued that secession describes the Saigon government's task better than 
nation building.16
This alone would have made creating a nation in South Vietnam a 
daunting task. However, the communists had succeeded in linking their 
movement w ith historical Vietnamese resistance a decade before the Saigon 
government declared its existence. The Vietnamese communists forged a
14 R. B. Smith, Viet-Nam and the West (Ithaca, NY, 1968), 67.
15 Ibid., 57-69.
16 Michael E. Tolle,' "In the Realm of Theory:" The Study of Nation-Building in Viet Nam,’ 
unpublished conference paper, Conference of the Society for Historians for American Foreign 
Relations, Boulder, Colorado, June 1996,14.
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fearsome w eapon from w hat Ken Post called their 'usable past.'17 While most in 
the Saigon governm ent had collaborated with the French and now depended 
utterly on the Americans, Ho had become the latest heroic incarnation of the 
independence fighter. His party had harnessed the Vietnamese idea of nation and 
pu t it to its ancient use: vanquishing foreign invaders and their Vietnamese 
collaborators. Le Ly Hayslip, who grew up in a Central Vietnamese village and 
w orked for the NLF before emigrating to the United States, wrote that 'everything 
we knew comm anded us to fight. O ur ancestors called us to war. O ur myths and 
legends called us to war. Our parents' teachings called us to war. Uncle Ho's cadre 
called us to w ar.'18 Ho's regime characterized their struggle as the apogee of 
traditional Vietnamese heroism. In 1975 Party Secretary Le Duan inflated that past 
by referring to Hanoi's victory as the culmination of 'ou r nation's 4,000 year 
h istory .'19 The m anner in which the North Vietnamese people m ade such 
trem endous sacrifices, in contrast to the deep ambivalence of the South 
Vietnamese, attests to Ho's political success. Thus, with words that sounded plain, 
Lyndon Johnson's tongue committed the United States to a course far more 
ruinous than m ost Americans imagined.
1.1 (ii) 'N ation  Building’ in Theory and Practice
Political scientist David Wilson dismissed nation building as 'a  pretty bit of 
rhetoric,’ bu t a poor term for use in a social science milieu.20 Perhaps a nation is 
too complex an organism to be 'built.' Some political scientists have suggested 
'national developm ent' or 'nation growing' as more accurate terms. But few
17 Ken Post, Revolution, Socialism and Nationalism in Vietnam. Volume One, An Interrupted 
Revolution (Aldershot, UK, 1989), 80-1.
18 Le Ly Hayslip, When Heaven and Earth Changed Places: a Vietnamese Woman's Journey from War 
to Peace (New York, 1989), xiv.
19 Post, An Interrupted Revolution, 80-1.
20 David A . Wilson, 'Nation-Building and Revolutionary War,' in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. 
Foltz eds, Nation Building (New York, 1963), 84.
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term s are so overused and ill defined as development. A nd growing a nation or 
economy, although in vogue, is ungainly language, questionable grammar, and no 
m ore accurate than are the alternatives. There is little sense in latching onto one 
inadequate term after another in succession as each is discredited. As we will see, 
nation building was never more than rhetoric in Vietnam, despite gargantuan 
efforts in its pursuit. However, the term remains in use, it was central goal of the 
American campaign, and therefore this study employs 'na tion  building' despite its 
conceptual weaknesses.
Having settled on the term nation building, one m ust ask how  nations 
come into being. Benedict Anderson objected to Gellner's emphasis on 
fabrication, preferring to think of nations as imagined. The critical question to 
Anderson is not who created a nation or even how, bu t how  a nation imagines 
itself.21 And, counter intuitive though it may be, many argue that it is possible for 
a state to create a national identity from the top down, by harnessing, rather than 
merely reflecting, sentiments expressed from the bottom up. Gellner and Elie 
Kedourie asserted that nationalists often fabricate national doctrine rather than 
expressing an existing nationalist identity; they often attem pt to impose nations on 
their societies.22 John Breuilly cautioned that there are lim its to w hat nationalism 
can contribute to the formation of a new nation, that nationalism  can only 
'reinforce an existing sense of national solidarity' and identity, but cannot create 
that sense.23
In Vietnam, nationalists attem pted to impose new  doctrines on their 
communities, bu t attem pted to couch them in familiar Vietnamese terms. The 
NLF and Hanoi, as later chapters will demonstrate, wielded an amalgam of 
socialist, Maoist, and pre-colonial Vietnamese local practices, always stressing 
idealized rural values: honest dealings and hard work from local officials, and fair
21 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 15.
22 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 56-7, Kedourie, Nationalism, 146.
23 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd Edition (Chicago, 1994), 278.
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treatm ent to peasant farmers. It is noteworthy that, given the makeup of the high 
officials in Hanoi, sons of the m andarin elites rather than peasants conceived this 
amalgam. The Saigon government, at the behest of its American paymasters, 
attem pted to impose som ething like W estern democracy with a Vietnamese face 
in the villages. All sides understood the deep Vietnamese xenophobia bom  of 
Chinese domination. W hile Hanoi and the NLF portrayed the Saigon 
governm ent as puppets of the American invaders, South Vietnamese and 
American propaganda depicted their enemies as purveyors of a foreign ideology 
and enemies of Vietnamese traditions of autonomous villages and agricultural 
practices. Thus, the Vietnamese experience supports Gellner's theory that 
nationalism is often initiated from above. It also supports Breuilly's assertion that 
nationalists cannot wholly fabricate a national identity, but m ust harness an 
existing sense of solidarity and connection, and, as this implies, it supports 
Anderson's belief that the way a group imagines its nationhood is integral to any 
effort to establish national binds. Clearly, given the relative identities of the Hanoi 
and Saigon governments, the South Vietnamese and the Americans faced greater 
obstacles in creating a sense of national identity.
This study will focus on the way in which the South Vietnamese, with 
American prodding, planning, and money, attem pted to create this complex 
organism. Tolle argued that the Americans patterned their nation building efforts 
on the ideas of Karl Deutsch's 'social mobilization model.'24 Deutsch based his 
model on lines of communication which he term ed 'a n  alignment of large 
numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional 
centers and leading social groups by channels of social communication and 
economic intercourse, both indirectly from link to link and directly from the 
center.'25 In this view, a nation is created by a properly constructed
communications netw ork over which the idea of national identity is transmitted.
24 Tolle, '"In the Realm of Theory,’" 1-3.
25 Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 75.
1 1
Economic and political lines of communication were vital to the effort. However, 
since no single entity piloted the campaign, no unifying statem ent or concept of 
either nation or nation building governed its many programs. As this study will 
demonstrate, a lack of a cohesive definition or goal weakened the effort.
1.1 (iii) Nation Building and its Elements Defined
Nation building in South Vietnam m ust be defined as those economic, social, and 
local, low-intensity security programs that planners designed to create a nation in 
the sense set out above: with a shared perception of national identity, a defined, 
controlled territory, and a functioning state or government w idely perceived as 
legitimate.
The various elements of the nation building effort require careful definition 
here as well. The terms pacification and development are especially vague. The 
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), and thereby m any historians, 
often used the term pacification to mean nation building. To MACV, pacification 
was
not one, bu t a com bination of m any program s. . . the m ilitary, 
political, economic and social process of establishing or reestablishing 
local government, responsive to and involving the participation of 
the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial 
security, the suppression of the Com munist underground  political 
structure [which MACV apparently assum ed w ould  no t contradict 
the will of the people], the maintenance of political control over the 
people, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of 
self sustenance and expansion.26
Development, to the American military, was an ill-defined subset of pacification 
and many military documents use the terms interchangeably. Civilians tended to
26 COMUSMACV Operation Plan No. 171-69, Annex Q, Pacification and Development, undated, 1969, 
MACCORDS 101774, Record Group 472, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland (hereafter 
cited as MACCORDS and file number).
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differentiate more carefully between pacification and development. USAID 
documents and those CORDS documents generated by civilians or perceptive 
military officers generally identify pacification with physical security and 
development w ith economic, political, and social program s.27
This study makes a clear distinction between the two terms. Here, 
'pacification' refers to program s designed to establish physical security, that is, to 
degrade the NLF's military power, physical presence, and political influence in the 
villages. 'Developm ent' refers to economic, political, and social program s 
designed to bind people to the state and create a sense of national identity. Here 
we are primarily if not exclusively concerned w ith economic development, the 
heart of the nation building effort. 'Economic development,' in ideal 
circumstances, refers to self sustaining processes which lead to increased 
productive capacity and production balanced between agricultural and industrial 
sectors, increased incomes, broader income distribution, improved physical 
infrastructure, and im proved hum an infrastructure such as health care and 
education, which lead to greater economic efficiency and capacity. According to 
Deutsch, the economic intercourse taking place w ithin these processes will 
contribute to political and social cohesion, and therefore to national identity.
In the context of wartim e South Vietnam, however, a definition of 
development m ust be more constrained. Conditions for development were far 
from ideal, and planning agencies focused on specific sectors to develop and 
express goals in clear time frames. In the long term, American agencies 
envisioned ideal economic development. In the short term, they set more modest 
goals. Industrialization would have to wait until the post-war period, when 
investment capital and secure lines of communication, they hoped, would make 
such activities possible. Heavily mechanized agriculture would likewise have to
wait until Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia could cooperate to harness the Mekong
27 As Chapter Two will clarify, CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support) was a 
military/civilian organization created in 1967 to coordinate the nation building effort.
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river, and until industrialization provided a sop for excess agricultural labor. Self 
sustainability for the national economy also was not possible until after the war. 
Therefore, a reasonable definition of development for South Vietnam m ust be 
restricted to fit the conditions of the day, and m ust be based upon the way 
American and South Vietnamese agencies envisioned their sometimes disparate 
goals, which are examined below.
CORDS constructed its development programs w ith political goals as their 
central and imm ediate goal. As Tolle saw it, CORDS attem pted, through South 
Vietnamese agents, to 'micro-manage' local projects dow n to the village level.28 
They sent South Vietnamese personnel into villages to install popularly  elected 
local governments, implement a variety of small-scale economic developm ent 
programs, and build an array of infrastructure projects. Its planners predicted that 
the political and economic benefits of this village presence w ould w in rural 
support for the Saigon government.
The USAID took a different approach to development. Economic results 
were the central goal of their programs. With the exception of land redistribution, 
USAID program s did not try to micro manage village affairs. Instead they sought 
to create economic growth and greater income equality through the provision of 
large scale physical infrastructure to ease market function, the introduction of new 
agricultural technology, and macroeconomic reforms to create incentives for 
growth. Like CORDS, USAID did not see a possibility of self sustainability, that is 
suspending aid, while the war persisted.
That political favor would follow economic im provem ent the Americans 
simply assumed. Surely, they reasoned, people would perceive that life under 
Saigon would be preferable to living under communism, even if Ho w as a 
national hero. Americans knew the NLF found fertile recruiting ground largely 
among the poorest peasants and in the poorest parts of the country. Therefore,
28 Tolle, '"In the Realm of Theory,’" 11.
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redistributive issues were prom inent in the m inds of policy makers.
Here, then, 'economic development' refers to policies creating growth in 
the agricultural production and processing sectors, leading to national economic 
growth, increased and more broadly distributed family incomes, im proved 
physical and hum an infrastructure, more responsive and efficient local 
administrations, and concomitantly, greater identification w ith the Saigon 
government. 'Political development' refers to processes creating efficient and 
popular local and national adm inistrations responsive to the needs and desires of 
their people, again leading to national cohesion.
Like nation building, the meaning of the term 'peasant' appears to be self 
evident, but is not. A peasant is not merely a poor rural farmer. Here a peasant is 
a member of a farm household that makes a living from land, relying mainly on 
family labor in farm production, and whose output is partly consum ed within the 
household, and partly supplied to outsiders. In such partial subsistence 
circumstances, produce not consumed within the household is supplied to 
landlords for rents, the state for taxes, and, if there is enough surplus, to the 
market for other produce, or m anufactured and consumer goods. In this context, 
the distinction between peasant farm households and 'fam ily farm enterprises' 
depends upon their relative integration into markets. Peasants are characterized 
by their partial integration into (usually imperfect) markets.29 They cease to be 
peasants when they become entirely integrated into 'fully formed m arkets/ at
which point they become family farm enterprises in an economic sense.30
Low intensity conflict, as opposed to conventional, large unit conflicts, 
encompass a w ide spectrum of military and political activities: peace keeping,
29 Imperfect markets refers to terms of competition. That is, peasants may not have the same access to 
credit as landlords or industrialists, or the marketing system may be skewed against them where 
brokers have conspired to keep farm gate prices down.
30 See Ellis, Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development (Cambridge, 1988), 8. 
Please note that a fully formed, or perfect market, is an ideal used for modeling purposes, and 
generally is not held to exist.
15
internal security, counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, unconventional warfare, 
special operations, and counter insurgency. Political scientist Loren Thompson 
identified one common characteristic that differentiates all low intensity conflicts 
from other forms of warfare. They 'are highly politicized hostilities that tend to 
blur the traditional distinctions between soldier and civilian and between front­
line and rear areas.'31 This definition aptly describes the varieties of conflict that 
most South Vietnamese provinces, and especially the densely populated and 
economically productive areas, experienced during from late 1968 to early 1972.
Chapter Four will explore the introduction of improved seed varieties 
which are commonly referred to as High Yield Varieties (HYVs). These seed 
varieties, however, are more accurately termed m odern varieties, since increased 
yields are only one of their possible attributes. While the earliest varieties tended 
to offer increased yields and little else, later varieties incorporated better disease, 
pest, and wind resistance, more uniform height for easier harvesting, and faster 
growing and ripening periods.
1.2 HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT
The literatures of East Asian economics, economic history, and development 
studies have ignored wartime Vietnam as if it were in some sort of scholarly 
quarantine. As the bibliography of this study attests, works on agrarian issues in 
China, the Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Japan, and India abound. One 
can count studies of economics, agriculture, and developm ent in wartime 
Vietnam on one hand.
There is no shortage of literature on the American war. American historian 
Robert Divine noted that a historiographical pattern has developed around
31 Loren B. Thompson ed., Low-intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modern World 
(Lexington, MA, 1989), ix. See also David Charters and Maurice Tugwell, Armies in Low-intensity 
Conflict: A Comparative Analysis (London, 1989), preface.
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American wars. Positive histories generally appear in the wake of conflicts. 
Negative revisionism tends to follow later and eventually a sort of synthesis 
emerges. But the American literature on the Vietnam w ar has followed the 
opposite track.32
In the immediate aftermath of the w ar, scholarly literature focused mainly 
on how and w hy the crusade had become such a debacle.33 Frances Fitzgerald's 
ground-breaking critique described the American presence as a political, military, 
and moral blunder, to great disparagement and acclaim.34 Gabriel Kolko and 
Joseph Buttinger likewise criticized both practical and moral aspects of American 
policy and tactics.35 Former defense departm ent officials Leslie Gelb and Richard 
Betts described the flawed policy-making system that m ade such a tragedy 
possible.36 Ngo Vinh Long illustrated the ignorance with which the U.S. 
approached Vietnam and described a comm unist strategy that he believes the 
Americans could never have overcome.37 Eric Bergerud wrote an extremely 
convincing critique of American military, civil, and intelligence efforts in heavily 
contested H au Nghia province.38 George Herring and Stanley Kam ow produced 
the most respected general histories of the war, which are widely regarded as 
balanced accounts, and are generally critical of American policy.39 Herring later 
quoted Kamow as saying that 'w e Americans do not have a revolutionary vision
for agrarian societies. . . .  I am inclined to doubt that there were "lost
32 Robert Devine, 'Vietnam Reconsidered,' Diplomatic History 12, 1 (Winter 1988).
33 Ibid.
34 Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam (Boston, 1972).
35 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical 
Experience (New York, 1985). Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: The Unforgettable Tragedy (New York, 
1977).
36 Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, DC, 1977).
37 Ngo Vinh Long, 'Vietnam: The Real Enemy,' Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 21 (1989), see 
especially p. 27. See also Ngo Vinh Long. Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese Peasants Under the 
French (Cambridge, MA, 1973).
38 Eric Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder, 1991).
39 George C. Herring, America's Longest War. Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A  History (New York,
1983). For other major critical works, see Sheehan, A  Bright Shining Lie. Larry Berman, Lyndon 
Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (New York, 1989). More recently, see Robert 
McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1996).
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opportunities" for the South Vietnamese to have saved themselves -  at least not 
w ithout an interm inable American presence.'40
Few scholars of any persuasion doubt that Tet Mau Thanh was a military 
disaster for the NLF and the PAVN, but critics of American policy and strategies 
contend that this did not make victory possible for South Vietnam. Harry 
Summers, w ho believed that the U.S. should have won the war, acknowledged 
that Tet 1968 w as the beginning of the end: 'W ith their disastrous tactical defeat 
N orth Vietnam struck w hat was to prove a fatal blow against our center of 
gravity-the alliance between the United States and South Vietnam. Now all they 
had to do was wait us out.'41 The political result was the beginning of a gradual 
American w ithdraw al, a plain signal from W ashington DC that its military 
commitment to Saigon was waning. Vietnamese enemies of the Saigon regime 
had always predicted that they would outlast its foreign supporters, and this was 
now clearly the case. Even critics of American intervention concede that once the 
U.S. had  revealed their intention to leave South Vietnam, the outcome was 
inevitable. George Ball, an early and fierce opponent of the war, believed that 
announcing the pullout discarded 'the  one really effective bargaining chip we 
could play to gain even minimal concessions.'42 Ronald Spector's study of the 
critical year after the Tet Offensive concludes that despite inflicting terrific 
suffering on their enemies, the South Vietnamese and Americans could not 
eradicate the NLF or dissuade N orth Vietnam.43 Stuart Herrington, a former 
intelligence officer in the anti-insurgency campaign, illustrated in microcosm the 
reasons for the NLF's survival.44
The flow of critical scholarship continued unabated, but was joined in the
40 George C. Herring, 'The Nixon Strategy in Vietnam,’ in Vietnam as History, ed. Peter Braestrup 
(Washington, DC, 1984), 57.
41 Harry Summers, On Strategy (Novato, CA, 1982), 134.
42 George Ball, The Past has Another Pattern (New York, 1982), 114.
43 Ronald Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York, 1993), 191.
44 Stuart Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon: The War in the Villages (Novato, CA, 1992).
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1980s by a body of literature that either defended American policy or claimed that 
the U.S. should have w on the war. 'V ietnam  revisionists' disagree on m any 
points, bu t share the conviction that Saigon and W ashington could have 
preserved an independent noncomm unist South Vietnam.45 Military analysts 
such as General Bruce Palmer and Colonel H arry Summers contended that 
America's fundam ental errors were its failure to make an all-out m ilitary effort 
and a misapplication of the strength it did use. They argued that instead of 
focusing on the NLF insurgency, U.S. forces should have concentrated on the real 
threat, the PAVN. Both advocated a radical plan: a blockade of North Vietnam by 
occupying Laos to the Thai border. Behind this line of defense South Vietnam 
could deal w ith a w ithering revolution and the task of nation building: two 
processes the South Vietnamese could do only themselves.46 General Dave 
Palmer similarly contended that the strategy of attrition was no strategy at all, and 
that the U.S. should either have sought the political support to prosecute the war 
as aggressively as necessary or avoided fighting.47
These alternative strategies raise more questions than they answer. Neither 
Palmer nor Summers sufficiently contends w ith the domestic or international 
political problems of a long-term occupation of Laos, or the tactical and strategic 
difficulties of m aintaining a line of defense three times longer than the existing 
demilitarized zone (although Summers implies that if these things were not 
politically possible, the U.S. should not have fought at all).48 However, their 
critiques of American military strategies cut a good deal of ice. Summers, for 
instance, makes an especially cogent case against U.S. m ilitary policies, 
demonstrating that the defensive strategy of attrition MACV adopted assumed
45For a summary of Vietnam revisionists, see Devine, 'Vietnam Reconsidered.'
46 Summers, On Strategy, 88,123- 124. Bruce Palmer, The 25 Year War (Lexington, KY, 1984), 176-7, 
182-5.
47 Brigadier General Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective 
(San Rafael, CA, 1978), 116-18, 147-60, 267-8.
48 Summers, On Strategy. 124.
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that time was on W ashington's side, w hen in tru th  it was on Hanoi's. Moreover, 
Palmer's and Sum m er's contentions that only the South Vietnamese could solve 
their internal problem s has merit, as this study will demonstrate. Both, however, 
made the startling assum ption that successful nation building was possible. This 
was a gargantuan assum ption indeed because neither author explored the 
economic, political, or social aspects of such an approach, or considered the Saigon 
government's will or capabilities. They were not alone in making such 
assumptions, and there was very little research for them to fall back on.
Marine General Lew Walt and Army Colonel David Hackworth agreed that 
the United States employed the wrong strategy and tactics but proffered more 
m odest alternatives. Walt argued that while American soldiers were exhausting 
themselves in the highlands and on the DMZ looking for large concentrations of 
enemy troops to destroy, they were losing the real prize of the war, the people and 
villages of the lowlands.49 Walt carried out his ideas in Central Vietnam with 
what some argue was great success, maintaining the ability to strike quickly at large 
troop concentrations while dispatching small units to populated areas and 
severely limiting their firepower. Hackworth devised and practiced successful 
guerrilla strategies w ith U.S. and South Vietnamese troops in several regions of 
the country.50 Historian Guenther Lewy concurred that this was primarily a 
political and guerrilla war and that the people were the prize and criticized the 
United States for relying too heavily on traditional military strategies. He 
advocated earlier concerted air attacks on North Vietnam, and a small unit 
approach to populated regions of the South.51
Richard Nixon goes furthest, claiming success for his 'V ietnam ization' 
policy of turning the war over to the South Vietnamese. The war, he m aintained,
was w on by 1974, by which time the South Vietnamese had 'proved their will and
49 Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy: A  General's Report on Vietnam (New York, 1970).
50 Colonel David H. Hackworth, About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior (New York, 1989), 
chapters 15-20.
51 Guenther Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York, 1978), 559.
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mettle,' their 'desire to live in freedom.' Nixon claims that Congress squandered 
victory by cutting off aid to Saigon.52 Nixon's Secretary of State and National 
Security Adviser Henry Kissinger countered that he w arned the president that 
Vietnamization was a flawed policy, that the South Vietnamese could not hope to 
succeed alone where they had already failed with massive American help.53 In the 
face of this, Kissinger makes the startling claim that Saigon w ould have survived 
'b u t for the collapse of the [American] executive authority as a result of 
W atergate.'54
A num ber of writers have argued that nation building as practiced 
succeeded in creating an opportunity for victory in South Vietnam. Former CIA 
chief and CORDS director William Colby contended that political reform, military 
pacification, enhanced social programs, local security im provem ents, and 
economic development were the keys to victory over the revolution.
Improvements were so great in these fields between 1968 and 1972, Colby argued, 
that South Vietnam was on its way to establishing a stable society that could have 
withstood the challenge from the North. However, Colby makes very little of his 
case for economic development, and his claims for political and security success 
are mainly based on an American evaluation system that w as deeply flawed, as
Chapter Two will demonstrate.55 W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson Frizzell
agreed that the United States and South Vietnam ' won the unconventional w ar in 
that the South Vietnamese and American joint effort had largely elim inated the 
Vietcong as a serious contender for power by 1972.'56 Lewy m ade far more modest 
claims for the nonmilitary campaign. He criticized American policy makers for 
not realizing that an earlier and greater effort at nation building w ould have
52 Richard Nixon, RN, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York, 1978), 889.
53 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston, 1979), 272.
54 Ibid., 1325. For similar arguments, see ARVN General Ngo Quang Truong, 'Easter Offensive of 1972,’ 
in Steven Cohen, ed., Vietnam Anthology and Guide to A Television History (New York, 1983), 325-7.
55 William Colby, Lost Victory (Chicago, 1989).
56 W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., The Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1977), 279.
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created a more stable South Vietnam and allowed the U.S. and the South to 
concentrate m ore fully on the conventional threat from the North. Lewy also 
noted that land reform and other programs created prosperity for some farmers 
and strengthened the Saigon government. This study will demonstrate that he 
was partly correct, bu t by depending solely on rudim entary tenurial statistics, Lewy, 
like most scholars, cites very little evidence to support such claims.57
Two authors have m ade revisionist argum ents based on macroeconomic 
evidence. W alt W hitm an Rostow was not only the originator of the economic 
'takeoff theory (which described the path to economic modernization as a matter 
of gaining enough m anufacturing m omentum  to launch the entire economy), but 
was also former National Security Adviser to John F. Kennedy and Lyndon 
Johnson. Rostow was thus involved in making U.S. policy in Vietnam and 
argued the revisionist case from two perspectives. In his book The Diffusion of 
Power, Rostow m ade a case for invasion of PAVN and NLF refuges in Cambodia, 
the Ho Chi M inh trail in Laos, and the southern part of North Vietnam. Despite 
these shortcomings, Rostow argued, American strategy m ade 'slow, real' progress. 
Elsewhere, he claimed that South Vietnam was on the verge of economic takeoff 
in 1972 in that it had achieved 'a  classic array' of industries and production.58 
Economist N guyen Anh Tuan's macroeconomic analysis used masses of statistical 
evidence to argue that South Vietnam's economic reforms in the early 1970s had 
been successful enough to create the potential for self sufficiency.59
Devine lauds Vietnam revisionists for broadening and deepening the
debate and forcing critics to make their cases more rigorously, and concludes that
57 Lewy, America in Vietnam, 437-9.
58 For Rostow's views on military strategy, see Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New 
York, 1972), 512-16. He described his take off theory in The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained 
Growth (London, 1963), and made the case for South Vietnam's takeoff in Diffusion of Power, 470-76, 
and in Douglas Dacy, Foreign Aid, 71-3. Interestingly, the Hanoi government may have adopted the 
term, at least in English translation. In 1995 the government produced a trade booklet entitled 
Vietnam: Efforts for an Economic Take-Off, Vietnam Exhibition-Fair Center, Panorama Magazine, 
1995.
59 Nguyen Anh Tuan, South Vietnam Trial and Experience: A  Challenge for Development (Athens, 
OH, 1987), preface, 5-6,146-78.
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redistributive issues were prom inent in the minds of policy makers.
Here, then, 'economic development' refers to policies creating growth in 
the agricultural production and processing sectors, leading to national economic 
growth, increased and more broadly distributed family incomes, improved 
physical and hum an infrastructure, more responsive and efficient local 
administrations, and concomitantly, greater identification w ith the Saigon 
government. 'Political developm ent’ refers to processes creating efficient and 
popular local and national adm inistrations responsive to the needs and desires of 
their people, again leading to national cohesion.
Like nation building, the m eaning of the term 'peasant' appears to be self 
evident, but is not. A peasant is not merely a poor rural farmer. Here a peasant is 
a member of a farm household that makes a living from land, relying mainly on 
family labor in farm production, and whose output is partly  consumed within the 
household, and partly supplied to outsiders. In such partial subsistence 
circumstances, produce not consum ed within the household is supplied to 
landlords for rents, the state for taxes, and, if there is enough surplus, to the 
market for other produce, or m anufactured and consumer goods. In this context, 
the distinction between peasant farm households and 'fam ily farm enterprises' 
depends upon their relative integration into markets. Peasants are characterized 
by their partial integration into (usually imperfect) markets.29 They cease to be 
peasants w hen they become entirely integrated into 'fully  formed m arkets/ at
which point they become family farm enterprises in an economic sense.30
Low intensity conflict, as opposed to conventional, large unit conflicts, 
encompass a wide spectrum of military and political activities: peace keeping,
29 Imperfect markets refers to terms of competition. That is, peasants may not have the same access to 
credit as landlords or industrialists, or the marketing system may be skewed against them where 
brokers have conspired to keep farm gate prices down.
30 See Ellis. Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development (Cambridge, 1988), 8. 
Please note that a fully formed, or perfect market, is an ideal used for modeling purposes, and 
generally is not held to exist.
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internal security, counter-terrorism, hostage rescue, unconventional warfare, 
special operations, and counter insurgency. Political scientist Loren Thompson 
identified one common characteristic that differentiates all low intensity conflicts 
from other forms of warfare. They 'are highly politicized hostilities that tend to 
blur the traditional distinctions between soldier and civilian and betw een front­
line and rear areas.'31 This definition aptly describes the varieties of conflict that 
most South Vietnamese provinces, and especially the densely populated and 
economically productive areas, experienced during from late 1968 to early 1972.
Chapter Four will explore the introduction of im proved seed varieties 
which are commonly referred to as High Yield Varieties (HYVs). These seed 
varieties, however, are more accurately termed m odern varieties, since increased 
yields are only one of their possible attributes. While the earliest varieties tended 
to offer increased yields and little else, later varieties incorporated better disease, 
pest, and w ind resistance, more uniform height for easier harvesting, and faster 
growing and ripening periods.
1.2 HISTORIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT
The literatures of East Asian economics, economic history, and developm ent 
studies have ignored wartime Vietnam as if it were in some sort of scholarly 
quarantine. As the bibliography of this study attests, works on agrarian issues in 
China, the Philippines, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Japan, and India abound. One 
can count studies of economics, agriculture, and development in wartim e 
Vietnam on one hand.
There is no shortage of literature on the American war. American historian 
Robert Divine noted that a historiographical pattern has developed around
31 Loren B. Thompson ed., Low-intensity Conflict: The Pattern of Warfare in the Modem World 
(Lexington, MA, 1989), ix. See also David Charters and Maurice Tugwell, Armies in Low-intensity 
Conflict: A Comparative Analysis (London, 1989), preface.
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American wars. Positive histories generally appear in the wake of conflicts. 
Negative revisionism tends to follow later and eventually a sort of synthesis 
emerges. But the American literature on the Vietnam w ar has followed the 
opposite track.32
In the immediate aftermath of the war, scholarly literature focused mainly 
on how and w hy the crusade had become such a debacle.33 Frances Fitzgerald's 
ground-breaking critique described the American presence as a political, military, 
and moral blunder, to great disparagem ent and acclaim.34 Gabriel Kolko and 
Joseph Buttinger likewise criticized both practical and moral aspects of American 
policy and tactics.35 Former defense departm ent officials Leslie Gelb and Richard 
Betts described the flawed policy-making system that m ade such a tragedy 
possible.36 Ngo Vinh Long illustrated the ignorance w ith which the U.S. 
approached Vietnam and described a communist strategy that he believes the 
Americans could never have overcome.37 Eric Bergerud wrote an extremely 
convincing critique of American military, civil, and intelligence efforts in heavily 
contested H au Nghia province.38 George Herring and Stanley Kamow produced 
the most respected general histories of the war, which are widely regarded as 
balanced accounts, and are generally critical of American policy.39 Herring later 
quoted Kamow as saying that 'w e  Americans do not have a revolutionary vision 
for agrarian societies. . . .  I am inclined to doubt that there were "lost
32 Robert Devine, 'Vietnam Reconsidered,’ Diplomatic History 12, 1 (Winter 1988).
33 Ibid.
34 Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam (Boston, 1972).
35 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modem Historical 
Experience (New York, 1985). Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: The Unforgettable Tragedy (New York, 
1977).
36 Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, DC, 1977).
37 Ngo Vinh Long, 'Vietnam: The Real Enemy,’ Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 21 (1989), see 
especially p. 27. See also Ngo Vinh Long. Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese Peasants Under the 
French (Cambridge, MA, 1973).
38 Eric Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder, 1991).
39 George C. Herring, America's Longest War. Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A History (New York,
1983). For other major critical works, see Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie. Larry Berman, Lyndon 
Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (New York, 1989). More recently, see Robert 
McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1996).
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opportunities" for the South Vietnamese to have saved themselves -  at least not 
w ithout an interminable American presence.'40
Few scholars of any persuasion doubt that Tet Mau Thanh was a military 
disaster for the NLF and the PAVN, but critics of American policy and strategies 
contend that this did not make victory possible for South Vietnam. Harry 
Summers, who believed that the U.S. should have won the war, acknowledged 
that Tet 1968 was the beginning of the end: 'W ith their disastrous tactical defeat 
North Vietnam struck w hat was to prove a fatal blow against our center of 
gravity-the alliance between the United States and South Vietnam. Now all they 
had to do was wait us out.'41 The political result was the beginning of a gradual 
American w ithdrawal, a plain signal from Washington DC that its military 
commitment to Saigon was waning. Vietnamese enemies of the Saigon regime 
had always predicted that they would outlast its foreign supporters, and this was 
now clearly the case. Even critics of American intervention concede that once the 
U.S. had  revealed their intention to leave South Vietnam, the outcome was 
inevitable. George Ball, an early and fierce opponent of the war, believed that 
announcing the pullout discarded 'the  one really effective bargaining chip we 
could play to gain even minimal concessions.’42 Ronald Spector’s study of the 
critical year after the Tet Offensive concludes that despite inflicting terrific 
suffering on their enemies, the South Vietnamese and Americans could not 
eradicate the NLF or dissuade N orth Vietnam.43 Stuart Herrington, a former 
intelligence officer in the anti-insurgency campaign, illustrated in microcosm the 
reasons for the NLF’s survival.44
The flow of critical scholarship continued unabated, but was joined in the
40 George C. Herring, 'The Nixon Strategy in Vietnam/ in Vietnam as History, ed. Peter Braestrup 
(Washington, DC, 1984), 57.
41 Harry Summers, On Strategy (Novato, CA, 1982), 134.
42 George Ball, The Past has Another Pattern (New York, 1982), 114.
43 Ronald Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York, 1993), 191.
44 Stuart Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon: The War in the Villages (Novato, CA, 1992).
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1980s by a body of literature that either defended American policy or claimed that 
the U.S. should have won the war. 'V ietnam  revisionists' disagree on m any 
points, but share the conviction that Saigon and W ashington could have 
preserved an independent noncomm unist South Vietnam.45 Military analysts 
such as General Bruce Palmer and Colonel H arry Summers contended that 
America's fundam ental errors were its failure to make an all-out m ilitary effort 
and a misapplication of the strength it did use. They argued that instead of 
focusing on the NLF insurgency, U.S. forces should have concentrated on the real 
threat, the PAVN. Both advocated a radical plan: a blockade of N orth Vietnam by 
occupying Laos to the Thai border. Behind this line of defense South Vietnam 
could deal w ith a withering revolution and the task of nation building: two 
processes the South Vietnamese could do only themselves.46 General Dave 
Palmer similarly contended that the strategy of attrition was no strategy at all, and 
that the U.S. should either have sought the political support to prosecute the w ar 
as aggressively as necessary or avoided fighting.47
These alternative strategies raise more questions than they answer. Neither 
Palmer nor Summers sufficiently contends w ith the domestic or international 
political problems of a long-term occupation of Laos, or the tactical and strategic 
difficulties of maintaining a line of defense three times longer than the existing 
demilitarized zone (although Summers implies that if these things were not 
politically possible, the U.S. should not have fought at all).48 However, their 
critiques of American military strategies cut a good deal of ice. Summers, for 
instance, makes an especially cogent case against U.S. military policies, 
demonstrating that the defensive strategy of attrition MACV adopted assumed
45 For a summary of Vietnam revisionists, see Devine, 'Vietnam Reconsidered.'
46 Summers, On Strategy, 88, 123- 124. Bruce Palmer, The 25 Year War (Lexington, KY, 1984), 176-7, 
182-5.
47 Brigadier General Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective 
(San Rafael, CA, 1978), 116-18, 147-60, 267-8.
48 Summers, On Strategy. 124.
19
that time w as on W ashington’s side, w hen in truth it was on Hanoi's. Moreover, 
Palmer's and Summer's contentions that only the South Vietnamese could solve 
their internal problem s has merit, as this study will demonstrate. Both, however, 
made the startling assum ption that successful nation building was possible. This 
was a gargantuan assum ption indeed because neither author explored the 
economic, political, or social aspects of such an approach, or considered the Saigon 
governm ent's will or capabilities. They were not alone in making such 
assumptions, and there was very little research for them to fall back on.
Marine General Lew Walt and Army Colonel David Hackworth agreed that 
the United States employed the wrong strategy and tactics but proffered more 
modest alternatives. Walt argued that while American soldiers were exhausting 
themselves in  the highlands and on the DMZ looking for large concentrations of 
enemy troops to destroy, they were losing the real prize of the war, the people and 
villages of the lowlands.49 Walt carried out his ideas in Central Vietnam w ith 
what some argue was great success, maintaining the ability to strike quickly at large 
troop concentrations while dispatching small units to populated areas and 
severely limiting their firepower. Hackworth devised and practiced successful 
guerrilla strategies w ith U.S. and South Vietnamese troops in several regions of 
the country.50 Historian Guenther Lewy concurred that this was primarily a 
political and guerrilla war and that the people were the prize and criticized the 
United States for relying too heavily on traditional military strategies. He 
advocated earlier concerted air attacks on North Vietnam, and a small unit 
approach to populated regions of the South.51
Richard Nixon goes furthest, claiming success for his 'V ietnamization' 
policy of turning the war over to the South Vietnamese. The war, he maintained,
was w on by 1974, by which time the South Vietnamese had 'proved their will and
49 Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General's Report on Vietnam (New York, 1970).
50 Colonel David H. Hackworth, About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior (New York, 1989), 
chapters 15-20.
51 Guenther Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York, 1978), 559.
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the emerging synthesis appears to be highly critical of American policy.60 
However, neither critics nor defenders of U.S. policy have sufficiently supported 
their claims w ith regard to nation building. Rostow's assertions that South 
Vietnam reached the 'takeoff stage were based on cursory analyses of agricultural 
production and sales of inputs such as fertilizer and irrigation pum ps. He never 
delved into the rural economic, social and political issues that underlay economic 
expansion and did not adequately address sustainability or dependence. Colby, 
Lewy, Kolko and Buttinger made broad economic claims based on even less 
evidence. Kolko especially ventures many intriguing and controversial opinions 
on security, economic, social, and political issues with very little evidence of any 
kind in support.
Several narrower studies of various pacification and developm ent issues 
are well researched and closely argued, but are not broad enough to offer a 
platform from which to make general conclusions about nation building. Dale 
Andrade confined himself to the Phoenix program .61 Eric Bergerud concentrates 
on one province.62 Richard Hunt's study of pacification is comprehensive for the 
pre- 1969 period and concentrated mainly on physical security.63 Tra Dinh Tho's 
study of pacification and development likewise focuses on security issues and calls 
upon very little economic thought or data.64 Douglas Dacy, a former USAID 
economist, concentrates on w hat he believes were failed macroeconomic policies 
and their relation to economic development.65 Like Tuan, w ho argued that 
macroeconomic policy succeeded, Dacy relies on aggregate economic data and
touches on rural issues and economic development only cursorily. Stuart Callison
60 See Devine, 'Vietnam Reconsidered,' Diplomatic History.
61 Dale Andrade. Ashes to Ashes: the Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington, MA, 1990).
62 Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat.
63 Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds (Boulder, 
1995).
64 Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (Washington, DC, 1980), for economic development 
commentary, see 109-32.
65 Douglas Dacy, Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development, South Vietnam, 1955-1975 
(Cambridge, MA, 1986).
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produced a valuable and detailed study of land reform, but it concentrated mainly 
on four villages of the Mekong delta, did not draw  wider conclusions about critical 
issues such as peasant economic behavior, regional differences, land reform in the 
larger nation building context, and the program 's effects on the war in general.66 
Perhaps the m ost prom inent book about rural economic issues in Vietnam, Robert 
Sansom's Economics of Insurgency, was published in 1970 on the basis of research 
conducted before the Tet Offensive, hence before the concerted development 
efforts of 1968-1972.67 Jeffrey Race's War Comes to Long An  analyzed rural 
development issues, but confines itself to one province and term inated w ith 
1970.68 Former USAID economist Nancy Wiegersma produced a study of the 
Vietnamese rural economy that brought some needed insight to village practices 
in Central Vietnam and underscored that American program s suffered from a 
limited cultural and social understanding of the place. Though it made large 
claims about economic history and peasant economic behavior, the book is most 
effective as social history. It was thinly researched in an economic sense despite 
Wiegersma's background w ith USAID, added little to the debate about economic 
development, treated agrarian reforms cosmetically and nearly ignored 
agricultural developm ent issues.69 While foreign scholars tend to make the error 
of treating Vietnam as a single culture and economy, a few, such as Martin 
Murray, have described the regional differences that are vital to understanding the 
place.70 But neither M urray nor any other scholar has analyzed the American war 
or the nation building effort in this context. Journal articles about nation building, 
and especially wartim e economic development issues in South Vietnam, are even
66 Charles Stuart Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller in the Mekong Delta: Economic, Social, and Political 
Effects of Land Reform in Four Villages of South Vietnam (Berkeley, 1983).
67 Robert Samson, The Economics of Insurgency (Cambridge, MA, 1970).
68 Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley, 
1972).
69 Nancy Wiegersma, Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution. Patriarchy and Collectivity in the 
Rural Economy (London, 1988).
70 Martin J. Murray, The Development of Capitalism in Colonial Indochina 1870-1940 (Berkeley, 
1980), 8, 67, 416-23.
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rarer than m onographs. The last major article on development, Callison's, 
appeared in 1974.71
In short, no monograph exists on the most critical phase of nation building. 
No m onograph exists on evolving agricultural technology and productivity  in 
South Vietnam. No studies exist of village economies, politics, or development. 
Neither is there a general study of rural economic development in South Vietnam 
for any period of its short history.
1.3 SOURCES AND METHODS
The Saigon governm ent had been long of the general opinion that the w ar had to 
be won militarily before serious development efforts could succeed.72 U nder years 
of American pressure, however, the government began to devote more resources 
to nation building. Nation building was inspired mainly, though not exclusively, 
by American policy makers and implemented at American insistence and w ith 
American money. South Vietnamese support, or at least acquiescence, w as 
required. One former USAID official lamented that 'w e were always pushing our 
own ideas and they would either grudgingly go along or enthusiastically go along 
but almost never in itiate/73 USAID and CORDS generated program s. These 
programs were theoretically administered on the South Vietnamese side by one of 
several ministries (Agriculture, Development, or Economy) , or the Central 
Pacification and Development Council, which w as rim  by the prim e minister. At 
times, such as in the case of land reform, the National Legislature helped to craft 
programs. Americans worked in each of these offices, reporting back to various 
U.S. agencies. They generally tried to stay in the background, and especially after
71 Charles Stuart Callison, 'The Land to the Tiller Program and Rural Resource Mobilization in the 
Mekong Delta of South Vietnam/ Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 
Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, no. 34,1974.
72 'Development Planning,’ Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-ABH-87.
73 Rutherford Poats, Georgetown oral history, 2 February 1990.
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1967, attem pted to give all civil program s a Vietnamese face. The best example of 
this is land reform. The theory and planning for the redistributions generally 
came from Americans, bu t the program  was decentralized to an unusual level and 
administered on the ground by Vietnamese village officials.74 In sum, while there 
is a good deal of gray area in the prom ulgation of nation building plans, the 
Americans wielded a heavy hand in the process.
Many of the developm ent planning documents are therefore American, 
and many Vietnamese documents were translated and stored in U.S. files. Of 
particular interest are evaluations w ritten by Vietnamese teams attached to 
CORDS and known as 'R ural Survey Teams,' or 'Rural Technical Teams,' which 
are remarkably frank and even undiplomatic. CORDS also fielded joint American 
and Vietnamese evaluation units which assessed nation building program s in the 
field and reported back to both governments. Much of this documentation found 
its way into CORDS files that today survive in two collections, MACCORDS and 
MACCORDS Plans Policies & Programs (MACCORDS PP&P), both of which are 
housed in the National Archives II, in College Park, Maryland. The U.S. 
government has recently declassified the latter through 1971 at the author's 
request.
American advisers at the province level subm itted qualitative m onthly 
reports to CORDS and these have been collected and stored at the United States 
Army Center of Military History at the W ashington Navy Yard. Some reports 
from the district level also turned up in this collection. These 'Province Monthly 
Reports' come from a narrow  source, American advisers of fairly senior State 
Department or military rank. They therefore suffer from the strengths and 
weaknesses of individuals, and offer only a foreign view of Vietnamese domestic 
conditions. Some of the reports are merely a dry recitation of questionable
statistics gathered from poorly defined sources. Much of the reporting is, however,
74 Jewett Millard Burr, 'Land to the Tiller: Land Redistribution in South Viet Nam, 1970-1973/ Ph.D. 
Dissertation (University of Oregon, 1976), 37-9, 337.
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insightful, sophisticated and well balanced. Moreover, the collection is extremely 
valuable in that it provides the only chronological, province by province, 
rendering of the U.S. view of the state of the nation building process. W ithout 
this collection, and in the absence of a general history of the nation building effort, 
researchers w ould be left to piece together the chronology and geography of the 
campaign from thousands of disparate reports in several archives.
The USAID m aintains its own archive and reading room in the 
W ashington suburb of Rosslyn Virginia, and a substantial body of documents 
covering larger scale economic development survives there. Supplem entary 
materials are available at the National Security Archive at George W ashington 
University in W ashington, DC, in the University of California at Berkeley's 
Indochina Archive (much of which is now housed at Texas Tech University) and 
at the Nixon Project at National Archives II. Georgetown University's Oral 
History Project, at the Lauinger Library, is devoted to fairly senior American 
advisers and policy makers.
The result of all this is a heavy reliance on American sources. W herever
possible, the study consults Vietnamese views, though not in the proportion the
author wishes. This reliance is, however, not as crippling as it m ay appear given
that most of these plans were conceived and even planned by Americans.
Moreover, the W ashington, DC area is home to many participants in the nation
building campaign, both Vietnamese and American, and several interviews were
invaluable to understanding the development process both from the perspective
of the field officer and Saigon government official. And the reader will note that,
as referenced above, a good deal of Vietnamese input is nestled into the American
files, especially field evaluations and interviews. While some m ight have
expected extremely diplomatic submissions in such cases, Vietnamese evaluators
did not often spare their allies harsh criticism. Moreover, while m any U.S.
advisers attached to CORDS were evaluating their own program s and pu t the best
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face on their reports, many unleashed scathing critiques. For future avenues of 
research, Vietnamese archives m ay yield some insight into South Vietnam's 
aborted nation building process.
USAID documentation dom inates the economic evidence cited here, which 
raises questions of objectivity. However, a spirited and frank internal debate over 
programs and policies took place w ithin USAID. Many evaluators were 
independent contractors, and the agency appears to have tolerated criticism from 
its own. Two illustrations will suffice for the moment. One particularly salient 
example of the critical nature of some internal USAID reporting is a 1971 review of 
the agency's largest and most prom inent aid (as opposed to development) 
program, commodity imports. The report concluded, among other things, that the 
commodity import programs were largely inappropriate to Vietnamese conditions 
and tastes, impossible to monitor properly, produced dependence and corruption, 
had not elicited the necessary interest or participation of the South Vietnamese 
government, and should be substantially trim m ed.7^  In 1968, USAID's assistant 
director in Saigon authorized a staff study  which underm ined the very nature of 
the agency's goals and approaches in Vietnam. The report asserted that both 
CORDS and USAID m isunderstood the nature of Vietnamese society, the struggle 
at hand, the attitudes of the population, and the role of foreign aid.76
Several weaknesses in the data, however, m ust be noted. Having read 
carefully for bias and naivete among foreign evaluators, and sycophancy among 
Vietnamese, the investigator m ust exercise caution in evaluating peasant attitudes 
as reported. One American Province Senior Adviser said after the war, '[A  
peasant] will take the measure of you. You w ant it bad, you get it bad. You want it 
good, he'll give it to you good. It's survival, of course.'77 These reports indeed call
for caution, but not disregard. Peasant opinions, even as expressed to outsiders,
75 'Management Review of PL 480-Title II Vietnam/ May-June 1971, USAID DD-AAL-163.
76 'The USAID Program and Vietnamese Reality/ Staff Study, June 1968, USAID PN-AJRE-177.
77 Frank Burnett, Georgetown oral history collection, p. 83, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, 
Washington, DC.
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are valuable in addition to and in comparison with other sources. Many of the 
opinions cited in these studies are consistent with substantive evidence from 
other sources and observed peasant behavior.
Equal caution m ust be observed when using statistical evidence from South 
Vietnam. Economic statistics could be difficult to gather in the circumstances. 
Naturally, collectors tended to avoid perilous places. And, as this study will note, 
Saigon's statistics-gathering capabilities were poor.78 CORDS did not employ 
professional economists in the field and their reporting reflects this. Neither is 
USAID economic material as comprehensive as a researcher would hope. Thus, 
in an exercise familiar to economic historians, in some cases I have had to use 
incomplete evidence to reach tentative conclusions. In other instances, however, 
the evidence is ample enough to conclude confidently on num erous controversial 
issues. I have tried to make these distinctions scrupulously in the text.
To consider nation building in South Vietnam in its entirety would require 
several volumes. Therefore, this study focuses especially on the 1968-1972 period, 
and on rural economic development. Prior to 1968, the development process was 
hindered by U .S./South Vietnamese concentration on military issues and the 
NLF's influence and control in the villages. The communist Easter Offensive of 
30 March 1972 'shattered optimism once and for all.'79 PAVN troops occupied 
large swaths of South Vietnam and non-military program s began a dow nw ard 
spiral into oblivion. Thereafter it was clear to nearly everyone that the Saigon 
government's fall was inevitable. This study concentrates on rural areas, w here 
the bulk of the Vietnamese people lived, where NLF influence and therefore the 
struggle for political influence and security was greatest, and where the vast 
majority of the economic production took place. The study concentrates on 
economic development because it was there that U.S. program s focused. While
78 For a description of the weaknesses of Saigon's statistics gathering capabilities, see 'Statistical 
Services,' Project Appraisal Report, 23 May 1972, USAID PN-ABB-463.
79 Dacy, Foreign Aid, 58.
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this study does not examine the massive political/propaganda effort m ounted by 
the South Vietnamese and Americans in detail -traveling  political indoctrination 
teams, radio shows, leaflet drops, children's activity organizations and the like- it 
does not ignore political aspects of development. But since the greatest effort was 
economic, political issues are treated mainly as outputs of economic developm ent 
programs. The study makes exceptions where political program s are integral to 
understanding the overall campaign. For instance, the make up of village 
governments is vital because they were responsible for m any small scale 
development projects. The study explores the various security environm ents in 
which development program s operated. The relative influence of the NLF and 
the Saigon government had profound effects on the nation building effort.
Without an understanding of those influences on village life and economic 
activity it is impossible to understand the rural development effort.
Among the m any economic program s and approaches attem pted in South 
Vietnam, the thesis explores three major strands of development and concentrates 
on the most im portant projects in each strand. In agricultural development, for 
example, the introduction of new technology was the vital program. In agrarian 
reform, land redistribution and related program s were most important. USAID 
conceived and championed both to the Saigon government. And in small-scale 
village or community development, a CORDS creation called Village Self 
Development Program  provides the best tool for understanding the process.
Geographic variances affected nation building profoundly. This study
demonstrates that American land reform and m odem  rice program s perform ed 
differently in the two major agricultural zones of South Vietnam: the Mekong 
delta region in the far South, and the coastal lowlands of Central Vietnam. The 
programs therefore provide an opportunity to test two controversial models of 
peasant behavior w ith im portant implications for developm ent planning in
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different environm ents. Fortuitously, these two regions play a prom inent role in 
this persistent debate, which pits theories of 'political economy' depicting income 
maximizing peasants, against theories of 'm oral economy' which describe 
cooperative, subsistence oriented peasants. The Americans appear to have had an 
implicit view of Vietnamese peasants as constrained income maximizers, but 
designed program s to enhance peasant economic cooperation as well. Thus, 
analyzing economic developm ent program s in South Vietnam proves especially 
revealing and adds a great deal to the peasant economic behavior debate.
South Vietnam would appear to present an opportunity to compare 
Marxian and capitalist approaches to agrarian development, especially regarding 
property rights, bu t in fact it does not. The National Liberation Front recognized 
that the majority of South Vietnamese peasants were land-hungry. They knew 
they could not collectivize land and win the cooperation of the peasantry. Hence, 
they did not pursue Marxian collectivist policies in the South until after the fall of 
Saigon. In fact, as Callison and others have demonstrated, the NLF and the Saigon 
government competed to bring secure individual property rights to the peasantry 
in the South. This affords an opportunity to address the theories of the property 
rights school of thought, which hold that farmers with secure property rights will 
be more productive than farmers without.
W ithin this framework, this study will analyze the economic results of 
program s designed to enhance rural security, agricultural technology, physical and 
hum an infrastructure, elected village governments, opportunities for income 
growth, cooperative village projects, secure individual property rights, and the 
general economy of South Vietnam. It will concurrently attem pt to gauge the 
degree to which these programs won the allegiance of its people for the Saigon 
government. That is, did these approaches constitute successful 'nation  building' 
and if so did they provide a platform for victory over the NLF and the North 
Vietnamese?
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Chapter Two serves the critical purpose of describing the context in which 
the American-inspired nation building effort in South Vietnam took place. 
W ithout at least a cursory understanding of Vietnamese society and economy, 
w ithout a sense of the respective influences and practices of the NLF and the 
Saigon government, and the nature of the American presence in a culture it little 
understood, studying particular rural development plans is of little use. The 
chapter is especially crucial because, as this introduction has explained, no existing 
study explores the nature of Vietnamese society and the American presence in the 
context of nation building. The nature of that presence profoundly affected the 
reception and outcome of development programs.
Chapter Three fills an equally large gap in the literature of the American 
war in Vietnam. In the absence of a comprehensive history of the American 
nation building effort there, this chapter m ust set the agrarian scene and explore 
the social and economic assumptions American planners m ade in Vietnam and 
delineate the various development approaches their program s took. The chapter 
also introduces the history and geography of Vietnamese agriculture and agrarian 
practices.
Chapter Four explores the profound effects of the USAID's efforts to 
introduce improved agricultural technology, commonly know n as 'green 
revolution' technology, to South Vietnam. The diffusion of this technology has 
profound implications for persistent debates over farm size and efficiency and 
peasant economic behavior, and perhaps especially for theories of development in 
wartime and low intensity conflict environments.
Chapter Five examines the USAID-engendered agrarian reform programs.
Agrarian reform centered on land redistribution, the nation building program
upon which both South Vietnamese and American officials pinned the most
hope. The success of land reform depended partly upon institutional reforms in
the realms of credit, agricultural extension and research, and m arket
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improvements. Land reform in South Vietnam has garnered attention from 
scholars, but not in the larger context of nation building and scholarly debates in 
which it is considered here.
Chapter Six turns to the CORDS sponsored village development effort. 
Sometimes referred to as 'com m unity developm ent/ 'project development,' or 
'grassroots developm ent', the approach is characterized by public participation in 
the choice, implementation, and operation of local, small scale developm ent 
projects. Such participation is thought to enhance appropriateness and 
sustainability of projects. In the case of South Vietnam, public participation in 
development or welfare projects was also calculated to bind villagers to to the 
governm ent. Examples of village development projects might be comm unity 
livestock or poultry  operations, fertilizer or tractor cooperatives, the building of 
village wells, schools, bridges, or medical facilities.
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Chapter 2 
The Context For Nation Building
During much of the 1960s, the ferocity of the guerrilla w ar and the National 
Liberation Front's military control of large swaths of rural South Vietnam 
prevented any sustained effort at economic, political, or social developm ent by 
the Saigon government and its American ally. Then came the com m unist 
offensives of 1968. Whatever their military results, those offensives ensured the 
United States' political defeat and precipitated its gradual w ithdraw al from 
Vietnam. Thus, most scholars have assumed that the post-1968 period has little 
to teach us. But the events of 1968 created an environment for an extensive effort 
at rural development in wartime and low intensity conflict environm ents. The 
United States and the development community continue to ignore this vast 
nation building campaign at breathtaking cost.
This chapter seeks to establish the economic, political, social, and security 
context in which South Vietnamese nation building and particularly the rural 
development efforts took place, both before and after the w atershed events of 
1968. Security is clearly a crucial aspect of any development cam paign undertaken 
in wartime. Because the National Liberation Front's rural influence is vital to the 
arguments presented here, this chapter devotes substantial space to the subject. If 
it is true that the NLF was essentially destroyed in 1968 and merely hung on as a 
powerless shadow, then American persistence might have paid  off in South 
Vietnam. If, on the other hand, the Front became ever stronger in the early 1970s, 
then the massive nation building campaign was doomed before it began. As the 
evidence below demonstrates, the truth lies somewhere betw een these 
arguments. Controversy has clouded the issue considerably, and studies of 
security in South Vietnam have taken an almost exclusively m ilitary approach. 
Thus, existing literature is not a sufficient platform to set the scene for a study of 
rural development.
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Not only has no scholarly work has attempted to gauge the political and 
security environment as it affected either agrarian or village development 
programs in South Vietnam, no post-war study has systematically considered the 
effect of the massive American presence on those programs. In fact, the field 
remains so little touched that only one book, Callison's land reform analysis, has 
considered a large-scale approach to rural development and no study has analyzed 
smaller-scale village developm ent efforts there at all. Yet, any attempt to analyze 
those programs is of questionable value without a solid understanding of the 
peculiar context in which they operated.
To understand the rural development campaign in South Vietnam, as well 
as the nature of the economic growth of the late 1960s and early 1970s, it is vital to 
understand the state of the NLF with reasonable accuracy and to have a clearer 
understanding of the depth of political and security turmoil in the villages than is 
to be found in the existing literature. While it was and remains impossible to 
gauge the strength of a secretive and partially decentralized movement like the 
NLF with precision, the information exists to make reasonably accurate 
judgments. This chapter contributes significantly to existing literature by using 
newly released documents to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of the NLF and 
its ability to affect the governm ent's nation building efforts during the 1968-1972 
period.
In this chapter, Section One provides a short history of Vietnam to 1968 as
it pertains to the subject at hand. Section Two describes the state of the South
Vietnamese economy and the government's macroeconomic policies leading up
to the communist offensives of 1968 and in their aftermath. Section Three
considers the nature and efficacy of the Saigon government. Most scholars
concentrate on the central government, but this study examines its rural
components to a depth not attem pted elsewhere. It also examines the nature of
corruption in the Saigon governm ent using newly available material, and
considers its causes from economic perspectives, something else not attem pted by
any scholar to date. Section Four summarizes the NLF's m ethods and strategies
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for m aintaining influence in rural South Vietnam. Section Five portrays the 
effects of the massive American presence in South Vietnam, which has received 
too little attention. Again, new material adds substantially to our understanding 
of this critical subject. Section Six details the regionally variable influence of the 
NLF relative to the government, and describes South Vietnamese and American 
attempts to eradicate that influence. This section is im portant in two ways. It 
brings new and conclusive evidence to a long debate in especially American 
scholarly circles. Moreover, this study links rural security to rural economic 
development, and thus to nation building, far more firmly than has previously 
been done.
2.1 A BRIEF HISTORY TO 1968
The roots of Vietnamese resistance to foreign dom ination are ancient. Moreover, 
according to the historian David Marr, the cooperation between peasants and 
elites in such resistance movements has always been an essential aspect of 
Vietnamese identity.1 Thus, Vietnamese history and identity m itigated against 
the success of a foreign nation building effort in South Vietnam. Both civilian 
and military American leadership among successive adm inistrations understood 
the enormity of their task of ensuring the survival of an anticom m unist regime 
in Saigon. They knew that Ho Chi Minh was popular, that the NLF and PAVN 
troops were skillful and determined.2 They also knew that their ally had  no 
national history. As ambassador to Saigon Henry Cabot Lodge told President 
Johnson at a W hite House meeting, 'There is not a tradition of national 
government in Saigon. There are no roots in the country. . . .  I don't think we 
ought to take this government seriously. There is simply no one who can do
1 David Marr, Vietnamese A nti colonialism (Berkeley, 1971), 44-6.
2
For American awareness of Ho Chi Mirth's popularity, see George Kahin, Intervention: How 
America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York, 1986), 89. See also Arthur Combs, 'The Path Not 
Taken: The British Alternative to American Policy in South Vietnam, 1954-56,' Diplomatic History 
vol. 19, no. 1, Winter 1995. For just one example from the voluminous evidence of American awareness 
of enemy military strengths, see McGeorge Bundy's memo to Lyndon Johnson in Larry Berman, 
Planning a Tragedy. The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York, 1982), 43.
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anything.'3 Contrary to widely held assumptions, then, the U.S. did not blunder 
insouciantly into Vietnam. In fact, a succession of leaders believed not just that 
their mission might fail, bu t that the odds were against their success. They simply 
believed they could not afford to stand aside and watch South Vietnam fall to a 
com m unist regime.4 Nonetheless, American policy makers took insufficient 
account of this essential aspect of Vietnamese ethnic or national identity. Hence, 
a general ignorance of Vietnamese history led policy makers to misjudge the 
reception their rural program s w ould get from the peasantry it sought to win 
over.
This study's introduction explored the roots of ethnic Vietnamese national 
identity and the history of resistance to China. By the 19th century, the French 
had become another great foreign invader in Vietnam, and in the 1880s they 
succeeded in subjugating the ancient kingdom, discrediting its monarchy, 
coopting or marginalizing the m andarinate, or elite civil service class, and 
driving out Chinese interests, thus ending the centuries-old tributary 
relationship .s The French colonial governm ent split w hat is now  Vietnam into 
three administrative zones which roughly correlated to Vietnamese cultural 
variations and between which travel and exchange were extremely difficult. 
Cochin China contained the Saigon area and the Mekong Delta and was sparsely 
populated bu t potentially the richest part of the colony. This the French annexed 
and administered themselves. Annam, or Central Vietnam, and Tonkin in the 
North, they designated French protectorates and installed nom inal Vietnamese 
administrations.
Under French rule, the m andarinate was left w ith the difficult choice of
collaboration and potential p rosperity or resistance and almost certain poverty. It
3 Berman, Planning a Tragedy., 108.
4 For the Eisenhower administration's views of the difficulty of achieving American goals in 
Vietnam, see Lloyd Gardner, Approaching Vietnam: From World War II Through Dien Bien Phu 
(New York, 1988), 315. See further, Combs, 'The Path Not Taken,’ especially 39-42. For the Johnson 
administration's awareness of the long odds in Vietnam, see Berman, Planning a Tragedy, 79-129, 
and especially 138-45. See also Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System 
Worked (Washington, DC, 1977), who discuss this issue from the perspective of the Eisenhower, 
Kennedy, and Johnson administrations.
5 Nancy Wiegersma, Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution: Patriarchy and Collectivity in the Rural 
Economy (London, 1988), 2.
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was from this class which sprang much of the leadership of the Vietnamese 
resistance culm inating w ith the National Liberation Front. When, during W orld 
War II, the Japanese invaded the East Asian m ainland and replaced France as the 
new est foreign colonist, long-smoldering Vietnamese nationalism  erupted into 
arm ed resistance led by Ho Chi Minh. Ho's guerrillas harassed Japanese 
occupation troops and, upon the defeat of Japan in 1945, m oved into Hanoi and 
declared Vietnamese independence. But the French returned and attem pted to 
reassert colonial rule over Indochina.
Ho's forces retreated into the highlands and, with the support of China and 
the Soviet Union, began an independence campaign that culminated in the defeat 
of the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Facing the unhappy possibilities of a 
communist takeover or another war on the heels of Korea, the powers called the 
Geneva Conference of 1954, co-sponsored by the Soviets and the British, to 
determine the fate of Indochina. Although Hanoi and Saigon protested 
vehemently, China, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, among others, agreed 
to partition Vietnam and stage elections two years later to reunite the country 
under one popularly elected government. Ominously, the Eisenhower 
administration refused to sign the Geneva Accords, merely 'taking note' of the 
agreem ents.6
The Americans, at least at the highest levels, were not as naive as is 
popularly assumed. The Eisenhower administration did not blunder blindly into 
Vietnam with the arrogant belief that they could do anything they pleased there. 
They helped install Ngo Dinh Diem as president in the hope of building an anti­
communist bastion similar to South Korea. They perceived Ho's popularity and 
quickly recognized Diem's shortcomings, but could not find a better leader.7 They
6 George Herring, America's Longest War, (Lexington, KY, 1979), 40.
7 See U.S. ambassador to Saigon Heath tel. to State Department, 29 September 1954, FRUS, 
1952-1954 13: 2093. See also, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, permanent head of the Foreign Office, minute of 
21 January 1955, Foreign Office Political Correspondence, Record Class FO 371/117176, Public Record 
Office, Kew, England (hereafter FO 371 with filing information). See also Foreign Secretary Harold 
Macmillan to Denis Allen, 10 August 1955, FO 371/117144/1041 and J.C. Cloake minute to letter from 
Sir Hubert Graves, minister at Saigon, to Prime Minister Anthony Eden, 12 July 1954, FO 371/11212.
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knew that if elections were held, Ho would win.8 Even w ith U.S. backing, the 
Eisenhower administration realized that South Vietnam probably w ould not 
survive. As he dispatched J. Lawton Collins as Special Am bassador to South 
Vietnam in 1955, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told him that the odds 
against the success of their mission were 10 to 1 against, bu t that they had  to try 
Traumatized by the fall of Nationalist China to communism in 1949, after which 
critics accused Harry Truman of losing China, suffering through the tail end of 
the McCarthy era, and believing that N orth Vietnam was part of a larger 
communist onslaught into East Asia, the Eisenhower adm inistration felt that 
they could not stand by and allow it to fall. Just as in Korea, a line m ust be drawn.
Diem and his brother and unofficial co-president Ngo Dinh N hu were 
unable to appeal to nationalist sentiment in South Vietnam. They were Catholic, 
French-educated, wealthy, urban men who had little sense of the majority 
Buddhist peasantry whose support they would need if any semblance of unity was 
to evolve in the new country. But not all Vietnamese were Buddhist. The Diem 
family attempted to govern an ethnically, religiously, and politically divided land 
in which military coup was a constant danger. Their goal therefore was to control 
rather to appeal to the people of South Vietnam and this they did w ith a good 
deal of repression and brutality.10 The Hanoi regime demonstrated that it was 
possible to both brutally control and deeply appeal to people. The Ngo Dinhs, 
however, failed at both and compounded their weaknesses by prom ulgating 
policies hostile to the peasantry.
Perhaps the best examples of such policies were the hated resettlem ent 
programs instituted by Diem, the 'agrovilles' of the later 1950s and 'strategic 
Hamlets' of the early 1960s. These program s aimed to separate the insurgents
8 R.B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War: Volume 1, Revolution versus 
Containment (London, 1983), 30.
9 See William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative 
Roles and Relationships, Part I: 1945-1960 (Princeton, 1986) 287; and Lloyd Gardner, Approaching 
Vietnam, 315.
10 For a short description of the Ngo Dinh's governing style, see Herring, America's Longest War, 90. 
For more extensive treatments see, Warner, The Last Mandarin, and George McT. Kahin,
Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York, 1986).
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from the people by m oving families from their far flung hamlets to new, more 
easily defended settlements. They were modeled on the fortified villages the 
British had used in Malaya in the early 1950s. In Malaya, however, the British 
were defending Malays against Chinese insurgents, while Diem sought to fortify 
'V ietnam ese hamlets against other Vietnamese who had grown up  in those 
ham lets.'11
Despite the failure of the Agroville program of 1959, the Americans 
envisioned the Strategic Hamlet program  as a tool for binding the people to their 
government. An attem pt to keep people near their ancestral lands was supposed 
to be made. Government troops would move peasants to secure areas, whether 
near to or distant from their ancestral lands, where defensive perimeters w ould 
protect their new hamlets from attack. Government services w ould be focused in 
these settlements, schools built, health centers opened. It did not work. The Ngo 
Dinhs saw Strategic Hamlets as tools of control, not as links to the peasantry.12 
The program  made no provision for the allotment of new land to displaced 
villagers. Francis Fitzgerald exaggerated to make the point that m any peasants 
ended up landless, 'five miles being the same as five hundred to those who had 
to walk to their fields each day and back.'13 The U.S. allocated money for services 
that never reached the hamlets. Defenses were minimal, m any of the insurgents 
were hamlet residents, and it proved impossible to keep most deportees near their 
ancestral lands.14
Fitzgerald described the Strategic Hamlet program  as 'a  political disaster/ 
and 'a  study in misplaced analogy' in its very conception.13 George Herring notes 
that resettling the peasantry added significantly to 'the  discontent that had 
pervaded the rural population since Diem's ascent to pow er.'1* Saigon's chief of
11 Francis Fitzgerald, Fire In the Lake: the Vietnamese and Americans in Vietnam (Boston, 1972), 
123.
12 Herring, America's Longest War, 88.
13 Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 123- 4.
14 Col. Harry G. Summers, Jr, Vietnam War Almanac (New York, 1985), 322. Herring, America's 
Longest War, 88-9.
15 Fitzgerald, Fire In the Lake, 125.
16 Herring, America's Longest War, 88.
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military security and manager of the Strategic Hamlet Program, Albert Pham 
Ngoc Thao, was Hanoi's spy. Thao was able to satisfy orders from both regimes by 
carrying out the hamlet program  quickly and assiduously, so effective were the 
resettlements at alienating the peasants from the governm ent.17
In spite of Diem's failings, many southern Vietnamese had no wish to live 
under a communist regime, however revered its leader m ight be. As later 
chapters will demonstrate, the NLF was aware of this, and waited until the war 
was over before attem pting to impose Marxian economic policies in the South. It 
was perhaps partly due to that ideological restraint that the insurrection met with 
swift political and military success in the early 1960s and drove the already 
paranoid Diem regime into ever greater spasms of violence and oppression, 
provoking widespread unrest. NLF minister Tang believed that his organization 
was 'no t at all anxious to see Diem overthrown. Flis intolerance and brutality had 
alienated whole segments of South Vietnamese society and were daily 
contributing to NLF strength.'18 Eventually John F. Kennedy was persuaded not 
stand in the way of a coup attempt. On 1 November 1963 coup leaders had Diem 
and Nhu m urdered. Kennedy himself was killed three weeks later and his 
successor, Lyndon Johnson, inherited an ally in a tailspin.
A period of coup, counter-coup, and increasing chaos followed, and the 
NLF took full military advantage. By late 1964 the Front controlled a large 
portion of the countryside and northern regulars were m oving southw ard to 
assist them. In 1965 it was clear that the Viet Cong were on their way to victory.1? 
Lyndon Johnson introduced American combat troops on a large scale in April of 
that year.
2.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY
17 Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War and its Aftermath 
(New York, 1985), 47. For more on Thao's history with the Viet Minh and his posthumous medal 
from Hanoi, see the interview with former Viet Minh journalist Xuan Vu in David Chanoff and 
Doan Van Toai, Vietnam: A Portrait of its People at War (London, 1996), 9.
18 Tang, Viet Cong Memoir, 50.
19 Ralph B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, Volume III, The Making of a 
Limited War, 1965-66 (London, 1991), 30-48. See also Walt W. Rostow, Diffusion of Power (New 
York, 1972), 447-8, and Herring, America's Longest War, 129-30.
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Economist Douglas Dacy identifies three stages of economic perform ance in South 
Vietnam during the American war. The first, from 1965 to 1968, w as the 
inflationary period of the big war. The second, after the Tet Offensive and until 
the w ithdraw al of American troops in 1972, he characterized as a period of reform 
and growth. After 1972, the withdrawal of hundreds of thousands of free- 
spending Americans resulted in stagnation and unem ploym ent.^ This study is 
most concerned w ith the period of reform and growth, but it is im portant to have 
a general idea of the functioning and management of the South Vietnamese 
wartime economy as it led up to and affected the nation building effort.
South Vietnamese and American economic policy makers w ere confronted 
with a daunting task of maintaining stability and fostering growth in a society in 
violent transition. The war had closed markets, sapped manpower, changed 
import and export patterns, denied farmers access to some arable land, and created 
general economic chaos and mass population movement. The U nited States 
Agency for International Development estimated that by 1968 one th ird  of South 
Vietnam's population had been refugees at some point during the w ar.21 The 
terrors of rural combat and the presence of well-paid American troops in towns 
and cities created massive migrations. Shanty towns sprang up in every major 
population center in the country. Rural flight saturated urban job m arkets and 
overburdened already poor city services.22 Between 1963 and 1968 South 
Vietnam's urban population increased from 15% of the total to 40%.23 This 
urbanization rate far out paced those of other Southeast Asian countries during 
the period. For instance, from 1960 to 1970, Indonesia's urban population grew 
from 14.59% to 17.07%, Malaysia's from 25.22% to 26.97%. In the Philippines it
climbed from  30.3% to 32.94%, and in Thailand from 12.51% to 13.22%.24 While
20 Dacy, Foreign Aid, xvi.
21 'Refugees', 31 December 1975, Terminal Project Appraisal Report, USAID PN-ABI-383.
22 See 'Refugees', Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-AAX-018.
23 'Economic Context/ 31 December 1975, Vietnam Terminal Report, USAID PN-ABI-250.
24 Naohiro Ogawa, 'Urbanization and Internal Migration in Selected ASEAN Countries: Trends and 
Prospects/ in Urbanization and Migration in ASEAN Development, eds. Philip M. Hauser, Daniel 
B. Suits, and Nohiro Ogawa ( Tokyo, 1985), 87.
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South Vietnam had the highest urbanization rates in Southeast Asia, it had one 
of the lowest rates of population growth during roughly the same period. In 1965, 
for instance, South Vietnam's gross reproductive rate w as low relative to the rest 
of Southeast Asia. In 1975, South Vietnam experienced am ong the lowest 
population growth rates in the region.25 Hence, it does not appear that South 
Vietnam's greater urban migration resulted merely from population pressure in 
the countryside, but to a large degree from circumstances created by the war.
In these conditions policy makers believed that they faced an economic 
dilemma; should they pursue policies designed to foster long term  development, 
try to ensure economic stability, or pursue both simultaneously? Prior to 1968, 
both South Vietnamese and Americans believed that their first economic goal 
was to maintain economic and hence social stability.2* To that end, the United 
States pum ped a substantial amount of aid into South Vietnam to prevent 
economic collapse, contain inflation, m aintain a flow of consum er goods, keep 
rice prices low, and generally maintain standards of living among urban South 
Vietnamese, civil servants, and military families -the  core of governm ent 
support.27 Knowing that the danger of coup came mainly from the urban 
military elite, and denied political and economic access to m ost rural South 
Vietnamese, planners focused on urban stability. They saw  hyperinflation 
spurred by the U.S. presence as the single most dangerous and destabilizing 
potential economic ill facing the country .28 Urban South Vietnamese of all 
classes lived in a market economy, and inflation was certainly their greatest 
economic fear.29 The rural peasantry, living largely in a subsistence economy,
25 Robin J. Pryor, 'South-East Asia: Migration and Development/ in Migration and Development in 
South-East Asia: A Demographic Perspective, ed. Robin J. Pryor (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), 9.
26 'The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam,' Institute for Defense Analyses, 
Arlington VA, Chester L. Cooper et al., March 1972, vol 1 ,19-20, Microfiche Collection, AD 763953, 
RG 472, Archives II.
27 'Development Planning/ 31 December 1975, USAID Terminal Report, PN-ABH-875. See also 
Dacy, Foreign Aid , xvii, xviii.
28 Dacy, Foreign Aid, 28, 79, 193.
29 See for instance Pacification Attitudes Analysis Survey, 16 June 1970, file 1602-01, Box 10, 
MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Record Group 472, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland 
(hereafter MACCORDS PP&P followed by box and file numbers where appropriate). See also 
Province Monthly Report for Saigon/Cholon, July 1970, Hatcher M. James, JR, Director, Saigon Civil 
Assistance Group/CORDS, which termed inflation an 'explosive issue' in Saigon.
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were less concerned w ith inflation. In the 1960s, the government and its 
American ally declared the urban constituency their economic priority by focusing 
on inflation and keeping rice prices low, including prices that farm families got 
for their produce.
The governm ent artificially lowered the price of rice through m arketing 
controls and rice im ports from the United States. Not only were these food 
imports designed to check inflation, increasingly they were needed to feed people. 
But rice imports, while filling the gap left by decreasong production, depressed 
that production further still. According to a USAID report, deteriorating security, 
the NLF closing of m arkets and lines of communication, depressed rice prices, rice 
imports, rural m anpow er shortages, and an exodus to the cities led to a decline of 
about 20% in rice production over 3 years, from 5.2 million tons from 2.6 million 
hectares in 1964, to 4.3 million tons on 2.3 million hectares in 1966. And dem and 
for food grew faster than  population growth in part because the U.S. employed 
about 5% of the country's labor force at relatively high wages, and in part because 
U.S. aid created a good deal of wealth among substantial numbers of especially 
urban South Vietnamese. As a result, in 1963 South Vietnam was the world's 
fourth largest rice exporter, by 1967 it was the world's largest importer.30 Most of 
this rice entered Vietnam through the 'Food for Peace' program  under which the 
United States provided commodities -usually  rice and other grains- free of 
charge. The governm ent managed its distribution and sale generally below 
market prices in order to check inflation and provide food to poorly paid civil 
servants and their dependents.31
The governm ent attem pted to contain the domestic money supply 
through the Commercial Import Program (CIP). This program  was designed not 
only to help soak up  m oney but also to dam pen public discontent w ith the
30 'Economic Context/ 31 December 1975,Viet Nam Terminal Report, USAID PN-ABI-250. This 
report does not specify how it estimated hectares under production and crop production in NLF 
strongholds.
31 Officially entitled PL 480 Title II, this was a humanitarian aid program. For a description of the 
program and its problems see, 'Management Review of PL 480 - Title II Vietnam/ 7 September 1971, 
USAID, DD-AAL-163. PL 480 Title I, which also brought produce to Vietnam, was designed to 
dispose of American agricultural surpluses. Dacy, Foreign Aid, 117,19#4.
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economic hardships posed by the war, especially among the urban classes who 
made u p  a large part of the government's supporters. Under the CIP, the United 
States provided aid dollars to the Saigon government, which then issued im port 
licenses for w hat and to whom it chose. As a gesture to the United States 
Congress, which approved the aid each year, the imports were to be American 
products only. South Vietnamese importers exchanged local currency for these 
dollars with which to pay for the goods. The government in tu rn  used the local 
currency so generated to help finance South Vietnam's defense spending. In this 
way the Americans could provide operating capital to the Saigon governm ent 
while simultaneously dampening inflation by decreasing the local money supply, 
helping them regulate imports and keeping consumer goods flowing to South 
Vietnam's urban classes.32
These policies helped create an economy largely dependent on im ports 
which in turn were financed by foreign aid. Keeping rice prices low depressed 
production of South Vietnam's most im portant economic ou tpu t and its major 
potential export. Flooding the country with cheap consumer goods also inhibited 
local manufacturing and industrial development. Besides fostering dependence, 
the availability of large sums of money and tons of goods created a trem endous 
potential for corruption, which by all accounts reached socially corrosive 
proportions.33 South Vietnam's dependence on imports has garnered harsh 
criticism, but may have been necessary to its short term  survival. The country 
ran a rice deficit during the 1960s and needed imports to feed its people. And 
hyperinflation was both a deep concern to urban South Vietnamese and a real 
danger because of the colossal size of the American presence. Given the perceived 
need to compete politically with the communists over the loyalties of the South
32 For description and purposes of the CIP program, see 'Commercial Import Program,' 31 December 
1975,Viet Nam Terminal Report, Volume II— A Summary, Part 2, USAID PN-AAX-018. See 
further, Dacy, Foreign Aid, 25-7,194, and Nguyen An Tuan, South Vietnam Trial and Experience: A  
Challenge for Development (Athens, Ohio, 1987), 332-3.
33 Air gram from Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to State Department, 7 March 1968, containing 
USAID Staff Study: 'Government of Vietnam Civil Service Reform and the Anti-Corruption program 
in Vietnam,' 6 March 1968 USAID, ISN 15660. See also Professor Nguyen Manh Hung, interview 
with author, 4 May 1994, Indochina Institute at George Mason University, Falls Church, Virginia.
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Vietnamese people, such inflation could have been devastating indeed to the 
South Vietnamese/US w ar effort.
Inflation increased the misery of m any South Vietnamese during the war, 
especially in urban areas. But as Thomas Thayer pointed out, under difficult 
circumstances Saigon m anaged to contain it w ithin comparatively reasonable 
bounds. South Korea suffered far worse inflation during its war than did South 
Vietnam, and w ent on to become an economic success. Although he cautions 
against drawing parallels too closely, Thayer noted that from the large scale 
commitment of American troops in 1965 to their w ithdraw al in 1973, South 
Vietnamese prices increased tenfold. One USAID report hypothesized that 
American aid, especially in the form of subsidized imports, prevented inflation 
from rising still higher.34 In contrast, during its far shorter war South Korean 
prices rose by a factor of 20.35
In its pursuit of stability, the government attem pted to run w hat amounted 
to a command economy by regulating trade and commerce. Almost any 
transaction that involved the shipm ent of goods beyond one's immediate area 
required licenses: all imports, all exports, all large rice sales outside the province 
of origin, the opening of any industry. Officially, even portable rice mills required 
licenses. Government road blocks and canal checkpoints choked local trad e d  
For the South Vietnamese government, however, 1968 proved to be a watershed 
year not merely for m ilitary and rural development efforts, but for economic 
policy as well.
Later chapters will explore post-Tet Offensive economic reforms in greater 
detail. They are briefly introduced here to complete the picture of the South 
Vietnamese economy as it affected the nation building effort. After years of 
American hectoring, w ith an increased sense of rural security, and w ith the 
knowledge that the American military and economic commitment was finite, the
Thieu government started to rely more on market mechanisms and less on
34 'Economic Context/ 31 December 1975,Viet Nam Terminal Report, USAID PN-ABI-250.
35 Thayer, War Without Fronts, 246.
36 See for example Province Monthly Report for January 1969, An Xuyen Province, George M. Nagata, 
CMH.
4 6
rationing and price controls, and attempted to dismantle internal barriers to 
trade.37 In 1968, for example, it revoked the ban on inter-provincial rice tra d in g s  
In 1970 it implemented exchange rate reforms, devaluing the piaster to discourage 
imports and encourage exports.39 The government also raised the price of 
imported rice.40 These reforms allowed the price of rice and other locally 
produced goods to better reflect demand, increasing incentives to produce. 
According to Dacy, net domestic production increased 28% between 1968 and 1971, 
to which growth the government sector contributed only 6%.41 As Chapter Four 
will demonstrate, by 1971 South Vietnam was producing enough rice to feed itself 
and only persistent internal barriers to trade preventing it from ending rice 
imports altogether.42 Chapter Five will examine in closer detail the reform s of 
the tax system, interest rates, and licensing procedures that continued until 
Saigon fell in 1975.
2.3 THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT
South Vietnam w ould have been a difficult country to govern even in peaceful 
conditions. It was ethnically and geographically diverse, riven by competing 
ideologies, and had been a state only 14 years by 1968. The Vietnamese tradition 
of village autonomy, embodied in the adage "the emperor's authority stops at the 
village gate/ m ade establishing central authority over rural areas difficult almost 
everywhere.43 Central Vietnamese villages traditionally had especially tenuous
37 Former Minister for the Economy Pham Kim Ngoc, interview with author, 28 August 1994, Seven 
Comers, Virginia. See also, 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report,' Vietnam, January 1971 USAID 
VS 338.17318 L831. And Dacy, Foreign Aid , 13.
38 Until 1968 all rice shipments had, by law, to go through Saigon. Province Monthly Report for 
January 1969, An Xuyen Province, George M. Nagata, CMH. However, substantial barriers to trade 
remained in spite of this attempted reform.
39 Nguyen An Tuan, South Vietnam Trial and Experience, 167.
40 Dacy, Foreign Aid, 15.
41 Ibid., 15.
42 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report,’ Vietnam, January 1971 USAID, VS 338.17318 L831.
43 For a description of Vietnamese village autonomy, see Neil Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam 
(Berkeley 1993), 28-9.
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ties to the leadership in both Saigon and Hanoi.44
The country was further riven by semi-autonomous enclaves ruled by local 
elites: Catholics, Buddhists, and powerful religious sects called the Cao Dai and 
Hoa Hao. Until military assaults subdued them in 1955, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao 
had their own arm ed militias and Saigon had little real power over their 
adherents. Other, generally unarm ed, bu t nevertheless potent local elites deeply 
influenced their devotees. Among these factions were various political parties, 
Chinese congregations, m ountain tribes, and ethnic Cambodians. These groups 
often levied taxes, ran their own schools, courts, social services, and farmers' 
organizations. One faction or another m ight command the loyalty of a clear 
majority in entire provinces. Such local groups provided the stability, structure, 
and security that colonial and post-colonial governments were unable to 
furnish.45 Ethnic Cambodians, for instance looked to their monks, rather than 
the government, for leadership .4* Even after Diem curbed their power, these 
organizations retained a good deal of authority and loyalty among local residents, 
controlling 'm uch of the social, cultural, economic, and institutional life of their 
respective areas.'47 Thus, the village w ar was not merely a bipolar struggle 
between the government and the NLF. Because the local elites could urge their 
adherents to cooperate with particular government program s and reject others, 
their existence had a profound effect on both security and development.
The structure and personnel of the new government proved as great an 
obstacle to nation building as the fractious nature of its territory or the 
communists. High officials of the Saigon government tended to be Catholic, 
many were from Central and North Vietnam, and mostly wealthy urbanites in a 
country whose vast majority were rural Buddhists.48 So weak was the Diem 
government in the provinces, the U.S. embassy reported that its 'authority  did
44 VSSG Study on Quang Nam province, March 1970, Province Monthly Reports, CMH.
45 Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam, 213-17.
46'VC Estimates for a Cease fire/ Vinh Binh Province,3 November 1972, Robert C. Hallmark,
LTC,Province Senior Adviser Report to DEPCORDS MR IV, Advisory Team 72 Files, CMH.
47 'The USAID Program and Vietnamese Reality/ USAID Staff Study, June 1968, PN-ARE-177.
48 Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley, 
1972), 19.
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not extend beyond its own offices/49 It was not until General Nguyen Van Thieu 
became president in 1967 that the Saigon government began to coalesce and 
function with any efficiency.
But for vast U.S. support, the Government of Vietnam w ould never have 
emerged or survived, and Americans took a proprietary view of the regime they 
had helped to build. Perhaps in part because it failed to behave as its sponsors 
envisioned, Americans have tended to portray the Saigon governm ent as venal 
and incompetent. A former USAID official expressed his mystification at Saigon's 
performance. 'W e were quite naive as to the motivations of the governm ent 
officials we dealt with, shocked to see that they were not committed to the 
national cause, weren't even loyal to the people who pu t them in office/ Since 
the Americans had  so little confidence in the Saigon regime, they found 
themselves taking over more and more of the war effort. 'W e kept building on 
quicksand. We never had a government composed both of technicians and 
political leaders in Vietnam that one could count upon to make the right 
decisions which we could then simply support.'50
Neil Jamieson, a former USAID official, took a more balanced view in his 
valuable social history of Vietnam. The government, he observed, was a highly 
funded, efficiently organized body staffed by well educated, well trained people. 
And although it did not work well, 'i t  was not, in fact, nearly as bad in some ways 
as it has often been depicted by many who were frustrated and outraged by its 
shortcomings. But it did fall short of what such a concentration of talent, 
technology, and money should have been able to achieve/ Jamieson insisted that 
Americans intruded too deeply into the administration of South Vietnam, and 
w hen the money, equipment, and suggestions did not produce anticipated results, 
'm any of us began to dislike and distrust those people who had so stubbornly 
resisted our efforts to remake them in our own image, who failed to meet our 
expectations, w ho produced a reality that mocked the logic of the organizational
49 Herring, America's Longest War, 86.
50 Rutherford Poats, Georgetown oral history, 2 February 1990.
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charts and training manuals we thought we shared with th em /51 Frances 
Fitzgerald w ent further: 'M istrustful of the Americans, the Vietnamese attem pted 
to box them into accepting the total responsibility for a situation that was, as the 
Vietnamese saw it, of American making.'52 Another USAID official defended the 
Saigon government by making the point that, in the face problem s of such 
magnitude, all that American talent w as not particularly effective either.55
Many American advisers believed they detected some im provem ent in the 
central government during the latter part of the war.54 Some of the regime's 
defenders pointed out that the record of oppression was little different from most 
East Asian countries -including its democracies- and certainly not so abject as 
Hanoi's. This was probably true, but since the government was in a bitter battle 
for the support of its people and attem pting to sell itself as a democracy far 
superior to the Northern dictatorship, such heavy handedness alienated it from 
much of the population. Even in Saigon, where people lived in proximity to the 
central government, a 1969 American-sponsored survey concluded that only one 
in ten residents believed that existing political parties reflected the chief 
aspirations of the people, and only one in four could even name a political party.55 
In the provinces awareness of the Saigon government was even rarer. An 
American adviser in the Mekong region reported in February 1970 that 'th e  
influential people in Tuyen Nhon [district] are primarily the elders and family 
heads. Many of these cannot read, few have traveled outside of the province and 
virtually none have any conception of the government apparatus in Saigon.
Their primary concern is to be let alone to continue in the w ay of life that their
51 Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam , 307.
52 Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 353.
53 Hugh Appling, Georgetown oral history, 26 January 1990. Appling was the Tay Ninh province 
senior adviser and later the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy.
54 See, for instance, "Vietnam Revisited/ Robert Komer memorandum to CORDS, October 1970, 
MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 10.
55 Saigon Public Attitudes as Expressed In Sample Survey Conducted in March 1969, JUSPAO 
Research Report, 15 April 1969, MACCORDS 101517b, Record Group 472, National Archives II, 
College Park, Maryland. (Hereafter MACCORDS and file number).
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forefathers practiced.'56 In June 1970 a South Vietnamese research team in Vinh 
Binh province found that an ability to name the country's prim e m inister, arm y 
general Tran Thien Khiem, was mainly limited to males who had served in the 
m ilitary, especially directly under Khiem himself.57 Moreover, their report noted 
that since the survey was conducted in villages contiguous to the province capital, 
the results were probably distorted in favor of the government. This chasm 
betw een the Saigon government and the rural people of South Vietnam had  an 
incalculably vast effect on the nation building effort.
The governm ent divided South Vietnam into 44 provinces, each of which 
contained several districts. In 1956 the Ngo Dinhs replaced the village council 
w ith autocratic province and district chiefs as the prim ary rural adm inistrative 
authority  .58 Thereafter, province chiefs ruled over both military and civil affairs 
in their domains and answered only to the president. Reporting directly to the 
province chief from a newly invented administrative unit were district chiefs. 
Village governments, once autonomous, became 'errand boys' that could make 
few im portant decisions w ithout consulting district or province authorities.5*
Since the chiefs tended to rule their areas like fiefdoms, the quality of local 
governments depended heavily on a few men. And since province chiefs 
commanded substantial military forces in a coup-prone country, presidents often 
chose them for their loyalty, rather than their ability.«> The majority of province 
and district chiefs were military men with little or no background in 
administration. And though some were able leaders, in most cases loyalty to the 
president proved no substitute for administrative ability. Moreover, they paid 
formidable fees to attain their posts, and had to realize large profits in order to pay 
for them by squeezing the officials under them. As the following section will
56 Attachment to Province Monthly Report for March 1969 by 1st Lt. Frederick L. Barbour, District 
Senior Adviser, Tuyen Nhon district, Kien Tuong province, MR 4, Earnest P. Terrell, Jr., LTC, PSA, 
CMH.
57 Rural Survey Team Report, 11 June 1970, Box 9, General Records 1602-01, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970. 
Survey conducted 1-10 June 1970, in 7 hamlets of 3 villages surrounding the capital of Vinh Binh 
province.
58 Race, War Comes to Long An, 21-2.
59 Ibid., 161.
60 See, for example, Race, War Comes to Long An, 19, and Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie, 213.
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detail, the 'corrupt district chief on the take' became a national stereotype.*1
Recently declassified documents dem onstrate that the Americans 
constantly hectored the Saigon government to im prove its local governments.
For example, CORDS lobbied unsuccessfully to strengthen village governm ent at 
the districts' expense.62 Laws got changed, but in the field district chiefs held 
tightly to their powers. In 1969, in w hat seems today an astounding interference 
in Saigon's affairs, CORDS director William Colby wrote to South Vietnamese 
Prime Minister Khiem to urge the removal of 10 province chiefs regarded by 
Americans as abysmally incompetent or corrupt. This left 34 chiefs, m any of 
whom CORDS considered dangerously poor, bu t did not feel they could cause to 
be ousted.63
There were province and district chiefs w ho lived hum bly and did their 
jobs courageously and well. A particularly good example can be found in the 
hotly contested Hau Nghia province, where Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van 
Thanh dampened corruption, showed respect for the citizenry, and ran a 
relentless campaign against the NLF that significantly weakened them in one of 
their traditional strongholds. The Front, however, assassinated Thanh 'because 
he was too effective as a military commander and not sufficiently corrupt to fit 
the Communist stereotype of a province chief.'*4 Colonel Thanh was by no 
means unique, but he was in a distinct m inority and the Americans had the 
impression that the Front helped to make sure they remained so by targeting such 
men for elimination. The result, as another adviser phrased it, was that 
uncorrupted younger GVN officials and officers were dam ned, there was no place 
for them and they were becoming 'as  rare as the dodo bird to the great satisfaction
61 Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon, 52.
62 See for instance the suggestions of former CORDS director Robert Komer, 'Vietnam Revisited/ 
Memorandum to CORDS, October 1970, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 10, with which his successor, 
William Colby, agreed in his marginal notes to the report.
63 Ambassador Colby to Prime Minister Khiem, draft letter, December 1969, DEPCORDS Files, 
District, Province, and Hamlet Chiefs folder, 1967-1969, CMH.
64 Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon, see especially pp. 55, 98-9.
5 2
; of the enem y/65 Herrington lamented this irony. 'Thanh would probably never
I
have been assassinated had he been a corrupt, ineffective, and self-serving 
province chief. These kinds of m en -o f whom South Vietnam had its fair share- 
were valuable assets to the revolution/66 Former NLF Village Chief Trinh Due
|
confirmed this practice. He temporarily refrained from executing one
I
governm ent appointed hamlet chief, a corrupt and pliant man, because Saigon 
might appoint a new  chief 'tougher and more effective than Thuan.'67
2.3 (i) Corruption among Saigon Officials
Corruption among Saigon government officials, and Americans as well, was a 
massive problem  in South Vietnam. It weakened both economic and military 
programs, disgraced the government before its people, and provided the 
communists w ith a colossal propaganda tool. The extent of the corruption was 
staggering. Much has been written about the phenomenon so this chapter will 
not dwell on its details.68 It will, however, introduce new material and explore 
the causes and motivations of corruption, something no scholarly study of South 
Vietnam has attem pted in any depth.
It should be noted that the trem endous quantity of commodities and 
consumer goods the United States injected into a poor country would have 
created intolerable temptations anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, the level of 
corruption in South Vietnam was sensational. The former acting director of 
USAID Saigon marveled that 'half a convoy going 3 miles in Saigon would 
disappear, whole trucks/69 The pilfering of foodstuffs sent to South Vietnam
65 Province Senior Adviser Report for Bac Lieu, June 1969, Peter S. Brownback, CMH. Much 
documentation exists on the NLF’s assassination campaign. For instance, a 1967 a provincial Party 
committee called for the annihilation of tyrants from the government’s village and hamlet 
administrative machinery. 'Directive from Province party Standing Committee (sic) to District and 
Local Party Organs on Forthcoming Offensive and Uprisings, November 1, 1967, in Vietnam: The 
Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, vol 2, ed. Gareth Porter (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), 
477.
66 Herrington, 122-3.
67 Chanoff and Toai, Vietnam: A Portrait of its People at War, 104.
68 See for instance, Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 93-4, 105-6, 345-53.
69 John Bennet, oral history interview, Georgetown University Library, 2 February 1990.
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; under the 'Food For Peace' program  was so dire that USAID finally cut off 
shipments to nine provinces in late 1970, and w ould have w idened the ban  had it 
not been for acute refugee problems in some areas.70
With civil service salaries extremely low, officials pa id  for their posts by 
squeezing those below them, and so on down the line. This m ade it difficult for 
officials to avoid diverting funds even if they wished to, w ith  devastating results 
; for development. Normal procedure in construction bids w as to add 40% to the 
cost of a contract for province officials to split.71 Everything seems to have been 
for sale, from jobs to ammunition. James Trullinger's study of a Central 
Vietnamese village uncovered a former village chief w ho complained that
None of us liked to have anything to do w ith bad  m oney practices, 
bu t we had to. A soldier w ho worked for the district chief came to 
every village chief to tell us that we had to instruct all our clerks and 
policemen that a certain am ount of m oney was expected from our 
village every month. This was to go first to the district chief, and 
then, above him, to the province chief72
Colonel Nguyen Van Ba, the Province Chief for Phu Yen in Central 
Vietnam apparently was a particularly egregious example of avarice at the 
province level. The American province adviser, James Engle regularly reported 
Colonel Ba's excesses to Saigon. In 1970 Ba was finally relieved, bu t by this time, 
Engle was near to despair.
In Phu Yen the processes of leadership and decision-making, which 
had been moving at a snail's pace ever since last September, came to 
a complete halt before the end of April. . . .The Province Chief 
devoted little attention to public affairs dow n to A pril 20, the day he 
learned of the GVN's decision to rem ove him. O n that date, he 
ceased all pretense of governing, to devote full tim e to w inding up 
his lucrative business operations and to entertainm ent.
70 CORDS Memorandum, 11 December 1970, Record Group 472, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 11,1601- 
09A.
71 Memorandum from province senior adviser Colonel D.Duncan Joy, to DEPCORDSIV CTZ (JP 
VANN) 11 December 1970. Pacification Files, 1968-1972 (Closed files), Vinh Long Province, CMH.
72 James Trullinger, Village at War: An Account of Conflict in Vietnam (Stanford, CA, 1994), 161.
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Engle asserted that public awareness of "gross corruption' in Phu Yen was high. 
Over the 50 m onths of his tenure Colonel Ba had distinguished himself as a 
talented profiteer, had  ignored rural areas, turned a blind eye to public 
sentiments, and tolerated and profited from the 'debauching of Tuy Hoa City.' Ba,
i
I he went on, "embodies just about everything that the U.S. government and, at
|
| least outwardly, the Thieu regime, stands against.' On top of that, the colonel was 
"militarily incompetent,' and had graduated last in his Officers Candidate School 
class. At best, concluded Engle, "Colonel Ba m erits oblivion.'73
The gross level of corruption clearly discredited the regime and its 
programs, which begs the question, why did the Saigon government allowed it? 
According to Professor Nguyen Manh Hung, the former chief of the National 
School of Adm inistration, South Vietnam's civil service academy, corruption 
began at the highest levels. H ung believes that, had they wished to, the president 
and his ministers could have curtailed corruption by reforming the m ilitary from 
which pow er in South Vietnam flowed. Since the president, his family, and his 
closest colleagues w ere at the top of the paym ent chain, however, this w ould have 
required a radical reduction in their own income. H ung trained civil servants for 
posts as deputy district and province chiefs to serve under military men, who 
monopolized the top positions. Many of them told their former m entor that 
what he taught them  w as not applicable in the field. Corruption was so great that 
going through official channels would assure the failure of a project. In order to 
get a job done, they had  to go outside approved procedure, which in turn  left 
them open to corruption charges.74
Low salaries and high inflation also assured high levels of corruption. 
Jamieson points out that South Vietnamese generals and cabinet m inisters were 
paid less than the average U.S. enlisted man. Field grade officers or high ministry 
officials m ade less than  most bar girls or taxi drivers. In fact, many army majors 
and senior civil servants drove cabs to make ends meet. Doctors, teachers,
73 Province Monthly Report for Phu Yen, April 1970, James B. Engle PSA, CMH.
74 Professor Nguyen Manh Hung, interview with author, 4 May 1994, Indochina Institute, George 
Mason University, Falls Church, Virginia.
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lawyers, nurses, journalists, most of the urban middle classes, found themselves 
poor because of inflation. 'Unless one could find some w ay to be plugged into the 
inflationary economy of the American spending, it was impossible to keep u p / 7^  
Fitzgerald pointed out that the old rich of Saigon had opposed the communists as 
a threat to their position in society only to find that the American presence 
abolished that position quickly and efficiently.76
The mix of Vietnamese culture and American presence created a chaotic 
system in which Vietnamese officials were tom  between adm inistrative and 
family duties. 'To fulfill what he perceived to be his obligations to his family and 
his family's obligations within the hierarchical social order, no m em ber of the 
military services or the civil service found his salary and the legal benefits of his 
office to be anywhere near adequate/77 According to a Rand Corporation study, 
Vietnamese culture took motivation into account when judging corruption. If 
one skimmed for others, rather for one's self, it was generally not considered 
corruption.78 This helped officials to justify diverting a significant percentage of 
American largess into the Vietnamese family domain. The level of skimming 
regularly practiced among South Vietnamese officials, however, w ent far beyond 
that traditionally tolerated by Vietnamese culture to m aintain family obligations. 
It went so far as to underm ine government program s and harm  governm ent 
personnel in the eyes of its people.79
So poor was the provincial administration of governm ent policy in many 
cases that one USAID official was prom pted to report that the governm ent of 
South Vietnam was 'n o t a government-in-being [but] a governm ent-in-training. .
. . Most Vietnamese see the Saigon government as an inefficient, corrupt group of 
self-seeking men. . . an unattractive mafia, whose major m erit is that in some
75 Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam, 293-5.
76 Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 352.
77 Ibid., 313-15.
78 Shepard C. Loman, Chief, Civil Operations, Saigon Civil Assistance Group, CORDS, to Mr. 
Hatcher M. James, Jr., Director, SCAG, Letter of 26 July 1969, CMH DEPCORDS Files.
79 Professor Nguyen Manh Hung, interview with author, 4 May 1994, Indochina Institute, George 
Mason University, Falls Church, Virginia.
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ways it strives to overcome that other mafia, the VC/NLF/so It is clear then that 
extraordinary socioeconomic conditions caused a great deal of corruption. But it 
appears that other, m ore universal forces, may have been at work.
In the early 1970s American economist Anne Krueger hypothesized that 
government economic interventionism  was a major cause of corruption.81 
According to Krueger, interventionism  creates 'rents,' or unearned windfalls.
Her central example w as governm ent rationing of im port licenses to the point 
that import licenses became valuable commodities themselves. In some cases, 
companies might pay m ore in domestic currency for an import license than they 
would for the foreign exchange to buy the imports. Companies pursuing these 
windfalls were said to be rent seeking, and they might expend substantial 
resources in the process. Rent seeking could include legal activities, such as 
lobbying, sending representatives to lobby in the capital city, or moving a firm to 
the capital city. Or it m ight take illegal form, such as bribery and corruption of 
government officials w ho allocate the licenses. The spinoff effects of this 
economic intervention appear to be several. The expenditures firms make in 
seeking these rents m ight alternatively be invested in productive behavior, thus 
there is not only the cost of rent seeking itself, but an opportunity cost as well. 
More, if governm ent posts become lucrative because of such windfalls, corruption 
may pervade civil service selection and promotion as competition for jobs 
becomes fierce.
Krueger found for both India and Turkey that rents were quantitatively 
important, and created substantially greater social and economic costs than tariffs 
w ould have. In fact, she estim ated that rents for im port licenses alone in Turkey 
accounted for 15% of GNP in 1968.82 And, Krueger suggested, rents are not merely 
created by import licenses, bu t other forms of economic intervention as well, such 
as price, wage, and interest rate controls.
 Several authors developed further the ideas of rent seeking behavior,
8° 'The USAID Program and Vietnamese Reality/ USAID Staff Study, June 1968, PN-ARE-177.
81 Anne Krueger, 'The Political Economy of a Rent Seeking Society,' The American Economic Review 
64, no. 3, June 1974.
82 Ibid., 293-4.
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especially, according to John Toye, in reference to India. The theory of a political 
economy of rent seeking became the salient neoclassical economic explanation for 
Third World corruption. Since the standard neoclassical prescription for 
corruption, indeed for a healthy economy generally, is the dim inution or 
elimination of governm ent economic intervention, the m odel has attracted 
critics. Toye argued cogently that the neoclassical prescription for the problem  of 
rent seeking was simplistic, that intervention was sometimes necessary and that it 
could be effected while discouraging corruption. For example, a free bidding 
system for im port licenses might minimize rent seeking and capture rents for the 
governm ent.83 Moreover, Alice Amsden, among others, has dem onstrated that 
Taiwan used governm ent economic intervention to create a highly productive 
economy and the second highest per capita income in Asia.84
Toye, however, does not challenge Krueger's linkage of certain 
government controls w ith corruption. And the South Vietnam m odel supports 
the theory of rent seeking behavior, intervention, and corruption emphatically.
A 1970 CORDS budget planning report identified two areas of governm ent 
economic intervention that misallocated resources and caused corruption. As 
Section Two detailed, the Saigon government had long fixed interest and 
exchange rates below equilibrium prices in order to dam pen the price of imports 
and inflation. Dem and for credit at these rates was higher than supply, loans 
were allocated by favoritism and this generated corruption. Artificially low 
exchange rates had indeed kept the price of imports low and dem and high. In 
1966 the Saigon government had set the exchange rate at VN$ 118 to USD 1. In 
the ensuing four years, however, retail prices in Saigon were up 243%, making 
the real price of imports far lower than it had been despite increased im port taxes. 
As a result, according to the report, demand for im port licenses soared above both 
licenses available under rationing and dollars available to buy them. This, too,
induced corruption. The report noted that the Saigon governm ent recognized
83 John Toye, Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development 
Theory and Policy (Oxford, 1987), 122.
84 Alice Amsden, 'Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency 
Theory/ Modern China 5, no. 3, July 1979.
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these problems and had the eventual goal of an open system for allocating import 
licenses and the liberalization of interest and exchange rate markets.85 As 
Chapter Five will describe, the Saigon government did attem pt to ease 
government economic controls. M inister for Economy Pham Kim Ngoc, in fact, 
set out w ith American backing to dim inish these m arket interventions in part 
because of their linkage to corruption.86
In the meantime, certain governm ent jobs in South Vietnam became 
tremendously profitable due to opportunities for rents and the process of 
choosing personnel for these posts became utterly corrupted. According to a 
previously unpublished CORDS report, 'the  corruption in the Vietnamese system 
is so far-reaching that the beginning and ending become lost/ The report detailed 
the prices of various governm ent jobs:
a. For young m an to join [the local militia] - 10,000 Piasters [or VN$].
b. For a job as National Policeman - 30,000 - 50,000 Piasters.
c. The price of a position as H am let Chief depends upon  the size, 
location, and w ealth of the particular hamlet. In some cases the 
position costs 150,000 Piasters.
d. Positions of village and District Chiefs also depend upon wealth of 
the area. Long Toan District 250,000 Piasters up to Chau Tanh District 
for 1,000,000 Piasters per annum .
e. The price for a Province Chief job also varies, how ever, it was 
reported that 10 million piasters was involved in the last change of 
Province Chief in Vinh Binh and that this m oney w ent to the 
Minister of the Interior in Saigon/87
This corruption in aw arding government posts clearly had ruinous effects 
on the South Vietnamese state and the morale of its lower echelons. Province 
Chiefs had to share their windfalls w ith regional military units. An American 
military adviser accompanied one colonel from a regional headquarters 'on  his 
rounds to the province chiefs in our [area] to collect his share of the chiefs' "takes"
85 Country Field Submission, Plans and Budget for FY 1972,22 August 1970, DEPCORDS File, CMH.
86 Pham Kim Ngoc, interview with the author, 28 August 1994, Seven Comers; Virginia.
87'VC Estimates for a Cease fire/ Vinh Binh Province, 3 November 1972, Advisory Team 72, 
Province Senior Advisor Report to DEPCORDS MR IV, Robert C. Hallmark, LTC., CMH. The 
official exchange rate in 1972 was VN$ 270 : USD 1. But the black market rate, which was more 
commonly used in unofficial exchanges, valued the dollar far higher.
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collected as tax from all the Viet businesses in the individual provinces.'88 
According to Hackworth, commanding officers almost all had lucrative 
businesses going, usually run  by their wives. M iddle level officers could 'm ill 
around like lost sheep or get a piece of the action.'89 Many simply ignored their 
responsibilities and became full-time businessmen. W ith so m any upper and 
mid-level officers deserting their men, Hackworth asserted, it is no w onder so 
m any South Vietnamese soldiers deserted their posts. 'ARVN just didn 't stand a 
chance,' and one could hardly blame soldiers for refusing to fight and possibly die 
for such officers.
Clearly, corruption in South Vietnam went far beyond government
economic intervention: low government salaries, high inflation, and the
proliferation of American imports, as well as the behavior of the highest officials
created a great deal of impetus for corruption. However, corruption was only one
of m any factors that separated the government from the rural peasantry. By
centralizing power and disempowering the villages, the Saigon governm ent and
their American backers ignored Vietnamese ethnic history and repeated the
errors of the Chinese and the French before them. As the French scholar Paul
Mus and his American protege John McAlister saw it:
From the outset of the agricultural organization of the country, the 
Vietnam ese village by  its very rusticity had  been an inviolable 
sanctuary for the nation. It was not that each village was capable of 
resisting individually. But these villages were. . . . not concentrated 
in any one place so that the adversary might have seized them  as one 
lays hold of a capital. How wrong the Chinese were to laugh secretly 
at such hum ble institutions for these institutions never yielded to 
them .90
The series of pro-western, urban oriented governm ents in Saigon were 
'lim ited to urban bases of power precisely because they have not had values 
relevant to the lives' of village people, and their rural institutions were never
durable because they did not have the respect of villagers. Mus believed that the
88 Colonel David H. Hackworth with Julie Sherman, About Face: The Odyssey of an American 
Warrior. New York, 1989) 725.
89 Ibid., 725-8.
90 John T. McAlister and Paul Mus, The Vietnamese and their Revolution (New York, 1970), 50. For 
the French and American error in this regard, see 53-4.
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Saigon regimes would therefore have had  trouble adm inistering rural South 
Vietnam even if there had been no NLF ,91
The Hanoi regime managed to centralize power, bu t although it was 
certainly a dictatorship, and a repressive one, it did not establish pow er purely 
from the top down, as the Saigon governm ent attem pted to do w ith American 
help. Mus long argued that Ho Chi M inh's regime came to pow er in the North in 
1945 with strong support in the villages, because the values it espoused, though in 
part foreign-inspired, resonated w ith the peasantry. Hanoi's new  values system 
offered opportunities for poor villagers to break out of rigid village hierarchies 
and participate in activities the old system  of values w ould have denied them. 
While villagers tended to accept the new  regime based on the relevance of its 
revolutionary values, Mus noted, it required extreme violence and coercion to get 
many of them to accept that new scheme of values into their daily lives.92 And, 
as we will see, the National Liberation Front took its lessons not from the Chinese 
or French colonists, but from Vietnamese history and from the Maoist tradition 
espoused by Hanoi.
2.4 THE ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF THE NATIONAL 
LIBERATION FRONT
The National Liberation Front attem pted to govern the countryside in a m anner 
radically different from the government, using the village rather than the 
province as the basic administrative unit. The NLF's involvem ent at the village 
level had a profound effect on nation building in that it forced the government to 
administer its pacification and developm ent program s from afar. The Front 
wisely built their shadow government based, if loosely, on traditional patterns. 
That is, they tried to govern with sem i-autonom ous village-based committees,
91 Ibid., 156-7, 161-163.
92 Ibid., 59-68.
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not from district or province towns that were to most of the peasantry as foreign 
countries. In creating a num ber of effective village institutions, the NLF achieved 
a level of village influence that eluded Saigon and gave it a significant advantage 
in the rural struggle.93
The National Liberation Front used a 'foot in the door' strategy to recruit 
supporters. NLF documents indicate that 'm iddle peasants/ relatively wealthy 
farm families w ith  landholdings of 2-5 hectares, were difficult to recruit.94 Hence, 
Front cadres initially tended to recruit according to class and concentrated their 
efforts among the sons of the poor and other disenfranchised groups: landless 
peasants, members of marginalized sects, young underem ployed villagers.95 
Thereafter family members and young friends of the new recruit proved far easier 
to entice or coerce. The NLF also set up hamlet and village youth groups in 
which participation was often compulsory. In this way they attem pted to involve 
children progressively in political, and later possibly military activities.96 Thus, 
although there was a class dimension to NLF membership, cadres attem pted to 
involve all villagers. However, as the w ar escalated with the coming of the 
Americans and NLF casualties m ounted, the Front paid less attention to such 
details as class.97
To establish their village institutions, the Front dispatched political cadres 
and security forces to oversee the election of carefully chosen, well respected men 
to leadership positions as hamlet or village secretaries and committee m embers.98 
At first, the cadres would control the committees, but would slowly turn 
responsibilities for village organization, tax collection, recruiting, and propaganda
over to them, ruling increasingly from behind the scenes.99 This ensured that
93 Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 77-180.
94 'Land Reform/ Vietnam Terminal Report, USAID, PN-AAX-019, p.24. The report cites captured 
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NLF village administration not only had a local flavor, but a good deal of 
flexibility and initiative.100 Thus, NLF village leaders were not m ere errand boys. 
Front village secretaries often commanded their own militias, local supply lines, 
and intelligence services.101 'In  such m atters as taxation, justice, m ilitary 
recruitment, and land redistribution, a Party village secretary had as m uch and 
often far more authority than a government province ch ief/102
Though the villagers had no choice in w hether a local NLF governm ent 
would be established, it was a system they could recognize. Moreover, in practice, 
the Front's village authorities were m ore responsive in m any ways than the 
government's village councils, who had m any responsibilities but little power. 
Many lower level NLF village cadres came from the local peasantry, and although 
they no longer farmed, otherwise lived like the peasants whom  they sought to 
woo and control. The Front also offered the rural poor an opportunity to advance 
through its hierarchy. GVN province and district chiefs, on the other hand, were 
required to hold a secondary school degree, a privilege reserved for the wealthy: 
urban middle and upper classes, rural landlords, and rich peasants. They tended 
to live like rich men, have minimal contact w ith villagers, and yet m ade 
decisions affecting their daily lives.103
In one sense, Hanoi and the NLF had an easier task w inning influence in 
the South than did the Saigon government because the com m unist m ovem ent 
was in large part a continuation of the revolution against Japanese and French 
colonists begun in the 1940s. Large num bers of Vietnamese, long denied a 
political voice by a series of colonists and local collaborators and culminating w ith 
the Saigon regime and its American ally, simply refused to stop fighting until 
foreign entities were expunged.104 In a more immediate sense, issues of 
redistribution and political participation appear to have been central to peasant
100 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 373.
101 Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake, 192-3.
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103 Ibid., 167-8.
104 For the nature of this continuing revolution, see John T. McAlister, Vietnam: Origins of Revolution 
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grievances and the persistence of revolutionary sentiments, or at the very least to 
anti-governm ent sentiments, in the South. McAlister argued that rural 
Vietnamese saw  the South Vietnamese army, the dominant rural m anifestation 
of a military government, as 'an  arbitrary institution that was trying to get control 
over the countryside w ithout sharing power w ith the peasant villagers.'105 In 
contrast, the NLF system won real commitment from many, though not rural 
control, because it 'rew arded popular participation' in a way the Saigon 
governm ent did not.106 While im portant posts in the Saigon military and civil 
hierarchy w ere often for sale, Vietnam veteran and International Relationist 
William H enderson observed that advancement in the NLF was largely, if not 
completely, based on merit and performance.107
M any scholars, among them Jeffrey Race, Robert Sansom, Francis 
Fitzgerald, Gabriel Kolko, and Nancy Wiegersma, claimed that the NLF's 
redistributive approach to rural social and economic reform appealed more to the 
peasantry than  did that of the government. Race, for instance, contended that 
while distributive issues were at the heart of peasant grievances, the Saigon 
government treated absolute poverty as the prim ary cause of peasant support for 
the southern insurrection.108 During the 1960s, when the governm ent was 
limited to operating mainly in the large towns, the NLF embarked on a reform 
effort aimed at redistributing resources. They implemented rent control and land 
reform m easures and pu t themselves squarely in the peasants7 com er against the 
landlords. According to Sansom, in the 1960s 'th e  Americans offered the peasant 
a constitution; the Viet Cong offered him  his land and with it the right to 
survive.109 It was not until the 1970s that the Saigon government began an 
extensive m ral reform effort, as we shall see, but until then, for those among the 
peasantry w ho yearned for systemic change during the 1960s, the NLF was clearly
105 Ibid., 360.
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the force to be supported.no
Finally, NLF security strategies depended upon establishing a sympathetic 
environm ent rather than on massive firepower. A netw ork of sym pathizers 
provided information on government and American activities, aided political 
proselyting, and helped with tax collections. Armed with a knowledge of their 
enemy's movements, Viet Cong troops could move, strike, and disperse to avoid 
attack. Clearly, NLF requirements for security used far fewer forces than that of its 
opponents. Political cadres were to collect taxes, recruit new  members, m aintain 
contact w ith village informants. They required only a small security force to 
provide protection, to enforce the silence of the peasantry, and keep the 
government from operating effectively in the hamlets. The m odesty of the 
Front's security goals reflects the easier nature of their prim ary task, which was to 
prevent the creation of, rather than to build, a new nation. Thus, while the 
government needed rural control, the NLF only required influence, and time was 
on their side.
Through these village tools, the damage done to the governm ent by the 
ubiquitous American presence, and Ho Chi Minh's history of resisting foreign 
invasion, the National Liberation Front succeeded in appearing as the defender of 
Vietnamese nationalism. It is clear, however, that the NLF w on the loyalty of 
only a m inority of the overall peasantry. And as the w ar escalated, evidence that 
the narrowness of the NLF’s popularity began to accumulate. For instance, 
during Tet M au Than of 1968, the Front called upon the people of South Vietnam 
to stage a popular uprising against the government. Hanoi led their soldiers and 
NLF cadres to believe that this was inevitable. No significant popular uprising 
accompanied the 1968 offensives.111 A captured N orth Vietnamese Com m unist 
party document claimed a crushing military and political victory in the offensive,
but rued the failure to motivate 'the masses to the extent that they w ould indulge
110 The inadequacy of the Diem regime's land reform effort of the 1950s is discussed in Chapter Five.
111 See NLF General Tran Va Tra, 'Tet: the 1968 General Offensive and General Uprising,’ in Jayne S. 
Werner and Luu Doan Huynh, The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives (Armonk, 
NY, 1993), 52-60. See also Stanley Kamow, Vietnam: A History (New York, 1983), 549, and Zalin 
Grant, Facing the Phoenix: The CIA and the Political Defeat of the United States in Vietnam, (New  
York, 1991), 29.
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in violent arm ed uprisings.'112 Truong N hu Tang claimed that some citizens rose 
up in the ancient imperial capital, Hue, and participated w ith fanatical young 
soldiers in comm itting atrocities. Ironically, this one example of popular uprising 
had left the NLF w ith 'a  special need to address fears among the Southern people 
that a revolutionary victory would bring w ith it a bloodbath or reign of terror.'113 
The anemic popular response to NLF exhortations, however, should not be 
mistaken for governm ent support. Fitzgerald pointed out that while the people 
did not rise up  to help the front during the offensives, neither did they help the 
government. The PAVN and the Viet Cong spent months building up  for their 
offensive all over the country. In the week prior they inserted five battalions into 
Saigon alone and still its defenders were caught by surprise, lending some 
credence to Fitzgerald's seemingly unlikely claim that vnot one citizen 
inform ed.'114
Evolving NLF tax policy also illustrates the limited popularity of the 
revolution am ong peasants. In the early 1960s, NLF taxes were generally low.
The central pillar of the system was a progressive tax based on per capita 
agricultural production, which the NLF attem pted to use to distribute income to 
the poorer peasants from whom most of their support sprang. This the Front 
supplemented w ith  a land tax based on potential rather than actual output to 
create incentive for production.115
Large-scale American intervention in 1965 changed this. As the w ar 
intensified, the NLF was compelled to dem and ever higher taxes in areas to 
which they had  access.116 For instance, in 1968 in the NLF province of Soc Trang, 
in the Mekong Delta, the agricultural production tax rates theoretically ranged 
from 5% to 20% of unhulled rice. In prior years the NLF w ould likely have relied
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mainly on this tax. By 1968, however, it was supplem ented by the im position of 
special taxes.117 In 1969, the Province Senior Adviser in Vinh Long province 
reported that, in a study of four villages, peasants paid between 20% and 50% of 
their yearly income to the NLF in land and crop taxes, as well as substantial 
additional taxes on irrigation pum ps, rototillers, and other agricultural 
im plem ents.118 A South Vietnamese research team in Vinh Long province 
reported in late 1969 that farmers in the district town and three villages paid  NLF 
taxes as follows: poor farmers 20% of yearly income, m iddle farmers 30% of yearly 
income, rich farmers 50% of their yearly income. To these taxes the Front added 
special levies on farming equipment as well. Those who failed to pay were 
kidnapped or killed.119 Moreover, there is evidence that the progressive nature of 
the Front's tax system began to skew. NLF taxes tended to be harsher in poorer 
areas with small rice harvests and large concentrations of VC troops needing 
sustenance.120 One 1970 CORDS report relied on captured NLF docum ents to 
conclude that 'nearly every activity is or has been taxed by the VC. Besides the 
transportation tax, there is a commerce and business tax, a plantation tax, a 
market entry and exit tax, an income tax and a property tax.' The Front w as 
aware, the report continued, that its tax collections had become increasingly 
burdensom e and unpopular to rural South Vietnamese and, as a captured Binh 
Tuy Province Communist Party Committee report lamented, their tax collectors 
increasingly required armed Viet Cong an even N orth Vietnamese Arm y 
escorts.121 Under this tax burden, peasants employed several evasive techniques. 
They hid rice, fled NLF influenced areas, and as taxes soared and access to markets
117 Ibid.
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declined, sometimes suppressed production to near subsistence levels.122
The recruiting practices of the NLF also suggest sagging popularity as the 
war stretched on. Pike, for example, found that in the early 1960s volunteers 
filled NLF and VC ranks. But as early as 1966 the Front began to rely on 
coercion.123 Long time revolutionary Xuan Vu noted that young men in heavily 
communist Ben Tre province were avoiding NLF recruiters in 1966, something 
that could 'n o t possibly have happened' during the Viet M inh war.124 Lanning 
and Cragg claimed that the NLF began resorting to conscription as early as 1963 
and noted that as conscripts replaced volunteers the quality of Front forces 
dim inished.125 Henderson, however, cited interviews with deserters who claimed 
that while the NLF did resort to conscription, the motivation of draftees and 
volunteers was equally high. W hether or not that is true, it appears that most 
young men tried to avoid serving in the NLF and that after Tet Mau Than the 
latters' recruiting job got even tougher. Several American advisers reported fear 
and avoidance of NLF conscription among South Vietnamese peasants.126 Trinh 
Due, then leading the NLF political and military movement for three villages, 
recalled after 1968 'i t  was almost impossible to get recruits.'127
James Trullinger's 1969 village study in Central Vietnam found that about 
5-10% of My Thuy Phuong's young m en had the wealth to buy draft deferments 
from government officials, 5-10% joined the NLF, and the rem aining 80-90% 
served in government forces out of a feeling of coercion, mainly because their 
alternatives were jail or the NLF. Although most people in this village preferred 
the NLF to the Saigon government, 'joining the local guerrilla force meant. . .
122 For the adoption of subsistence practices among peasants, see 'Two Revolutions in Bac Lieu,’ August 
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sacrifices that few w anted to share.'128 Trullinger also cites a Com munist
document dated 1966 in which the leadership lamented the shortage of guerrillas
in this traditional revolutionary stronghold.129
In sum, peasant reactions to NLF calls for civilian uprisings, to taxes, and to
recruiting efforts, indicate that the Front did not enjoy the full support of the
South Vietnamese people. Again, however, this narrow  popularity apparently
did nothing to enhance the Saigon government's standing among the people.
One American report captured this dilemma; it details the depth of peasant
resentment of NLF tax policies, but lamented that the South Vietnamese
government was wholly unable to exploit that resentm ent.130
Most South Vietnamese opted for some form of neutrality. N guyen Van
Trung, a Catholic scholar from Saigon who might have been expected to support
the Thieu government, trusted neither side:
If the Sou thern  L iberation Front tru ly  w as m erely  resisting  
"American Im perialist Aggression," then w hy up  until now  has it 
not yet been able to stimulate. . . an ardent uprising among all the 
people? If a policy of opposing Com munism  has tru ly  only been 
called into existence because of the aggression of the no rthern  
Com m unists, w hy has it not been able to stim ulate a positive 
attitude of self defense? We cannot make a clear cut choice. . . . The 
problem  is how  to enable all of us to avoid the plight of having to 
choose.131
Truong N hu Tang, the former NLF Justice Minister, confirmed that neither side 
w on the popularity of a majority of the people. 'The South Vietnamese found 
themselves trapped between their loathing of the Thieu dictatorship and their 
fears of communism. Given these political realities, there was nowhere for most 
people to turn, so they paid outward allegiance to whoever held the w hip hand.'132
Like the GVN, the Front was unable to consolidate and m aintain political 
control over the country. Like the GVN it achieved greater influence in some
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regions than in others and often ruled more w ith fear than w ith persuasion. 
However, though the NLF won the voluntary participation of only a minority, 
among that minority it elicited a rem arkable loyalty. It was not unusual for Front 
cadres and guerrillas to suffer outrageously for their cause and persevere. In 
contrast, most of those who fought for the Saigon government did so only 
because they were drafted and those who did volunteer did so to combat 
communism, rather than out of loyalty to or enthusiasm  for the governm ent.133 
This difference in political comm itm ent w as to prove crucial.
2.5 THE AMERICAN PRESENCE AND ITS CORROSIVE EFFECT ON SOUTH 
VIETNAM
2.5 (i) American Strategies: Regular Soldiers and the Village War
General William W estmoreland's strategy of attrition and body count proved 
impracticable and wholly incompatible w ith  the concomitant nation building 
campaign. By definition it required a protracted commitment that w as to prove 
politically untenable. A protracted w ar favored North Vietnam. Hanoi knew 
their greatest advantage was that foreigners would eventually lose the political 
will to fight far from home.134 Thus, W estmoreland played to his enemy's 
strength.133 Many in the U.S. governm ent understood this as well. As early as 
1966, Defense Secretary Robert M cNamara told Johnson that the strategy of 
attrition would not work.13* The Pentagon itself conducted a num ber of statistical 
studies in 1967 and 1968 which dem onstrated clearly that at the prevailing 'kill 
ratio7 it would take 30 years to 'a ttrit7 Hanoi to the point at which they could not 
m ount a military force capable of threatening the Saigon governm ent's 
existence.137 Paradoxically then, although the United States needed a quick result 
for political reasons, it chose a protracted strategy. As vociferous W estmoreland
133 Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon, 201.
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critic Harry Summers declared, we were fighting for time rather than space, and 
time ran o u t/188
American units fulfilled their mission as MACV defined it; enemy 
casualties far outstripped 'friend lies/139 But while U.S. troops were effective in 
the sparsely populated piedm ont and highlands, the use of large conventionally- 
trained combat units in the village war alienated the rural population. W ith 
fearsome firepower, U.S. soldiers who could have no sense of Vietnamese society 
or culture and were unable to tell friend from foe brought an unprecedented level 
of violence to South Vietnamese villages. Villagers knew that the NLF often 
punished government informants with death and so tended to rem ain silent 
when asked by Americans about guerrillas, snipers, and booby traps. U.S. troops 
had been told they were sacrificing themselves to help the South Vietnamese 
people. Thus the soldiers believed that villagers who let Americans blunder into 
their deaths must be either communists or communist sym pathizers. The 
results were predictable. Under fire the Americans 'acted like the scared and tired 
young men they w e re /140 One U.S. adviser reported a painful recollection of 
failed efforts to convince an American military commander that he could not 
simply 'blow  away' villages when his men took sniper fire from that direction. 
The soldiers 'had  no w ay of knowing that the w idespread refusal of the 
Vietnamese peasantry to get involved in the war that raged around them  was 
really a testament to the Viet Cong's organizational effectiveness/141
Several factors inhibited peasants from cooperating w ith the governm ent, 
even if they did not support the Front. Along with NLF intimidation, an 
important factor was heavy handed behavior and indiscriminate fire in the 
villages. Northern and Viet Cong troops often occupied heavily populated areas, 
knowing that American and South Vietnamese forces w ould likely resort to 
massive firepower to oust them. The U.S. response to such tactics induced one
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139 Summers .Vietnam War Almanac, 111-13.
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peasant to complain that 'the  Americans don 't care about the peop le /142 After a 
communist offensive in the Mekong delta in 1969 during which U.S. and South 
Vietnamese fire destroyed thousands of homes, a frustrated adviser reported that 
'the zone commander could care less (and does care less) how m uch civilian 
property is destroyed by his operations; he doesn't have to rebuild it, and he 
doesn't have to contend with the major psychological and political 
repercussions/143 Another U.S. adviser lam ented that the indiscriminate 
destructiveness was hastening American defeat and w ithdraw al.144
Many Americans believed that villagers would vent their anger at the NLF 
for using their villages for snipers and for U.S. or ARVN retaliatory fire, bu t this 
was often not the case. Trullinger found three reasons for this apparently 
paradoxical response among inhabitants of the Central Vietnam village of My 
Thuy Phuong. First, many villagers had taken part in NLF activities leading to 
the retaliation. Second, Front cadres or guerrillas tended to conduct themselves 
in a generally polite and humble fashion while in the villages, in contrast to U.S. 
and South Vietnamese soldiers. And third, NLF cadres warned, prepared, and 
propagandized villagers prior to operations.145
But weapons fire was only part of the villagers' torm ent w hen U.S. forces 
moved through their hamlets. A CORDS evaluation team reported that armor 
and mechanized infantry 'frequently drove their tracked vehicles through the 
secondary crop gardens of the peasants, destroying fruit trees, seedbeds, and 
meager cash crops/ The evaluators took these complaints to a culpable American 
unit. There a line officer demonstrated the general ignorance among combat 
personnel of the plight of the peasants, w ho were trapped between the destructive 
allies and the selective NLF. 'If the people did not w ish to suffer such 
destruction/ he informed the CORDS evaluators, 'th en  they m ight avoid it by
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warning U.S. troops of the presence of the VC in the ham let/ Such attitudes and 
behavior prom pted one peasant to say of the Americans, 'if  the people were 
grateful towards them  for their generous aid, they did not also hate them  less for 
their m isconduct.'146 Another concluded, 'I  thought the American troops were 
better than the French, but they are the sa m e /147 An American military adviser 
wrote in his memoirs that although 1968 Tet Offensive was a m ilitary failure for 
the communists, it was a successful political statement. 'The VC came to My Tho 
and all the other towns knowing w hat w ould happen. They knew that once they 
were among the people we would abandon our pretense of distinguishing 
between them. In this way they taught the people. . . that we w ould kill every last 
one of them to save our own sk in s/148
It was not only American and NLF soldiers that South Vietnamese 
peasants had to fear. The South Vietnamese Army developed a particular 
reputation for abusiveness.149 Both Americans and South Vietnamese referred to 
them derisively as 'chicken stealers/ But, like the Americans, some of the ARVN 
soldiers' abusive behavior was a predictable reaction to their environment. The 
government paid the average enlisted m an the equivalent of USD 20.00 per 
month, not enough to feed his family. And before the 1970s, ARVN soldiers on 
operations were issued no rations. No field kitchen followed them. They were 
forced to forage, often without sufficient money, among the peasantry who of 
course deeply resented such t h i e v i n g . ^
W hatever the motivations of young men at war, the presence of regular 
troops in the villages resulted in massive destruction in and alienation of rural 
South Vietnam. It crippled the nation building effort, sometimes physically, but 
especially politically. The damage w rought on a village by one small skirmish
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illustrates the level of crop destruction and personal traum a the peasantry faced 
in contested areas. On 24 January 1970, as the delta rice ripened and harvest got 
underway, a South Vietnamese armored cavalry unit and an infantry platoon 
conducted a minor operation in a village of Vinh Binh province. The military 
tally for the operation was one Viet Cong killed. Against that achievement, 
indiscriminate fire killed one civilian and w ounded several others. Villagers 
requested medical attention for their w ounded b u t the troops told them  that none 
was available. Tracked vehicles destroyed 150 hectares of unharvested rice, 
enough to ruin more than one hundred families for the year. The province 
senior adviser was beside himself. The people of this village, he lamented, had 
been considered cooperative and had not paid NLF taxes in 3 years. They were 
disillusioned now, by the 'complete disregard' w ith which the soldiers treated the 
people and their property.151
Thus the government faced an ugly dilemma caused by the need to fight a 
village war and w in political support simultaneously. This dilemma was 
reflected in a Rand Corporation study of the potential enhancement to 
government political control from various combat missions. The findings: small 
operations potentially had some good effect, large combat operations had no 
positive political effect, and bombing 'obliterated the village.'152
2.5 (ii) The Dominance of the American M ilitary Culture
Many critics believe that the United States underem phasized the importance of 
nation building in South Vietnam. Certainly this was true before the communist 
offensives in 1968, bu t even afterwards non-m ilitary efforts received minimal 
attention at the highest American and South Vietnamese levels. A perusal of 
documents on Vietnam housed in the Nixon Project of the National Archives
reveals a nearly exclusive focus on military aspects of 'V ietnam ization' and on
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negotiations w ith Hanoi. Among high officials of the Nixon adm inistration, 
awareness of developm ent and pacification issues appears to have been almost 
nil. In late 1969, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had never heard of the most 
famous American practitioner of pacification in Vietnam. Kissinger wrote to 
Nixon, 'Sam Yorty told me on the phone that John Vann was the best m an on 
pacification in South Vietnam. I haven't heard of him and it is possible that 
Yorty doesn't know w hat he is talking about.' Having satisfied himself that Vann 
was indeed an authority on these issues, Kissinger set up a meeting w ith Nixon, 
informing the president that Vann believed the U.S. had achieved a 'w inning 
position.’153
Writing in 1970, Robert Komer, the first chief of CORDS as well as one of its 
founders, argued that the redoubled pacification and development efforts begun 
in the late 1960s w as 'one of the few really bright and relatively inexpensive 
things a musclebound U.S. ever did in that tragic conflict/ But, he complained, 
'the overwhelming bulk of U.S. energy and resources still go into the military 
war, we spend comparative peanuts on all the rest. . . . Our entire economic aid 
bill per annum is less than the dollar cost of one U.S. division for the same 
p e rio d /154
The military's influence in CORDS led to several problems. Nearly two 
years after he had left Vietnam, Komer wrote that he had only sought to combine 
civil and military affairs in one umbrella organization because only the military 
had the budget necessary to carry out civil projects on a reasonably large scale.155 
Inevitably, there w as a good deal of conflict between American military and 
civilian personnel. The head of the Information Service complained that 'even 
the embassy seemed to be under [military] control/ and deplored the military's 
authority over political and economic programs, for which they had  no 
background. 'Just as I don't know a darned thing about cannons, I don't expect
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them to know something about a parliament, but that is w hat w as happening out 
th e re /156 A district senior adviser observed that the military culture 
overwhelmed the civilian culture within CORDS as well. In the field, m ost of the 
military leadership simply tolerated CORDS officers, but d id  not have any 
particular understanding of or respect for their mission. 'They d idn 't know w hat 
to think of them, what to do with them. But they figured if these guys w ant to go 
on a camp out, o k /157
Lieutenant Colonel Carl Bernard, a career army officer assigned as a 
Province Senior Adviser and thus attached to CORDS, repeatedly attem pted to 
convince the American military command of this need to take a w ider 
perspective. Bernard argued that the NLF's prim ary goals were subversion of the 
Saigon government and control of the people. Their m ain tools were thus non­
military: persuasion, propaganda, intimidation, and terror. The governm ent and 
its U.S. ally, on the other hand, used overwhelmingly m ilitary tools: bombs, 
artillery, and large infantry units. Its primary goal was to control terrain and kill 
the enemy. 'Each succeeds. The GVN and its ally range unim peded in the 
unpopulated wastelands, masters of the terrain. The VC have the loyalty of only 
some of the people—but enough of these people potentially to control the 
population/ The real enemy, Bernard insisted, was the local NLF political 
organization, and concluded, 'there is little doubt that w e are m oving lustily
forward on our programs; there is m uch doubt that the program s are re levan t/155
2.5 (iii) Weaknesses of the American Advisory System
American advisers formed a virtual shadow governm ent from the top to very 
near the bottom of the South Vietnamese government. The South Vietnamese
156 Robert A. Lincoln, Georgetown oral history, 19 April 1989.
157 John Lyle, interview with author, 25 July 1995, U.S. State Department, Washington, DC.
158 'Observations and Reflections of a Province Senior Adviser/ Memorandum to CORDS, October 
1969, personal papers of Lieutenant Colonel Carl F. Bernard, Alexandria, Virginia. Provided during 
interview with the author, July 1994. It should be noted that Bernard served in two provinces 
renowned for their powerful NLF presences.
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president had an American adviser in the person of the ambassador, the Central 
Pacification and Developm ent Council had advisers, the ministries had advisers. 
Field advisers assigned to CORDS lived in every province and district capital in 
the country. Almost every discrete development program had at least one 
adviser assigned to it full time. But despite the existence of some extremely able 
personnel, most advisers were ill-prepared for their jobs. Few spoke fluent 
Vietnamese or had  anything more than a rudim entary understanding of 
Vietnamese society. According to a study commissioned by the Army in 1968, 
only 35% of advisers had  received any language training at all, and this was 
usually a basic course. Only 12% had any special training in development or
cultural m atters.159 In July 1971, several USAID staff economists reported that
CORDS advisers in Central Vietnam had little awareness of economic and 
development affairs. For most of them, the report lamented, the sum total of 
their local economic knowledge was that 'their provinces had water, perhaps 
trees, farmland, salt, etc/^o
American advisers ill-educated in Vietnamese language or culture were 
often saddled w ith inappropriate jobs, and most had no way of knowing this. A 
particularly glaring example of the cultural inappropriateness of many American 
plans, and indeed of the American presence, was the woefully m isguided 
treatment of time and scheduling. Under American direction, all fiscal, military, 
pacification, and developm ent planning was based on the Western, or solar 
calendar. The Saigon governm ent officially operated on the same. However, the 
Vietnamese people, governm ent officials included, operated on a lunar calendar. 
The U.S. nevertheless imposed American cultural practices on the South 
Vietnamese in their ow n country. Every year, detailed and ambitious pacification 
and development plans called for the establishment of new programs and the
159 'Hamlet Evaluation System Study/ Report to U.S. Army Concept Team in Vietnam, Submitted by 
The Simulmatics Corporation, 1 May 1968, MACCORDS PP&P, General Records 1601-09A -1603-01, 
file 1601-09A.
160 Memorandum for: Deputy Chief of Staff, Economic Affairs/Trip Report: USAID/CORDS 
Industrial Seminar - MR II/ Files of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Economic Affairs, MACV, Box 15, 
Record Group 472, Archives II.
77
revision of old ones. Work was set to begin on January 1st and detailed 
timetables and quotas were devised for the 12 m onth planning period. These 
schedules were nearly always thwarted by the Vietnamese. Until Tet celebrations 
of the lunar new  year ended in February, existing program s languished and new 
ones remained stillborn. Year after year, frustrated American evaluators 
lam ented the poor performance of South Vietnamese personnel during January 
and February and the chaos into which the rest of the planning year was pitched. 
One adviser called the period an unofficial m onth long holiday during which 
nothing got done and the tempo of everything was determ ined by the NLF.161 
Those advisers and field officers w ith enough experience or insight recognized 
the problem. 'In  practice it is the lunar year which regulates GVN civil and 
military activities as in fact it regulates almost all cycles in Viet Nam. . . . When 
realization and understanding of this Vietnamese reality finally perm eates the 
United States advisory community, the result will be a decrease in un-necessary 
(sic) frustration and friction with our counterparts/162
Both m ilitary and civilian personnel considered nation build ing in 
Vietnam something of a professional purgatory, which aggravated these training 
deficiencies. Military officers tended to see CORDS assignments as threats to their 
careers. They needed combat commands to 'punch their tickets' if they were to 
reach the highest ranks. Among civilians, Vietnam was an increasingly 
unpopular posting after the Tet Offensive of 1968. At that point, m any Americans 
began to turn against the war, and those who still believed it w as a good cause saw 
that the U.S. government was pulling out. A deep cynicism perm eated the 
CORDS training center outside W ashington DC, coloring the attitudes of advisers 
before they ever planted a boot in Vietnam.1^  As a result, 'except at the highest
161 See Province Monthly Report for Phu Yen, February 1970, James B. Engle PSA, CMH. For more on 
the Tet slowdown see Province Monthly Report for Vinh Binh, February 1969, Paul E. Suplizio PSA, 
CMH, and Province Monthly Report for Kien Phong, January 1969, Clement H. Will, LTC, PSA, 
CMH.
162 'Vinh Long Province—General Information/ 1967, MACCORDS 101463.
163 Dan Strasser, former District Senior Adviser, Pacification Evaluator, Cease fire Observer, 1970- 
1973, Central Vietnam, interview with the author, 2 August 1994, Washington, DC. See also 
Howard Lange, former Province Senior Adviser, Hue, CORDS Official, Saigon, interview with the 
author, 25 July 1994, State Department,Washington, DC.
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levels, personnel brought into pacification from the various U.S. agencies has 
tended to be second or third ra te /164 Moreover, most served one year to 18 
m onth tours, leaving just as they began to understand w hat had been going on 
around them and being replaced by another newcomer. This crippling problem 
popularized a quip usually attributed to John Paul Vann, that America had not 
been in Vietnam for 10 years, but for 1 year, 10 times.
The advisers had a hellish task. In the words of one field evaluator, it was 
'w idely recognized that being an advisor is more often a frustrating job than a 
rew arding job. . . . Few men, civilian or military, have been able to overcome 
their counterpart's natural aversion to having an a d v i s o r / 16^  After all, he added, 
the existence of the system told the Vietnamese every day that they were not good 
enough. This hit upon the classic advisory dilemma in South Vietnam. If the 
Americans did too little for the overmatched Saigon government, it would fail. If 
they did too m uch for the increasingly dependent and corrupt Saigon 
government, it w ould fail. The presence in a relatively poor nation of thousands 
of Americans deeply involved in the day to day affairs of the government, as well 
as the cornucopia of m oney and goods they brought, not only nurtured the 
dependence and corruption of the government but also emasculated it in the eyes 
of its people.166
While the existence of the advisory system was paradoxical, the feasibility 
of its task was a greater problem  yet. The idea that foreigners could create and 
administer a nation building effort in a hostile environm ent that they did not 
understand was probably misplaced. Harry Summers laments that U. S. strategists 
saw it as their duty  to force the South Vietnamese into an American economic, 
social, and political mold. 'I t  is difficult today to recall the depth of our 
arrogance.'167 Said one former U.S. adviser of the field advisory task, 'the  job was
164 Province Monthly Report for Phu Yen, April 1970, James B. Engle. See also Former District Senior 
Adviser John Lyle, Interview with author, 25 July 1994, U.S. State Department, Washington, DC.
165 Evaluation Report, Pacification Program in Phuoc Tuy Province, HI CORPS Tactical Zone, 19 July 
1968 MACCORDS,101442.
166 Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam, 309-15. See also CORDS Report, Social Reconstruction, 7 
April 1968, MACCORDS, 101568.
167 Summers, On Strategy, 171.
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too big. How could you expect CORDS to carry out the rebuilding of a nation on 
18 m onth tours? They w eren't prepared, their mission was ill-defined and 
probably impossible. Some people spent their entire tours building outhouses. 
W ho could you get to pu t up with the danger and discomfort and loneliness of 
living in a district, who with the education and skills necessary? It was hubris to 
think we could do it.'188
2.5 (iv) The Corrosive Effects on South Vietnamese Society of the Am erican 
Presence
All this time, the American presence was having a paradoxical effect by 
preserving South Vietnamese independence in the short run  while h indering it 
in the long run. Vietnamese colleagues told a senior USAID official that Tor 
every American military guy that we brought in, two Vietnamese w ould simply 
quit making any effort/169 One USAID officer believed that the m agnitude of the 
American presence in Vietnam 'posed a severe and immediate threat to the 
dignity and integrity of the very people it was supposed to be assisting/170 As we 
have seen, even American and government sponsored polls turned up  peasants 
w ho expressed resentment toward the American presence. American participants 
frequently comment on this tendency. John Lyle, a former district senior adviser, 
observed that most Vietnamese saw the huge United States presence, bu t had 
little real communication w ith Americans. While they tended to be sophisticated 
in the ways of local politics, peasants generally did not understand the Cold War 
or believe the propaganda about American altruism. 'The only reason they could 
see for this foreign presence was that Vietnam was a good place, and these
168 Former District Senior Adviser John Lyle, Interview with author, 25 July 1994, U.S. State 
Department, Washington, DC.
169 John Bennet, Georgetown oral history, 2 February 1990. For other opinions in the same strain, see: 
Frank Schmelzer, Georgetown oral history, 1 and 8 December 1992. Schmelzer served in the CORDS 
program from 1970-1972. See also Ambassador James B. Engle,Georgetown oral history, 1 August 1988. 
Phu Yen Province Senior Adviser 1969-1971. Finally, Robert A. Lincoln, Georgetown oral history, 19 
April 1989. Lincoln was the head of the Joint U.S. Vietnam Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in 
Saigon from 1969-1971. JUSPAO was run by the State Department's United States Information 
Service.
170 Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam, 348-9.
80
foreigners m ust want to take it over/*7*
It is hardly surprising that peasants evinced resentm ent of the Americans 
in Vietnam, not least because of the level of violence and destruction Americans 
brought to m any of their lives, villages, and crops. But Neil Jamieson, a USAID 
officer, encountered hostility from a more surprising quarter. Jamieson was asked 
to speak to a group of South Vietnamese political officers in Saigon and among 
them  found a startling degree of hostility, resentment, and m istrust for the United 
States, criticizing it for its use of herbicides, for USAID sponsored textbooks in 
Vietnamese schools, or bringing m oral depravity to Vietnamese women.
These m en were selected, indoctrinated, and trained to provide political 
education to their units in the arm y of the Republic of Vietnam. The 
United States had lavished billions of dollars w orth of equipm ent and 
supplies on that army. American aid had purchased the uniforms these 
men were wearing, the chairs on which they sat, the weapons they bore. 
These young men were far above average in education and intelligence. 
They w anted to resist the com m unists, and they w anted the United 
States to help them  in that effort. W hy should they of all people feel 
such resentm ent?
Jamieson found his answer in the form of a question from the audience.
Does the United States w ant to make Vietnam into a little America? If 
the answer to that question is 'yes,' then the second question is 'W hy 
should they w ant to do such a thing?' If the answer to the first question 
is 'no,' then our second question is 'W hy do they consistently act the 
way they do?' We honestly cannot understand American behavior in 
V ietnam .172
After m any years in Vietnam, Jamieson came to understand that the root 
problem was not herbicides, schoolbooks, or even culture clash, the problem was 
that the American presence was of such a magnitude that it disrupted the process 
of self determination and sapped the country of dignity. W ith the loss of a feeling 
of control over their own country, the Vietnamese began to feel increasingly
171 John Lyle, district senior adviser, Bien Hoa province, interview with author, 25 July 1994, U.S. 
State Department, Washington, DC..
172 Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam, 346-8.
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resentful. 'A fter working w ith us and fighting with us for several years, even 
m any of our friends began to doubt not just our efficacy, but our motives.'173
The evidence is conclusive that the enormous American presence in South 
Vietnam created as m any problems as it solved. Inventing a nation in all its 
social, political, and economic aspects proved too complex for foreigners to 
orchestrate. As a result, as subsequent chapters will demonstrate, program s 
requiring micro m anagem ent fared poorly in comparison w ith those that worked 
w ith  local markets and impulses.
2.6 RURAL SECURITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON NATION BUILDING.
2.6 (i) Gauging Rural Security
The security situation in pre-Tet Offensive South Vietnam was am biguous and 
convoluted. In general, the government wielded the most influence during 
daylight hours in and adjacent to major cities, towns, and roads. The National 
Liberation Front was more powerful in rural or isolated areas and more or less 
ruled the night. Government officials rarely slept outside semi-secure 
com pounds or large towns. But the situation could vary radically from province 
to province. Some areas were almost entirely free of danger from NLF forces.174 
Others were effectively 'no-go7 zones for government personnel.
Initially, the American military command used body counts, colored maps, 
and narrative reports from hundreds of advisers with varying views and 
experience to gauge rural security. But the complexity of the situation prom pted 
them  to create the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) in 1967. The HES has 
received a good deal of attention from scholars. But previously unpublished 
documents are now available from the MACCORDS PP&P series at the American 
National Archives as well as reports housed at the U.S. Army Center of Military
173 Ibid., 349.
174 'An Giang Fact Sheet/ 22 January 1968, Record Group 472, MACCORDS 101462, National 
Archives, Washington, DC).
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History which shed greater light on how the system was used. And because it 
became the most im portant tool for m easuring the progress of and making policy 
for pacification and in some cases development as well, and since so m any 
participants and scholars have based their perceptions of success or failure of rural 
programs either on the HES itself or on the general impressions created by the 
system in Saigon and W ashington, it deserves further critical examination 
here.175
The HES was more objective than previous ad hoc practices in part by 
standardizing the questions asked in each ham let nationwide. The system 
involved a lengthy questionnaire completed m onthly by American district senior 
advisers and their staff. It contained two sections, one concerning security, the 
other development. Advisers dispatched these data to the U.S. headquarters 
outside Saigon where they were translated into computer-readable punch cards. 
Different factors, such as government or NLF presence in a hamlet, num ber of 
assassinations, availability of medical care, were weighted according to their 
perceived importance to influence and control. The presence of a local militia 
unit in a particular hamlet, for instance, was judged to be more im portant to 
pacification than the num ber of propaganda broadcasts the population had been 
exposed to. Hamlets were then rated A,B,C,D,E, or V, where 'a ' signified 
government control, VV' signified Viet Cong control, and the rest represented 
relative influence in contested hamlets.
The HES may have been suitable for use as a crude approximation of 
various countervailing influences in South Vietnam so long as the user was 
aware of its limitations, and m any officials, including Colby, did understand that 
the system had limitations.176 But in general the American command and 
Saigon government looked to it for detailed pictures of rural security, to 
formulate military and civil policy, and to grade the performances of programs
175 See for instance, William Colby, Lost Victory (Chicago, 1989), 227-8, who claims based on the 
HES that 90% of the rural population of South Vietnam were under some form of Saigon government 
control by 1970.
176 See Colby to Stovall, 25 November 1968, MACCORDS 101585. See also 'Vietnam Revisited/ 
Memorandum to CORDS, July 1970, Robert Komer, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 10.
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and personnel. This dem anded far too much from the system and claims of 
victory based on HES data are misleading.
Several glaring weaknesses rendered the Hamlet Evaluation System 
inappropriate for such profound demands. It measured visits by government 
personnel, num ber of schools constructed, canals dredged, wells built, num bers of 
NLF night infiltrations, but did not account for what those activities 
accomplished. Thus the system concentrated on various inputs rather than 
outputs, or results.177 The num ber of contacts made by 'friendly forces' with the 
Viet Cong, for instance, was one measure of security, but it did not account for 
'th e  num ber of VC actually th e re /178 This practice skewed the system's 
m easurem ents of influence and pacification efforts, but rendered it useless as a 
developm ent tool. In fact, most advisers on the ground dismissed it as a 
dependable gauge of development.179 As Fitzgerald pu t it aptly, this dependence 
on inputs insulated high officials in Saigon from bad news.180 It also simplified a 
society in flux in misleading ways. For instance, a shanty town of misplaced and 
im poverished persons on the outskirts of Saigon would likely have more 
governm ent than NLF presence. Thus, it would appear on HES reports as 
governm ent controlled, as though it were some kind of success, w hen in fact it 
was m ore likely a cauldron of discontent and anger.181
M oreover, there is controversy about the system's purpose. One Defense 
Departm ent contractor argued that the HES was an inaccurate device because it 
had 'evolved out of a need to measure "results" or "progress." ' 182 The 
bureaucratic need to show progress led to basic problems of interpretation as well.
177 'Hamlet Evaluation System Study/ The Simulmatics Corporation for the U.S. Army, 1 May 1968, 
Record Group 472, MACCORDS PP&P, 1968, file 1601-09A.
178 Province Monthly Report for Bac Lieu, August 1968, Peter E. Brownback, U.S. Army Center of 
Military History, Washington, DC. Also found in MACCORDS 101452.
179 See, for instance, 'The Use of HES and TFES as Management Tools/ Memorandum from Robert E. 
Matteson, CORDS Deputy, to Ambassador Robert Komer, CORDS Director, 15 May 1968. See also, 
'Hamlet Evaluation System Study/ 1 May 1968, The Simulmatics Corporation, MACCORDS PP&P 
1968, file 1601-09A.
180 Fitzgerald, Fire In the Lake, 363.
181 Ibid., 352-3, for Fitzgerald's description of South Vietnamese shanty towns.
182 'Analysis of Vietnamization: Summary and Evaluation/ November 1973, Bendix, Inc., Vietnam 
Collection, Jack Taylor Donation, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 
Washington, DC.
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Field personnel regarded 'C ' hamlets as heavily contested, but the Pentagon listed
them as secure despite num erous reports suggesting that the practice stop.183 It is
difficult to say w ith precision how much the need to demonstrate victory skewed
HES reports, but there is no doubt that field officers were under pressure to show
results in their districts. One adviser told a U.S. Member of Congress:
I w ork a 110 hour week. I dow ngraded four ham lets after the 
February Tet Offensive and was im m ediately hit w ith a barrage of 
cables from Saigon dem anding a full explanation for dow ngrading 
them. For the next couple of weeks, I spent m y time justifying m y 
evaluations. . . . D uring that time, I w asn't doing the things I should 
have been doing. I believe I am an honest m an, and although I hate 
to adm it it, it may be a long time in hell before I downgrade another 
ham let.18*
It was common to find the HES showing an area to be government 
controlled while qualitative reports depicted it as heavily contested. The 1970 
HES rating for all hamlets in Chau Doc province was 89.9% secure (AB or C). But 
a pacification study found the Viet Cong Infrastructure 'strong and widespread.
In m any areas of the province the enemy can move undetected, unchallenged, 
and w ithout fea r/185 An American adviser in Phu Yen province cited HES claims 
that the province was 90% secure and developing nicely. The adviser saw things 
differently. 'The government's position here is that it was in the forefront of 
pacification progress last year and made all its goals (it did not), and that 
everything is really all right etc. etc. (it is no t)/ Local security forces were 
'm arginal or completely inadequate/ The province chief was not interested in 
pacification or development. Non-military program s were 'in e r t /188
Moreover, American evaluators essentially rated their own performances.
183 See for instance, 'Report to Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. Review of 
Hamlet Evaluation System, Vietnam Pacification Program/ Comptroller General of the United 
States, 16 January 1969, MACCORDS 101585.
184 'Measuring Hamlet Security in Vietnam/ Report of a Special Study Mission by Honorable John 
V. Tunney (California), of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
Washington: 1969, CMH Pacification Files.
185 'Territorial Security in Chau Doc Province,’ IV CORPS Tactical Zone, 25 January 1970, 
Pacification Studies Group, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, file 1601-09A. See also report for Binh Dinh, 
n CORPS, June 1969, MACCORDS 101564.
186 Territorial Security in Chau Doc Province, Territorial Security in Phu Yen Province, Pacification 
Studies Group, 25 January 1970, RG 472, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970,1601-09A. see also Province (RD) 
Reports, Phu Yen Province, January 1970, CMH.
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The result, according to a former adviser, was that 'reporting was usually too 
optim istic/ It was simply too tem pting to make oneself look good.18? The system 
had the same effect on the advisers' Vietnamese counterparts. A bad HES report 
reflected poorly on the local Vietnamese hierarchy, and especially the district 
chief, w ho stood to lose a lucrative post. This helped to create adversary 
relationships betw een many Americans and South Vietnamese, whose lucrative 
jobs could be at stake if HES scores dropped too much on their watch. A former 
American intelligence adviser claims that HES scores would have dropped 
countrywide had the tru th  been known, but that local officials m ade strenuous 
efforts to make things look good to Saigon.188
South Vietnamese peasants, as the following section will demonstrate, 
were even less likely to report the true strength of communist units to American 
advisers. As a Congressional report noted, villagers under threat of death for 
informing on the National Liberation Front could hardly be expected to answer 
candidly questions about the local activities of the guerrillas.189 After decades of 
war, villagers knew the rules of survival. 'Rule num ber one was "Never inform 
the Governm ent of Communist activities." '19o This tendency skewed HES scores 
significantly.
In short, the HES generally underestimated NLF presence and strength.
This dependency on a skewed system led U.S. and Saigon officials to overestimate 
their ow n influence, and underestim ate that of the National Liberation Front, 
both before and after the Tet Offensive of 1968. This insulated policy makers from 
bad new s and helped lead to claims by some participants and scholars that nation 
building was succeeding in the early 1970s, claims that are difficult to prove.
187 Ambassador James B. Engle, oral history interview, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, 
Georgetown University Library, 1 August 1988. Engle was the province senior adviser to Phu Yen 
Province.
188 Herrington, Silence Was a Weapon, 193.
189 'Measuring Hamlet Security in Vietnam/ Report of a Special Study Mission by Honorable John 
V. Tunney (California), of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
Washington: 1969, CMH Pacification Files.
190 Herrington, Silence was a Weapon, 39.
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2.6 (ii) Post Tet Offensive Security Conditions: the N ational Liberation Front and 
the G overnm ent's Presence in  the Villages.
Until 1968, NLF influence prevented the Saigon governm ent and their American 
allies from sustaining political or economic program s in the vast majority of rural 
South Vietnam. But the Tet Offensive of 1968 altered the rural balance of power 
and opened the way for the government to begin asserting itself at the village 
level.19i By January 1968 Lyndon Johnson was claiming that victory was on the 
horizon, that the enemy in Vietnam was a spent force, incapable of m ounting a 
serious challenge to U.S. and South Vietnamese power. On the evenings of 29-30 
January, however, 70,000 Viet Cong regular and local troops supported by 
thousands of N orth Vietnamese regulars attacked all the major cities and most of 
the m ajor m ilitary installations in South Vietnam.192
The American public was shocked by the scope and ferocity of the 
offensive. From news reports in its aftermath, it became clear that the Viet Cong 
owned the countryside and the government was left w ith only daytim e control of 
the major cities and towns. This did not look like a victory to the American 
polity and its support for the war began to deteriorate. Tet M au Than, as the 
Vietnamese call it, proved to be a political defeat for Saigon and W ashington, but 
ironically, it was a stunning military victory.193
The Viet Cong died in droves. Accurate figures m ay never be known. One 
American estimate, however, pu t VC dead at 30,000 in the first 10 days of the 
offensive, and 60,000 for the first half of 1968. Such losses w ould have 
represented half their southern-born m anpow er.19* W hatever the precise figures, 
the Viet Cong suffered a brutal military, if not political, defeat. But having told its
191 For a good description of the post Tet Offensive period, Ronald Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest 
Year in Vietnam (New York, 1983). For descriptions of changes in security during this period, see 
Colonel Harry Summers, On Strategy (Novato, CA, 1982), 134. See also George Herring, America's 
Longest War, and Brigadier General Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.—
Vietnam in Perspective (San Rafael, CA) 1978.
192 For statistics on the Tet Offensive, see Harry Summers, Vietnam War Almanac (New York, 1985) 
and Dave Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, appendix.
193 For a description of the political and military effects of the Tet Offensive, see Don Oberdorfer, 
Tet: The Turning Point of the Vietnam War (New York, 1983).
194 David Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet, 191. See also Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 371.
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public that the enem y was exhausted in 1967, the American military and 
government had dam aged its credibility beyond short term repair. Now, when 
U.S. and South Vietnamese officials announced truthfully that the Viet Cong was 
in military extremis, a large percentage of the American public did not believe 
them. Even am ong m any who had considered themselves 'hawks,' the w ar had 
begun to look futile.195 Still another irony of this situation was that, w ith the 
Viet Cong's m ilitary capability radically reduced, the nation-building effort could 
move forward as never before.
When the offensives subsided, the South Vietnamese and Americans 
began to utilize new  pacification and development agencies and budgets that had 
been upgraded the year before at American insistence. The civil campaign now 
enjoyed greater access to funds and the increasing interest of both President Thieu 
and the American command. Village security ratings began to rise in late 1968 
and early 1969. Roads, canals, and waterways previously impassable or heavily 
interdicted by the Viet Cong now were passable. In Sa Dec province, for instance, 
advisers were able to report in July 1969 that whereas the province's major roads 
and waterways had been too dangerous to use regularly, cutting local farmers off 
from their markets, all major roads and all but one of the waterways now were 
considered secure.196 Elsewhere, engineers extended and improved the national 
road system. Far less fighting occurred in and around heavily populated areas 
and villages previously difficult for government personnel to operate in became 
accessible. By 1971, even the NLF's command, whose assessments tended to be as 
optimistic as were the American command's, admitted grudgingly that 
pacification w as m aking headw ay in rural areas.197
Controversy thrives still over just how weakened the National Liberation 
Front was during the post-Tet Offensive period. Brigadier General Dave Palmer
claims that during the Tet Offensive the South rose up 'in  revulsion and
195 Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the 
crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (New Haven, 1983), 694.
196 Sa Dec Province Briefing Folder, CORDS Advisory Staff, July 1969, Record Group 472, 
MACCORDS 101454.
197 COSVN Directive No. 01 /  CT71, believed by U.S. intelligence to have been written in January or 
February of 1971, Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation of Human Decisions, 550.
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resistance to the invaders/ leaving them forever crippled.198 Allen Goodman 
argues that the 1968 offensives not only militarily damaged the com m unist 
movement, but had  weakened it significantly as a political force in the South 
because of the brutality of the Viet Cong and their PAVN allies.1"  Seymore 
Hersh, a journalist widely regarded as anti-war, argues that the NLF did not 
oppose pacification successes after 1968 because they were militarily weakened, but 
that they remained politically intact. Ronald Spector believes the NLF was greatly 
weakened by its 1968 losses, but that it survived and managed to deny the 
governm ent control of the countryside.200 Gabriel Kolko, a vociferous critic of 
U.S. policy in Vietnam, sees the NLF as only temporarily weakened after the Tet 
Offensive but insists that its political infrastructure remained intact and that by 
1971 its military wing had "fully recuperated/201 The historian N go Vinh Long 
claims that the NLF reached the apex of its power in 1971-2.202
Improvements in rural security between 1968 and 1972 w ere so dramatic 
from the South Vietnamese government's point of view that claims of victory 
over the National Liberation Front are understandable. But victory in such a case 
m ust be carefully defined. Killing off the bulk of the Viet Cong and reopening 
lines of communication, while crucial, w on for the governm ent only increased 
influence in the countryside, not anything like control. And the Front's change to 
long haul, low intensity tactics after the disastrous losses of 1968 aided in its 
survival, especially its political survival. In the post 1968 period, Richard Nixon's 
Vietnamization policy was stark evidence that the U.S. commitment was waning. 
The depleted Viet Cong, or military wing, went to ground and w aited for U.S. 
forces to w ithdraw. They broke into small elusive units, providing security for 
NLF political cadres, attacking in force only when they believed they had a clear
198 Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective (San Rafael, CA, 
1978), 187.
199 Allen E. Goodman, The Lost Peace (Stanford, CA, 1983), 168-9. See also Allen Goodman, 'The 
Dynamics of the United States—South Vietnamese Alliance: What Went Wrong/ in Vietnam as 
History , ed. Peter Braestrup (Washington, DC, 1984), 91.
200 Ronald Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York, 1983), 290.
201 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modem Historical 
Experience (New York, 1985), 371.
202 N g0 Vinh Long, Vietnam: The Real Enemy/ Bulletin of Concerned Scholars 21,1989, 27.
89
advantage, but otherwise generally leaving larger engagements to the PAVN.205 
The idea was to retain as m uch political power as possible along w ith enough 
m ilitary potency to keep the governm ent from consolidating its nation building 
gains.
From the governm ent's perspective, security improvem ents were often 
limited to daylight hours. Some provinces enjoyed near peace-time conditions, 
but in most areas the threat of selective violence remained high. Rare indeed 
were the district and village officials who slept outside armed compounds. The 
National Liberation Front's skeletal m ilitary force remaining after 1968 was not 
able to dominate rural areas as its once powerful main force units had done, but 
was sufficient to ham string the government in the villages. As one CORDS 
official noted, even when the VC military presence was diminished, the 
insurgents could cripple local government and development in the absence of a
military security team.204 A U.S. district senior adviser in Bien Hoa, a relatively
secure province, pu t im proved security in perspective. After 1968, "you could go 
just about anywhere you w anted, once. It was the tenth time that was the 
problem .' You had to think in terms of investment and investors. It was one 
thing for advisers who could call up support to operate in the countryside, and 
quite another for Vietnamese civilians w ho sought economic or political 
opportunities that the NLF m ight disapprove of. "If you drew  the attention of the 
VC and they w anted you, they got you.'205 Howard Lange, a CORDS official in 
Hue, pointed out that the NLF did not control the local countryside in 1971. They 
did not have to. Just the threat was enough to keep investors from making a 
commitment to new  projects.
So long as this was the case, most potential investors w ould take part in the
203 The orders to break into small groups and avoid large scale contact came in the form of COSVN 
Resolution DC, from the communists's South Vietnamese headquarters. For details of the order, see 
for instance, VSSG study on Quang Nam Province, March 1970, Pacification Files I CORPS, 1968- 
1972, Quang Nam Province, 1967-70, CMH. See also COSVN Resolution XTV, described in "VC/NVA 
Strategy/ 30 June 1970, MACCORDS PP&P 1969, File 1601-09A.
204 Memorandum to Chief R D C /O , from Chief RDC/O South, 26 February 1967, MACCORDS, 
101559.
205 Former District Senior Adviser John Lyle, interview with author, 25 July 1995, U.S. State 
Department, Washington, DC.
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artificial economy constructed of American largess while shunning real 
development, especially in rural areas. Visiting evaluators m ight get an 
impression of security, but the NLF retained the ability to subvert long-term and 
diversified economic revival. Rice farming could and did boom under such 
circumstances in m uch of the country, partly because the NLF favored increased 
food production, partly because they did not wish to alienate peasants w ho were 
strongly in favor of the new technology, partly because the divisibility of the 
technology m ade it difficult for the NLF to physically oppose. The long-term 
private investm ent in agriculture, infrastructure, industry, and technology vital 
to sustained economic growth would not be forthcoming so long as investors 
knew that even a decreased risk existed. And the massive costs required to keep 
markets and transport links open, which can be considered transaction costs, 
w ould continue to hinder growth.
Until 1968 pacification had consisted mainly of military operations aimed 
at physical control of the population.2** After the slaughter of 1968, the American 
command recognized that the National Liberation Front's most potent rem aining 
weapon was its political wing, the area and village cadre and shadow 
governments whose job was to propagandize, collect taxes, set up  inform ant 
systems, and generally create an environment in which the insurgency could 
function. In their ungainly language, the U.S. command called these political and 
economic organizations the vViet Cong Infrastructure/ or VCI. The U.S. believed 
that w ithout this infrastructure the Front's m ilitary units, which depended upon 
local food, money, information, and silence to operate, w ould shrivel. The 
Americans therefore devised a program they named Phoenix (Phung H oang in 
Vietnamese) to root out and destroy this political organization. Phoenix 
attem pted to establish province and district intelligence centers w ith which all 
South Vietnamese and American agencies would share intelligence on 
individual NLF operatives and guerrillas. All information from informants, 
police and military operations, and prisoner interrogations were to be gathered at
206 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 386.
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these centers. When dossiers on particular individuals were substantial enough, 
small teams of commandos, regular troops, or police were to be dispatched to 
capture or kill the person targeted.
William Colby, who directed the program, attributed to Phoenix the 
capture of 28,978 'com m unist leaders' of the NLF's political apparatus, the 
defection of 17,717 of them, and the killing of 20,587 more by 1971.2°7 He believes 
the program, combined w ith the rest of the pacification effort, nearly severed the 
tie between the NLF and Hanoi, leaving the former to wither.2^  The program 
did pu t great pressure on the NLF, m ade the lives of many of its members in 
South Vietnam a misery, and, judging from internal documents, caused it serious 
alarm .209 But Phoenix did not perform  as envisioned and the NLF survived it.
The vast majority of the American province senior advisers reported the 
Phoenix program  as failing between 1969 and 1971.210 One particular weakness 
was the reliance on intelligence sharing among all appropriate U.S. and South 
Vietnamese agencies. By all accounts this was an unrealistic expectation. One 
originator of the program  called the hope of a coordinated and cooperative effort 
'sheer nonsense' while adm itting that he had shared such hope in the beginning. 
'MI5 fights MI6, the GRU hates the KGB and the FBI w ouldn 't tell the CIA the 
time of day unless forced to by higher [authority]: however, the Vietnamese 
services were going to cooperate in an atmosphere of sweetness and light.'211 
More important, Phoenix never w as adopted by the South Vietnamese, w ithout 
whom  the program  rem ained American and therefore tem porary and only 
partially effective, 'a  classic example of an attem pt to graft an American-conceived 
plan onto a stubbornly resistant Vietnamese situation.'212
 Stuart Herrington calls the Phoenix program  'about as popular as leprosy'
207 Colby, Lost Victory, 331.
2°8 Ibid., 360.
209 Dale Andrade, Ashes to Ashes,the Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Toronto, 1990), 255- 
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DC.
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am ong most Vietnamese province and district officials, and cites several reasons 
for this. Many officials knew their lives depended upon not threatening the local 
Front apparatus too severely. More often, they feared for their jobs. Herrington's 
ow n counterpart was exemplary of this attitude:
Major N ghiem  w ould  have liked to have som ehow  m ade the 
Vietcong shadow  governm ent go away~he knew how  dangerous it 
w as—but he sim ply could not accept Phoenix as the solution to the 
problem . I som etim es had the im pression that [Nghiem] feared 
Phoenix m ore than he feared the Vietcong, for a functioning Phoenix 
program  w ould uncover and centralize information on the extent of 
enem y strength in Due Hue district, something he could not accept.
Since such an exposure of the enemy's activities w ould find its way 
into the PIES report, Major Nghiem feared for his job. Sharp declines 
in a district's HES ratings (which would probably happen countrywide 
had the tru th  been known) reflected on the district chief.213
Thus the South Vietnamese allies tended to go through the motions, 
attem pting to satisfy insistent American advisers without doing too m uch 
dam age to the NLF. Some areas had successful programs run  by determined 
governm ent officials, bu t usually successes resulted from American pressure or 
direct action, and the program  withered as the U.S. presence diminished. Most 
cadres caught or killed were trapped by conventional military 'cordon and search' 
operations rather than by individual targeting, and these cadres tended to be low 
level. The families or comrades of many prisoners bought their freedom from 
acquiescent government officials, and so one way or another, the higher level 
NLF cadre generally remained at liberty. Thus, many of the successes claimed for 
Phoenix were mere 'p ap er eliminations.'214 Former NLF Justice Minister Truong 
N hu Tang gave Phoenix a mixed review. 'In  many places the program  was 
carried out in a lackadaisical or ham-handed fashion. . . .  In some locations, 
though, Phoenix was dangerously effective.'215 Captured NLF documents suggest 
that by whatever means, the counterinsurgency effort did cause the Front
213 Herrington, Silence was a Weapon, 195.
214 'The Status of the Viet Cong Infrastructure in Long An and Phu Yen Provinces,’ 3 January 1970, 
CORDS Information Center, MACCORDS 101745.
215 Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong Memoir, 201.
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problems in some regions. One document from Central Vietnam calls Phoenix 
intelligence personnel 'th e  most dangerous enemies of the Revolution.' Another 
document lamented the loss of key cadre at the district and village level.216 
Phoenix did weaken the National Liberation Front, bu t fell far short of 
eliminating its political infrastructure country-wide or diminishing its influence 
sufficiently for government purposes. And so the NLF, although m uch depleted 
and under trem endous pressure, survived nearly everywhere and, as the 
following examples confirm, rem ained potent in m any parts of South Vietnam.
Diverse conditions in South Vietnam are at least partially responsible for 
conflicting accounts of the strength of the National Liberation Front. Many 
American participants in the 1968-1972 period remember it as som ething akin to 
peace time and had the impression that pacification and development were 
succeeding. Their impressions depended largely upon where they served.217 For 
example, some of the more secure provinces in the Mekong delta experienced 
very little of the war in the early 1970s. In Kien Phuong province, there were only
six NLF/PAVN incidents reported in December 1970.218 In An Giang province in
December 1971, CORDS reported 'no  evidence of enemy presence or influence/21* 
In contrast, delta provinces, such as Vinh Binh and Kien Hoa, were the scenes of 
ferocious struggle.2^  Few districts in Central Vietnam experienced respite from 
the war. A mid-1970 evaluation from Quang Nam province, on the border with 
North Vietnam, reported w idespread physical devastation, an acute refugee 
problem, and socioeconomic stagnation. It lam ented that half the province's 
arable land had been given over to 'free fire zones/ in which anyone m oving 
above ground was considered an enemy and fired on by South Vietnamese and
216 Andrade, Ashes to Ashes, 270-1.
217 Kenneth Quinn, Interview with author, 21 July 1994, U.S. State Department, Washington, DC. 
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218 Province Monthly Report for Kien Phong, December 1970, Richard A. Hippier , Col., CMH.
219 Province Monthly Report for An Giang, December 1971, T.S. Jones, CMH.
220 See for instance the Province Monthly Report for Vinh Binh, December 1971, Walter B. Clark, 
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U.S. troops and a irc ra f ts  Just to the south, in Binh Dinh province, advisers 
reported the m ost extensive NLF terror campaign since 1963, resulting in a 
pervasive atmosphere of fear in the villages of the coastal plain.222
Selective attacks kept the South Vietnamese government off balance, bu t it 
was the common peasant practice of refusing to divulge local NLF activity that 
prevented both the Americans and the government from accurately gauging their 
enem y's influence in the villages. In heavily contested Phuoc Hiep village, in 
H au Nghia province, 85% of the population was paying NLF taxes in m id 1970, 
according to a Vietnamese evaluation team. Phuoc Hiep village lay along 
H ighway 1, the main north-south artery in the country. It was just over an hour's 
drive from Saigon and was near major South Vietnamese and American bases. A 
few villagers were willing to speak to the Vietnamese evaluators sent by CORDS. 
Until then, distressed citizens of Phuoc Hiep had not reported Front activities to 
the governm ent for fear of angering both. If government officials knew of the 
high level of local NLF activity, they might accuse villagers of being communist 
sym pathizers, and 'the VC would say that the people reported them and they 
w ould be terrorized immediately. Even the [GVN] officials' wives and children, if 
they paid taxes to the VC, dared not talk about it.'223 This silence, both willingly 
practiced and violently enforced, caused the government to underestim ate the 
Front's political influence in the villages.
Saigon officials were aware of NLF taxation efforts, but because of the 
peasants' silence, the extent of this drain on the economy was obscured and the 
influence it afforded the Front did not show up on security ratings. The four 
village Vinh Long study cited previously provides an apt example. The U.S. 
Province Senior Adviser estimated that villagers there paid between 20% and 50% 
of their yearly income to the Front, an indication of substantial NLF influence.
The HES, however, classified these four villages to be 85-90% secure, or under
221 VSSG study on Quang Nam Province, March 1970, Pacification Files I CORPS, 1968-1972, Quang 
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very little NLF influence. The HES did not pick up  on the obstacles posed by the 
villagers' silence; only perceptive or experienced evaluators or field personnel 
tended to discern the depth of NLF influence.
The NLF found more isolated areas easier to live in, work in, and 
influence. For instance, in secluded Bac Lieu province, in the lower Mekong 
delta, the NLF in 1970 was 'still able to enter most hamlets at will, collect taxes 
and organize support at the expense of the GVN /2 2 4  D uring the same period, in 
the remote delta province of Chau Doc, where the NLF was not historically strong 
because of the province's Hoa Hao and Khmer populations, the Phoenix adviser 
reckoned the Viet Cong Infrastructure was w idespread and well-organized in the 
m ost densely populated and economically im portant districts .225 In the far north 
of the country, a special evaluation found in spring 1970 that the NLF was 
building up local forces w ith Northern soldiers as 'fille rs/ and could maintain a 
presence in hamlets. They showed no inclination to confront the governm ent 
directly, but were waiting for U.S. forces to depart. 'Since it is clear that security 
and control gains have been dependent on, and continue to rely on [American 
troops], it is difficult to see how existing gains could be m aintained if the U.S. 
w ithdrew within the next 18 m onths /2 2 6
In winter and spring 1970 in Phu Yen province, a communist stronghold 
on the central coast, the NLF/PAVN presence was immensely powerful. The 
province senior adviser suspected an accommodation betw een the province 
government and the NLF, 'o r at least a stubborn desire to do nothing in the hopes 
that the VC will do the sam e/ He further reported that rural security could be 
gauged by the unwillingness of people associated w ith the governm ent to sleep in 
their villages. 'Every day, hundreds of [soldiers and officials] pour into Tuy Hoa 
City in the late afternoon, past theoretical checkpoints/ To avoid the capricious
224 Province Monthly Report for Bac Lieu, July 1970, Bert H Herigstad, Col., Sr. Military Adviser., 
CMH.
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violence of the village war, between 8 - 10,000 civilians moved into the province 
capital at Hoi An at night as well.227
Finally, another problem province for the Saigon government, Chong 
Thien in the delta, proved unable to dislodge the Front's shadow government or 
their VC wing. In October 1970 the NLF was 'selective and bo ld / overrunning 
district headquarters and outposts, interdicting waterways and markets. In 
December, they conducted several successful attacks again, and despite the 
pressure Phoenix brought to bear on them, the Front managed to stay close to the 
population. Things had  not improved by December of 1971, when 'th e  enemy, in 
the form of m ain force units and tough, seasoned local elements was still potent 
and able to choose targets of opportunity almost at will.'228 An American adviser 
in Vin Binh province reported in 1972 that, 'although the [VC] m ilitary structure 
has suffered over the past year the VCI seem to have gained strength /2 2 9  
The National Liberation Front wielded influence even in areas the 
governm ent considered friendly. William Colby acknowledged the danger the 
NLF continued to pose even in An Giang, a Hoa Hao stronghold which the 
Americans and the governm ent considered the most anti-communist province 
in the country. In early 1971 Colby complained that because of poor management, 
corruption, and a lack of interest by government officials, the Viet Cong's political 
apparatus there survived.238 This evidence that the NLF was active and 
potentially influential in even the m ost secure of provinces should have been the 
especially alarm ing to strategists in Saigon.
In short, there were few places in South Vietnam where the National 
Liberation Front was unable either to strike selected targets or operate in villages, 
collecting taxes, enforcing the silence of would-be informants, and terrorizing
m any governm ent officials into inaction. A 1970 attack on a South Vietnamese
227 Province Monthly Report for Phu Yen, February and March 1970, James B. Engle, CMH.
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company compound in Phu Yen province demonstrates common NLF tactics in 
the post Tet period: carefully chosen targets, hit and rim  tactics, and a clear 
political message. Three platoons of guerrillas overran a com pound, inflicting 
heavy casualties, executing its commander along with his three small children, 
and destroying a hamlet reputed to be cooperative w ith the government. The 
usual careful NLF planning demonstrated the effectiveness of small forces against 
the governm ent's rural presence. According to the U.S. province adviser, the 
message to villagers was clear: 'cooperation with the GVN will not go 
unpun ished  .'23i
2.7 CONCLUSIONS: DEVELOPMENT DESPITE INSECURITY
This chapter has presented overwhelming evidence that the Saigon governm ent 
did not establish an effective rural presence, that the American presence in South 
Vietnam did as much harm as good, and that the National Liberation Front, 
while physically diminished, m aintained potent political influence throughout 
the country. The Front did not w in the wide political support it sought, but was 
able to maintain a village presence in many areas, to encourage or intimidate 
most South Vietnamese into w ithholding their cooperation from the 
government and the Americans, and to obstruct especially the political objectives 
of Saigon government.
In spite of continuing NLF influence in rural South Vietnam, however, 
successive chapters will demonstrate that several nation building program s 
functioned successfully. Which programs functioned well in the teeth of the NLF 
threat, which did not, and why, are intriguing questions w ith answers that prove 
particularly revealing about development in wartime and low intensity conflict 
conditions.
23i Province Monthly Report for Phu Yen, August 1970, Russell Meerdink, CMH.
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Chapter 3
Rural Development: American Strategies and
Vietnamese Realities
Despite the dim inution of the NLF military threat after 1968, American 
development planners faced daunting problems in South Vietnam. A 
conventional w ar ebbed and flowed in the sparsely populated piedm ont and 
highlands, a m urderous insurgency and counter insurgency terrorized m any 
villages. The Saigon government, a military dictatorship, was in its infancy and 
was woefully short of the administrative technicians and economists necessary to 
implement large scale economic development. To add to these difficulties, the 
Americans did not have much time. American public support for the Vietnam 
campaign was ebbing and W ashington's commitment was beginning to contract.
In these circumstances, development planners from an array of agencies threw 
everything they could into the pot. The result was a wide range of development 
programs employing several approaches and philosophies. Thus, South Vietnam 
during this period provides a unique opportunity to study foreign inspired- 
development, developm ent under conditions of war, of low intensity conflict, 
and in some provinces, w hat amounted to a post conflict setting as well.
Having discussed the political, macroeconomic, and security context for 
American nation building efforts in Chapter Two, this chapter establishes the 
agrarian context w ithin which rural development program s operated. W ithout a 
sense of the economy and society that faced South Vietnamese peasant farm 
families, and a sense of who those farm families were, it is impossible to judge the 
rural development program s examined in subsequent chapters. Section One 
examines U.S. aims and assum ptions regarding rural development and identifies 
the num erous developm ent approaches attem pted in South Vietnam. No study 
has attem pted either of these things. The section also introduces the two major 
American nation building agencies, the United States Agency for International
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Development (USAID) and the Civil Operations and Rural Developm ent Support 
agency (CORDS). Section Two introduces the debates over farm size and 
productivity in Asian agriculture, a debate on which the South Vietnamese 
development experience sheds much light. Section Three introduces the history 
and geography of Vietnamese agriculture and stresses the differences between the 
two major agricultural areas of the country, the Mekong region in the far South 
and the Central Vietnamese coastal plains. Geographic variances played a 
significant role in the performance of development program s in South Vietnam. 
Dramatic differences in climate and agricultural practices affected m any facets of 
economic and social life in their respective regions, and are crucial to 
understanding a m ultitude of issues presented here. Together, these discussions 
provide a framework for the remaining chapters, which examine the aims and 
outcomes of three American inspired development programs.
3.1 THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
SOUTH VIETNAM
No precise definition of development or explicit unifying model inform ed the 
nation building campaign in South Vietnam.i As one CORDS official p u t it, 'no  
convincing concept concerning the role of development emerged at any stage' of 
the American effort in Vietnam.2 The scatter shot development approach, in 
which American planners tried a bit of everything all at once, w as the result of 
several factors: competing views within and between the plethora of agencies 
involved in nation building, desperation in the face of N orth Vietnamese and 
NLF pressure, and years of trial and error not only in South Vietnam, bu t also in 
Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, where American planners had taken part in 
similar agrarian reform programs. Moreover, results were required quickly, and
1 For an explanation of this lack of agreement on a definition of development, see 'The American 
Experience with Pacification in Vietnam/ vol. 1, no. 18, Institute of Defense Analyses, Arlington, 
Virginia, March 1972, Record Group 472, Microfiche Collection, AD-763 953, National Archives II, 
College Park, Maryland (hereafter Archives II).
2 'The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam/ Vol. 1, 42, Institute of Defense Analyses, 
Arlington, Virginia, March 1972, Record Group 472, Microfiche Collection, AD-763 953, Archives II.
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the Americans did not have the time to test each approach at their leisure.
Lacking a clear policy statement for the overall development effort, this 
study looks to the policies themselves and to documentation of the internal 
debate concerning them in order to judge their purposes and underlying 
approaches. It is evident that American planners shared an implicit, if loosely 
held, view of Vietnamese peasants as income maximizing individuals who, 
within the particular constraints they faced, would respond to economic stimuli 
more or less the way American farmers might. In general, Americans tended to 
see Vietnamese peasants from w hat might today be called a rational choice 
political economy perspective (although as a theory this was only emerging at the 
time). A clear illustration of this view appears in a 1973 USAID report: 'W e 
believe that if farmers are provided w ith an opportunity to purchase inputs 
(including machinery and equipment) that they will be like farmers the world 
over and produce more to increase their returns.'3 One developm ent program 
called for peasants to join cooperative economic unions, but even then 
Americans apparently expected them to behave as income-maximizing 
individuals. A CORDS report expressed hope for the program  in these terms: if 
the cooperative unions could achieve 'long run economic gain then the 
motivation for personal gain w ould guide individuals into community 
structures.'4
Because the NLF's strength was mainly rural, rural development was a 
vital facet of the American-inspired nation building effort. American and South 
Vietnamese officials hoped that increased agricultural production would result in 
growing and more equally distributed rural incomes to produce overall economic 
growth and new consum ption opportunities. Village-specific program s were to 
improve health care, education and economic infrastructure. Successful
development program s were to demonstrate the advantages of a democratic free
3 Evaluation Report, National Economic Development Fund, 12 July 1973, Henry F. Lee, leader, 
George Grande, Ken Krause, PD-AAT-196, p. 36, United States Agency for International 
Development, Development Information Center, Washington, DC (hereafter cited as USAID 
followed by document number).
4 'Problems as Posed by the Vinh Long Report on VSD for 1969, undated, Pacification Files, Vinh Long 
Province, United States Center of Military History, Washington, DC. (Hereafter CMH).
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market system over the autocratic communist system of North Vietnam. Clearly, 
planners perceived a happy confluence of economic and political goals.5
Hence, American-inspired large scale, or infrastructural, developm ent 
plans tried to woo peasants to participate by promising increased incomes. Where 
peasants resisted the introduction of economic change, Americans tended to 
adjust their program s in an attem pt to get income incentives right, for instance, 
by subsidizing chemical fertilizer prices.6 The existence of a moral economy as a 
distinct social system does not appear to have suggested itself to American 
planners. But, while land reform was designed with optimizing peasants in 
mind, many village based programs generated by American planners were 
designed to function in different economic atmospheres. As succeeding chapters 
will demonstrate, American agencies were aware that risk aversion and 
community reciprocal arrangements might affect peasant behavior, and 
attempted to account for this in various ways. It would probably imply too much 
coherence to refer to the American development model in South Vietnam as a 
constrained maximizing model. More likely an implicit and loosely held view of 
Vietnamese peasants as rational, optimizing economic actors sprang from the 
focus on the M ekong/Saigon regions, and from the hum an tendency to see others 
as we see ourselves.
For instance, though references to economic theory are rare in U.S. 
documents on Vietnam, American economic planners appear to have tacitly 
assumed that economic growth and change in South Vietnam w ould resemble 
historic growth in the West. Documentary evidence reveals that American plans 
sought a transition from a largely peasant agricultural economy to a more 
commercial, m iddle class, and eventually industrial society, believing that this 
would would be for the greater good, as it had proved in Europe and N orth 
America. Nobel laureate Simon Kuznets demonstrated that in highly developed
5 For general goals of the USAID program, see the following documents. 'Report to the Ambassador 
from the Director of the United States Agency for International Development, Vietnam 1969/ 
Pacification Files 1967-1970 (Closed Files), CMH. See also 'Agricultural Exports and Marketing/ 
Project Review 1971-1974, July 1974, USAID PD-AAF-355-A1.
6 Numerous examples of this are cited in Chapters Six and Seven.
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countries, this transition had indeed been for the greater good. But w ith 
development come structural economic changes, and "while some stand to gain a 
great deal, others stand to lose, if only relatively.'7 Hence, as capital is invested in 
new ventures and income growth accrues there, incomes and consum ption in 
rural areas, especially in the small farm sector, may initially fall in relation to the 
large farm, urban, and industrial sectors.8 However, Kuznets dem onstrated for 
developed countries that these losses are relative and temporary. Over time 
consumption rises for all sectors.9 In the extraordinary political conditions of 
South Vietnam, however, the rural small farm sector had to be catered to 
immediately. Successive chapters dem onstrate that the Americans hoped to 
avoid the initial relative loss and potential economic dislocation Kuznets 
predicted by focusing on raising agricultural standards of living before embarking 
on large scale industrial development.
More specifically, also implicit in the American approach was the goal of 
speeding the transformation of the peasantry into small family farm enterprises 
by improving the technology they used, giving them control over their land, 
bringing them  affordable credit, and integrating them into improving markets, 
thereby raising output and productivity and distributing income more broadly. 
Frank Ellis contends that such approaches "are designed, whether consciously or 
not, whether successfully or not, to "de-peasantize" the peasants and convert 
them into family farm enterprises in a competitive m arket system .'10 There 
seems to have been an unconscious effort on the part of Americans to remake the 
Vietnamese peasant in the image of the American family farmer of the previous 
century. Most U.S. development plans talked about economic stability and
7
Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and Production Structure (Cambridge, 
Mass: 1971), 346.
g
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76.
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grow th.11 But some American analysts recognized an underlying bias to their 
efforts. One U.S. research team noted a 'tendency to force American standards 
and values on the Vietnamese people. Many development plans were designed 
and planned to fit American conceptions of Vietnamese aspirations. . . / 12 This 
plethora of approaches had one common if only vaguely stated goal. The 
Americans believed that prosperous peasants w ould oppose communism.^
There was a political component to these assumptions as well. The 
Americans reasoned that the democratic system they championed was far 
superior to French colonialism or North Vietnamese dictatorship.14 The British 
historian R.B. Smith pu t it best in 1968: 'The hidden assum ption on which m uch 
of American policy in Viet-Nam was based was that the Vietnamese, given 
proper opportunity would live up  to the ideals of liberty and democracy that had 
been bom  in the European enlightenment of the eighteenth century, and had 
been w ritten into the American Constitution.' Smith argued that this reflected 
ignorance about Vietnamese realities. American policies suffered because they 
'proceeded not from theories bu t from assum ptions/15
The internal American debate over what constituted appropriate 
developm ent took place largely between CORDS and USAID.16 Generally, the 
CORDS philosophy called for high impact, short term  development and 
emergency aid on the village level, such as the provision of building materials for 
the construction of schoolrooms and medical facilities, or cash to purchase 
rototillers, irrigation pum ps, start small businesses or create other village 
infrastructure. This approach was new in its grassroots focus and its coordination
11 See for instance, Vietnam Terminal Report, Sector Descriptions, Introduction, USAID, PN-AAX- 
018.
12 'The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam/ Vol. 1,19-20, Institute of Defense 
Analyses, Arlington, Virginia, March 1972, Record Group 472, Microfiche Collection, AD-763 953, 
Archives n.
13 Ibid., 18.
14 For a discussion of anti-colonialism in U.S. policy, see Victor Bator, Vietnam: A Diplomatic 
Tragedy: The Origins of United States Involvement (Dobbs Ferry, NY, 1965),191-205.
15 Ralph Smith, Viet-Nam And the West (Ithaca, NY, 1968), 170-1.
16 'The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam/ Vol. 1,19, Institute of Defense 
Analyses, Arlington, Virginia, March 1972, Record Group 472, Microfiche Collection, AD-763 953, 
Archives II.
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with security forces. CORDS termed this approach 'revolutionary development.'17 
Planners designed these grassroots projects w ith political goals foremost, to 
alleviate some of the most egregious effects of the w ar on South Vietnam's 
populace and w in them over to the governm ent side. In 1967, the U.S. military 
command, into whose structure CORDS fitted, produced a 'strategy statement' 
that defined the political goals of nation building as the elimination of the NLF 
political structure and the 'developm ent of Vietnamese governm ental and 
political institutions and program s which offer attractive alternatives to the VC; 
and which foster cohesiveness and create a sense of nationhood on the part of 
both rural and urban Vietnamese.’18
The USAID approach called for more Tong term  nation building', 
according to a former field officer. This approach sought large scale development 
of infrastructure, technology, and institutions w ith economic goals foremost.19 
Among the USAID's longer-term economic goals w as an increase not merely in 
rural output, bu t also in marketed surplus. This is a crucial distinction, because if 
surpluses are hoarded or consumed by producers, the potentially positive effects 
on the economy at large of increased production are dampened. Therefore, 
merely increasing rural production, while marginally improving peasant welfare, 
may not have the same positive effects on overall economic developm ent or 
industrialization as will increasing m arketed agricultural surplus. Rural 
development plans in South Vietnam depended upon increasing m arketed 
surplus as a link between agricultural improvem ents and general economic 
development. Bringing m ore produce to market, economists predict, will 
increase the purchasing power of the peasantry, creating savings and investment 
income that can be plowed back into productive ventures and prom pting peasants 
to consume more manufactured goods, thus spurring the entire economy. 
M arketed agricultural surpluses can be exported, earning coveted foreign
17 Jan H. Vanderbie, Prov Rep in Vietnam (Philadelphia, 1971), 105.
18 This MACV strategy statement of 1 November 1967 is quoted in 'The USAID Program and 
Vietnamese Reality,' Staff Study, June 1968, USAID PN-ARE-177, p.33.
19 Vanderbie, Prov Rep in Vietnam, 105-18.
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exchange. Planners thus set general development goals of achieving national self 
sufficiency in rice, improving m arketing of the rice crop from surplus to deficit 
areas, and diversifying Vietnamese agriculture to take advantage of potential 
export m arkets.20
Clear evidence of this policy goal comes from a 1970 USAID report in 
which the agency's director declared that enough basic infrastructure investment 
had taken place and that it would be 'necessary for the emphasis in the [USAID 
economic program ] to begin to change to that of fostering domestic production to 
offset im port requirem ents and develop export potential/2* To that end, domestic 
markets had to be improved upon. Four years after the introduction of the 
'Accelerated Rice Program / which is explored in Chapter Four, one USAID report 
noted during the 1970/71 harvest that the Mekong delta area had produced 
enough surplus rice to provide 722,000 tons to deficit areas of South Vietnam. 
Thus, it urged expansion of the coastal merchant fleet, improvement of transport 
infrastructure and commercial contacts between southern and Central Vietnam.22
But USAID could not dictate overall development strategy. As has been 
m ade clear, dozens of South Vietnamese and American agencies with little 
central coordination m ounted an essentially ad hoc development effort. The 
USAID advised each of the Saigon government's technical ministries: agriculture, 
economy, transport, and the like. CORDS alone advised w hat was to be a super 
ministry, the M inistry of Revolutionary Development (MORD). MORD was 
intended to oversee the development effort of the technical ministries, bu t in
20 Regarding the goal of self sufficiency in rice, see 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ 
William J. C. Logan, USDA, and William F. Doody, CIP Program, January 1971,
USAID,VS338.17318. (Hereafter 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam,’ followed by date 
and file no.). Regarding the goals of increased marketed surplus, increased and more widely 
distributed income, and increased farmer welfare, see 'Agricultural Exports and Marketing/ Project 
Review 1971-1974, July 1974, USAID PD-AAF-355-A1. Regarding effects on the overall economy see 
Pham Kim Ngoc, interview with the author, 28 August 1994, Washington, DC.
21 Memorandum for Ambassador William E. Colby, Director CORDS, from D. G. McDonald, Director 
USAID, Spring Review Memorandum, 16 May 1970, DEPCORDS files, GVN Economic Policies (also 
found in USAID file) CMH.
22 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ January 1971, USAID VS338.17318. For an 
outlook on potential agricultural exports, see 'Agricultural Exports and Marketing/ USAID Project 
Review, June 1974, PD-AAF-355-A1.
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practice, it wielded little power over them.23 Officially overseeing the whole 
South Vietnamese effort was the Central Pacification and Development Council 
(CPDC), headed by the Prime Minister. Through USAID and CORDS input, again, 
development plans and approaches emanating from this bureaucratic maze 
proved to be largely American-inspired. Adherents to both long term economic 
development and more politically oriented 'revolutionary development' 
approaches seem to have been satisfied that their views were being pu t into 
practice.24
The intended output of all this bureaucratic input was the achievement of 
w ide range of goals. South Vietnamese and the U.S. sought to raise output, 
m arketed surplus, and rural incomes, to improve rural education, health care, 
local government and economic infrastructure, all w ithin the small, family farm 
context. In pursuit of these tacit goals, the Americans caused several 
development approaches to be attempted concurrently. Surviving 
documentation suggests that development planners did not use labels such as 
'transform ation approach' or 'im provem ent approach' for their efforts. 
Nevertheless, their development programs did bear resemblance to some well- 
known economic theories, both contemporary and just then emerging.
The Americans attem pted the 'transform ation approach' popular in the 
1960s and 70s, which stems from a view of peasants as efficient given available 
technology, and therefore implies that only dramatic shifts in farm technology 
can transform peasant agriculture.2^  Large irrigation projects, farm 
mechanization, and technical packages of seed, fertilizer, pesticides, and credit 
characterize this approach. The technical packages were introduced by USAID and 
proved appropriate. Large scale irrigation projects did not, however, because they 
w ould have required cooperation with Cambodia and Laos over the Mekong
23
For a description of the circuitous relations between USAID, CORDS, and the various Saigon 
ministries, see Vanderbie, Prov Rep in Vietnam, 105-18.
24 'The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam/ Vol. 1,19, Institute of Defense 
Analyses, Arlington, Virginia, March 1972, Record Group 472, Microfiche Collection, AD-763 953, 
Archives II.
25 See Theodore Schultz, 'Economic Growth from Traditional Agriculture/ in Schultz, Transforming 
Traditional Agriculture (New Haven, 1964).
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river, which w as not practicable during the war. Neither was mass 
'tractorization' then a realistic ambition. It would have created surplus 
agricultural labor for which there was no outlet in an unindustrialized country 
and would have required greater capital and credit than was available to all but a 
few farmers in South Vietnam.26
The U.S. sim ultaneously pursued what Ellis has termed the 'im provem ent 
approach/ which implied inefficiency in existing peasant practices.27 The 
approach stressed agricultural education and extension services in order to 
improve cultivation practices. It also implied potentially efficient use of 
technically simple or inefficient methods, and so also focused on limited scale 
improvements, such as small irrigation pum ps. As a part of the improvement 
approach, USAID was involved in the search for appropriate small pum ps, 
attem pted to convince the m inistry of agriculture to provide nation-wide 
agricultural extension services, and tried to open a national agricultural research 
center at My Tho, in the Mekong delta.
United States agencies, including USAID, also tried what has come to be 
known as the 'g e t the prices right' or 'structural adjustment' approach which was 
to gain a great deal of credibility during the 1980s. Advocates of the 'righ t prices' 
approach point to governm ent policies, such as the suppression or distortion of 
market prices as a basis for resource allocation, as the greatest problem facing 
developing economies. Such distorting policies might include overvalued 
currencies, artificially low rates of interest, and factor and produce pricing 
controls.28 Hence, this approach stresses the improvement of imperfect markets 
that inhibit production by denying farmers, and especially peasants, access to
affordable credit, inputs, and fair prices for their produce. Writing in 1971, one
26 The following documents describe the need for large-scale irrigation development, but make it 
clear that such development would require the cooperation of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, 
and possibly China, a political impossibility at that time. 'Mekong River Basin Development/ 
Project Appraisal Report, 25 February 1977, USAID PD-AAD-964-A1, and 'Maximum Agricultural 
Production in An Giang Province, Viet-Nam, March 1969, USAID ISN-20479.
27 Ellis, Peasant Economics, 75-8.
28 See Hayami, Yujiro, and Ruttan, Vernon W. Agricultural Development: An International 
Perspective (Baltimore,1985), 442. See also Deepak Lai, The Poverty of "Development Economics 
(London, 1983). See also, T.N Srinivasan 'Neoclassical Political Economy: The State and Economic 
Development/ Asian Development Review, 3, No. 2, (1985).
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USAID consultancy paper decried the use of economic controls as inefficient and 
inviting corruption. His report argued instead that South Vietnam should 
m anage its economy through 'the exercise of financial controls, including 
governm ent expenditures, taxation, exchange rate and m onetary measures. The 
emphasis is on government action designed to affect expenditures, rather than on 
prices or quantities.'29 In these beliefs USAID found an ally in the Saigon 
governm ent in Minister for the Economy Pham Kim Ngoc. In the early 1970s, 
Ngoc fought to dismantle government economic controls and replace them  with 
m ore economically rational pricing policies and m arket im provem ents. Ngoc 
preferred steering the economy with price mechanisms rather than controls. He 
contended that price controls, for instance, are self defeating. 'They never work, 
they breed corruption, and they didn't stop in fla tion .'so  D uring Ngoc's 1969-1973 
tenure as Minister for the Economy, and with USAID backing, the Saigon 
governm ent attem pted to privatize the critical fertilizer and pesticide businesses, 
lifted some price controls to allow the price of rice to rise and better reflect 
dem and, raised interest rates to make investment more attractive in an 
inflationary economy, devalued the currency to bring its value closer to market 
dem and, and reduced internal barriers to trade.31
The United States also attempted what Ronald Dore and Zoe Mars have 
term ed community development, and is generally referred to in this study as 
village or project development. W riting in 1981, Dore and Mars defined 
community development as community action to create public goods such as 
im proved roads, clinics, and schools, along w ith comm unity action for 
sim ultaneous production by individuals of private goods. Com m unity efforts in 
private production they termed desirable if coordination m eans greater efficiency
and equality of results. They stressed coordinated action because greater
29 'The Transition to Economic Development in Vietnam/ Part I, April 1971, Arthur Smithies, 
Institute for Defense Analyses, PN-ARE-895.
30 Pham Kim Ngoc, interview with the author, 28 August 1994, Washington, DC. For comment on 
these reforms see Dacy, Foreign Aid, 14,15,115. See also Nguyen Anh Tuan, Vietnam Trial and 
Experience, 160-67. See also Economic report of the Special National Security Council Committee, 
Dr. Charles Cooper, head, Memorandum for the Record, June 1970, R.G. 472, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, 
Box 13, File 1601-11A to 1608-11, Archives II.
31 See, for example, 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report,’ January 1971 USAID VS 338.17318 L831.
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community solidarity is an end itself, along w ith economic goals.32 Dore and 
Mars's approach closely resembles the village development approach that CORDS 
advocated in South Vietnam fourteen years earlier. The CORDS-inspired 
program  called for comm unity groups, called People's Common Activity Groups, 
to choose among public and private goods and to oversee the production of 
private goods collectively. As Chapter Six will explain, the CORDS approach was 
designed to prom ote economic activity, wealth, and income equality, but was 
particularly focused on comm unity cohesion and identification with the central 
government.
Finally South Vietnamese and American policy makers, during the post 
1968 period, attem pted to correct for what Michael Lipton called the urban-rural 
divide. Lipton posited that urban elites, or an urban political class, tends to shape 
national policy and engineer an urban bias into economic processes. Even if a 
country with such a divide achieves economic growth, it will be maldistributed, 
the gains being mainly captured by urban dwellers.33 The South Vietnamese 
experience strongly supports Lipton's argument. As Chapter Two showed, the 
South Vietnamese governm ent w as indeed dom inated by an urban elite class, in 
this case generally well-to-do graduates of the national military academy and 
Catholics from the m andarin class. The NLF's makeup was largely rural, as was 
South Vietnam's political constituency. Under political pressure to compete for 
rural influence, as succeeding chapters will establish, the Saigon government 
increasingly caused the terms of trade to favor rural people after 1968.
It should be noted here that the major development programs examined in 
this study -lan d  reform, im proved agricultural technology, community 
development, and political, social and security program s— were dependent upon 
another aspect of USAID's infrastructural approach to institutional and physical 
development. Roads appear to have been the great diffuser of ideas and products
32
Ronald Dore and Zoe Mars, Community Development: Comparative Case Studies in India, the 
Republic of Korea, Mexico, and Tanzania, (London and Paris, 1981) Introduction, 18.
33 For an explanation of urban bias in development see Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor: 
A Study of Urban Bias in World Development (Cambridge, Mass, 1977), 44-79. See Toye's short 
summary of Lipton's arguments in, Dilemmas of Development, 127.
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in South Vietnam. A striking number of former American officials poin t to road 
building as the most influential development effort in South Vietnam. A 
poignant example came from a former delta adviser and pacification evaluator:
Building roads, building bridges, build ing ports, sh ipp ing  stuff, 
p u ttin g  u p  te lecom m unica tions fac ilities ch an g ed  th in g s  
dramatically. But [the importance of this] probably w asn 't recognized 
by the Vietnamese or by the Americans, and probably still isn 't. A 
practical example: You could go down the road in districts I had, as 
far as you could drive, where there was a bridge or im proved road, 
life changed dramatically and you m arginalized rapidly Viet Cong 
guerrilla efforts. They were unable to deal with the forces that a road 
w ould bring: the information that w ould come, the ability to move 
back and forth, for people to go to a district hospital and dispensary, 
for governm ent people to come in and ou t no m a tte r  how  
ineffective they might be, for their kids to go to that next level of 
school. And there was so much bus service and lambretta service all 
of a sudden that would open up. Different kinds of crops suddenly 
became possible, marketing of vegetables, all of that m oved so fast 
that the Viet Cong couldn't do anything about it. . . . because people 
reacted as hum an beings react wherever you put a road up. . . .Where 
the road stopped, and I had places where the roads only w ent so far 
in my district, and then you had to go across a rickety old m onkey 
bridge and you started walking, and life would change. The products 
you 'd  see, the style of life, the style of agriculture, the level of 
sophistication of the people. I saw that again in the Philippines. 
W here the [rebel] strongholds began was where the roads ended.
Same thing again in Cambodia.34
Thus, w ithout the provision of a road net in South Vietnam, and likewise 
w ithout the post 1968 security improvements that opened those roads to daily 
travel, none of the development programs examined in the following chapters 
w ould have been practicable.
3.2 THE FARM SIZE DEBATE AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE DEVELOPMENT
The debate over farm size and efficiency, introduced here and considered in 
context in Chapters Four and Five, has simmered among economists and 
economic historians for many years. Debate has focused upon w hy an inverse
34 Kenneth Quinn, District Senior Adviser, Sa Dec and Chau Doc provinces, Mekong delta region, 
1969-1970. Evaluator, CORDS Pacification Studies Group, 1971. Interview with author, U.S. 
Department of State, Washington, DC, 21 July 1994.
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relationship between farm size and productivity tends to exist in developing 
countries w ith preindustrial agricultural practices. That is, why do smaller farms 
tend to be more productive per unit of land—that is, to have higher land 
productivity rather than necessarily higher total factor productivity—than larger 
farms? Economists generally agree that such an inverse relationship has been 
established for m any developing countries, at least until the 'green revolution.' 
Graham Dyer contends that 'th e  empirical evidence for the existence of an 
inverse relationship between farm  size and farm productivity is overwhelming, 
both historically and geographically/33 Defining what constitutes a small or large 
farm becomes difficult w hen different climates, crops, and cultivation practices 
are considered. Frank Ellis believes that the key distinction is not merely size, but 
also whether or not a farm depends on hired labor or family labor, the latter of 
which m any observers contend is more productive.36
While the existence of an inverse relationship is largely accepted, the 
reasons for its existence rem ain under debate.37 The most widely accepted 
explanations center on the attributes of small family farmers, who are said to 
have more direct motivation than  the hired laborers working someone else’s 
farms, a better intrinsic grasp of the agronomic attributes of their land, and more 
flexibility in seasonal labor deployment. Capitalist farmers, on the other hand, 
may have management and supervision problems, face greater rigidities of 
seasonal employment, and have less detailed knowledge of their land. Moreover 
imperfect factor markets m ay present large and small farmers with differing prices 
for similar inputs. For instance, land and input prices tend to be lower for large 
farmers, because they have greater access to capital, and at lower interest rates. 
Labor prices, on the other hand, tend to favor small family farms, because they do
35 Graham Dyer, 'Farm Size-Farm Productivity Reexamined: Evidence from Rural Egypt/ The 
Journal of Peasant Studies. Vol. 19, No.l, October 1991, 59. See also Ajit Kumar Ghose, 'Farm Size 
and Land Productivity in Indian Agriculture: A Reappraisal.’ The Journal of Development Studies. 
Vol.16, No. 1, October 1979. Bhalla and Roy believe the concept has endured the test of time and 
become 'conventional wisdom/ Sujit S. Bhalla and Prannoy Roy, 'Mis-specification in Farm 
Productivity Analysis: The Role of Land Quality/ Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 40, 1988, 55-73.
36Frank Ellis, Peasant Economics, 207.
37 For instance, in 'The Role of Land Quality/ Bhalla and Roy argue that small farms in India tend 
to have greater soil fertility than large farms, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 40, 1988, 55-73.
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not price their labor by the hour, but tend to work as necessary.
High land and input prices combined with low labor prices w ould tend to 
provide small farm families w ith more incentive to use w hat land is available to 
them more productively than larger farms. Amartya Sen, for one, asserted that 
the crucial factor among all of these is the intensive practices of small farmers. 
Where large farms will employ labor to the point where the m arginal physical 
product of labor equals the market wage, small family farmers will continue 
working a plot until the marginal physical product of labor equals zero. 'Because 
the small farms tend to use labor more intensively they are able to achieve a 
higher cropping intensity and a greater output per acre than large farms.'38 
Graham Dyer pu t it more starkly: 'The inverse relationship indicates a desperate 
effort to scratch a living from inadequate la n d /3 9
The apparent implications of an inverse relationship have constituted 'a  
central plank in the case for redistributive land reform and a small farm bias in 
agrarian developm ent p o l i c y . In South Vietnam, the political effects of the 
existence of a majority of landless or near landless peasants presum ably 
eliminated consideration of a large farm policy on political grounds alone 
-research has turned up no evidence that such a strategy was ever discussed by 
policy makers.
With regard to the farm size and efficiency question, economic and political 
goals in South Vietnam coincided. Because Vietnam's rural population in 
productive areas was dense, largely impoverished, and a vital political 
constituency in the late 1960s, because its industrial sector was small, and because 
its level of agricultural technology was relatively low, a small farm strategy and 
more equitable distribution of income were valid initial goals. A large num ber of 
the peasantry were refugees. Most peasants who were farming w ere mainly 
subsistence oriented, and thus produced very little m arketed surplus. South 
Vietnam, once a rice exporter, had become the world 's largest rice im porter, so
Amartya Sen cited in V. N. Balasubramanyan, The Economy of India (Boulder, 1984), 89.
39 Dyer, 'Farm Size-Farm Productivity/ 84.
40 Ibid., 59.
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low was its agricultural production in the late 1960s 41 In 1967, for instance, 
imports represented 28% of South Vietnam 's rice availability.42
So long as the peasantry merely subsisted, economic growth w as impossible 
and industrialization unlikely. O utput and productivity gains were necessary in 
order to increase marketed surplus and stimulate the economy as a whole, but 
large-scale farm mechanization was neither possible nor desirable since the 
industrial sector was too small to absorb an excess agricultural work force, and 
capital was not sufficiently available. As the following chapters will confirm, a 
small farm approach swelled the ranks of 'm iddle peasants', increased marketed 
rice surplus, and was the clear choice on technological, economic, employment, 
and political grounds as well.
This increase in marketed surplus, vital to overall economic growth, was 
not an automatic result of the increase in peasant production and fortunes. 
Peasants are both producers and consumers of food. Especially poor farmers may 
be forced into commerce by their inability to feed themselves from their meager 
land holdings. W hen foodgrain prices rise, poorer peasants are often forced to sell 
their grain and buy that of lower price and inferior quality for family 
consumption. M iddle peasants, on the other hand, may have more discretion 
over how much of their harvest they consume or sell on. They m ay retain more 
grain than usual for family consum ption rather than sell on and risk having to 
buy grain for consumption later at higher prices.
Thus, increasing production may create more m iddle peasants and, 
ironically, may simultaneously decrease or hinder marketed surplus, as some 
economists have theorized for India.43 If true, this would be especially critical for 
South Vietnam because in the late 1960s and early 1970s it saw increases in both 
middle peasants and rising food grain prices. T.N. Krishnan's research in India,
41 'Economic Context/ 31 December 1975, Vietnam Terminal Report, USAID PN-ABI-250.
42 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ January 1971, USAID VS338.17318.
43 P.N. Mathur and H. Ezekiel, 'Marketable Surplus on Food and Price Fluctuations in a Developing 
Economy,' Kyklos, 1961, 316-406, and Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Indian Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture, Report on an Enquiry into the Pace and Pattern of Market Arrivals of 
Foodgrains (Seasons 1958-9), cited in T.N. Krishnan, 'The Marketed Surplus of Foodgrains,’ in 
Readings in Indian Agricultural Development, ed. Pramit Chaudhuri (London, 1972), 99.
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however, suggested that while farmers do increase their own consum ption of 
food following increase in relative price of food grains, farmers tend to consume 
more, but to market more grain as well. In short, 'w hen  agricultural production 
grows, the elasticity of the marketable surplus will invariably be positive.'44 As 
the following chapters will demonstrate, this held true for South Vietnam. 
Marketed surplus of rice expanded along with the ranks of m iddle peasants and 
the price of rice.
3.3 GEOGRAPHIC, HISTORICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN THE MEKONG DELTA AND CENTRAL VIETNAM
The Mekong delta, in the southernmost part of South Vietnam, is a vast 
area of flat, largely fertile soil fed by one of Asia's largest rivers. The climate and 
hydrology are relatively stable, rainfall generally predictable, and catastrophic 
flood and drought rare. Central Vietnam, which was bisected by the border 
between North and South Vietnam during this period, contains far less arable 
land than the Mekong delta. Its mountains crowd close to the sea and its rice 
lands are narrow strips of densely populated coastal plains. The climate, both 
along the coastal plains and in the piedmont above, is harsher. Parts of Central 
Vietnam experience 'the  driest and most unreliable rainfall environm ent in 
South Vietnam / The area is also subject to torrential rainfall and flash floods, as 
well as extreme heaths So severe is the climate that one agricultural consultant 
w arned that w ithout full scale water-control projects 'Q uang Tri and Thua Thien 
Provinces will likely be faced w ith a serious food production-consumption crisis 
during the 1980's and beyond,' a prediction that has proved accurate.46
Because these drastic variations in climate often result in drastic harvest
44 T.N. Krishnan, 'The Marketed Surplus of Foodgrains/ 99, and Balasubramanyan, The Economy of 
India, 95.
45 'The Crop Growing Season Climates in South Vietnam/ 15 May 1969, George L. McColm, CORDS, 
USAID VS 338.15 M129.
46 'Agricultural Production Possibility Estimates for Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces in 
Vietnam, Projections to year 2000/ CORDS Memorandum to Donald G. McDonald, Director, 
USAID/Saigon, 4 May 1970. The memorandum quotes from a study conducted by the Development 
and Resources Corporation, DEPCORDS Files, Folder: Agriculture: 1969-70, CMH.
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reductions, rice yield variance is higher than in the more stable Mekong delta. In 
the late 1960s, for instance, rice yields from local varieties on single-cropped land 
averaged about one metric ton per hectare, a third less than yields in the far 
South.47 Moreover, farms tended to be smaller; prior to the intensive agrarian 
development of the late 1960s and early 1970s, tenants and smallholders farmed 
an average of one half hectare as compared w ith an average of just over a hectare 
in the most productive areas of the Mekong delta.48 Finally, coastal lowland 
farmers tended to cultivate their land more intensively. On the eve of the 
introduction of m odem  rice, peasant farmers double-cropped 2.5% of the Mekong 
region but 26% of the coastal lowlands 49
Social differences existed between the regions as well. W hereas ethnic 
Vietnamese had settled in the Red River delta around 200 B.C. and in Central 
Vietnam in the 1st century, Vietnamese settlement and village formation had 
just begun in the Mekong delta in the 19th century when it was interrupted by 
French colonial occupation. While most of the Mekong frontier had been settled 
by the 1930s, Vietnamese did not consider it completely closed until the 1980s.50 
Thus, most of the Vietnamese population of the South could not date their 
landholdings, family tombs, or villages 'from  time im m em orial/ as was the 
custom in N orthern and Central Vietnam.51 Villages in the far South developed 
along different lines from those to the north. The existence of surplus land 
meant that people in the southern region were not tethered to their natal villages; 
they could move. Mobility broke down family hierarchies and weakened 
traditions such as ancestral duties: keeping a genealogy, gathering on anniversary
47 'Land Reform/ Project Appraisal Report, USAID PD-AAF-398-E1.
48 Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller , 55-6. In the Mekong/Saigon region, which included the provinces 
around Saigon, the operating rice farm size averaged just over 2 hectares. The average was driven 
up by the larger size of farms on the floating rice areas in the west. In the more densely populated 
areas, which were the most productive lands and those most associated with land reform and new 
technologies, average farm size was 1.38 hectares. This area comprised the upper and lower Mekong 
delta as well as some areas along the Saigon river.
49 Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution, 15, and Murray, Capitalism in Colonial Indochina, 67 .
50 Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller, 38.
51 Martin J. Murray, The Development of Capitalism in Colonial Indochina,1870-1940 (Berkeley, 
1980), 418.
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days of ancestors' deaths, saying ritual prayers at the ancestral alters2
Villages in Northern and Central Vietnam tended to be closed corporate 
societies, unintegrated into regional markets. The danger of flood and drought 
created a need for communal labor on dikes and storage ponds. Social norms 
tended to be strict and a high degree of communalism existed. These villages 
retained their essential corporate structure throughout the French period, 
m aintaining a strong sense of village citizenship, an elaborate internal hierarchy, 
and fierce resistance to change.53 In contrast, villages in the southern zone were 
usually m ade up  of several hamlets strung out along waterways. In Michael 
Cotter's words, 'th is type of linear settlement pattern reflected not only the 
influence of the environm ent but also the breakdown of village traditions over 
the years. . . .Villages in the south were more open to outside forces, and social, 
economic and religious activities did not become as village-centered' 54 Murray 
pointed out that 'a lthough community norms reflected the traditional corporate 
m entality inherited from the northern zones, the southern villages were never 
isolated nor self-sufficient.'55
W ithout the rigid social relationships and ranked hierarchies of the North, 
village status was 'nearly always synonymous with wealth derived from land 
ownership. . . . traditional criteria for village office—morality, education, age,
[were] manifestly absent in Cochin China by the turn of the century.'56 Different 
agronomic conditions further divided the regions. Higher yields per labor input 
and fewer crop failures relative to northern regions made labor cooperation and 
crop sharing less efficient, so that southern villages were not only socially less 
cohesive, bu t also economically less cohesive than villages to the north.
52 Ibid., 416.
53 Samuel Popkin, 'Corporatism and Colonialism: The Political Economy of Rural Change in 
Vietnam/Comparative Politics, vol. 8, no 3 (April 1976) 255. See also Murray, Capitalism in 
Colonial Indochina, 382. For a more general definition and description of closed corporate villages, 
see Wolf, Peasants, 85.
54 Michael G. Cotter, 'Towards a Social History of the Vietnamese Southward' Movement/ Journal of 
Southeast Asian History 9, no. 1, March 1968. See also Murray, Capitalism in Colonial Indochina, 
382, and Gerald C. Hicky, Village in Vietnam (New Haven, 1964), 278-80.
55 Murray, Capitalism in Colonial Indochina, 422-3.
56 ibid., 422.
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Moreover, in Northern and Central Vietnam, scarce land and uneven rainfall 
produced a system of communal land and water storage controlled by local 
notables. The relative abundance of land and water in the South deprived village 
notables of some of the enormous power such scarcity provided them up n o r t h s  
Hence, a sense of commercialism and individualism  sprang up among the 
peasantry in the Mekong region that did not appear to the North.
Markets functioned differently in the two regions as well. M urray asserted 
that 'the  patterns of land tenure and ownership, class relations and village 
organization in the Mekong delta developed in direct response to colonial rule 
and the politico-economic influences of the capitalist world economy rather than 
through extensive contact w ith traditional indigenous social and economic 
o r g a n iz a t io n /5 8  The same can be said of the development of markets. A. Terry 
Rambo described the agricultural markets of the lower Mekong region as linear, 
based on rice monoculture and export. Peasant farmers rarely bought and sold 
among themselves. Instead they sold rice to a local dealer, and bought w hat they 
needed from agents. From local dealers rice went to provincial dealers, and then 
on to Saigon for export. In Northern Vietnam, and Central Vietnam followed a 
similar pattern, peasants cultivated a wider variety of crops, very little of which 
was for export. They tended to buy and sell among themselves in 'cyclical' 
markets.59
Tenurial conditions increasingly differed between the two regions as well. 
Under French rule, land concessions in the Mekong region to European farmers 
and favored Vietnamese clients from the landlord classes gradually stripped 
peasant settlers of their plots, and by 1930 approximately 80% of the Mekong delta 
region was farmed by tenants renting from landlords often created by French 
concessions.60 Land consolidation was less pronounced in Central and N orthern
57 Samuel Popkin, 'Corporatism and Colonialism: The Political Economy of Rural Change in 
Vietnam/ Comparative Politics, vol. 8, no. 3 (April 1976), 255.
58 Murray, Capitalism in Colonial Indochina, 8. See also Pierre Brocheux, The Mekong Delta: 
Ecology, Economy, and Revolution, 1860-1960 ( Madison, WI, 1995), 72.
59 A. Terry Rambo, A Comparison of Peasant Social Systems of Northern and Southern Viet-Nam 
(Carbondale, IL, 1973), 391-2, 404-5.
60 Murray, Capitalism in Colonial Indochina, 421.
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Vietnam during French rule, although landlord power increased there as well.** 
W ith a growing population of landless peasants, landlord-tenant relations became 
more rigid and disadvantageous to tenants as settlement progressed. The 
economic condition of peasants thus worsened steadily as the southern frontier 
disappeared and population growth forced increasing land fragmentation in 
Central and N orthern  V ie t n a m .62
The revolution radically altered the social and economic landscape of 
Central Vietnam. Under intense Viet Minh and later Viet Cong pressure during 
the 1950s and 60s, nearly all the large and medium landlords of the coastal plains, 
m any of them village notables, fled to the city of Hue. One indication of the 
nature of the landlords' presence and influence in their villages is 
'm oonlighting/ As of 1970, only 38% of Central Vietnam's landlords had jobs 
outside farming, while in the Delta the portion was 94%.63 One explanation for 
this is that nearly all of those landlords who could make a living off-farm in 
Central Vietnam had fled. Those who remained were generally poor and did not 
have the w herew ithal to work in other professions.
As a result, while tenants and landlords were separated by a wide gulf in 
the South, they shared a profoundly intertwined existence in Central Vietnam by 
the 1960s. The small landlords who remained in their coastal lowland villages 
were m ore likely to be smallholders who shared similar economic and social 
conditions w ith their tenants. Moreover, because of greater population pressure 
and harsher climate in Central Vietnam, both landlords and tenants alike worked 
in a m ore precarious subsistence environment than farmers in the 
M ekong/Saigon region. Many landlords were also tenants, since they often 
rented some of the land they tilled. Often landlords and tenants were related by 
blood, and social relations tended to be not only familiar, but friendly in many 
cases. N um erous USAID reports confirm that because landlords in Central
Vietnam were of a similar social status to tenants, they were far less resented than
61 Ibid., 470-1.
62 Ibid., 46
63 Henry C. Bush, 'Small Landlords' Dependence on Rent Income in Vietnam/ October 1970, Control 
Data Corporation for USAID, USAID ISN 26769, 20.
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their counterparts in the Mekong region, and more likely to engage in reciprocal 
economic behavior: lend money at little or no interest, or help in neighbors' and 
tenants' fields in times of n e e d .64 Hence, the atmosphere of tenant-landlord 
hostility that still prevailed in the South had moderated in the central region. 
Both the Viet Mirth and Viet Cong movements were less pow erful in the far 
South. Thus, while many southern landlords fled their villages, more remained 
than on the coastal plains. Southern landlords, though seeing their economic, 
social, and political positions deteriorating under communist pressure, 
nevertheless retained a greater rural presence, more often tried, albeit usually 
unsuccessfully, to collect rents. Hence they generated more antipathy than their 
colleagues in Central Vietnam.
In sum, these factors helped to produce a peasant society in Central 
Vietnam that was often on the verge of subsistence crisis, m ore risk averse, more 
likely to engage in reciprocal exchanges, and therefore less likely to embrace 
relatively risky farming technology and techniques than farm ers in the Mekong 
region of the South. The flight of landlords in Central Vietnam dam pened 
reform sentiment, and smaller farms m ade land redistribution physically 
problematic. Southern farmers worked larger land parcels under kinder 
conditions, and therefore had a larger margin for error. Generally, the far South 
experienced less combat, fewer incidents of selective violence, and less pressure 
from communist taxation during both the Viet Minh and Viet Cong periods. 
Moreover, South Vietnamese and American development program s tended to 
focus energy and resources on the Mekong Delta region, the m ost im portant 
agricultural area in the country. In 1972, the government allocated almost half 
the development budget to the Mekong region alone, and only about 30% to
Central Vietnam.65 For these reasons, as we will see, American developm ent
64 For two examples, see Ibid., and Project Appraisal Report, Land Reform, 1 October 1975, USAID 
PD AAF-398-E1,13
65 Development Budget Allocations for 1972, Original Source: Vietnam Bulletin, Vol. VII, No. 6, 
March 6, 1972. Reprinted in, 'Analysis of Vietnamization: Summary and Evaluation,' Final Report, 
Volume I, November 1973, Bendix Corporation, Sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency, Vietnam Collection, Jack Taylor Donation, Box 4, National Security Archive, 
George Washington University, Washington, DC.
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programs designed to entice an income maximizing peasant to participate often 
worked reasonably well in the South, but tended to be less effective in Central 
Vietnam.
3.4 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has established that American and South Vietnamese planners took 
a multifarious approach to development based on a small farm strategy. This 
scatter shot effort, encompassing large and small scale development, market based 
schemes, and community development program s linked to security programs, 
provides a rich opportunity to study economic development in wartime and low 
intensity conflict environm ents. Furthermore, the near peacetime conditions in 
some populous Mekong delta provinces after the communist offensives of 1968 
afford a view of w hat was essentially 'post conflict reconstruction,' as current 
development jargon has it. The American approach to rural development was 
based implicitly on a rational choice view of economic behavior in that peasants 
were to be attracted to program s by the opportunity to maximize their family 
incomes. American officials m ade similar political assumptions, believing that 
Vietnamese w ould calculate that life would be both more prosperous and more 
pleasant under some form of democracy than under Hanoi's dictatorial system of 
government. Guided by these assumptions, the Americans and their South 
Vietnamese allies pursued a small farm policy based on secure property rights in 
order to satisfy the politically essential peasant classes, and attempted to install 
democratically elected village governments. Because of climatic, population, 
economic, and social differences between the most im portant agricultural regions 
of the country, their economic efforts produced better results in the 
M ekong/Saigon area than in Central Vietnam. The long revolutionary tradition 
in Central Vietnam produced similar differentiation in political efforts. 
Succeeding chapters will attem pt to analyze the appropriateness of these various
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approaches to development to determine what they meant to the larger nation 
building campaign in South Vietnam, whether they can be said to have 
contributed to the potential survival of the Saigon regime, where and w hy they 
succeeded or failed, and what implications this may have for global development 
policies generally.
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Chapter 4
Agricultural Development: The 'Green Revolution'
Policy makers and scholars often assume that in wartime or insurgency environments, 
only emergency aid is viable; development m ust wait until peace comes. South 
Vietnam's experience, however, dem onstrated that economic developm ent is possible 
even in conditions of acute political instability and low intensity conflict. Highly 
divisible products for which local dem and exists can, through m arket mechanisms, 
diffuse into the countryside, improve farm ers’ lives, and lift a rural economy.
This chapter concentrates on the 'Accelerated Rice Program / a package of 
improved agricultural inputs introduced by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) that included m odem  rice seed varieties, chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides, and new farming techniques. M odem  seed varieties, usually called high yield 
varieties (HYVs), emerged in the late 1960s and produced dramatically higher yields than 
local seed varieties. They are perhaps better termed m odem  varieties because they also 
increasingly incorporated better disease, pest, and w ind resistance, more uniform height 
for easier harvesting, and faster growing and ripening periods. Often referred to as 'green 
revolution' technology, m odern rice varieties and new inputs radically changed South 
Vietnamese rice farming in only a few seasons, diffusing quickly and crossing both 
political and m ilitary frontiers w ith impunity.
The USAID introduced the program  with several immediate goals in mind: to 
make the country self sufficient in its staple crop, to enhance the welfare of farmers 
whose loyalty the Saigon governm ent needed, to increase rural employment by 
expanding the practice of double-cropping, and to spur the economy generally, by 
increasing, and distributing more widely, farmer income and consumption.! The 
USAID worked extensively w ith im proved sorghum varieties and crop diversification. 
However, this chapter focuses exclusively on rice because it was the staple crop and most 
important economic product of Vietnam. Modern rice technology is a particularly apt
1 For reference to these goals, see 'Agriculture/ Vietnam Terminal Report, Volume II, Part 2, PN AAX-018, 
United States Agency for International Development Reading Room, Rosslyn, Virginia (hereafter USAID and 
document number).
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vehicle for gauging peasant economic behavior because it presented farm  families w ith 
an opportunity to increase their incomes but also entailed extra risk. As one USAID 
report observed, 'in  an economy where money is a relatively scarce resource as it is in 
rural Vietnam the shift to new technology presents a real risk to those farmers who m ust 
borrow  money to meet their cash needs at planting time.'2 Thus, this chapter tests the
USAID's assum ption that South Vietnamese peasants would behave as income
/
maximizing individuals by experimenting with new technologies if some combination of 
the following created a perception of reasonable risk: yield variance was not too high, 
they had enough land to assure subsistence leaving some surplus that they could risk, the 
w ar and insurgency allowed for use of the new technology, and the necessary inputs were 
sufficiently available and affordable. This adoption rate is also useful for comparing the 
varying regional economic responses of Vietnamese peasants, since it was highly 
divisible and widely available.
Section One briefly describes the state of Vietnamese agriculture before the 
introduction of m odem  rice varieties. Section Two explores the rates of diffusion of this 
new  technology, the reasons for the speed of the process, the obstacles it overcame, and 
the effects of socioeconomic differentiation among farmers on rates of adoption. It also 
considers the theoretical implications of that diffusion for development studies and 
economic history. Section Three analyzes the returns to factors achieved by m odem  rice 
varieties. Section Four considers the implications of the diffusion of m odem  rice for 
theories of peasant economic behavior, reassessing the prom inent debate betw een Scott 
and Popkin on the basis of crucial evidence presented here. This key segment of the 
debate concentrated on Vietnam, rendering a significant opportunity to examine another 
im portant aspect of economic history and development studies here. Finally, Section 
Five compares the South Vietnamese green revolution experience w ith evidence from 
other Asian countries.
2 'Rice Cost of Production in Vietnam—1968/69. Rice Crop and Preliminary Estimates for 1970/ Ray S. Fox, 
United States Department of Agriculture, March 1971, USAID VM 338-17318-F793 (Hereafter 'Rice Cost of 
Production' and USAID file no.).
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4.1 VIETNAMESE AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES AND PRODUCTIVITY BEFORE THE 
GREEN REVOLUTION'
Flood control in the Red River delta of northern Vietnam was already an ancient practice 
when the Tran dynasty rationalized and im proved the dike system in the 13th century. 
Imperial Vietnam commenced land reclamation in the 14th century and canal building 
in the 15th.3 The tools of Vietnamese rice farming, draft animals, the iron-pointed plow, 
hoe spade, coupe-coupe or brush cutting knife, wooden rake, weed cutter, small sickle, 
and threshing basket, had changed little in centuries when South Vietnam became a state 
in 1954.4 Although data on cultivation practices in precolonial Vietnam are scarce, it is 
clear that Vietnamese rice yields were low in comparison to some of its Asian neighbors.5 
In China and Japan, for instance, farmers m ade significant gains in output through 
improved practices and technology during the second millennium.* More recently, 
differing attitudes among colonial regimes appear to have perpetuated some of these 
patterns.
The French disposition toward peasant farmers helped to keep Vietnamese 
agricultural practices static relative to m any other Asian countries. French 
administrations helped open the m arshy lands of the Mekong delta region, starting in the 
19th century, and invested heavily in irrigation all over Vietnam.7 European plantations 
employed scientific practices but, according to American scholars, French colonists did 
not transfer new techniques or technologies to peasant farmers, affecting a 'total 
separation of peasant and plantation economies/s French scholar Charles Robequain 
disagreed, claiming that, beyond irrigation improvements, in the 1930s the French began 
studying improved rice strains, attem pted to make reasonably priced credit available to 
small farmers, introduced the concept of farmers' cooperatives to improve peasants'
3 Bray, The Rice Economies, 95.
4 Walinsky, Louis J., ed., The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky: Agrarian Reform as Unfinished Business 
(Oxford, 1977), 245.
5 For technological change in Vietnam see Walinsky, Wolf Ladejinsky, 245.
6 For 2nd millennium cultivation improvements in Japan and China, see Bray, The Rice Economies , 5, 42-53.
7
Charles Robequain, The Economic Development of French Indo-China (London, 1944), 220-27.
8 See Robert Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam (Cambridge, MA, 1970), 50- 
1, Nancy Wiegersma,Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution. Patriarchy and Collectivity in the Rural 
Economy (London,1988), 84.
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access to markets, and m ade available a diverse selection of crops.9 But even Robequain 
admitted that as of 1939, 'native agriculture. . . still depends largely on traditional 
m ethods of cultivation.'10 Pierre Brocheux agreed that the French did not entirely ignore 
peasant agriculture. He noted that the colonial administration pu t on a few desultory 
agricultural expositions for Vietnamese farmers between 1896 and 1904, produced 
pam phlets in Vietnamese extolling chemical fertilizers and improved tools, and set up a 
rice culture research station at Can Tho in 1913 to improve local agriculture. But small 
cultivators rarely participated in French expositions or profited from improved 
technology, which was priced out of their reach. Both Robequais and Brocheux noted 
that peasant farmers experienced constant shortages even of m anure and that pesticides 
were virtually unknown to them.11 As a result, most had no improved seed, depended 
on m anure as their sole additive, single-cropped in the southern regions, and double­
cropped to some extent in the Red River delta.12
During his field trips at the end of the colonial period in the m id 1950s, Wolf 
Ladejinsky, one of the principle architects of land reform in both Japan and South 
Vietnam, calculated that rice yields among peasant farmers averaged about 1.2 metric 
tons per hectare.13 Thailand was never colonized. Farmers there had no access to 
improved inputs and, as in Vietnam, their rice yields remained low in comparison to 
most East Asian countries during the early and middle 20th century. Japanese colonial 
governments, in contrast, introduced scientific farming m ethods to farmers in Taiwan 
and Korea, and yields in those countries increased throughout the 20th century as a 
result.14 Table 4.1 below compares rice yields in various Asian countries in the 1950s and 
60s.
9 Robequain, The Economic Development of French Indo-China, 219-42.
10 Ibid., 219.
11 Brocheux, The Mekong Delta, 60-3, Robequain, The Economic Development of French Indo-China, 219-42.
12 Robequain, The Economic Development of French Indo-China, 219-42.
13 Walinsky, The Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky, 245. Here, as elsewhere, tons refers to metric tons. Please note 
that this South Vietnamese national figure included all methods of cultivation. Average yields for 
transplant rice alone would have been higher.
14 For a short description of Japanese technology and practices transfer in Taiwan, see Alice Amsden, 
'Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency Theory/ in Toward a 
Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley, 1988), 142-75. 
Regarding transfer of scientific agriculture from Japan to Korea, see Penelope Francks, Japanese Economic 
Development, Theory and Practice (London, 1992), 157.
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Table 4.1
Rice Yields by Country. 1950-6515
average yields unhulled rice in mt/ha
1950-55 1956-65
China 2.3316 2.71
Japan 3.97 4.70
South Korea 3.47 3.88
Taiwan 2.4017 3.40
T hailand 1.3218 1.44
V ietnam 1.42 1.90
It will become clear that South Vietnamese soil and climate differences did not 
explain these productivity differences, because developm ent efforts in the post-1968 
period changed these yield relationships rapidly.
Here a note about Vietnamese rice farming techniques is in order. The most 
common cultivation method in the Mekong and Central Coast regions was single 
transplanting, where rice was seeded in a nursery and seedlings later transplanted into 
the main paddy field. Because it was the dom inant cultivation m ethod, m any of the rice 
production figures in this chapter are for single transplant rice. Three other methods 
were in common use, however, and are referred to in the text. In some areas of the lower 
Mekong delta where native grasses were particularly aggressive, farmers double­
transplanted as a weed control measure, taking the rice seedlings and leaving the weeds 
in successive nurseries. Double transplanting should not be confused w ith double­
cropping, in which two rice crops are grown on the same ground in one season. In some
heavily flooded areas of the western Mekong delta farmers planted 'floating rice' by seed
15 Randolph Barker and Robert W. Herdt, with Beth Rose, The Rice Economy of Asia (Washington, DC, 1985), 
47. Barker’s figures agree closely with other sources. For instance, Francks cited evidence that between 1953 
and 1962 Thai rice yields averaged 1.38 tons per hectare. Japanese Economic Development, 108. According to 
Bray, China's Agricultural Yearbook, which must be regarded in this period with healthy skepticism given 
the political sensitivity of the subject, reported rice yields of 2.89 mt/ha for 1957. And the Japanese Ministry 
of Agriculture estimated average yields in that country to be 4.25 mt/ha in 1950 and 5.06 mt/ha in 1956. The 
Rice Economies , 52-3.
16 1949-55 av.
17 1946-55 av.
18 1946-55 av.
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broadcast. This rice grew taller and faster than transplanted varieties and tended to keep 
its head above rising water. Floating rice, however, failed more often than transplant 
rice, and yielded less per hectare. This, coupled with land availability and lower demands 
for labor per hectare m eant that farm sizes tended to be larger in these areas. Finally, in 
the highlands, farmers practiced dry-land broadcast seeding, with varieties that produced 
still less. M odem  varieties were generally single-transplanted, although some did well as 
broadcast crops in the highlands.19
4.2 THE DIFFUSION OF MODERN RICE VARIETIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
In November 1967 USAID agronomists imported to South Vietnam 50 metric tons of a 
new high yielding Philippine rice variety named IR-8.20 In trials and in practice in the 
Philippines this variety produced an average of double the yield per hectare of traditional 
rice varieties and, because it ripened faster than most local varieties, often allowed 
double-cropping where before only single-cropping had been possible. IR-8 performed 
well enough in South Vietnam that USAID imported an additional 2,000 metric tons and 
supervised the planting of about 44,000 hectares in a number of provinces for the 
following crop year, 1968-69.21 Improved rice varieties diffused quickly. By the 1970-71 
crop year, South Vietnamese farmers had planted 500,000 hectares w ith the improved 
varieties.22 Thus, after four growing seasons, from 1967-8 through 1970-1, m odem  rice 
cultivation accounted for roughly 22% of South Vietnam's estimated 2.3 million hectares
19 Charles Stuart Callison, Land to the Tiller In the Mekong Delta: Economic, Social, and Political Effects of 
Land Reform in Four Villages of South Vietnam (Berkeley, 1983), 93-4. Francesca Bray,The Rice Economies, 
Technology and Development in Asian Societies (Berkeley, 1986), 11-20. See also 'Rice Cost of Production,’ 
USAID VM 338-17318-F793.
20 'Crop Production/ 31 December 1975,Terminal Project Appraisal Report, USAID, PD-AAF-584-D1.
21 'Agriculture/ Vietnam Terminal Report, Volume II, Part 2, USAID, PN AAX-018.
22 Ibid.
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of ricelands and about 37% of its rice output.23 In the Mekong region, m odem  rice 
accounted for even more of the total rice hectarage. For instance, farmers planted half of 
Gia Dinh province's 1972 ricelands with m odem  varieties.24
A good deal of evidence indicates that IR-8 regularly doubled farmers7 yields per 
hectare for each crop. When double-cropped on land previously single-cropped with 
local varieties, it could produce between three and four times more per hectare per 
season. The senior American agricultural adviser for the Mekong delta region, for 
instance, estimated average yields of m odem  rice varieties there to be five metric tons per 
hectare for the 1969 and 1970 crop years, a figure that included both single and double­
cropped hectarage.25 And the senior American adviser in Ba Xuyen province, South 
Vietnam's biggest rice producer, reported to CORDS that while traditional rice yielded an 
average of two metric tons per hectare, m odern varieties were yielding up to 7 seven tons 
per hectare.26 A 1971 countrywide USAID study reported average yields for traditional 
varieties of single transplant rice, both single and double-cropped, to be approximately 2.6 
metric tons per hectare, and for both single and double-cropped m odem  varieties to 
average approximately 4.5 tons.27 Largely as a result, during the 1967-1971 period total 
national rice production increased from 4.37 to over 6.23 million metric tons.28 Two 
things are noteworthy here. First, it took three growing seasons with m odern varieties 
before production surpassed that of the 1962-64 harvests. This is likely explained by the
23 One USAID report ('Crop Production/ Terminal Project Appraisal Report, 5 September 1975, USAID PD- 
AAF-584-D1) estimated that 500,000 ha in modem varieties accounted for 30% of South Vietnam's ricelands 
and half its rice output. However, stronger evidence suggests that South Vietnam's ricelands totaled about 
2.3 million ha for this period, and that HYVs therefore accounted for 22% of ricelands. See, for instance, 
'Agricultural Credit Requirement of Vietnam,’ Dr. Nguyen Van Hao, undated 1969, USAID PN-INJ16. See 
also 'Economic Context,' Viet Nam Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-ABI-250, which cites 
fairly comprehensive land use statistics. On the issue of modem varieties as a percentage of the total crop, 
one extensive study calculated that modem varieties in Central and Southern Vietnam averaged 
approximately 4.5 metric tons/ha, and other evidence supports this estimate ( 'Rice Cost of Production/ 
USAID VM 338-17318-F793). If that estimate is accurate, 500,000 ha of modem varieties would have 
produced roughly 2,250 (1000 mt) of 6100, or apx. 37%.
24 Province Monthly Report for Gia Dinh, December 1972, Robert L. Walkinshaw, United States Army Center 
of Military History, Washington, DC. (Hereafter CMH).
25 End of Tour Report of Gleason D. Rohlfs,14 April 1969 to 1 December 1970, USAID file, CMH.
26 Province Monthly Reports, February 1970, Ba Xuyen, John D. Evans, Jr., CMH.
27 'Rice Cost of Production/ USAID VM 338-17318-F793. Please note that these figures are substantially 
higher than those cited by Walinsky above for the 1950s for two reasons. These figures are for transplant rice 
only, the highest yielding method practiced on the most productive land. And chemical fertilizers were 
increasingly available to farmers by the late 1960s.
28 Figures for unhulled rice. 'Crop Production/ 31 December 1975, Terminal Project Appraisal Report, USAID, 
PD-AAF-584-D1.
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fact that the 1962-64 harvests were achieved in essentially peacetime conditions; military 
operations did not become generalized until the mid-1960s. Second, South Vietnam's 
1971 rice crop surpassed the previous productive high from the 1930s for the whole of 
V ie t n a m .29 Former USAID economist Douglas Dacy cited slightly different production 
figures, but similar trends, reproduced below as table 4.2.
Table 4.2
Rice Production in  South Vietnam betw een 1956 and 1974 (thousand tons)30
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965
3,412 3,192 4,235 5,092 4,995 4,607 5,205 5,357 5,185 4,82231
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
4,336 4,688 4,36632 5,115 5,500 6,100 5,90033 6,600 7,165 N /A
After the introduction of m odem  varieties, rice imports to South Vietnam fell steadily.
Table 4.3
Im ported Rice as a Percentage of National Rice Availability34
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
28% 22% 12% 18% 2.8%
There is evidence that the Accelerated Rice Program was largely responsible for 
this dramatic agricultural growth. The USAID's final report on South Vietnamese 
agriculture noted that between 1960 and 1975 the total amount of previously arable land 
left fallow because of the war remained fairly stable in area at 500,000 hectares, while 
shifting geographically as the w ar manifested itself in various regions.35 Hence, the
29 'Crop Production/ 31 December 1975, Terminal Project Appraisal Report, USAID, PD-AAF-584-D1.
30 Source: Dacy, Foreign Aid, 74.
31 American war begins, with large unit combat and free fire zones, especially in Central Vietnam.
32 Communist offensives, volume of refugees increases significantly. First harvest of modem rice from 1,000 ha.
33 1972 was a drought year in the Mekong region and extensive flooding occurred on the Central Coast.
34 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ William J. C. Logan, USDA and William F. Doody, CIP 
Program, January 1971, USAID,VS338.17318 (Hereafter 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ 
followed by date and file no.).
35 This report cites the war years, from the founding of the NLF to the fall of Saigon. It is likely, however, 
that land-abandonment did not begin in earnest until the mid-1960s, when the shooting war began to heat up.
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report concluded, agricultural growth was the result of increasing yields per hectare, 
rather than expanding hectarage planted.36 Sufficient data exists for the 1968 to 1971 
period to calculate roughly the proportion of increase in rice output for which m odem  
varieties were responsible.
Table 4.4
Increase in Rice Output Attributable to Modern Varieties, 1968-197137
Year 1968/9 1970/1
Total rice output 5,115 6100
MV: ha, yield in m t/ha, output 44,000 @4.50 = 198 500,000 @ 4.50 = 2,250
LV: ha, yield in m t/ha, output 2,256,000 @2.18 = 4,917 2,300,000 @ 2.264 = 3,850
MV as % of total output 4% 37%
Yield on same ha without MV 5014 5198
Additional yield as result of MV 101 902
These rough calculations indicate that over three seasons annual rice output rose 
approximately 985,000 metric tons, and that m odem  varieties were responsible for 902,000 
tons, or 92% of this increase. In the rice-rich Mekong region, w here some provinces had 
up to half of ricelands planted with m odern varieties, this new technology would have 
accounted for a higher percentage yet of overall growth in rice output. Even allowing for 
errors in USAID hectarage and yield estimates, it is clear that m odem  varieties accounted 
for the great majority of rice output growth in this period.
The picture after the 1970/1 crop year is less clear. Detailed data on hectarage and 
yield data for those years are not available, and those that exist are ambiguous. One 
USAID report estimated that the half million hectares of m odem  rice planted in 1971
accounted for 30% of South Vietnam's ricelands and 50% of its crop and that this ratio
36 'Agriculture/ Vietnam Terminal Report, Volume II, Part 2, USAID, PN AAX-018.
37 All yields expressed in 1000 metric tons. MV = modem varieties, LV = local varieties. MV yields from 
'Rice Cost of Production,' USAID VM 338-17318-F793. LV yield calculated by LV output /LV hectarage. 
Please note that this report calculated the average yield of LVs for its sample as 2.6 m t/ha. This sample, 
however, was taken in the single transplant rice areas of Central Vietnam and the Mekong delta where 
yields per hectare are the highest in the country. Higher figures for LVs in 1970/1 may be attributable to 
increasing availability of reasonably-priced chemical inputs, and may reflect the fact that 1968-69 were 
highly insecure periods in much of rural South Vietnam. The nationwide yields expressed below included 
highland dry broadcast and floating rice, as well as marginal transplant rice regions, which accounts for 
lower yields.
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held through 1975 while hectarage in rice did not expand.38 As discussed above, however, 
detailed data suggest that more accurate figures for 1968-71 would be 22% and 37% 
respectively. It is therefore difficult to decipher the meaning of the report’s estimate that 
the 1974/5 crop was approximately 7.2 million tons w ith some 3.5 million tons 
attributable to m odem  varieties. There are, however, several plausible interpretations. 
The USAID's claims for fairly static total rice hectarage are consistent with other 
evidence. Most abandoned riceland was in Central Vietnam. For instance, Jewett Millard 
Burr cited evidence that in South Vietnam's five northernm ost provinces, 295,000 
hectares were cultivated. By 1970 hectarage under cultivation had fallen to 191,493.39 
Hectarage in cultivation w ould likely have fallen further still during Hanoi's 1972 Easter 
Offensive, when conventional warfare in Central Vietnam increased dramatically. 
Assuming stable hectarage then, and retaining yields for m odem  varieties at an average 
of 4.5 tons/ha, South Vietnamese farmers had planted approximately 778,000 hectares by 
the war's end. This would have left roughly 1,520,000 hectares of local rice varieties 
which produced 3.7 million tons or approximately 2.43 tons/ha. These significant 
increases in hectarage for m odern varieties and yields per hectare for local varieties are 
quite likely. As Chapter Five will demonstrate, a large percentage of South Vietnamese 
farmers received titles to their land after 1970, and title holders displayed a significantly 
greater propensity to invest in new inputs and to grow m odern varieties. Hence, as 
farmers reacted to their new titles, as farm incomes and potential for investment 
increased, as farmer proficiency improved with inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides, 
they began not only to increase their use of m odem  varieties, bu t to intensify cultivation 
of local rice as well, increasing yields per hectare and total output.
It is also possible that USAID land use estimates are mistaken and that expanding 
ricelands account for a more significant portion of increases in total output than these 
calculations suggest. In any case, there is powerful cumulative evidence that modern 
varieties and improved inputs were responsible for a vast majority of the dramatic
oo _
'Crop Production/ 31 December 1975,Terminal Project Appraisal Report, USAID, PD-AAF-584-D1. The 
final portion of this
39 Jewett Millard Burr, 'Land to the Tiller: Land Redistribution in South Viet Nam, 1970-1973,’ Ph.D. 
Dissertation (University of Oregon, 1976), 217.
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increases in rice yields between 1967 and 1971, and acted in concert w ith agrarian reform 
to continue to amplify rice production between 1972 and 1975.
4.2 (i) Farmer initiative and the diffusion of m odem  rice varieties
The economic historian Christopher Baker pointed out that the availability of new inputs 
is useless without endogenous demand for such technical advance.40 South Vietnamese 
farmers displayed such demand by being extremely receptive to m odem  rice varieties, as 
illustrated by the speed with which a large hectarage was planted. And it appears they 
embraced m odem  rice varieties not merely on a large scale, but on their own initiative. 
The use of m odern varieties grew well beyond the scope of the governm ent program , and 
in some cases in spite of it. USAID trained 50,000 farmers in 1969 and supervised 110,000 
hectares of IR-8 rice, while growers planted 70,000 hectares of which the USAID was 
aware outside the official program, through farmer to farmer seed exchange41
A 1970 South Vietnamese survey of farmers in two Mekong villages found that 
48% of IR rice growers participated in the official scheme because agricultural extension 
agents gave them seed, fertilizer, and insecticide free of charge during the 1967/68 pilot 
program. Fifty two percent of IR cultivators observed their neighbors' higher yields and 
planted the improved seed w ithout government aid or encouragement. Forty six percent 
of IR growers received training from extension agents and 54% from other farmers.42 In 
these two Mekong villages, the varieties had a positive effect on peasant income. 
According to the Vietnamese evaluator, 'th e  respondents above confirmed that the IR 
success has made the growers wealthy as evidenced by their better living conditions with 
new houses, m odem  furnitures (sic), and even tractors.'43 Jewett Millard Burr observed 
that in one Central Vietnamese village, Vo Dat, the government had provided IR-8 seed
40 Christopher J. Baker, 'Frogs and Farmers: the Green Revolution in India, and its Murky Past/ in 
Understanding Green Revolutions: Agrarian Change and Development Planning in South Asia, eds. Tim P. 
Bayliss-Smith and Sudhir Wanmali (Cambridge,1984), 47.
41 End of Tour Report of Gleason D. Rohlfs, Senior Agricultural Officer to Region 4,14 April 1969 to 1 December 
1970, USAID file, CMH.
42 'Report on IR Culture Development in Vinh Loi District, Bac Lieu Province/ Translation 20 July 1970, 
MACCORDS PP&P, Box 9, General Records 1601-02, Record Group 472, Archives II, College Park, Maryland 
(Hereafter MACCORDS PP&P with box and file numbers).
43 'Report on IR Culture,’ 20 July 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, Box 9,1601-02.
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and inputs in 1967 because their previous crop had been destroyed by flooding. Yields of 
the new variety averaged 2.6 tons/ha, as opposed to 1.9 tons/ha  from 'the best of Vo Dat's 
fields.' After this success, farmers began to 'bootleg' seed to relatives in other villages, 
and two years later intelligence reports claimed that the seed was diffusing up the Ho Chi 
Minh trail to N orth Vietnam.44
In order to attain maximum yields m odern varieties required chemical fertilizers 
and pesticides. They could, however, be grown in the same m anner as local rice varieties. 
Baker found that in India 'G reen Revolution technology is probably only a little less 
divisible than a packet of cigarettes/ Poorer farmers who wanted m odem  seeds bought 
them from other farmers and used inputs at their own discretion, remaining outside 
official program s that insisted upon an expensive package of m odem  inputs.45 Many 
South Vietnamese farmers took the same approach. They often adapted their practices to 
the new varieties, mixing old and new techniques. About half the 67 farmers surveyed in 
two villages of the Mekong delta province of Bac Lieu in 1970 reported that they ignored 
government guidelines on growing m odern varieties and looked to the experiences of 
other farmers. Government advice was based on 'fresh water land provided with a 
proper irrigation system / and these respondents farmed on naturally irrigated saline 
soils. Thus, while the farmers requested greater availability of m odern inputs, especially 
DDT, they 'followed their own experience in seedlings, transplanting, fertilizer, 
insecticides [and especially] seed broadcasting/4* In 1969, the second year of the 
Accelerated Rice Program, South Vietnamese researchers in H au Nghia province, just 
northwest of the Mekong region, found similar attitudes. Most farmers who embraced 
the new variety did so because of its yield potential but, as was common elsewhere, 
resisted the recommended growing m ethods and used inputs as they saw fit.47
New inputs were increasingly available in South Vietnam. Between 1968 and 
1970, fertilizer usage increased from 230 tons to 502,000 tons. As we will see in greater
44 Jewett Millard Burr, ’Land to the Tiller: Land Redistribution in South Viet Nam, 1970-1973/ Ph.D. 
Dissertation (University of Oregon, 1976), 212-13.
45 Baker, 'Frogs and Farmers/ 49.
46 'Report on IR Culture Development in Vinh Loi District, Bac Lieu Province/ Translation 20 July 1970, 
MACCORDS PP&P, Box 9,1602-01.
47 'IR-8 in Hau Nghia, May 1969/ CORDS Local Survey Detachment Report, 14 July 1969, RTT Reports: Hau 
Nghia, 1967-70, Pacification Files, III CORPS, 1968-1972 (Closed files), CMH.
134
detail in Chapter Five, the Saigon government privatized fertilizer and pesticide 
marketing, engineered price increases for rice at the farm gate by increasing the price of 
im ported rice, removing price controls on domestic rice, and at times intervening to buy 
rice w hen wholesale prices slumped. The ratio of the price per kilogram of rice to the 
price per kilogram of fertilizer climbed during the life of this program  from 1:1 in 1967 to 
2.5:1 in 1970.48 All of this increased farmer incentive to maximize rice yields.
It appears that the rising price of rice accounted for a substantial portion of the 
increase in farmer income resulting from the Accelerated Rice Program. The following 
data from a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) report render a very rough 
approximation or w hat may be attributed to price increases as opposed to increased 
output. In the Central Vietnamese coastal province of Binh Dinh, rice production 
increased from 161,500 metric tons in 1968/9 to 200,000 tons in 1969/70. The average 
wholesale price of rice in the province for 1968/9 was VN$27.00, while in 1969/70 it 
averaged VN$36.25. Thus, rising wholesale prices contributed approximately 74% and 
increased output 26% to Binh Dinh rice farmers' gross income growth in this period.49 In 
the Mekong delta's biggest rice producer by volume, Ba Xuyen, rice output increased from 
423,600 metric tons in 1968/9 to 460,600 tons in 1969/70, while the average wholesale price 
rose from VN$19.83 to VN$24.00.50 Here, approximately 72% of gross income growth was 
due to price increases and 28% to output growth. A note of caution: 1970 saw especially 
dramatic rice price increases for this period in Central Vietnam, and is thus not ideally 
representative. Over time, the proportion of rural income growth due to increased 
output would have been greater than these calculations suggest. However, wholesale 
price figures are scarce, and 1969-70 are the only years for which analysts broke down 
prices and output by province. In spite of this, it is clear the rising commodity prices 
contributed significantly to increasing rural incomes.
48 Plans and Budget for FY 1972, 22 Aug. 1970, CORDS Country Field Submission, CMH DEPCORDS file.
49 Wholesale prices = prices paid to farmers at the mill for unhulled medium grain rice. 'Rice Marketing and 
Situation Report, Vietnam/ January 1971, USAID,VS338.17318. These proportions are approximate because 
rice harvested from the 1969/70 crop would have been marketed partly in 1969 and partly in 1970, at various 
prices along the way, depending on the region, cultivation methods, family needs, and marketing strategies. 
Gross income growth due to output increase was obtained by subtracting income on 1968/9 output from income on 
1969/70 output for old price. Growth due to price increase was obtained by subtracting this increase by volume 
from total gross income increase.
50 Prices for January - April 1970 unavailable, average is for May-December. Again, some portion of rice sold 
in 1970 would have been from the 1970/71 crop.
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It also appears, both from farmer response to new varieties and from economic 
evidence, that farmers captured a significant proportion of the rice price increases. USDA 
figures suggest that in 1969 the average wholesale price of unhulled rice in Binh Dinh 
province was 73% of the average retail price for polished rice, while in Ba Xuyen 
wholesale prices captured 67% of retail price of rice sold locally, and 54% of the retail price 
in Saigon, where a significant portion of the province's farmers sold their produce.
When rice prices tem porarily soared in 1970, farmers got a lower portion of the retail 
price, 53% in Binh Dinh and 46% in Ba Xuyen. However, as this report noted, polished 
rice averaged about 60% by weight of unhulled rice in South Vietnam. This reveals that 
farmers were indeed capturing a significant portion of the gains from both output and 
price increases in rice.51 Moreover, farmers in Central Vietnam appear to have captured 
slightly more of these gains for the period. Finally, m odern rice varieties appear to have 
spread wealth more evenly among Mekong region provinces. Two provinces, Ba Xuyen 
and Bac Lieu, supplied 51% of Mekong delta rice deliveries to the Saigon market in 1969, 
and only 33% in 1968 and 1970. The implication, according to U.S. analysts, was that 'the 
benefits of the Accelerated Rice Program have spread widely throughout the Delta and 
have brought previously marginal suppliers of surplus rice into greater significance as 
sources of national supply.'52
Thus, the program 's performance created a great deal of incentive for farmers to 
plant m odem  rice varieties. And it is clear from increased farm family investment and 
consumption that these deliberately engineered economic changes began to shift the 
balance of trade in favor of rural people over urban.53 Hence, South Vietnam and USAID 
addressed the problem described in Chapter Three which Michael Lipton termed the 
urban-rural divide.54
South Vietnamese farmers increased investm ent not only in factors of production,
51 Ibid. See table P-l. Wholesale prices = per kg. unhulled rice at mill. Retail prices = kg polished rice.
Report calculates 25% of retail price went to brokers.
52 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ January 1971, USAID,VS338.17318. The report noted that 
it was unable to distinguish between 'improved marketing facilities or arrangements' and production 
increases.
53 Plans and Budget for FY 1972, 22 Aug. 1970, CORDS Country Field Submission, CMH DEPCORDS file. This 
report claimed that after Tet 1968 real income increased in rural areas while urban income fell.
54 Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study of Urban Bias in World Development (Cambridge, 
Mass, 1977), 44-79.
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but in spent more on consumer goods as well. Numerous reports, especially from the 
Mekong region, cited vastly increasing sales of motor bikes, radios, and building 
m aterials.55 Farmers also began to invest in technical improvements beyond the 
immediate needs for m odem  rice cultivation. The sale of 400,000 small irrigation pum ps 
in South Vietnam between 1967 and 1971 is a particularly good example.56 Much of this 
investm ent predated land reform and is therefore attributable to m odem  varieties. 
Moreover, these pum ps were not introduced from the top down, further evidence that 
dem and am ong South Vietnamese peasant farmers for productive improvements w as 
endogenous. A Vietnamese mechanic invented and built this simple pum p 
independently and sold it w ithout subsidy. Yet it was adopted widely despite opposition 
from all sides of the political spectrum. The USAID initially resisted this particular pum p 
because they considered it mechanically inefficient, wished to introduce a more complex 
model, and only later relented in the face of popular demand. The Saigon governm ent 
attem pted to stifle sales because it feared NLF-controlled agriculture would profit. The 
NLF opposed diffusion of the pum p because it bore a USAID symbol, and the Front did 
not w ish the Americans to get credit for such a popular implement.57
In Sansom's view, Vietnamese farmers bought the pum ps for several reasons.
They were obviously labor-saving. But the pum ps were land-saving as well in a 
generally land-scarce economy, and therefore they were potentially profitable. Because 
they increased dramatically the flow of water that could be moved manually, the pum ps 
allowed double-cropping on lands where only single-cropping had been possible before, 
and farmers recognized the potential for increasing their incomes. Finally, according to 
Sansom, the innovation had a ripple effect on the South Vietnamese rural economy by 
decreasing dry season unem ploym ent.^
4.2 (ii) Impediments to modem rice diffusion: shortages of inputs, peasant 
differentiation, and institutional obstacles
55 See, for example, Province Monthly Report for December 1969, Bac Lieu Province, Peter S. Brownback, CMH.
56 Douglas Dacy, Foreign Aid, War, and Economic Development, South Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Cambridge, 1986), 
73.
57 Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency, 176.
58 Ibid., 177.
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Despite its achievements, the Accelerated Rice Program  encountered several revealing 
obstacles. A 1970 USAID report on m odem  rice diffusion in the Mekong province of Bac 
Lieu identified several problems. While praising the initial stages of the program -test 
plots, training, dissemination of seed-the report criticized the governm ent for shortages 
and untimely deliveries of critical fertilizers and insecticides, as well as too few extension 
agents. The report also pointed out that IR rice was not universally accepted because a 
Targe num ber' of farmers thought that it required too m uch expenditure.59 IR-8 was 
more vulnerable to disease, and because it often grew in the off season and was the only 
living thing in most paddies, it provided a fat target for insects and rodents. According to 
a Vietnamese evaluation for CORDS, early efforts failed in one province 'd u e  to peasant 
skepticism and failure to follow directions, a lack of seed, fertilizer, insecticide, raticide, 
and easy credit, and inadequate follow up by the understaffed Agricultural Service and its 
part-time American adviser/so IR-8 also tasted dry and therefore initially sold for about 
10% less than traditional rice.61 There is evidence, however, that its price began catch up 
with those of local varieties by 1971.62 However, new varieties w ith im proved taste and 
milling characteristics, IR-20, IR-22, and RD-I from Thailand, soon became available, and 
it is clear from farmer response that the varieties overcame initial com plaints.1&
Scholars have debated the effects of high yielding varieties on peasant economic 
differentiation for decades. James Scott argued that green revolution technology tends to 
leave the poorest 20% of society worse off, in part because high yielding varieties fail 
more often and require higher input costs, which require fair access to credit. Credit 
markets are often skewed to wealthy cultivators and landowners, and Scott contended 
that this has implications not merely for income inequality, but for land tenure as well. 
As higher yields render farming more profitable than renting out land, the argum ent
5 9
'Report on IR Culture Development in Vinh Loi District, Bac Lieu Province/ Translation 20 July 1970, 
MACCORDS PP&P, Box 9, 1601-02, Archives II.
60 'Local Agriculture/ 14 July 1969, Local Survey Detachment Report, Pacification Files III Corps, 1968-1972 
(Closed files). RTT Reports, Hau Nghia, 1967-1970, CMH.
61 While the average price differential was 10%, at one point in September 1970 IR-8 prices were 20% lower 
than local rice. 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ January 1971, USAID,VS338.17318. In 1971 
in the Mekong markets, however, the price of IR-8 was climbing relative to local rice.
62 'Trip Report: An Giang and Sadec Provinces, Memorandum from Arthur L. Kobler, Sector Analysis Branch, 
JEO, to Mr. Willard D. Sharpe, Chief, Joint Economic Office, 16 April 1971, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Economic Affairs, Box 15, Record Group 472, National Archives II (hereafter DCSEA).
63 'Agriculture/ Vietnam Terminal Report, Volume II, Part 2, USAID, PN AAX-018, p.14.
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goes, large landow ners will be tem pted to revoke tenancy.64 Gabriel Kolko contended, 
w ithout substantive evidence, that this is precisely what happened in South Vietnam 
between 1970 and 1973.65
There is evidence that existing peasant differentiation affected m odern rice 
adoption in South Vietnam, but it is unclear what precise effect the varieties had on 
income distribution. During the program 's second year, South Vietnamese researchers 
in Hau Ngia province found th a t ' model' or wealthy farmers appeared to be the first to 
grow these riskier rice strains.66 Several farmer surveys revealed similar testimony. For 
instance, a 1970 report from the lower Mekong delta province of Ba Xuyen, Vietnam's 
largest rice producer, found that farmers in 'm arginal' economic positions were reluctant 
to plant m odem  rice strains.67 A 1970 Bac Lieu province survey cited earlier complaints 
that credit shortages prevented m any poorer farmers from acquiring the recommended 
inputs. The Agricultural Development bank was giving priority to farmers 'w ho have 
received loans and have repaid, so that the majority of poor farmers can never get a loan 
for cultivation purpose[s].'68 It is possible that extension agents also gave priority to 
prosperous cultivators, who tended to farm in secure and easily accessible areas.
A shortage of credit for peasant farmers appears to have most affected the poorest 
peasants, who especially needed loans to invest in the new technology, and therefore 
would have slowed the diffusion of m odern rice generally. Chapter Five will 
demonstrate that, by USAID's reckoning, credit requirements rose with the need for 
m odem  inputs and that credit reform was inadequate. The assumption that small 
farmers are hu rt most by credit constraints is supported by subsequent theoretical 
research.69 A nd the unsatisfied demand for credit was widely lamented by South
64 Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, 209.
65 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience 
(New York, 1985), 391-4.
66 'IR-8 in Hau Nghia, May 1969/ CORDS Local Survey Detachment Report, 14 July 1969, RTT Reports: Hau 
Nghia, 1967-70, Pacification Files, III CORPS, 1968-1972 (Closed files), CMH.
67 'Pacification Attitude Analysis Survey,’ Ba Xuyen Province, 22 June 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, Box 10,1601- 
09A.
68 'Report on IR Culture Development in Vinh Loi District, Bac Lieu Province,’ Translation 20 July 1970, 
MACCORDS PP&P, Box 9, 1602-01.
69 Hans P. Binswanger and Donald A. Sillers, 'Risk Aversion and Credit Constraints in Farmers' Decision- 
Making: A Reinterpretation,' The Journal of Development Studies 20, no.l, October 1983, 18.
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Vietnamese and U.S. officials.™ Kolko argued that, after land reform, former landlords 
began to dominate the supply of credit nationwide with interest rates hovering between 
60% and 70%.71 The nationwide shortage of credit would likely have had a more 
deleterious effect on m odem  rice diffusion in Central Vietnam than in the far South.
Since farmers in the former regions tended to be poorer, expensive credit would have 
been a greater obstacle to their planting the risky varieties. Thus the failure to make 
credit more widely available had a profound effect on the outcome of the 'green 
revolution' generally, but especially in Central Vietnam.
A preponderance of secondary literature supports the presum ptions in these 
reports that smaller or poorer farmers may initially fall behind larger or wealthier farms 
in m odem  variety adoption, but suggests that given time, poorer South Vietnamese 
farmers may well have benefited from new rice technology. Yujiro Hayam i contended 
that two decades of accumulated empirical evidence solidly refutes argum ents that, over 
the long run, green revolution technology favors wealthy or large farmers, leads to land 
consolidation, increased income inequality, increased m echanization and therefore 
decreased demand for labor. Hayami cited convincing evidence that m odem  varieties 
have increased demand for labor in Asia.77 Feder, Just, and Silberman surveyed the 
developing world and found that while large farms may adopt green revolution 
technology first, there is much evidence that small farms, practicing 'cautious 
optim ization/ wait, watch, and adopt later if all goes well. More, they claimed, there is 
evidence that the intensity of HYV adoption is higher on smaller farms. Finally, they 
contended that a lack of credit is the largest potential inhibitor to poorer farmers adopting 
the technology.73 Satish Jha agreed that the productive response of small-scale farmers to 
m odem  varieties has compared well to that of large-scale farmers.74 Eicher and Saatz
70 See for instance, Dr. Nguyen Van Hao, President, National Economic Development Fund, 'Agricultural 
Credit Requirements of Vietnam/ undated, USAID PN-INJ16.
71 Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience 
Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 392.
72 Hayami, Yujiro, 'Assessment of the Green Revolution/ in Eicher, Carl K., and Staatz, John M, eds., 
Agricultural Development in the Third World, 2d ed. (Baltimore, 1990), 416-423. See also Yujiro Hayami, 
'Asian Development: A View From the Paddy Fields/ Asian Development Review'6, no. 1, 1988.
73 Gershon Feder, Richard E. Just, David Silberman, 'Adoption of Agricultural Innovations in Developing 
Countries: A Survey/ Economic Development and Cultural Change 33, no. 2, 1985, 263-4, 267-8, 272.
74 Satish C Jha, 'Rural Development in Asia: Issues and Perspectives/ Asian Development Review 5, no. 1,
1987.
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found that 'large farms have not inexorably gained control over farm production in Asia 
and Africa' as a result of green revolution technology. W hether or not land 
concentration accelerates w ith the introduction of m odem  varieties depends largely upon 
the particular institutional setting w ithin which the new technology is introduced.75
The South Vietnamese experience generally supports Hayami et al. Data are scarce 
on whether the poorest Vietnamese peasants as a group found their incomes shrinking 
because of the introduction of m odem  rice varieties. Nor does available evidence allow 
for precise calculations of the extent of modern rice adoption among various 
socioeconomic groups. However, two aspects of the rural credit program  demonstrate 
clearly that, although supply fell short of demand, policy makers attempted to provide 
poorer peasants w ith the resources to invest in new inputs. One of the major goals of the 
Agricultural Developm ent Bank of Vietnam was to provide credit to small farmers, and 
from 1971-74 three quarters of the ADBV's loans were made without collateral.76 
Moreover, there is evidence that in South Vietnam's institutional setting after the 1970 
land reforms, smaller farmers were more likely than larger to adopt m odem  varieties 
and associated inputs.77
Kolko used anecdote to claim that widespread peasant evictions took place when 
land owners attem pted to amass large scale farms to take advantage of high yielding 
rice.78 However, there is no evidence that such widespread or systematic evictions took 
place. Extensive land redistribution followed the introduction of the new technology and 
likely served to dam pen this impulse. In fact, it is clear that life improved for many rural 
people. According several sources, demand for rural labor rose during the post-1968 
period.79 And, as this chapter has demonstrated, overall rural incomes increased and 
became more widely distributed geographically.
Overbearing rural bureaucracies also ham pered m odem  rice diffusion. An
75 Carl K. Eicher, and John Staatz, eds., Agricultural Development in the Third World, 2d ed. 
(Baltimore,1990), 26.
76 For credit program goals, 'Agricultural Credit,' Terminal Project Appraisal Report, 4 September 1975, 
USAID PD-AAF-353-C1. For statistics on uncollateralized loans, 'Agriculture,' Vietnam Terminal Report, 
Volume II, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-AAX-018.
77 Callison, Land -to-the-Tiller, 292-3.
78 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 393, expounds on his view of the credit crisis of the early 1970s.
79 See for instance, 'Land Reform/ Terminal Report, 31 Dec.1975, USAID PN-ABH-885, 82. See also Sansom, 
The Economics of Insurgency, 177.
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abundance of evidence demonstrates the formidable ability of South Vietnam's 
provincial governments to obstruct economic development and growth. For example, in 
the early stages of the program in Kien Giang, a Mekong delta province, CORDS advisers 
complained that local officials required farmers to get 20 signatures and make two trips to 
the village offices on specified dates in order to grow IR-8.80 Even this cumbersome 
procedure had been simplified from 1968. Along with the factors m entioned earlier 
-shortages of extension agents and inputs together with poorer farm ers' dem and for seed 
without expensive inputs- this explains why so many farmers grew m odem  varieties 
outside official programs.
Critics have pointed out that population growth threatened to offset the 
production gains attributable to m odern varieties. In 1954 South Vietnam 's population 
was approximately 12.5 million, in 1964 it was 15.72 million, and by 1974, just before the 
state fell, it had climbed to 20.4 million.si Per capita rice production peaked in 1960 at 0.36 
tons, fell off to 0.25 tons in 1968, at the height of the fighting, and then climbed back to 
0.35 by 1 9 7 4 .8 2  However, while it is true that production merely kept pace with 
population growth, the effects were partly offset because between 1969 and 1971 inclusive, 
both per capita and gross demand for known rice stocks decreased 1% per year in rice 
deficit areas even while population grew 2.6% per year. Two analysts posited that this 
decrease might be explained by refugees returning to their villages and growing rice not 
yet appearing in government statistics, the (temporary) dim inution of NLF/PAVN forces 
in the South, price increases out-pacing consumer incomes, and the observed evidence 
that South Vietnamese were increasingly consuming non staple foods.83 Even without 
this dam pening of demand, population growth hardly detracted from the m odem  rice 
program. The alternative was to have allowed per capita production fall further and 
import ever more of Vietnam's staple crop. This would have been a particularly
80 Province Monthly Report for April 1969, Kien Giang Province, Lt. Colonel Billy M. Stanberry, CMH.
81 Nguyen Anh Tuan, South Vietnam Trial and Experience: A Challenge for Development (Athens, Ohio, 
1987), 363. Tuan derived these figures from The Economic Bulletin, 1975, The National Institute of Statistics, 
South Vietnam.
82 Dacy, Foreign Aid, 74.
83 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ January 1971, USAID,VS338.17318. The authors make 
clear that this decrease in demand was neither an anomaly nor a manipulation by any agency. They cross 
referenced these data with that of several other agencies' reports and found only 1% variation.
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egregious error given the Mekong delta's significant comparative advantage over most of 
the world in the production of rice, and since a thoroughly appropriate land-saving 
response to increasing population density was available.
More cogent criticism concerned imports, subsidies, and sustainability. While 
officials hailed increased pesticide and fertilizer sales as signs of surging agriculture, these 
products were heavily subsidized, casting doubt on whether these increases constituted 
economically sustainable development. That is, since both the availability of and 
subsidies for inputs were not dependable, the hectarage planted w ith m odem  varieties 
might shrink if some change of government or U.S. policy occurred. However, 
subsidizing vital new productive inputs may have been the best way of helping peasant 
farmers, who had suffered a great deal, to improve their lots. In any case, South Vietnam 
had little choice at the time. It had no chemical fertilizer industry and market prices for 
inputs were too high for peasant farmers to afford, even after the government began to 
free rice prices. Moreover, the potential for future rice exports might have enabled this 
new technology to become self-supporting in a foreign exchange sense. Restoring its 
status as rice exporter was not a far fetched idea in the early 1970s. By 1971 South 
Vietnam was producing enough rice to feed itself despite its abandoned land, and only 
imported grain because of internal distribution and m arketing problems.84 In sum, 
while it appears that the poorest farmers profited less than middle or wealthier peasants 
from new technologies initially, both local and global evidence suggests that given South 
Vietnam's post-reform institutional setting they would have benefited from the program  
over time had the regime survived.
4.2 (iii) Regional Variations in the Diffusion of Modem Rice
M odem seed varieties m et w ith greater receptivity in the far South than in Central 
Vietnam. In 1973 approximately 38% of ricelands in the M ekong/Saigon regions were
planted w ith the new seeds compared with about 15% in the coastal lowlands.85 While
84 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ January 1971, USAID,VS338.17318.
85 'Agriculture/ Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-AAX-018. See also 'Rice Cost of Production,' 
USAID VM 338-1738-F793, which claims that 15% of the coastal lowlands were planted with modem rice by 
1971.
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peasants in Central Vietnam adopted m odern varieties less readily than those in the far 
South, their responses should not be judged strictly on a comparison of hectarage. The 
15% of area planted w ith m odem  varieties by 1971, and approximately 10-15% of farmers 
adopting the technology, is a much greater peasant response in the Central Vietnamese 
context than it seems.86
First, in security and political terms, rice farming in Central Vietnam riskier and 
more difficult than in the southern region. Whereas the w ar in the delta after 1968 
manifested itself almost exclusively as a low intensity guerrilla struggle, nearly all the rice 
producing coastal lowlands were either the scene of large unit combat or longtime 
revolutionary strongholds fiercely contested by the NLF. According to one economic 
report, Military Region 1 (MR1) in the far north was essentially a 'w ar area.' In that 
region's Quang Nam province in 1970, for instance, half the arable hectarage in the fertile 
coastal lowlands had been abandoned to free fire zones.87 Hence, m uch of Central 
Vietnam was unable to respond to the needs of cultivating m odem  varieties. The vast 
majority of the peasant response to m odem  varieties occurred in MR2. For instance, by 
1971, MR1 merely regained its 1967/8 rice production levels. In contrast, production in 
MR2 increased 33% between 1967/8 and 1970/1.88 Even MR2, however, was inhospitable 
to farming.; in 1970, an American adviser in Binh Dinh province, Central Vietnam 's 
largest agricultural producer, described a ubiquitous NLF presence and a pervasive 
atmosphere of fear on the coastal p la in 89 A stronger Front presence m eant a greater 
prevalence of increasingly heavy agricultural taxes that often targeted productive 
investments. In four villages of one Mekong province, peasants paid the NLF between 
not only 20% and 50% of their yearly income, but substantial additional taxes on 
irrigation pum ps, rototillers, and other agricultural implements.90 Since NLF tax 
collectors had greater access to the Central Vietnamese population, it is a fair assum ption
86 Since approximately 15% of the Central Coast's ricelands were planted with modem varieties, and since 
farm size there was remarkably uniform with large and even medium farms having been broken up, 10-15% is 
a safe assumption.
87 VSSG Study on Quang Nam Province 1970, undated, Province Monthly Reports, Quang Nam Province, CMH.
88 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ January 1971, USAID, VS338.17318.
89 Province Monthly Report for July 1970, Binh Dinh province, Billy J. Mendheim, CMH.
90 Memorandum for DEPCORDS from Ronald L Tausch, Province Senior Adviser, Vinh Long, Rural Survey 
Team Report for four villages in Vinh Long province, 4 November 1969, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 9.
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that fewer farmers there escaped taxation. As the following subsection demonstrates, it is 
possible that the NLF presence, as opposed to main force combat, had less influence on 
m odem  rice diffusion than intuition w ould suggest. Still, taxes on productive 
investments m ust be taken into account as a potentially inhibitor to the adoption of 
m odern varieties, especially on the coastal plains.
A second set of factors affecting adoption concerned the varying levels of 
agricultural risk described previously. Smaller farms and greater frequency of drought 
and flooding m eant less m argin for error and greater yield variance in Central Vietnam. 
More farmers there were poor. As Chapter Five will detail, there were very few wealthy 
or even middle peasants left on the coastal plains. Nearly all rem aining farmers were 
smallholders and tenants. Hence, a large proportion of m odem  rice adopters in Central 
Vietnam came from the most risk-averse class: those functioning close to subsistence 
levels and those m ost likely to be involved in reciprocal arrangements. And again, 
potential losses for m odem  varieties could be greater because of the extra inputs required 
for optimum production. These inputs in turn  generally required access to affordable 
credit, in which Central Vietnamese farmers were also at a disadvantage. Already a large 
portion of the Central Coast's ricelands was double-cropped and, where the war allowed, 
nearly all the arable land was under cultivation.91 Peasants in this rice deficit region 
were producing near maximum capacity given their limited choices. Finally, opting out 
of the reciprocal labor and rice sharing systems in which Central Coast peasants were 
more likely to be involved might be socially difficult or time consuming. All of this: risk, 
and poverty, preexisting arrangements, w ould have restrained adoption.
A third variety of factor that slowed HYV adoption in Central Vietnam was
existing market structures. W hereas Mekong region peasants had long produced
extensively for national and international markets, Central Coast farmers had far less
experience of this. They farmed in rice-deficit regions and their produce was generally
consumed locally. Thus they tended to produce for local markets, buying, selling, often
bartering goods among traders they knew well. Hence, the lesser development of the
91 CaUison reports that 61% of the ricelands in the central coastal plains were double-cropped in 1961, Land 
to the Tiller , 55, while a 1971 USAID report puts the figure at 38%. 'Rice Cost of Production,’ USAID VM 338- 
17318-F793. This seems a steep decline. However, the vicissitudes of farming in a combat zone, the closing of 
markets, and the increasing weight of NLF taxes might well account for it.
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m arket links needed to move the surpluses potentially generated by m odem  varieties 
w ould have suppressed their adoption as well.
A fourth inhibitor was the disparity of government attention given the two 
regions. W ithin the Accelerated Rice Program, Central Vietnam could not compete for 
scarce resources and attention w ith the Mekong region, the 'rice bowl' of Vietnam. One 
U.S. evaluator lam ented that 'since agricultural program s developed at the Saigon level 
have been, by and large, tailored for production increases in Regions HI and IV [the far 
south], the "national" program s have been tantam ount to a Delta Regional p rog ram /92 
Thus, farmers in Central Vietnam faced far greater obstacles to adopting m odem  
rice varieties than those in the M ekong/Saigon region: physical danger and destruction, 
free fire zones, heavier NLF taxes, smaller farms, poorer peasants, weaker credit 
institutions, harsher climate, greater yield variance, stronger reciprocal socioeconomic 
arrangements, weaker market structures, and less program  attention. Despite all this, 
Central Vietnamese adoption surpassed policy makers' expectations.93 Under these 
circumstances 15% of hectarage devoted to m odem  varieties in the coastal lowlands 
represents a significant response indeed.
4.2 (iv) Wartime economic development: the diffusion of modem rice across military 
and political boundaries
M odem  rice varieties offer a good opportunity to gauge not only the capacity for 
economic development in wartime, but the effects of security conditions upon peasant 
economic behavior. One U.S. evaluator credited the success of the Accelerated Rice 
Program to the fact that it 'd id  not call attention to any particular location or people to the 
extent of arousing enemy h a r a s s m e n t / 9 4  The seed, and the required inputs as well, did 
not necessarily require governm ent personnel at introduction, they were inexpensive, 
highly divisible, easily transported, and difficult to target for destruction or interdiction.
92 'A Program Approach to ICTZ Development, with applicability to II CTZ/ A.B. Guroff, enclosed in 
memorandum, Groth to Firfer, 14 October, 1969. Agricultural Files (closed files), CMH .
93 See ibid. See also Memorandum from Major Carl Groth, Acting Chief, Economic Development Division, 
CORDS, Region 1, to Alexander Firfer, Deputy for CORDS, Region 1, Subject: ICTZ Agricultural Development 
Proposal, 14 October, 1969. Agricultural Files (closed files), CMH.
94 'A Program Approach to I CTZ Development, with applicability to II CTZ/ A.B. Guroff, enclosed in 
memorandum, Groth to Firfer, 14 October, 1969. Agricultural Files (closed files), CMH.
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Farmer to farmer seed exchange can be a highly effective diffuser, obviating the 
immediate need for highly developed m arket structures. W riting in the late 1960s,
Robert Sansom declared that any technology -pum ps, tilling machinery, seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticides- that helps impoverished farmers and laborers 'should  be pushed through the 
market, which ignores security considerations/95 Because the NLF could most easily 
find, tax, or confiscate pum ps and rototillers, more divisible products such as seed, 
fertilizers, and pesticides proved the most easily diffused in insecure environments.
This assumption is widely held, but has received little critical attention. In fact no 
scholar of the American w ar in Vietnam, an especially salient model, has explored the 
issue. Comparing diffusion in heavily contested areas w ith relatively peaceful ones sheds 
some light on the w ar's effects on peasant economic behavior. Three cautions are, 
however, necessary. First, there are insufficient data for a systematic approach isolating a 
number of districts and provinces, which w ould help control for some variations.
Second, simple risk aversion and wartime survival strategies are difficult to differentiate. 
Peasants may have shunned economic risk, been discouraged by NLF taxes or 
propaganda, or simply reacted to wartime uncertainties by planting only w hat they 
needed to eat. Third, this study does not suggest that peasants were more or less 'secure' 
under NLF domination. The popularity among the peasantry of m odem  seeds no doubt 
inhibited NLF opposition. Moreover, although they typically resisted program s that 
might confer political credit on the governm ent even if they were popular, the Front 
profited from increasing rice yields as well. However, we know that the NLF taxed some 
of the inputs associated w ith HYV cultivation while the government did not, that 
peasants were more likely to pursue subsistence strategies under NLF domination, and 
that the struggle for influence was often violent in heavily contested areas. It is therefore 
a reasonable assum ption that cultivating m odern varieties at optim um  levels was easier 
in areas under lesser NLF influence. Even w ith these limitations, it is clear from 
available evidence that peasants adopted m odern varieties in both lightly and heavily 
contested areas.
The lower Mekong province of Ba Xuyen was relatively secure from the
95 Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency, 244.
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governm ent's point of view. In December 1971, the province senior adviser reported that 
about 20% of Ba Xuyen's hamlets were contested, that only a handful were dominated by 
the NLF, and that daylight travel was generally safe. M odem rice varieties were planted 
on 35,682 hectares, or roughly 20% of the province's total rice area,98 Kien Hoa province, 
in the upper delta, experienced vastly different security conditions. A communist 
stronghold since the Viet Minh days in the 1950s, Kien Hoa still had a potent Viet Cong 
presence at the beginning of the 1970s. Americans considered fully half the hamlets in 
the province contested, and about one quarter of the population to be under NLF 
dom ination.97 Kien Hoa's peasant farmers, however, planted 30,000 hectares of m odem  
rice a season before Ba Xuyen's farmers reached that level.98 An extensive American 
study of rice cultivation described Military Region (MR) 1, in the northern reaches of 
Central Vietnam, as a 'w ar area' whose rice hectarage was shrinking. The guerrilla 
struggle rem ained severe there, but unlike the Mekong region, larger scale conventional 
fighting was commonplace as well. Nonetheless, farmers were adopting m odem  
varieties faster than the government had predicted they would. Government plans in 
MR1 called for 11,500 and 15,000 hectares of IR-8 to be planted for 1970 and 1971 harvests 
respectively. According to CORDS statistics, farmers planted enough of the new seeds to 
surpass these goals two years ahead of schedule." Immediately to the south, in MR2, rice 
production had increased 33% from 1967 to 1971 because of m odem  varieties.100 The 
province senior adviser for Phu Yen, which was infamous for its poor governm ent and 
strong NLF presence, reported in 1970 that the m odem  rice crop was 'vast.'101
Judging from the rather spotty evidence available throughout the rest of the 
Saigon/M ekong region, similar farmer responses appear to have obtained. Thus, while
96 Province Monthly Report for December 1971, Ba Xuyen province, James J. Turner, CMH. As Chapter Two 
demonstrated, NLF influence in this report for Ba Xuyen and that below for Kien Hoa were likely 
underestimated for both provinces. It is clear from all reporting, however, that Ba Xuyen experienced 
dramatically less NLF influence than did Kien Hoa throughout the war.
97 See Province Monthly Reports for October 1969 through March 1970, Kien Hoa province, A. L. Kotzebeue, 
CMH. Chapter 2 demonstrated that American reports commonly underestimated NLF influence.
98 Province Monthly Report for December 1969, Kien Hoa province, A. L. Kotzebeue, CMH.
"  Memorandum from Maj. Carl Groth, Acting Chief, Economic Development Division, CORDS, Region 1, to 
Alexander Firfer, Deputy for CORDS, Region 1, Subject: ICTZ Agricultural Development Proposal, 14 October, 
1969. Agricultural Files (closed files), CMH.
100 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ January 1971, USAID, VS338.17318.
101 Province Monthly Report for August 1970, Phu Yen Province, Russell Meerdink, CMH.
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heavy combat appears to have severely hindered m odern rice diffusion, low intensity 
conflict seems to have played a far lesser role in the rates of adoption of m odem  varieties 
than heavy or conventional combat, socioeconomic factors, climatic variances, and 
program  efficiency. This investigation, then, supports the proposition that market- 
driven improvements can be diffused into contested or even enemy-dominated areas so 
long as endogenous demand for the improvements exists. While military forces are able 
to kill off rival officials or cadres, scare off extension agents or tax collectors, and destroy 
infrastructure equipment, they will have difficulty inhibiting the diffusion of divisible 
technology such as seeds and fertilizers.
4.3 RETURNS TO FACTORS: LAND, LABOR, AND CAPITAL
As this chapter has established, modern rice varieties increased returns to land by 
yielding more per unit of land than local varieties. This alone is not necessarily sufficient 
to induce the adoption of an innovation. Total factor productivity is defined as returns 
in produce to the combination of all factor inputs, land, labor, and capital. The concept is 
crucial to understanding farmer response to any innovation. For instance, if a m odem  
rice variety increases yields per hectare by 50%, but requires 100% more labor or capital, 
obviously the innovation's returns to land are positive, but returns to labor and capital 
are negative. Negative returns to factors may create a disincentive to adopt the new 
technology. Returns to all factors, however, need not be positive. In peasant agriculture 
especially, farm families may adopt an innovation for which returns to relatively 
abundant family labor are negative so long as returns to scarce land and capital are 
positive. As Frank Ellis acknowledged, peasant farmers may measure the value of family 
labor by subjective criteria internal to the family and push the marginal product of that 
labor well below the market wage, possibly near zero.102 In South Vietnam, however, it 
appears that total factor productivity was indeed positive for m odern varieties.
The following calculations regarding returns to factors are derived from the cost
estimates given in a single, albeit extensive, United States Departm ent of Agriculture
102 Frank Ellis, Peasant Economics: Farm Households and Agrarian Development (Cambridge, 1988), 203-5.
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(USDA) study conducted between 1968 and 1970 for USAID. The study sampled 703 rice 
farms in both the Mekong region and the coastal lowlands of Central Vietnam to 
estimate costs of rice production, and narrowed the sample to 260 responses.103 This is 
indeed a narrow  plank on which to base conclusions for the entire green revolution 
experience in South Vietnam. However, the results of this USDA study are consistent 
w ith other evidence from South Vietnam.
4.3 (i) Returns to Labor
As Table 4.5 indicates, according to the USDA survey, returns to labor were positive for 
m odem  rice relative to local rice varieties in both the central and southern regions.
These positive returns to labor occurred mainly because of dramatically increased 
response to fertilizer use in m odem  over local varieties.104 Nationally, returns to labor 
for m odem  rice m ay have been higher than represented here because the varieties' 
speedy ripening allowed increased double-cropping. Prior to the introduction of m odern 
varieties, approximately 38% of the coastal lowlands were double-cropped, but only about 
2% of the southern region. Double-cropping remained stable in Central Vietnam but 
increased to about 25% in the Mekong delta after the introduction of m odern rice.105 In 
the sample cited here, however, only 5.5% of the land area of the Mekong region was 
under double-cropping.106 Double-cropping can increase returns to labor because it does 
not necessarily double labor requirements; many tasks must be perform ed only once. J.
T. Purcal, for instance, found that in four Malaysian villages farms that double-cropping 
rice required approxim ately 90% more labor than single-cropping.107 Bray asserted that, 
'w here a transition from broadcast sowing to transplanting, or from single- to double­
103 'Rice Cost of Production,’ USAID VM 338-17318-F793.
104 For a sample of the response of modem versus local rice varieties to fertilizer in South Vietnam, see the 
final two pages of Fox’s report.
105 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 55. See also 'Rice Cost of Production,’ USAID VM 338-17318-F793.
106 Ibid. In Fox’s sample, 5.5% of the land in the southern region and 37.8% in Central Vietnam was double­
cropped. Significantly, this sample was taken before the 1970 land redistribution.' As Chapter Five will 
demonstrate, farmers receiving titles under this program increased their productive investments 
dramatically, which may have increased double-cropping as well.
107 John T. Purcal, Rice Economy: A Case Study of Four Villages in West Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, 1971), tables 
3-3, 4-7, 6-3, 9-5.
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cropping is made, the increases in yield will certainly outstrip concomitant rises in labor 
in p u ts /108
108 Bray, The Rice Economies , 5.
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Table 4.5 Returns to One Year's Labor for Local Rice versus M odem Rice.109
Local Rice
Yields 
(tons/ha)
Human labor input 
(work-days/ha)
Yields/working-day 
(in kgs. unhulled rice)
Coastal Lowlands 
Central Vietnam
2.7 79 34.2
Mekong delta 
region
2.6 59.5 43.7
M odem  Rice
Yields 
(tons/ha)
Human labor input 
(work-days/ha)
Yields/working-day 
(in kgs. unhulled rice)
Increase in rtns to labor 
(% increase kgs/day)
Coastal Lowlands 
Central Vietnam110
4.5 84 53.6 56.7%
Mekong delta 4.5 66 68.2 56.1%
region
109 Rice yields and human labor inputs were derived from, 'Rice Cost of Production,' USAID VM 338-17318- 
F793. Figures given are for single transplant rice. Labor included seed bed preparation, paddy preparation, 
transplanting, weeding, insecticide application, fertilizer application, water control, and harvesting. It did 
not include post-harvest activities such as threshing and transport.
110 The figures for single transplant modem rice in Central Vietnam were derived from 24 farms in only 2 of 9 
coastal lowland provinces. The figures for single transplant rice in the Mekong region are from a larger 
sample, 113 farms from 7 provinces.
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Shigeru Ishikawa proposed a model for rice sector developm ent for Japan that has 
come to be called the 'Ishikawa curve' and is commonly used as a model for Asian rice 
development in general. Ishikawa demonstrated that while labor productivity in rice has 
been increasing for over a century in Japan, labor input initially increased, but eventually 
declined by over 50%.111 Barker et al. described a comparable century-long trend for Java 
and similar trends in the post World War II period for Taiwan and South Korea.112 
However, Barker indicated that in the early 20th century, Taiwan experienced increasing 
labor inputs per hectare along with increased productivity w hen new, fertilizer- 
responsive, 'ponlai' varieties were introduced, and then settled into a long term period of 
labor input decline and productivity increase.113 Ishikawa hypothesized that Japan 
experienced the same pattern in the 1870s when irrigation was radically expanded during 
the Tokugawa period.114 Hence, South Vietnam apparently fitted into Ishikawa's model 
for Asian rice development at the point where radical new technology was introduced 
and both labor input and productivity increased, after which Japan and Taiwan embarked 
on long term productivity increases and labor decreases.
4.3 (ii) Returns to Capital
Returns to capital also appear to have been positive in both the southern and central 
regions for m odem  rice varieties relative to local varieties. The following relationships 
between capital and average rice yields emerge from USAID estimates for the costs of land 
preparation (the average cost of hiring draft animals or tractors), seed, insecticide, 
fertilizer, and interest on agricultural loans. In the southern region in 1970, the average 
cost of these factors required to produce one kilo of single transplant local rice varieties, 
but using improved fertilizers and insecticides, was VN$ 5.98/kg. The average cost in 
capital of producing m odem  varieties w ith improved inputs in the southern region was 
3.88/kg . In the coastal lowlands of Central Vietnam we have estimates for growing local
111 Shigeru Ishikawa, Essays on Technology, Employment and Institutions in Economic Development: 
Comparative Asian Experience (Tokyo, 1981), 42.
112 Barker et al., The Rice Economy of Asia, 47.
113 Ibid.
114 Ishikawa, Essays, 37.
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varieties both w ith and w ithout improved fertilizer and insecticides. The capital costs for 
growing local varieties w ithout commercial fertilizer or insecticide in 1970 was 
approximately VN$ 7.41 per kg. For local varieties using commercial fertilizer and 
insecticide, the cost was 8.40/kg. For m odem  varieties using improved inputs, the cost 
was 5.31 /kg . Thus, according to these data, returns to capital were lower for local varieties 
grown with im proved inputs compared to those grown without. And as in the far south, 
returns to capital were substantially higher for m odem  varieties than for traditional 
rice.115
4.3 (iii) Total Factor Productivity
Total factor productivity for both regions may be calculated using data from this same 
USAID report. Taking again the costs per hectare for land preparation, seed, insecticide, 
fertilizer, and interest, and adding the costs per hectare of labor and land rents, the 
following calculations emerge. In the Mekong region during the 1970 crop year, the 
average total cost of producing a kilogram of single transplant local rice was VN$
17.81/k ilo  while m odern varieties cost an average of VN$ 12.81 /kg . to produce. The 
proportions in Central Vietnam were similar, local rice costing VN$ 14.71/kg. to produce 
and m odern rice 10.97.u6 Some m odern varieties sold for about 10% less than local 
varieties, but even accounting for this, higher average yields m ade it profitable to grow. 
Thus, according to this USDA report, total factor productivity was positive for high 
yielding rice in both major rice production regions of South Vietnam.
4.3 (iv) Returns to factors and the appropriateness of m odem  rice
The increase in total factor productivity provided strong incentive for farmers to plant 
m odern rice varieties and certainly accounts for the speed w ith which the technology 
diffused. Especially revealing are the data showing that returns to fertilizer and
insecticides were higher for m odern rice than for local varieties. This would have added
115 'Rice Cost of Production,’ USAID VM 338-17318-F793.
H6 Ibid.
154
to the incentive for using m odern seed varieties rather than simply applying commercial 
fertilizers and insecticides to familiar and trusted local varieties. Also of note is the 
evidence that m odem  varieties did not produce negative returns to labor in South 
Vietnam, as even profitable innovations may. In this respect, despite having been 
introduced from outside, or 'above,' green revolution technology was particularly 
appropriate for South Vietnam at that time. Moreover, the innovation apparently  fitted 
a long term  pattern of innovation in East Asian agriculture. Bray observed that the 
Western model of agricultural development was based on capital intensive 
improvements while Asian wet rice farming has developed, often highly successfully, 
quite differently. In the Asian model, labor intensive and highly divisible innovations 
play the dom inant role and capital investments a smaller one than in the West. Shigeru 
Ishikawa traced this arc of development, based on what he called 'labor-using 
technological factors,' for Japan.117 Those familiar with the Western m odel then, often 
assume that an im provement requiring greater labor inputs and relatively small capital 
inputs, such as green revolution technology, 'im plies a corresponding reduction in the 
productivity of labor, but this is not necessarily true.’118 And so it proved in South 
V ietnam .
The changes in total factor productivity do not appear to have had a significant 
effect on regional variations in m odem  rice diffusion. Returns to factors increased by 
similar proportions in both major production regions. More likely it w as the m ultitude 
of factors cited above that made innovation in Central Vietnam far riskier than in the 
South. Some theories suggest, however, that another factor was at work in Vietnam: that 
universal norms of peasant economic behavior are the major determ inants in the 
adoption of new technology and the relationship to the marketplace.
4.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIFFUSION OF MODERN RICE VARIETIES FOR 
THEORIES OF PEASANT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, AND OPTIMAL FARM SIZE
4.4 (i) Competing theories of peasant economic behavior
117 Ishikawa, Essays, 36.
us Bray, The Rice Economies , 5, 7, 149-55.
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Long before the American war, the debate over Vietnamese peasant economic behavior
had focused on whether or not farmers w ould adopt innovations. In the 1930s Pierre
v
Gourou claimed that Northern peasants avoided innovations only because they lacked 
the capital to take risks with untested m ethods of production. Vu Quoc Thuc saw it 
differently, writing in 1951 that N orthern peasants were hostile to innovation because 
failure could be ruinous and hum iliating in a tightly knit village.119
Two major schools of thought characterize the debate in Economic History and 
Development Studies circles over peasant economic behavior. The awkwardly named 
'rational choice political economy' m odel describes a system in which economic actors are 
income maximizers w ithin a lim ited choice set.12o The name does not imply perfect 
rationality: purely objective reasoning based on full information. Rather, while there 
may be constraints such as imperfect markets, a dearth of information, or the need to 
ensure family subsistence, actors will generally attempt to maximize their profits given a 
perception of acceptable levels of risk. This is perhaps more aptly called a 'constrained 
optimizing m odel/ For peasants, this means a willingness to invest surpluses, even in 
ventures that pose some risk, in order to improve their lots. Economists seek to model 
how the optimizing individual or family reacts to a change in one or more variables.
The most basic policy implication is that peasant farm households make predictable 
adjustments to changes in prices and availability of farm inputs and outputs. Hence, 
development policies that m anipulate the prices and availability of infrastructure, inputs, 
land, or commodities could profoundly affect peasant resource allocation and 
productivity.
The moral economy model depicts peasants as risk averse members of a unique 
economic system.121 According to this view, being constantly on the brink of economic
disaster, peasants quite rationally protect their subsistence by forgoing potentially risky
119 A. Terry Rambo, A Comparison of Peasant Social Systems of Northern and Southern Viet-Nam: A Study of 
Ecological Adaptation, Social Succession, and Cultural Evolution. Carbondale (Carbondale, IL, 1973), 41-2.
120 For a good description of the rational choice political economy school of thought, see Robert Bates, Beyond 
the Miracle of the Market, introduction. For a rational choice view of peasant economic behavior, see Samuel 
Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley , 1979). Popkin's 
research was carried out largely in the Mekong delta region of Vietnam. See also Thrainin Eggertson, 
Economic Behavior and Institutions (Cambridge, 1990), 28, and Frank Ellis, Peasant Economics, 74-5.
121 The originator of the term 'moral economy7 was E.P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd 
in the Eighteenth Century/Past and Present, 1971, and reprinted with further comment in E.P. Thompson, 
Customs in Common (New York, 1991).
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opportunities to raise their incomes. For instance, rather than plant m odern rice 
varieties that offer high yields bu t are sensitive to pests and drought, peasants will tend to 
plant local varieties that yield less, but are less likely to fail. Income maximizers m ay be 
risk averse as well. The dimension that separates a moral economy from simple risk 
aversion is a belief among peasants or workers in a moral right to subsistence: that it is 
intrinsically wrong that owners or consumers may flourish while producers starve. The 
urban and rural poor, according to this school of thought, hold owners, employers, 
notables, landlords, and governments responsible for m aintaining their end of a moral 
bargain, that is, for not employing tax or rent policies that threaten subsistence. In its 
simplest terms, this is a bread for obedience arrangement. If the wealthy do not threaten 
their subsistence, the poor will not rebel. In this context -and  this is a key difference 
between the schools of thought- w hat is left to producers is more im portant than w hat is 
taken by those em powered to take. Though scholars often m isunderstand this, 'm oral' 
does not imply a higher morality, merely that the deep emotions stirred by dearth, and 
the 'outrage provoked by profiteering in life threatening emergencies, imparted a 
particular "moral" charge to protest/*22
In the 1970s, James Scott linked another dimension to the idea of moral economy 
and focused it on peasants.123 In Scott's influential view, a well defined system of 
peasant-to-peasant reciprocity in food, labor, or money, to which peasants and landlords 
are socially and morally bound, governs their economic behavior. Scott argued that these 
practices are unique to peasants and global in practice: 'there is good reason for viewing 
both the norm  of reciprocity and right to subsistence as genuine moral components of a 
[universal peasant cu ltu re]/124 These norms of reciprocity level incomes within villages 
or groups so that while few may prosper, few may starve. In a good year one gives, in a 
bad year one receives. Peasants generally eschew risky but potentially profitable 
agricultural practices in part because large surpluses would likely be shared out anyway,
but also because farmers would risk not only their own family's survival, but that of their
122 E.P. Thompson, 'Moral Economy Reviewed/ in Customs in Common ed. E.P. Thompson (New York, 1991) 
271.
123 James C. Scott was the first to apply the term moral economy specifically to peasants, The Moral Economy 
of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven, 1976).
124 Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, quoted in E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common , 341.
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neighbors. Thus, Scott identified a moral dimension to these norms as well as to the 
subsistence ethic. 12s
Scott's model of a moral economy is im portant to policy makers because, if it is 
accurate, peasants are not necessarily responsive to relative price changes in the market 
and will resist development program s designed simply to increase their incomes. In a 
good year, for instance, m odem  high yielding seed varieties appear promising, but the 
peasant operating in a moral economy w ould be more likely than a 'rational peasant' to 
cast a weather eye to the bad years, or even the average years. Peasants m ight resist 
planting high yielding crops even if necessary inputs were priced appropriately, and even 
if they know the practices might raise their incomes, because they are morally bound to a 
system that eschews such communal risks for personal gain. A peasant family would 
thus be especially reluctant to abandon value laden subsistence practices for a market 
oriented approach offered by most W estern development programs. In short, according 
to Scott, a peasant's economic system is part of a larger system of values or beliefs, not 
merely a response to environment or a rational individual economic choice in unstable 
conditions.
4.4 (ii) The Vietnam  Specialist Literature and Peasant Economic Behavior
Vietnam specialists have tended to dismiss the application of behavioral models. Neil
Jamieson, a former USAID officer and longtime resident of Vietnam, argued that it is
impossible to understand or model Vietnamese behavior w ithout a profound historical
sense of the society. Jamieson did not address the Scott-Popkin debate directly, but
contended that an internal clash of old and new values cut across geographical, religious,
political, and socioeconomic differences (which also involved differences in attitudes and
values). The dynamic tension between these m ultiple cleavages in society produced an
invisible and largely unperceived network of m utual influence so complex as to
confound utterly any linear model that might be employed to m anipulate any single set
of variables. Yet, in Jamieson's view, such models were employed constantly by all 
125 Scott, The Moral Economy, 40-3.
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concerned, w ith uniformly disastrous results.126
Nancy Wiegersma, another former USAID officer in Vietnam, also stressed that 
late 20th century Vietnam could only be understood in reference to the society's older 
values. She criticized both Scott and Popkin as having a shallow and simplistic sense of 
Vietnamese history and society, charged that both overestimated the decision making 
power of family patriarchs while underestim ating the public nature of village decision 
making, and claimed that Vietnam fitted no other economic or social model.127 
W iegersma asserted that village notables allotted community land and water, 
neighborhood associations governed labor exchanges, and peasants families generally 
obeyed. 'Economic decisions were not made either "rationally" or "morally" by 
Vietnamese peasants. Decisions were m ade by the village leaders and family patriarchs 
in the context of m odem  and traditional realities.'128
W iegersma and especially Jamieson greatly enhanced the American social and 
political literature on m odem  Vietnam. But while dismissing W estern models for 
Vietnamese society, Jamieson does not contend with the details of economic behavior. 
And W iegersma seems to have missed the essence and importance of the Scott-Popkin 
debate. She mislabeled Popkin as a neoclassical economist, overlooked his work on 
public decision making, and never acknowledged evidence that Vietnamese peasants 
embraced profit maximizing practices. Further, like many scholars, she wholly failed to 
grasp the meaning of moral economy. 'Peasant views of social justice are based on their 
view of equity and of tradition, not on "morality," which connotes religious 
m ysticism ./l29 Wiegersma not only confused the titles of these theories with their 
meanings, she appears to have been writing about Central Vietnam in an earlier age. She 
underestim ated the disintegration of village apparatuses there and grossly overestimated 
the pow er of village notables in the M ekong/Saigon region, where there was very little 
communal land and water to distribute.
126 Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam (Berkeley, 1993), 305.
127 Wiegersma, Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution, 13-15
128 Ibid, 15.
129 Wiegersma, Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution, 13-15.
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4.4 (iii) Peasant Economic Behavior: Evidence from Vietnam and Beyond
A superficial perusal of regional variations in the adoption of m odem  varieties suggests 
that Samuel Popkin's 'rational peasant' roughly describes peasant economic behavior in 
the Mekong delta region, while James Scott's 'm oral economy' better describes behavior 
in Central Vietnam. This is not surprising since the authors carried out the bulk of their 
research in these respective areas. If this was the case, the American perception of the 
peasant as self interested income maximizer did not allow for regional differences. An 
internal USAID staff study touched on these narrow perceptions w hen it criticized 
American programs for assuming that 'V ietnam has a uniformity that it does not 
possess. Our present program  takes little account of the considerable differences that exist 
from region to region, from province to province.'130 In fact there is convincing evidence 
that peasants throughout South Vietnam m ade economic choices as constrained income 
maximizers. A m ultitude of conditions m ade innovation far riskier and more difficult 
in Central Vietnam. These conditions, not separate forms of peasant economic behavior, 
explain differing rates of adoption.
The moral economy model called necessary attention to peasant culture and 
practices, but it does not constitute a comprehensive m odel for peasant economic 
behavior in any region of South Vietnam. Thompson, Scott, and others have 
demonstrated conclusively, if not universally, that both the urban and rural poor hold 
the right to subsistence to be intrinsically just and are often prepared to defend it with 
remarkable moral fervor. However, in light of strong evidence, linking a belief in the 
right to subsistence w ith norms of reciprocity to create a generalized model of peasant 
economic behavior is a conflation.
Roger Wells and E. P. Thompson saw that changing conditions in the developing 
world had largely wiped out the practices described by Scott. But Wells argued that this 
merely underscored the damage that meddling outsiders and m arket penetration can do 
to peasant societies, and he likely would dismiss the evidence of income-maximizing 
cited here. Wells asserted that Scott's model is period specific and 'does not founder on
130 "The USAID program and Vietnamese Reality', Staff Study, June 1968, 45. USAID PN-ARE-177.
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the emergence of peasant aspirations for wealth and upw ard social mobility.'131 Scott's 
model, however, founders on the very thing (moreover, he imbued the theory with no 
such modesty). A large percentage of South Vietnamese peasants spread Green 
Revolution technology largely through farmer-to-farmer exchanges. They took 
significant risks w ith radical new crops in an attempt to escape subsistence agriculture. 
When security conditions, physical infrastructure, and institutional arrangements 
allowed, they m arketed their produce in both the Mekong region and in Central 
Vietnam. To assum e that m eddling outsiders destroyed Central Vietnam's moral 
economic system, to assume that peasant responses in the 1970s have no bearing on this 
debate, not only ignores peasant demand, it does so in particularly condescending 
fashion.
South Vietnamese peasants adopted green revolution technology as an individual 
income-maximizing practice w ithout the 'deep  emotions' or 'outrage' Thompson rightly 
identified with threats to subsistence. Norms of reciprocity did exist and were a central 
issue in peasant life, bu t they simply did not stir the same emotions, were not held as a 
similarly intrinsic value, right, or obligation, as was the subsistence ethic. Rather, strong 
peasant dem and for new technology, improved inputs, and access to the market, reveals 
that reciprocal arrangem ents were essentially economic arrangements from which 
peasants began to w ithdraw  when they were no longer needed to ensure subsistence.
Global evidence reveals that the most glaring weakness of Scott's model is its 
assum ption that non-m arket exchanges are non-economic. Often this is manifestly not 
the case. As Pranab Bardhan phrased it, 'social transactions and w hat are usually 
attributed to customary practice can often be shown to have a core economic, and more 
generally, material interpretation /1 3 2  Frank Ellis argued that on a global basis, 'a  great 
deal of indirect evidence, especially on the responsiveness of peasants to changes in 
relative m arket prices between crops, reveals a strong element of economic calculation on 
the part of peasant farm households ev ery w h ere /^  The slightest exposure to peasant
131 Roger Wells, 'E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common and Moral Economy/ Journal of Peasant Studies 21, no. 2, 
January 1994, 294.
132 Bardhan, Pranab K., Land, Labor, and Rural Poverty: Essays in Development Economics (New York, 1984), 
3.
133 Frank Ellis, Peasant Economics, 74
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society reveals the serious problem of 'free riders/ those w ho do not contribute to 
communal activity but attempt to profit from it. In fact, some reciprocity systems contain 
elements designed to discourage free riders.13* Free riders are obviously making 
economic choices when they withhold their resources but attem pt to profit from 
communal activity and the moral economy literature does not adequately explain this 
pervasive element in communal arrangements. Some peasant reciprocal practices take 
on an overt flavor of economic exchange. Samuel Popkin noted the case of a 20th 
century Thai village in which officials kept a ledger w ith scrupulous, formal records of 
who owed w hat to whom: a clear case, he contends, of economic exchange in a non- 
m arket setting. 135 Popkin also argued convincingly that common efforts succeed where 
peasants find it in their own family's interest to allocate resources to the common effort, 
but fail if the effort appears to be counterproductive. If free riders, for instance, are not 
controlled, families may refuse to cooperate.136 Yujiro Hayami traced the evolution of 
'baw on', Javanese reciprocal practices in rice cultivation. Under the bawon system, able 
villagers who did not own enough land to feed their families all participated in the 
overall harvest and received a share of the produce. But recently, fewer laborers have 
been invited to take part in bawon, ever more labor has been required for a share of the 
harvest, and shares have fallen, thus the implicit 'w age' has fallen. This has been good 
for landowners and bad for laborers, contributing to inequality, and  has the strong scent 
of an economic arrangement.137 This illustrates another weakness of the moral economy 
model. Its literature only vaguely refers to the problem of w hat to make of subsistence 
practices that keep peasants poor without actually threatening their survival.
Evidence exists from throughout Vietnam that, historically, collective activity 
among peasants was not necessarily a sign of moral commitment. Some consensual 
activities were undertaken out of economic self interest, or even compulsion. In 
imperial Vietnam, for instance, peasants were obliged to perform  communal labor not
134 Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam, 35.
135 Samuel L. Popkin, 'Public Choice and Peasant Organization/ in Toward a Political Economy of 
Development ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley 1988), 259.
136 Popkin, 'Public Choice/ 252.
137 Yujiro Hayami, 'Asian Development: A View From the Paddy Fields/ Asian Development Review 6, no. 
1, 1988, 53-5. See also Barker et al., The Rice Economy of Asia, 135-6.
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merely to avoid official censure, but to retain rights to the land they tilled. Under the 
Hanoi government, N orth Vietnamese agricultural officials in the 1960s and 1970s 
attem pted to entice peasants to participate in collective activity by 'm aking own-account 
activity conditional upon  such participation.' The government withheld access to the 
m arket as punishm ent for refusal to participate in communal activities. Because Hanoi's 
collective system was imposed from above, this alone does not negate Scott's theory of 
peasant reciprocity as a value-based vote for community welfare. But cumulative 
evidence demonstrates a clear effort on the part of peasants to maximize individual 
rather than collective income. This was the experience of a great many American 
officials in South Vietnam. One representative comment came from a former USAID 
agricultural adviser w ho characterized South Vietnamese peasant farmers as very astute, 
continually calculating the costs and benefits of various cultivation strategies. 'Like 
farmers anywhere in the world, if you gave South Vietnamese farmers an opportunity 
they could understand to make a profit, they would do it.'13*
The rational choice school has critics as well. Some object to the w hat they 
perceive as cavalier use of the term 'ra tional/ question the existence of 'rational m an/ 
and the wisdom of taking individuals and their preferences as the starting point of 
analysis in economics.139 They point out that individuals tend to have unstable 
preferences, are not calculators with access to complete data, that plenty of caprice attends 
hum an decision making, that knowledge and expectations are subjective, and that people 
have different abilities to sense and process data. The rational choice school, according to 
this view, does not take into account reciprocal behavior, charity, favors to clients, and 
the maximizing of prestige at the expense of income, all of which could be survival 
strategies, but may not be maximizing behavior. For instance, Vietnamese peasants did 
not ruthlessly maximize income, they also sought prestige and position, which in fact 
could have the opposite effect on income.140
Such criticisms often over-simplify the rational choice approach, lum ping it in
138 Charlie Seckinger, USAID Assistant Director in Agriculture, January 1973-August 1974, interview with 
author, 26 August 1994, Potomac, Maryland, USA.
139 See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Economics and Institutions: A Manifesto for a Modem Institutional Economics 
(Cambridge, 1988), introduction and 79.
140 For an excellent description of the political and prestige economies of the Vietnamese village, see Neil 
Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam (Berkeley, 1993), 31-36.
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with neoclassical theory as purely mechanistic, accusing it of being enslaved to purely 
economic explanations for behavior, of ignoring the role of extra-market institutions 
employed by peasants to substitute for missing credit, insurance, and futures markets, and 
indeed of ignoring hum an nature a lto g e th e r .141 Scholars from the rational choice school 
of thought, w hether political scientists, political economists, or 'new  institutional 
econom ists/ have defined 'ra tional/ 'm axim izing/ and 'optim izing ' in reasonable terms 
accounting for caprice, hum an limitations, and non-economic interests. They have no 
more described hum an economic actors as computers making perfectly rational, 
maximizing choices than Scott or Thompson described the poor as more moral than the 
rich. Both schools have been victims to their provocative names.
Rational choice theorists have demonstrated conclusively that non-m arket 
exchanges can be economic in nature, and provided plausible economic explanations for 
institutions such as sharecropping and norms of reciprocity- explanations that take into 
account social relations, moral force, hum an weakness, and limitations to 
maximization. 142 Share-cropping, a basis of moral economy analysis, can be motivated 
by more than peasant risk aversion. It may be the optimal economic response for 
peasants to imperfect m arkets .^  It m ight even represent landlord risk aversion by 
delegating the majority of risk to the peasant or laborer, or it m ight be an attem pt to keep 
peasants at a subsistence level and leave produce, input, and credit markets to landlords' 
and traders' ministrations. And Haggis et al. cite several instances in South and 
Southeast Asia in which peasants initiated the abandonm ent of share-cropping .144 
Moreover, rational choice adherents have reckoned with criticisms of the overemphasis 
of individual choice. In a later work, Samuel Popkin departs from the em phasis on the 
individual that colored The Rational Peasant, describing peasant economic decision 
making as an effort to optimize for the family unit while paying attention to the interests
141 Pranab Bardhan, 'Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development/ in The 
Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions ed. Pranab Bardhan (Oxford, 1989), 7.
142 For a description of several explanations for sharecropping, see Ellis, Peasant Economics, 142-63.
143 Pranab K. Bardhan, Land, Labor, and Rural Poverty: Essays in Development Economics (New York, 1984), 
3.
144 Haggis et al., 'By the Teeth: A Critical Examination of James Scott's The Moral Economy of the Peasant, 
Journal of Development Studies 18 (1983), 1437-8.
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of the community through a combination of individual and collective behavior. 145
In sum, advocates of the rational choice school have demonstrated that peasants 
employ varied strategies both to subsist and to maximize, but that these strategies, while 
the result of accumulated knowledge and use of rules of thumb rather than perfectly 
rational, perfectly informed calculation, are indeed economic strategies, not traditions to 
which peasants feel morally bound. Peasants recognize implicitly that markets are 
imperfect, that the poor do not have the same access as the prosperous to credit, 
technology, crop insurance, fair prices for inputs, and the like. Where the market does 
not offer peasants an opportunity to subsist or prosper, institutions outside the market 
m ust allocate resources. Thus, norm s of reciprocity are in part economic responses to the 
realities peasants face, a form of crop insurance, or a substitute for wage labor in a cash- 
poor society. These practices are certainly fortified with a sense of social and even moral 
obligation, as a credit card paym ent might be to a Western capitalist, but they are not a 
belief system based in intrinsic notions of right and w r o n g s  Finally, Scott's attempts to 
generalize his theory, by identifying a universal peasant culture, fall flat. A peasant 
culture universal to South Vietnam is difficult to identify, much less in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America as well. E. P. Thompson himself wrote that The findings of the moral 
economy cannot be taken across to any peasant m arket/ each particular society and 
culture m ust be reckoned w ith.147
Separate models for economic behavior were not at work in the coastal lowlands 
and the Mekong delta. Rather, South Vietnamese peasants appear to have responded to 
different social and climatic circumstances as constrained income maximizers. The 
adoption rates of m odem  rice and associated inputs under widely varying circumstances 
reveals that peasants in Central Vietnam displayed more risk aversion, more reciprocal 
behavior, and more resistance to green revolution technology than did Mekong delta 
farmers because they were responding to objectively higher levels of risk. They were not 
navigating scientifically, rather they were dead reckoning through turbulent times, but 
they were doing so based by and large on personal and family interest.
145 Samuel L. Popkin, 'Public Choice.’
146 For more comment on this issue, see Bates, Toward a Political Economy of Development, 7.
147 Thompson, Customs in Common, 261.
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Long term research has found that there is no 'innate deficiency in the willingness 
of small farmers to take risks that hold them back.' It is simply that the sam e explicit 
terms will translate into far higher risk for a small farmer than for a large farm er.148 
These findings support the contention that peasants tend to take risks to maximize 
production where population density is not too great, land holdings are large enough to 
provide a surplus, and some cushion against subsistence failure is possible.149 That 
cushion may take the form of insurance, affordable credit or a potential crop surplus 
coupled w ith adequate access to a functioning market.150
This suggests that supplying appropriate risk-reducing factors was the key to 
inducing Vietnamese farmers to innovate and increase production. In Central Vietnam, 
as Chapter Five will demonstrate, it was not possible to create large enough landholdings 
to lift cultivators out of subsistence patterns. Thus, land-saving technology such as 
m odem  rice was particularly appropriate. Since risk could not be mitigated by providing 
additional land, it could have been reduced by providing reasonably priced credit and 
crop insurance. Yield variance between good and bad years could have been ameliorated 
through improved irrigation infrastructure. Some success may have come out of w ider 
distribution of small irrigation pumps. The fact that up to 15% of Central Vietnamese 
farmers did so, often under dreadful conditions and largely w ithout such services, 
suggests that more w ould have been willing given a reduction of risk.
4.4 (iv) The Diffusion of Modem Rice Varieties and the Optimal Farm Size Debate
Several scholars have argued that the introduction of green revolution technology harms 
the poor by encouraging mechanization, farm consolidation, peasant landlessness, rural 
unemployment, and a small class of wealthy farmers.151 Moreover, evidence exists that
148 Hans P. Binswanger and Donald A. Sillers, 'Risk Aversion and Credit Constraints in Farmers’ Decision- 
Making: A Reinterpretation,’ The Journal of Development Studies 20, no.l, October 1983, 18.
149 Ellis, Peasant Economics, 80.
150 On market penetration and production increases, see Eric Wolf, Peasants (Edgewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966), 82.
151 Shari and Sundaram, for instance, found such iniquities for certain regions of Malaysia. Ishak Shari and 
Jomo Kwame Sundaram, 'Malaysia’s Green Revolution in Rice Farming: Capital Accumulation and 
Technological Change in a Peasant Society,’ in Village-Level Modernization in Southeast Asia: The 
Political Economy of Rice and Water ed. Geoffrey B. Hainsworth (Vancouver, 1982), 246.
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as larger-scale mechanization such as tractors appears, the inverse relationship of farm 
size to farm productivity, described in Chapter Three, weakens.152 Such a weakening of 
the inverse relationship theoretically w ould further encourage land consolidation and 
induce landholders to fight agrarian reforms still harder.
Richard Grabowski, however, asserted that it is pointless to argue about whether 
agricultural innovations harm  or help the poor laborers and small farmers without 
reference to the social and institutional structure into which new practices are 
introduced. In certain structures, 'high-yielding technologies increase the demand for 
labor, provide additional income for small farmers.'153 And there is a good deal of 
evidence from Asia that the introduction of green revolution technology does not 
necessarily weaken the inverse relationship or harm  the rural poor. Hayam i et al. 
showed that smallholders and tenants captured gains of HYVs because of rent control in 
one Philippines village.154 Cordova determined that in Laguna, the most important rice 
province in the Philippines, the introduction of HYVs increased dem and and wages for 
laborers, even w hen accounting for increased mechanization.155 A W orld Bank study 
found that small farmers have benefited from increasing productivity per hectare in 
world rice farming in recent decades.156
The introduction of m odem  varieties proved generally advantageous to small 
farmers and laborers given South Vietnam's institutional character. Because of both NLF 
and Saigon governm ent land reforms analyzed below in Chapter Five, small farmers in 
South Vietnam enjoyed secure property rights. Because of a dim inution of the guerrilla 
war and improving road nets, farmer access to markets improved. Because of partial 
deregulation of the rice trade and input markets, price incentive to produce rose. Green
152 Graham Dyer, 'Farm Size-Farm Productivity Reexamined: Evidence from Rural Egypt/ The Journal of 
Peasant Studies. Vol. 19, N o.l, October 1991, 58. See also Ajit Kumar Ghose, 'Farm Size and Land 
Productivity in Indian Agriculture: A Reappraisal/ The Journal of Development Studies 16, no. 1, October 
1979, 59.
153 Richard Grabowski, 'Agriculture, Mechanisation and Land Tenure,' The Journal of Development Studies 117, 
no. 1, October 1990,43.
154 Hayami et al., 'Anatomy of a Peasant Economy: A Rice Village in the Philippines,’ International Rice 
Research Institute paper, Los Banos, Philippines, 1978.
155 Violetta G. Cordova, 'New Rice Technology and its Effects on Labour Use and Shares in Rice Production in 
Laguna, Philippines, 1966-78/ Village-Level Modernization in Southeast Asia: The Political Economy of 
Rice and Water ed. Geoffrey B. Hainsworth ed. (Vancouver, 1982), 191, 205.
156 'Agricultural Diversification: Policies and Issues from East Asian Experience/ The World Bank, 
Agriculture and Rural Development Department, Washington, DC, March 1990.
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revolution technology proved highly divisible and, as subsection 4.2 (i) dem onstrated, it 
prom pted investment in land-saving practices such as double-cropping, and in small- 
scale mechanization, such as irrigation pum ps and rototillers. In fact, the most extensive 
post-1970 study suggests that new title holders were not only far more likely to make such 
investments than tenants, but 17% more likely to do so even than wealthy owner- 
operators.157 Hence, at South Vietnam's level of mechanization and given its rural 
institutional structure, the introduction of green revolution technology did not increase 
optim um  scale of production or encourage land consolidation. Moreover, as subsection
4.2 (i) indicated, the gains from m odem  varieties were captured largely by small farmers. 
Thus, small farms dom inated the agricultural sector and the inverse relationship profited 
South Vietnamese farmers and the national economy.
4.5 SOUTH VIETNAM'S GREEN REVOLUTION' IN REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Efforts to increase rice production in South Vietnam fared extremely well compared with 
other Asian producers, which is impressive considering the wartime obstacles the effort 
faced. For instance, the diffusion of modern rice varieties in South Vietnam compares 
favorably with a similar program  in Thailand, which began in 1969 w ith 3,000 hectares of 
m odern rice and increased to 450,000 hectares for the 1974 crop. Thus, Thailand, a 
country at peace and w ith roughly double the population of South Vietnam, planted 
approximately 50,000 fewer hectares of m odem  rice varieties over five seasons than did 
South Vietnam in four.iss
Moreover, this chapter has demonstrated that roughly 92% of the increase of rice 
output in South Vietnam may be attributable to m odem  varieties, rather than expanded 
hectarage planted. Francesca Bray's research buttresses this assertion. She cited evidence 
that South Vietnam's production gains due to increases in yield per hectare, as opposed to
increase in area cultivated, were the highest in Asia for the period 1955 to 1975. These
157 Callison, Land -to-the-Tiller, 292-3.
158 David Feeny, The Political Economy of Productivity: Thai Agricultural Development, 1880-1975 
(Vancouver, 1982), 110. For Thai population figures from 1965 and 1975, see Kamphol Adulavidhaya and 
Tongroj Onchan, 'Migration and Agricultural Development of Thailand: Past and Future,’ in Urbanization and 
Migration in ASEAN Development, eds. Philip M. Hauser, Daniel B. Suits, and Nohiro Ogawa ( Tokyo,
1985), 433.
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economies were starting from different levels. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, for 
instance, had embraced chemical fertilizers and pesticides long before Vietnam.
Therefore, their productivity gains for this period would have been less dramatic. 
Nevertheless, Vietnam's productivity gains through higher yields per hectare compare 
favorably w ith Malaysia and Thailand, which introduced green revolution technology at 
about the same time, and which had the advantage of being at peace during this period.159
159 Both Thailand and Malaysia faced insurgencies in this period, but these were small and confined generally 
to border areas.
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Table 4.6
Relative Contributions of Area and Yield to Total Grow th in  Rice
Production, 1955-7316o
A B
Burma 1.98 1.13 0.84
Cambodia -1.04 -2.76 1.54
Indonesia 2.84 1.31 1.50
Japan 0.64 -0.88 1.55
S Korea 4.09 0.55 3.52
Laos 3.48 1.61 1.75
M alaysia 5.91 3.97 1.86
Philippines 2.78 1.11 1.62
Taiwan 2.00 -0.15 2.15
Thailand 2.84 1.78 1.06
South Vietnam 5.27 1.08 4.18
A: Annual growth rate of output (%)
B: Change in output due to change in area (%) 
C: Change in output due to changes in yield (%)
Table 4.7 below demonstrates that rice farms planting m odem  varieties in South 
Vietnam began to produce some of the highest yields in Southeast Asia, and were quickly 
following the developmental path in rice of South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. Especially 
impressive, according to these data, the increase in returns to labor for m odern over local 
rice in South Vietnam were extremely high on a comparative basis: more evidence that 
South Vietnamese farmers experienced strong incentive to shift to m odern varieties just 
as farmers in the most productive rice-growing countries in Asia had.
160 Reproduced from Bray, The Rice Economies , 43. Original source: Asian Development Bank, Rural Asia: 
Challenge and Opportunity (New York, 1978), appendices l-4.5c/d.
170
Table 4.7 Rice Yields and Labor Inputs for Selected Countries 161
Japan162
Years Yields
(metric tons/ha)
Human labor inputs 
(working-days /ha)
Yields /  working-day 
(in kgs unhulled rice)
1950
1956
1962
4.3
5.0
5.8
255
229
190
16.9
21.8
30.5
S Korea 1960
Hwas. local163 1974 
Hwas. modem 1974
3.3
5.6
7.2
139
126
139
23.7 
44.4
51.8
Taiwan 1926
1967
1972
2.1
5.1
5.7
96
113
125
21.9
45.1
45.6
Java
Thailand
Nong Sarai 
S Buri local165
1969-70
1972
1972
S Buri modem 1972
Philippines1
3.5
2.0
2.0
3.4
360
83
82
117
9.7164
24.0 
24.4
29.1
C Luzon local 1966 1.6 60 26.6
C Luzon modem 1974 2.9 82 35.4
Laguna local 1966 2.5 88 28.4
Laguna modem 1975 3.5 106 33.0
South Vietnam
Mekong local 1969 2.6 59.5 43.7
Mekong modem 1969 4.5 66 68.2
Coast local 1969 2.7 79 34.2
Coast modem 1969 4.5 84 53.6
,  W1 
\K
161 Most yields and working days figures from Bray, The Rice Economies , 149. Where indicated, figures are 
from Barker et al., The Rice Economy of Asia, 127. Figures and data for South Vietnam are derived from from, 
'Rice Cost of Production in Vietnam/ VM 338-17318-F793. Yields/working day calculated by author. Figures 
for one year's harvest could be misleading given seasonal variations, but a general picture emerges.
162 Japanese post-war figures for agricultural labor inputs are notoriously vague. Many farmers worked part 
time at off-farm jobs, but statisticians tended to calculate full time hours for farmers. Therefore, these human 
labor input figures may be exaggerated. Letter from Dr. Janet Hunter, 17 June 1996.
163 Hwasunggan, South Korea, local and modem varieties, from Barker et al.
164 Bray's productivity figures for Java appear to be low. Barker et al., however, surveyed several studies and 
found the following. Between 1968 and 1970, for both m odem and local rice varieties, for five regions of Java, 
two in the west, one in the center, and two in the east, the average return to labor (kg unhulled rice per 
working day) was 20.9. This, however, was for preharvest labor only. Purcal found for four villages in 
western Malaysia that post-harvest labor accounted for about 38% of total labor for both single-cropped rice 
and 44% for double- cropped. Purcal, Rice Economy, tables 3-3, 6-3. Therefore, Javan returns to labor do indeed 
appear to be low compared to other areas of Asia.
165 Suphan Buri figures from Barker et al.
166 For Central Luzon, Barker's figures compare 63 farms with no m odem  varieties in 1966 with the same farms 
in 1974, when 64% were growing modem rice. For Laguna, 62 farms with no MVs in 1966 compared with 94% 
growing MVs in 1975.
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4.6 CONCLUSIONS: THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MODERN RICE VARIETIES IN 
SOUTH VIETNAM
A preponderance of evidence indicates that the effort to introduce the widespread use of 
m odem  seed varieties, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides was profoundly appropriate 
given South Vietnam 's institutional makeup. The results were impressive both on their 
own merits as well as in comparison with other Asian experiences. The trend in total 
factor productivity appears to have been positive, a large percentage of farmers adopted 
the technology, while output and productivity increased. South Vietnam became 
potentially self sufficient in rice again and imported rice declined sharply as a percentage 
of nationally available grain. Moreover, Vietnamese labor productivity w ith local 
varieties appears to have been high when compared with the rest of Asia. This suggests 
that, prior to the introduction of 'green revolution7 technology, South Vietnamese 
peasant farmers were optimizing given existing constraints and available technology 
-further evidence that m odem  varieties fitted into existing modes of production. The 
South Vietnamese production response also generally appears to have fitted the early 
part of the Ishikawa curve for Asian rice sector development. Moreover, the seed 
technology introduced in the late 1960s persisted into the reunification period as well. 
Clearly, the innovation worked w ith rather than against underlying indigenous 
economic assum ptions and impulses.
There are questions about the program 's sustainability. The chemical inputs 
necessary for m axim um  yields were still being imported and sold to farmers at subsidized 
prices. Douglas Dacy contended that unsustainable economic gains cannot be called 
developm ent.167 it is of course impossible to predict with precision w hat the program  
might have produced over the long run. But perhaps sustainability is more appropriate 
as a peacetime goal. A nd m odern varieties have performed well over the long run in 
many Asian settings. While it appears that prosperous farmers adopted m odem  varieties 
first in South Vietnam, and that credit shortages were a key inhibitor for the poor, there 
is global evidence that smaller and poorer farmers tend to catch up and make good use of
167 Douglas,Foreign Aid, introduction.
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highly divisible green revolution technology, especially where institutional structures are 
relatively friendly to small farms, as they were increasingly in South Vietnam.
It m ust be said that there were environmental and hum an implications to Green 
Revolution technology that this study has not analyzed. Some chemicals introduced 
under the Accelerated Rice Program were highly toxic and have since been banned 
globally. However, given the level of general awareness of these issues and the risks 
facing South Vietnam, famine among them, the new technology was the best available 
choice despite its harmful effects. In sum it appears that the program  was economically 
and institutionally appropriate not only for its place and time, bu t in the long term as 
well. In any case, under such circumstances, labor-using, land-saving technology was the 
obvious choice. Continuing to rely on local varieties in such circumstances w ould have 
been ludicrous.
Perhaps the most im portant finding in the chapter is that the new technology 
diffused well beyond the scope of the government program  that introduced it, and that 
both seed and inputs crossed military and political frontiers. This has implications for 
development planning as well as for theory. It supports the old idea that the market at 
times can diffuse technology far more efficiently than a development program. And it 
confirms the appropriateness of a basic tenet of the American approach to development 
in South Vietnam. Peasant farm families grasped opportunities to maximize their 
incomes within acceptable levels of risk. Scholars and policy makers may argue the finer 
points of green revolution technology, but a large portion of South Vietnam's farmers 
voted for the program  by taking on increased risk and investing in new  inputs and extra 
labor over a short, tum ultuous period.
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Chapter 5
Agrarian Development: Land and Market Reforms
Successive Saigon governm ents displayed an almost uncanny ignorance of rural 
Vietnam. President Nguyen Van Thieu was different. According to Timothy Lomperis, 
Thieu's attentiveness to rural issues was well known. He assiduously courted the 
influential Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects, and in the 1967 elections, won more votes in rural 
regions than in the cities.1 The ideas behind the 1970 land redistributions were mainly 
conceived by Americans, bu t w ithout Nguyen Van Thieu, there would have been no 
agrarian reform.
Land redistribution is one of the few non-military nation building issue in South 
Vietnam that has received serious scholarly attention. In fact, Stuart Callison's book on 
South Vietnamese land reform is the only post-war m onograph dedicated solely to rural 
economic developm ent issues in the country .2 Callison found that peasants responded 
positively to land redistribution, increasing investment, production, and productivity.
This chapter confirms those findings and adds to existing literature on the subject in four 
ways. It incorporates new  evidence recently declassified at the author's request.
Prominent among these documents used in this chapter are studies of landlords, rent 
income, crop production, several USAID evaluation and project appraisal reports on land 
reform and agricultural technology, consultancy papers, a vital agricultural cost analysis, 
an extremely revealing m arketing study, a num ber of rural political analyses and surveys, 
agricultural credit studies, a num ber of economic and political studies conducted on the 
province and district level, reports on the workings of the South Vietnamese
government w ith reference to the rural economy, transport studies, and finally,
1 Timothy J. Lomperis, From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of 
Vietnam (Chapel Hill, 1996), 116.
2 Charles Stuart Callison, Land to the Tiller In the Mekong Delta: Economic, Social, and Political Effects of 
Land Reform in Four Villages of South Vietnam (Berkeley, 1983). The next most recent work is on economic 
development in South Vietnam is Callison's own article, 'The Land to the Tiller Program and Rural Resource 
Mobilization in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam’, Ohio University Center for International Studies, 
Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 34,1974. Please note that two books about macro- 
economic issues in South Vietnam were produced since the war: Douglas Dacy, Foreign Aid, War, and Economic 
Development, South Vietnam, 1955-1975 (Cambridge, 1986), and Nguyen Anh Tuan, South Vietnam Trial and 
Experience: A Challenge for Development (Athens, Ohio, 1987).
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sociological studies. This chapter also broadens the enquiry into critical agrarian reform 
programs. It gives more attention to the rural political implications of agrarian reform 
than previous studies. Moreover, by analyzing agrarian reform in greater depth and 
breadth than has formerly been done, this study anchors the process firmly in the context 
of both nation building in Vietnam and the greater war effort. For the first time, this 
makes possible a comparison of the efficacy of the various types of rural development 
attem pted in South Vietnam, which is one of the major contributions of this study.
Land reform, defined here as the redistribution of property rights in land, is only 
part of a wider agrarian reform process. Agrarian reform is defined here as land 
redistribution combined with complimentary programs: credit, agricultural research, 
agricultural extension, along w ith market and financial improvements.
The issue of property rights in land plays a major role in developm ent theories. 
Adherents to the property rights school of thought believe that farmers who enjoy secure 
rights to their land are more productive than those who do not. Lack of secure 
ownership is said to create uncertainty among farmers about w hether they will be able to 
profit from investments in their land. This uncertainty produces a reluctance to invest 
in infrastructure improvements and inputs necessary for increasing productivity. Thus, 
to property rights advocates, land reform is central to any development program.3 As 
this chapter will demonstrate, American development planners generally subscribed to 
such a view of property rights. Ironically, the National Liberation Front was temporarily 
pursuing a land redistribution effort similar to the governm ent's in an effort to win 
peasant support, and did not attempt to collectivize South Vietnamese agriculture until 
after the war.
Both sides were responding to the sentiments of South Vietnam 's peasant farmers. 
Callison found that the grievances fueling the southern revolt were largely land based; 
peasants objected to the exploitative nature of the landlord-tenant system and the
3 See David Feeny, 'The Development of Property Rights in Land: a Comparative Study/ in Robert Bates, 
Toward a Political Economy of Development: a Rational Choice Perspective (Berkeley, 1988); Gershon Feder, 
'Land Ownership Security and Farm Productivity: Evidence from Thailand/ The Journal of Development 
Studies 24, No. 1, October 1987. See also Rehman Sobhan, Agrarian Reform and Social Transformation: 
Preconditions for Development (London, 1993). For an overview of land ownership, landlessness, and poverty, 
see Michael Lipton, 'Land Assets and Rural Poverty,’ World Bank Staff Working Papers, no. 744,1985.
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governm ent's association w ith the landlord class.4 Like all reforms attempted in South 
Vietnam, agrarian and market reforms were largely politically motivated. This was 
particularly so w ith regard to land redistribution. Because of the peasant attitudes noted 
above, many American policy makers believed that land reform offered the greatest hope 
for winning political support in rural South Vietnam, both directly by satisfying the 
hunger to own land, and indirectly through greater prosperity that planners hoped would 
result from increased productivity bom  of secure property rights. Thus, there was a 
confluence of political and economic aims. After all, any program  that failed 
economically was unlikely to curry political favor.
This chapter first sketches Vietnamese land tenure history to pu t the 1970 reforms 
into local context. Section Two examines the nature and scope of the program and 
explains its economic and political effects on rural South Vietnam. Section Three gauges 
the effects of 'second half of land reform / programs to improve credit, research, and 
agricultural extension services. Finally, Section Four places the South Vietnamese 
experience into the larger East Asian context.
5.1 VIETNAMESE LAND TENURE HISTORY TO 1970
Several W estern scholars have helped propagate the misconception that colonial policies 
created the tenant-landlord system in Vietnam characterized by large landowners and 
landless peasants.5 All these things, however, existed in precolonial Vietnam in various
forms. Under the Vietnamese imperial system the emperor owned all land. It was
separated into private lands, which were to be farmed by villagers w ith the right of 
usufruct, and common lands, which village notables were to redistribute every few years 
to m aintain reasonably equitable land holding patterns. In theory, villagers retained 
usufructory rights so long as the village paid taxes to the emperor and donated its labor as 
required each year for public works. Local village notables were responsible for both
distribution of common lands and the apportioning of water for irrigation. This gave
4 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 74.
5 See Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam, A Dragon Embattled (New York, 1967), 161- 4, and John T. McAllister, Jr., 
Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution (New York, 1969), 70.
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them enormous pow er and they often abused it.*
The result was a cycle which recurred throughout the past 1,000 years. 'In  general, 
a continuous conflict occurred between the imperial state administration, which desired 
to maintain more or less equitable land distribution for the sake of social order and 
uninterrupted tax revenues, and the tendency of local notables to amass large-scale
holdings in la n d /7  Stronger emperors generally achieved greater success in enforcing
land laws than did weaker ones, under whom peasant landlessness increased.8 Even 
under stringent laws, local elites often managed to amass large land holdings at the 
peasants' expense because villages enjoyed a great deal of autonomy and m any land laws 
existed chiefly on paper.9
Despite constant legislation during the eighteenth-century Trinh dynasty 
to ensure their equitable distribution, com m unal lands w ere in fact 
largely concentrated in the hands of the notables. In 1860 the N guyen 
rulers of Tonkin again attem pted to reform  the inequalities of the 
commune. But ... the notables retained their power: the poorer peasants 
were either kept in ignorance of the reforms or were afraid to incur the 
enmity of the notables. Central government had little direct control over 
the notables' administration of the villages. . . .10
While the French did not introduce the tenant-landlord system, they did reverse 
Nguyen Dynasty policies that encouraged smallholdings, and they helped to create and 
m aintain an extremely harsh land tenure system.^ The colonial governm ent conceded 
large-scale land holdings to French settlers and cooperative Vietnamese elites, which 
required expropriation of smallholders' lands. By the 1940s, French land concessions 
totaled more than two fifths of the arable land of Vietnam, most of it in Cochin China in 
the far S o u th .* 2 Further, French authorities established individual proprietary rights to 
land, which created a land market. Other vital changes took place at the sam e time.
Population growth combined with land expropriation to force peasants onto smaller and
6 Francesca Bray, The Rice Economies: Technology and Development in Asian Societies (Berkeley, 1986), 171.
7 Martin J. Murray, The Development of Capitalism in Colonial Indochina (1870-1940) (Berkeley, 1980), 378.
8 See, in addition to Murray, Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution: The Vietnamese Peasants under the 
French (Cambridge, Mass, 1973), 5-10, and Callison, Land to the Tiller, 35-38.
9 Callison, 37, and Buttinger, The Smaller Dragon (New York, 1958), 281.
10 Bray, The Rice Economies, 171.
11 Ibid., 181, Callison, Land to the Tiller, 37, Murray, Capitalism in Colonial Indochina, 50.
12 Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution, 18.
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smaller plots, creating an ever larger landless or near landless class. The French appear to 
have shared w ith most Westerners, then and now, a belief that peasant farmers 
deliberately stuck to backward agronomic practices. In the 1920s the French colonial 
administrator to the delta province of Long Xuyen, M. Le Bret, opined that 'if the small 
landowner is to be encouraged, the large landowner m ust not be disregarded; he alone is 
capable of audacious in itiatives/13
Data on colonial land tenure are scarce. However, in 1939 the French economic 
geographer Pierre Gourou found that in Cochin China 12.5% of cultivated area was 
comprised of holdings under 5 hectares, 42.5% between 5 and 50 hectares, and 45% in 
excess of 50 hectares.14 In Annam, or Central Vietnam, there was far greater population 
density and fewer European plantations. Large farms tended to be Vietnamese owned, 
and the small holders and ta dien, or tenants, were relegated to extremely small plots. 
According to Gourou, 95% of peasants farmed 2.5 hectares or less while 69% farmed less 
than a hectare.15 The Colonial Agricultural Department director Yves Henry found that 
in the western Mekong region, smallholders (who owned fewer than 5 hectares) made up 
38.3% of total owners but held only 3.3% of land.16 It appears that the French preference 
for large farms not only forced Vietnamese peasants onto ever smaller lots, it increased 
landlessness significantly as well. According to Henry, 36% of the population of Tonkin, 
in the North, were landless in 1931. Gourou estimated that by 1953 the proportion had 
risen to 58%.17 In the Mekong Delta region, during the same period, tenants farmed 80%
of the land under cultivation.^ Pierre Brocheux asserted that Henry, for one,
underestimated tenancy rates because land owners tended to farm part of their holdings 
and rent the rem ainder out to ta dien, whereas in surveys the whole of their land was 
generally listed as directly farm ed.19 According to Ngo Vinh Long, communal lands 
became more vital even as they shrank to the point at which they were no longer
13 Pierre Brocheux, The Mekong Delta: Ecology, Economy, and Revolution, 1860-1960 (Madison, WI, 1995), 31.
14 Ibid., 43.
15 Murray, Capitalism in Colonial Indochina, 397.
16 Brocheux, The Mekong Delta, 43.
17 ibid.
18 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 39.
19
Brocheux, The Mekong Delta, 47.
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sufficient to support the village poor. Population pressure and partible inheritance 
continued to produce ever smaller plots. Living standards spiraled dow nw ard and farm 
debt increased, as did land expropriations and peasant tenancy.20
Under these conditions, Vietnamese landlords practiced some of the harshest 
forms of tenancy in Asia. Rents tended to be fixed and averaged 50% of the crop while 
tenants supplied their own housing, tools, livestock, and supplem entary labor.
Landlords controlled credit and had the right to buy surpluses at a price they deemed fit. 
According to Wolf Ladejinsky, an American land reform specialist, these arrangements, 
combined with cyclical debt, meant that in a good year the tenants' were left with an 
average of one third of their crop.21 This tenure system had historically resulted in 
cyclical peasant rebellions aimed at landlord practices.22 In the m id 20th century, 
however, a new kind of rebellion emerged in Vietnam. The tem porary conquest of 
m uch of Southeast Asia by the Japanese during World War II dem onstrated the fallibility 
of European colonialists and spawned the first large-scale Vietnamese arm ed resistance in 
a generation, against the Japanese and later the French. Ho Chi M inh's Viet Minh army, 
however, did something new. They challenged not only tenurial practices they 
considered oppressive, but the existence of landlords. New confidence and new ideas 
infused the Vietnamese resistance and transformed its nature. W hen Wolf Ladejinsky 
surveyed peasants in 1955 he concluded that tenurial conflicts had gone too far to be 
resolved by mere rent reforms. Tenants wanted to own land and would not be satisfied 
w ith  less.23
From its early days, the Vietnamese communist party referred to its land policy as 
its la bua ho menh, or talisman. The Viet Minh dealt a fatal blow to w hat remained of 
Vietnamese tenurial tradition. In regions they either controlled or influenced, the Viet 
Minh lowered from about 50% to between 5% and 15% of the harvest. They also began to 
redistribute land. This had a spill-over effect by depressing rents in areas beyond direct
20 Long, Before the Revolution, 16-17, Murray, Capitalism in Colonial Indochina, 393.
21 Walinsky, Louis J., Editor, The Selected Papers of Wolf Ladejinsky: Agrarian Reform as Unfinished 
Business (Oxford, 1977), 301; Callison, Land to the Tiller, 39. For descriptions of tenure conditions during the 
French colonial period, see also Ngo Vinh Long, Before the Revolution, 44-56.
22 For an explanation of the nature of these revolts, see Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, especially 
127-49, 198-203.
23 Walinsky, Wolf Ladejinsky, 255.
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Viet Minh influence as well. Viet Minh reforms in the South in the early 1950s had a 
lasting effect even after the anti-communist Diem regime took over in 1954. In areas 
near former Viet Minh strongholds, rents tended to stay below 20%. Elsewhere, rents 
remained between 25% to 40% of the harvest. Even this was a significant reduction from 
the average 50% rents paid before the Second W orld War.24 Where the Viet Minh and 
National Liberation Front rebellions were strongest, in Central Vietnam and a few 
provinces of the Mekong delta, most landlords fled their villages and never returned. 
Many absentee landlords were unable to collect rents regularly, even in reasonably secure 
areas. Farmers knew who was responsible for these things.25 Upon m oving to towns 
and cities, many wealthier landlords invested in urban economic activity and became 
politically active in regional and national affairs. The policies of the Diem government 
make it clear that the landlord classes wielded a great deal of influence upon the regime.
Most senior officials in the Diem governm ent sprang from the urban, mandarin, 
and landlord classes, as did most of its rural support. Thus, where they could, the Saigon 
government reappropriated land previously distributed by the Viet Minh and returned it 
to landlords. This landlord affiliation was to haunt successive Saigon regimes and 
undermine many of their development program s of the late 1960s and early 1970s. As 
Chapter Three demonstrated, whatever they felt about communism, few peasant farm 
families saw the Saigon regime as representing their interests.
The Diem regime instituted a land reform program  in the mid 1950s that called for 
maximum rents of 25% of harvest, the restriction of ricelands ownership to 100 hectares, 
and the redistribution of 1.8 million hectares of land to new small landowners, who were 
to pay for their land over 4 years. Theoretically the Diem reforms would reduce both 
tenancy and rents significantly. In reality, however, they proved anemic. Ladejinsky, 
who had been an architect of the Diem land reform effort as well as the m ost important 
American evaluator of the program, became one of its most vociferous critics.26 Later 
United States Agency for International Development studies were equally critical. A 1968
24 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 40. For a discussion of tenurial conditions during the Viet Minh period, see 
Walinsky, Wolf Ladejinsky, 40-1.
25 For an example of the voluminous evidence on this issue, see Robert Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency in 
the Mekong Delta of Vietnam (Cambridge, MA, 1970), 234.
26 Walinsky, 255-301. See also Callison, Land to the Tiller, 46-7, Sansom, Economics of Insurgency, 61.
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paper found that tenants in the Mekong delta were paying an average of about 35% in 
rents despite D iem 's land reform policies.27 The final USAID report on land reform
argued that, largely because landlords remained in control of rural politics, there was no 
real enforcem ent of the Diem reforms, which rendered them 'ineffective'.28
A captured 1966 National Liberation Front document indicated that land remained 
central to the newest manifestation of the revolution. 'The essence of the national 
problem is the farmer's problem. The basic problem of the farmer is land. This . . .  we 
can never neglect.'29 The Front transformed South Vietnamese land tenure in the 1960s. 
In m uch of the country they began redistributing land to peasants who paid NLF taxes 
and cooperated w ith the cadres.30 Like the Viet Minh before them, the Front carried out 
a sustained assault on landlords7 interests and persons wherever they could. It was not 
only landlords, however, who were early targets of the program. The NLF reforms aimed 
to supply peasant families w ith a little more land than required for subsistence. This 
ideal required the confiscation of lands not only from large land owners, but also from 
peasants who held more than a hectare or two.
By attem pting to confiscate and redistribute the lands of these 'm iddle peasants’, 
the NLF reforms ran into significant early troubles. The middle peasant was only 
vaguely defined by either side in South Vietnam. With the majority of peasants landless, 
and average farm sizes about one hectare in the far South and a half hectare on the 
Central Coast, Callison rather arbitrarily defined middle peasants as those tilling between 
five and ten hectares. Scott does not use the term, but identifies a group of land owning 
peasants in colonial southern Vietnam who owned fewer than five hectares.31 Both the 
NLF and the USAID appear to have defined the middle peasant as any landowner of one
27 Land Reform in Vietnam: Working Papers, William Bredo et al., 4 vols., publication of Stanford Research 
Institute, vols 1-2, (Menlo Park, California) B17-B36, Record Group 472, National Archives, Archives II, 
College Park, Maryland (hereafter Archives II).
28'Land Reform', United States Economic Assistance to Viet Nam, 1954-1975, 31 December 1975, USAID 
Terminal Report, PN-ABH-885, 43, United States Agency for International Development Reading Room, 
Rosslyn, Virginia (hereafter USAID and document number).
29 'Land Reform,’ Terminal Report 1975, USAID PN-AAX-019.
30 For descriptions of the NLF land reforms of the early 1960s, see Callison, 52-5, 'Land Reform', 31 December 
1975, USAID, PN-ABPI-885, and Land Reform in Vietnam: Working Papers, William Bredo et al., SRI, B17- 
B36, Archives II.
31 Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, 78.
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to five hectares.32 Captured NLF documents described landless or near landless farmers 
as poor peasants, small landowners (presumably of 1-5 ha) as 'm iddle peasants', and 
landowners of over five hectares as wealthy.33 This m iddle group was strongly 
represented among village notables and generally wielded a good deal of power w ithin 
their communities.
In 1965, Front leaders realized that they could not yet afford to alienate such an 
influential sector of rural society. A captured NLF docum ent dated 1965 suspended all 
previous land reform directives, underscoring that 'solidarity  w ith m iddle farmers m ust 
be properly maintained since these classes formed a solid foundation. . .in the rural 
a reas /34 One former NLF cadre told Saigon officials that the Front 'took the land from 
the middle-class farmers. . . and this was a great failure/35 They halted confiscations of 
m iddle peasant lands and concentrated on that of larger landowners.36 The communists7 
troubles with middle peasants did not end w ith the fall of Saigon. Ngo Vinh Long 
alludes to the persistent potency of this group, acknowledging that the Hanoi 
government had not yet curbed their power by the early 1980s.37
In the 1960s, however, the ripple effect of NLF land policies pushed remaining 
rents in communist held areas down to about 5% to 10% of harvest by 1966, and 
depressed land rents in Saigon controlled areas as well.38 Callison reports that 'the  
overall effect of VC land policies on the peasants7 welfare was quite favorable/39 The 
effort was a political success as well, clearly establishing the NLF as the champion of the 
peasantry. This forced the Saigon regime to either capitulate to Front policies or take the 
side of the landlords, both potentially damaging political choices. Prior to 1970, Saigon7s 
leaders chose the latter. When they regained control of territory, the government often
reappropriated land previously distributed by the NLF and returned it to landlords.40
32 'Land Reform/ Vietnam Terminal Report, USAID, PN-AAX-019, p. 24.
33 Ibid. This report cites captured NLF documents.
34 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 23.
36 'Land Reform/ United States Economic Assistance to Viet Nam, 1954-1975, 31 December 1975, Terminal 
Report, USAID, PN-ABH-885.
37 Ngo Vinh Long, 'Agrarian Differentiation in the Southern Region of Vietnam/ in Taylor, John G. and 
Turton, Andrew, eds. Sociology of 'Developing Societies': Southeast Asia (London, 1988), 137.
38 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 53.
39 Ibid., 54.
40 Joseph Buttmger,Vietnam: The Unforgettable Tragedy (London, 1977), 113-4.
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By 1966 rents paid for land in the Mekong delta were determined as much by the 
NLF as by the Saigon regime.41 NLF influence catalyzed peasant hostility and helped 
make rural South Vietnam thoroughly hostile to landlords' interests and persons. Henry 
Bush, a prom inent American researcher of land issues, estimated that only 15% of 
absentee landlords in South Vietnam collected rents regularly in 1969-70.42 The seminal 
American report on pre-1970 tenurial conditions observed that the Viet Cong successfully 
intimidated landlords not only in contested regions, but also in many areas defined as 
secure governm ent strongholds43 As Chapter Four explained, from the late 1960s until 
the w ar's end in 1975, approximately 500,000 hectares of previously cultivated land 
remained abandoned as a result of combat, population movements, and labor shortages.44 
Many farmers simply squatted where they could. After the communist offensives of 
1968, the governm ent's rural access improved, but rent collections continued to lag, the 
government collected rural taxes only haphazardly, and even low level guerrilla activity 
continued to make absentee land ownership unprofitable for most. It was in the context 
of this rural chaos, and partly because of it, that Saigon's massive land reform effort took 
place.
5.2 THE LAND TO THE TILLER' PROGRAM OF 1970 AND ITS EFFECTS
5.2 (i) Nature and Scope of the Reforms
Years of American pressure had failed to move a number of Saigon governments to enact 
radical land reform. But Nguyen Van Thieu's sensitivity to rural issues, combined with 
the opportunities offered by the NLF's military defeats in 1968 created a hospitable 
climate in Saigon at last. Thieu and Minister of Land Reform and Agricultural 
Development Cao Van Than proposed the law in 1968 and pushed it through the
41 See Sansom, 60-1, and 'Land Reform/ United States Economic Assistance to Viet Nam, 1954-1975, 31 
December 1975, Terminal Report, USAID, PN-ABH-885.
42 'Small Landlords' Dependence on Rent Income in Vietnam’, October 1970, Henry C. Bush, Control Data 
Corporation, USAID ISN-26769.
43 'Land Reform in Vietnam/ Draft Final Report, June 1967, William Bredo et al., Stanford Research Institute 
for USAID, MACCORDS 101484, Archives II.
44 'Agriculture', Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-AAX-018.
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legislature in a form very near to their original proposal.45 Under the 1970 law, landlords 
lost whatever land they were not themselves farming and were restricted to a maximum 
ownership of 17 hectares of ricelands. They were to be compensated w ith cash and 
government bonds. Peasant farmers could receive up to a maximum of 3 hectares free of 
charge. Most would receive just over a hectare.
The scope of the program was ambitious. According to the Saigon Government 
Bureau of Land Affairs, by January 1975, 999,725 titles had been distributed for 1,136,705 
hectares of riceland, an average of 1.14 hectares per title, which Callison estimates to have 
been between 45-50% of total riceland crop hectarage in South Vietnam.46 It is impossible 
to determine the precise performance of the program  since complete tenancy statistics did 
not exist beforehand, a fact that the majority of official reports fail to mention.47 
Significantly, the 'Land to the Tiller7 law elicited only m inor opposition from landlords, 
many of whom were finding land ownership increasingly unprofitable and dangerous.48
USAID estimated that nationwide 860,000 families, or about 5 million people 
-over 25% of the rural population of South Vietnam - may have been direct beneficiaries 
of Land to the Tiller.49 Those who had been paying rents got an immediate and dramatic 
increase in disposable income. This increase in income, combined w ith modestly 
improving credit availability and growing yields from m odem  rice varieties, swelled 
investm ent capital.
Law Professor Roy Prosterman, whose research and advocacy helped lead to the 
law7s implementation, calculates that the central and southern regions of South Vietnam 
had similar pre-reform tenancy rates.50 The benefits of land reform, however, accrued 
mainly to the southern regions of the country. Most estimates of the program 's results 
suggest that tenancy in the ricelands of the Saigon/M ekong region declined from between
45 Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller, 79.
46 'Land Reform’, Terminal Report, 31 December 1975,93, USAID PN-AAX-018. See also Callison, Land-to- 
the-Tiller, 327-8.
47 'Land Reform’, Terminal Project Appraisal Report, 1 October 1975, USAID PD-AAF-398-E1.
48 See Henry C. Bush, Gordon H. Messegee, Roger V. Russell, 'The Impact of the Land to the Tiller Program in 
the Mekong Delta,’ Control Data Corp., October 1972, quoted in 'Land Reform,’ Vietnam Terminal Report, 
USAID PN-ABH-885, and 'Land Reform’, Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, 93, USAID PN-AAX-018.
49 'Land Reform’, Project Appraisal Report, 29 April 1975, USAID PD-AAF-398-E1.
50 Roy L Prosterman, and Jeffrey M. Riedinger, Land Reform and Democratic Development (Baltimore, 1987), 
131.
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60-70% of farmers prior to 1970 to about 10-15% by 1973.51 Approximately half the farmers
in the far South became owner-operators under the program .52
Land to the Tiller did not produce the same results in Central Vietnam, where 
tenancy rates sank only a few percentage points. Whereas the goals for land 
redistribution in some delta provinces were in the tens of thousands of hectares, the 1971 
goal for Quang Nam, the largest province in Central Vietnam, was a mere 1,000 hectares, 
and the provincial governm ent failed to achieve it. By the end of the year only 2015 
farmers had applied for titles in that province and a mere 300 hectares had been 
distributed.55 The program  was ill suited to the land scarce region where the average plot 
was already tiny, w here most of the landlords who remained were themselves 
smallholders and lived in economic conditions similar to their tenants, and where the 
government m ade less effort.5* According to Gabriel Kolko, only 5% of the land targeted 
for redistribution was in Central Vietnam. USAID reported that 'the law simply did not 
comfortably fit the Central Vietnam situation. . . . Considerable evidence was developed 
to indicate that perhaps the majority of landlords in Central Vietnam were little better 
off, either economically or socially/ than their tenants. Friendly relationships often 
existed, and landlords 'som etim es helped their tenants in emergencies/ A joint South 
Vietnamese/USAID report noted that government compensation formulae were based 
on Mekong region land prices, bu t that Central Vietnam’s land prices were higher, (and 
as a result, Central Vietnamese owners received less than market value for their land).55
Thus, several factors inhibited tenants from applying for land to which they were 
legally entitled. Little was redistributed 'except for some formerly rented communal
51 See Henry C. Bush et al., 'The Impact of the Land to the Tiller Program in the Mekong Delta.’ See also C. 
Stuart Callison, 'The Land to the Tiller Program and Rural Resource Mobilization in the Mekong Delta of 
South Vietnam,’ Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series No. 34 (Athens, Ohio, 1974), 2.
52 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 329.
53 Province Senior Adviser Monthly Report for Quang Nam Province, December 1971, Col. George G. Tucker, Jr., 
Pacification (RD) Reports (Province Senior Adviser Monthly Narrative Reports), United States Center of 
Military History, Washington, DC. (Hereafter CMH, and Province Monthly Reports respectively).
54 USAID Project Appraisal Report, Land Reform, 4.29.75, PD-AAF-398-E1, p.13. Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of 
a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modem Historical Experience (New York, 1985), 391. See also 
'Small Landlords' Dependence on Rent Income in Vietnam/ October 1970, Henry C. Bush, Control Data 
Corporation, USAID ISN-26769.
55 Joint Evaluation Report, 'Vietnam Land to the Tiller Program,’ Third Draft, Phi Ngoc Huyen, Ministry of 
Land Reform, Gerald H. Huffman, USAID, 5 November 1971, USAID 62-36605.
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lan d s /56 Significantly, there is evidence that most Central Vietnamese peasants were 
opposed to the distribution of these lands. According to Callison, 'o u t of 676 villagers 
interviewed in five provinces along the Central Coast, only 24% favored the distribution 
of communal land (which represented 55% of all rented land in those provinces in 1960- 
61) to the current tillers: whereas 76% of the 269 villagers interviewed in the southern 
province of Long An Province (where 10% of all rented land in 1960-61 was communal) 
were in favor of it.'57 Henry Bush attributed the Central Vietnamese sentim ents to the 
fact that communal lands there still 'provided basic welfare security.'58 For the majority 
of Central Vietnamese farmers, landless peasants, or those who needed to supplement 
their tiny plots w ith rented land, communal land was a scarce and valuable commodity.
It is possible that the 24% of Central Vietnamese polled who supported the distribution of 
communal lands were mainly those who stood to receive the titles. Jewett Burr noted 
that landlords opposed the reforms so violently in many areas of the central coast, that 
they threatened tenants who sought to apply for land titles. He believed that this 
contributed to the relatively weak peasant response in that region. He further pointed 
out that some of the most vociferous opposition to Land Reform in Central Vietnam 
came from village officials, who feared losing lucrative influence over the communal 
lands that were to be expropriated under the program.59 Some Central Vietnamese 
peasants were tenacious in their efforts to acquire land titles under the program , and it 
appears that dem and exceeded eventual supply of land titles there. Jewett Burr, who 
studied land reform in Central Vietnam first hand while there w ith USAID, found that 
in January 1971, 787 peasants in Quang Ngai province applied for the distribution of 1,956 
hectares. By July 1971, only 27 had received titles. In one Quang Ngai village, a group of 
farmers applied for land under the program eight separate time, and got nothing.60 Burr 
blames this failure not on lack of peasant demand, but on insufficient attention and 
willful obstruction by provincial government officials who profited under the old
56 'Land Reform,' Project Appraisal Report, 29 April 75, USAID PD-AAF-398-E1.
57 Callison, Land-To-the-Tiller, 78.
58 Callison cites two Control Data Corp. reports: Fitzgerald and Bush, 'Land Ownership and Tenancy,’ pp. iv- 
v, 34-5, and Bush, 'Village Use of Communal Riceland,’ pp. 22-3. Ibid., 78.
59 Jewett Millard Burr, 'Land to the Tiller: Land Redistribution in South Viet Nam, 1970-1973,’ Ph.D. 
Dissertation (University of Oregon, 1976), 225, 236-40.
60 Ibid., 314-15.
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system.61 By March 1973, according to Burr, the government had distributed only 28,969 
hectares in Central Vietnam while 909,900 hectares gone to farmers in the 
Mekong /Saigon region.62
Nevertheless, peasant response in the Central region was tepid in comparison to 
that in the South, and post-war events indicate that the region's attitude toward secure 
property rights in land have rem ained so. According to Vietnamese economists Vo 
Nanh Tri and Nguyen Xuan Lai, whereas Mekong peasants had furiously resisted the loss 
of individual property rights in the 1970s and 80s, 'in  the coastal plains of Central 
Vietnam forced collectivization did not meet strong reaction from the peasants because of 
certain specific economic and political factors.'63
An advocate of the moral economy school of thought might argue that the 
relatively m uted response of Central Vietnamese peasants to land redistribution, and to 
later collectivization efforts, represented a resistance to the commercialization of 
agriculture and a desire to m aintain a cooperative approach to agricultural production. 
Although there was a clear economic reason for most farm families in Central Vietnam 
to resist the distribution of comm unal lands to individuals, the 1970 land reforms do not 
provide a solid platform on which to base a comparison of peasant economic behavior in 
the regions of South Vietnam. As constituted, Saigon's land redistribution policy was 
inappropriate for Central Vietnam, which renders comparisons problematic at best.
Suffice it to refer to Chapter Four's conclusion that peasants in Central Vietnam 
displayed enough tendency to pursue individual or family economic gain to cast doubt 
on the existence of a separate economic system in that region. As we will see, however, 
despite its failure on the coastal plains, the economic changes the law wrought in the 
Mekong region were enough to have a profound effect on South Vietnam. The urgent 
question for the Saigon governm ent was whether the program  resulted in immediate 
political gain.
61 Ibid., 327.
62 Ibid., 321.
63 Vo Nanh Tri, Vietnam’s Economic Policy Since 1975 (Singapore, 1990), 79. Tri cites Nguyen Xuan Lai, 
'Questions of Agrarian Structure,' 37-40.
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5.2 (ii) The Political Effects of Land Reform
As with all U.S.-backed nation building programs, political goals were central to the Land 
to the Tiller program . A multiplicity of documentary sources indicate that land reform 
did  w in some support for the South Vietnamese government, but there is m inor 
controversy over w hether it was the political panacea that Saigon and W ashington hoped 
for or thought they r e c o g n iz e d .64 Former USAID officials who helped to implem ent the 
program  come dow n on both sides of the debate. Mike Korin, who worked exclusively 
on land reform while in Saigon, calls it a marked success.65 But John Bennet, the last 
director of USAID's Saigon mission, calls Land to the Tiller 'a  total waste of tim e' 
politically, because the NLF had already redistributed land. Land reform, he contends, did 
not transform peasant loyalties and was only valued by peasants because it is better to 
have two governments guarantee your land than one. Bennet attributes the agricultural 
production gains that followed to new rice varieties and market reforms, not land
re fo rm .6 6
Among those who believe land reform achieved its political goals, W illiam Colby 
claimed that because the reforms were carried out by local administrations, rather than 
Saigon bureaucrats, they produced stronger ties between rural South Vietnamese people 
and the g o v e r n m e n t .67 Walt Rostow agrees.68 Several USAID reports speak of the 
program 's political effect in euphoric terms.69 An expansive Mekong delta study carried 
out in the early 1970s m ade use of extensive peasant interviews and concluded that land 
reform had significantly strengthened peasant support for the Saigon governm ent in 
most villages. According to Henry Bush et al., the Saigon government increased rural tax 
collections, an indicator of government presence, and potentially of influence. W ithout
64 For a variety of views on the subject, see Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller, 220-39, 282, 336- 41. Kolko,
Anatomy of a War, 389-90. Neil Jamieson,Understanding Vietnam (Berkeley, 1993), 367; Jeffrey Race,War 
Comes to Long An (Berkeley, 1972), 214-15.
65 Michael Korin, USAID, interview with the author, 15 August 1994, U.S. Department of State, Washington, 
DC.
66 John Bennet, USAID economic officer Saigon, 1963-65, Deputy Director USAID Mission Saigon, 1973-75, 
Acting Director, 1975. Telephone interview with the author, 23 August 1994.
67 William Colby, Lost Victory (New York, 1989), 300-01.
68 See Walt Whitman Rostow quoted in Dacy, Foreign Aid, 71-2.
69 See, for example, 'Land Reform/ Viet Nam Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-ABH-885.
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giving figures, the report cited increased participation in village elections as evidence that 
Southern fanners had become more active politically. Peasant farmers interviewed for 
the report also expressed greater identification with the government.™ The USAID's 
terminal land reform report marveled that land reform was so popular among delta 
farmers interviewed for Bush's study that 'i t  gets credit for more than it could possibly 
have effected.'7i The inquiry, it should be noted, was conducted mainly in secure 
Mekong delta villages, which m ay have skewed its findings.72 Moreover, it would be so 
difficult to find a causal link between increased participation in village elections and land 
reform that the observation is probably fatuous. In any case, it is clear that many peasants 
welcomed the Saigon governm ent’s land titles.
Several factors did weaken the political effect of the Saigon program. The very 
chaos that helped make the program  possible also blunted its political effect, as the lack of 
resistance by landlords suggests. Had landlords been collecting rents successfully, they 
would likely have fought the measure harder. Thus, land reform did not represent the 
universal rent relief for land recipients usually associated w ith such programs. And, as 
Kolko points out, NLF land distribution, wartim e conscription, and population 
movement had produced conditions of land surplus and labor scarcity in m any parts of 
the M ekong/Saigon region. This, he believes, meant that access to credit and expensive 
inputs had replaced land as the central issue for peasants. The Mekong delta peasant, 
Kolko declares, 'sim ply no longer needed land reform, however strong his traditional 
desire to own land. . . .  In a situation of labor scarcity and land surplus, reform ceased to 
have any real meaning.' Additionally, he argued, in areas of continued land scarcity, 
such as Central Vietnam, land reform failed.73 Later sections will demonstrate that 
Kolko had a point, even if he vastly overplayed it. Though land remained a central 
concern to peasants, issues of credit and marketing had indeed begun to loom large.
Some peasant distrust of the program  was likely confirmed w hen a num ber of
70 See Henry C. Bush, et al., 'The Impact of the Land to the Tiller Program in the Mekong Delta,’ 41-51. See 
also Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-ABH-885, p. 82.
71 'Land Reform/ Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID, PN-ABH-885, p. 83.
72 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 289.
73 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 390, 392.
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former landlords reclaimed their land w ith the help of corrupt local officials.7* In many 
areas the program was slowed and corruption aided by the lack of accurate land registers 
(the keeping of which faltered during the war) and the resistance of both tenants who 
were renting more land than would be possible under the law, and landlords w ho still 
profited under the old system. Moreover, Saigon's land program  followed two 
reasonably successful communist reforms. According to Jeffrey Race, by 1970 the program  
was 'little  more than the Saigon government's stamp of approval on a land 
redistribution already carried out by the [communist] Party—in m any cases a quarter of a 
century before. Communist defectors interviewed made the striking analogy that one is, 
after all, hardly grateful to a thief who is compelled by force of circumstance to return 
stolen property.'7^
However, Race's implication that Saigon simply returned the land tenure situation 
to a condition that the communists had previously created is exaggerated. The Thieu 
reforms were more extensive than the NLF had been able to m ount and created far more 
farmer-owners than had ever before existed in Vietnam, North or South. Moreover,
NLF reforms were contingent upon peasant cooperation: the paym ent of taxes w ithout 
complaint, supplying information about government troops, attending party  meetings 
and the like. Government reforms, in contrast, were meant to help any landless peasant 
who applied. In comparison, communist reforms were 'discrim inatory and piecem eal.'7*
In spite of its weaknesses, peasant response to the 1970 land redistributions was 
clearly positive, especially in the far South. One measure of rural sentiment tow ard land 
redistribution was the National Liberation Front's response. An American author of the 
Land to the Tiller law believes that '[The NLF] opposed the program  with propaganda bu t 
m ade no effort to physically interfere w ith the titling process, apparently recognizing that 
to do so would be extremely unpopular among the peasantry.'77 One USAID report 
claims that in fact the NLF initially resorted to violence against peasants w ho accepted 
land titles, but desisted when it became clear the program was popular and that further
74 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: The Unforgettable Tragedy, 113-4.
75 Race, War Comes to Long An, 214-15.
76 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 52.
77 Prosterman and Riedinger, Land Reform, 139.
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NLF disruption w ould hurt food production.78 Jewett Burr noted that Hanoi's Liberation 
Radio initially down-played Saigon's land redistribution, but m ounted increasingly 
vitriolic attacks as the program  gained momentum, 'a  sure sign that Land to the Tiller 
was construed as a very dangerous counter-revolutionary activity . . . .'79
This alone exposes the gross inaccuracy of Kolko's contention that land reform had 
ceased to have real meaning for South Vietnamese peasants. There is, however, more. 
Comparative evidence exists that as rents go down, dem and for secure property rights
slackens.so Yet it is hard to defend the argum ent that dem and for land disappears, and
indeed Kolko does not defend it, citing no evidence in support of his claim. Kolko's 
argument assumes, as no peasant ever would, static conditions. Peasants, often living 
near to subsistence levels, habitually keep a weather eye out for potential problems, and 
would have taken a long term  view of land rights. They knew the w ar w ould not last 
forever and that land scarcity might return to the Mekong region. Eric Wolf contends 
that he has never encountered a situation in which land issues were unim portant to
peasants.81 The sheer preponderance of pre and post reform reports and rural polls,
imperfect as they were, citing land as the central issue in peasant life, supplies convincing 
evidence that property rights retained meaning to peasants in the far South. In one 
example, Prosterman cites a poll in which Mekong peasants cited land five times more
often than security as the most im portant concern in life.82 William Bredo's pre-reform
survey for the m ost extensive American study of land issues in Vietnam found 
overwhelming empirical evidence of desire among landless farmers to own land.83 
Henry Bush's 1972 study found that recipients were pleased to have governm ent titles to 
land.84 American researchers, however, largely ignored Central Vietnamese farmer 
attitudes until after redistribution had begun. W hen at last they began to redress this
oversight, the Americans, as subsection 5.2 (i) demonstrated, found widely diverging
78 'Land Reform/ Vietnam Terminal Report, USAID, PN-AAX-019, pp. 22-3.
79 Burr, 'Land to the Tiller,’ 305.
80 Feeny, 'The Development of Property Rights in Land/ 282.
81 Eric Wolf, Peasants, (Edgewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966), 92.
82 See, for instance, Prosterman and Riedinger, Land Reform, 132.
83 Land Reform in Vietnam: Working Papers, William Bredo et al., vol. IV-I, 83-6, Archives II.
84 Henry C. Bush et al., 'The Impact of the Land to the Tiller Program in the Mekong Delta/ 41-51.
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attitudes about village communal lands between Southern and Central Vietnam.
In short, peasants who gained from the program, and they were many, were glad of 
it. And, as the following subsection will demonstrate, the redistribution was far more 
successful economically than its detractors insisted. But land reform profited the Saigon 
government little in a political sense. But the program failed to achieve its goals, not 
under the weight of it imperfections, but because the South Vietnamese peasantry and 
the Saigon governm ent remained unreconciled. Rural distrust of the governm ent ran 
far deeper than agrarian reform could reach. It was a fact that m ust have been 
particularly galling to policy makers in the early 1970s; despite its appropriateness and 
popularity in the Mekong region, and despite the surging agricultural economy, Saigon's 
political standing in the countryside remained poor.
A general consensus, however, has formed around the idea that the reforms might 
have cut more political ice had they been enacted in the early 1960s. This view is 
supported by a remarkable variety of critics and supporters. The USAID's terminal study 
lamented that the United States did not push for reform in the 1950s, when it could have 
been the most politically effective, because Americans failed to heed other examples in 
economic history and 'grasp the relevance of the contemporary successful Asian Land 
Reforms in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.'85 Kolko, one of the program 's most 
vociferous W estern critics, Roy Prosterman, one of the programs champions in the late 
1960s, and peasant farmers who received land, agreed that Land to the Tiller was about a 
decade too late in a political sense.8* It came on the heels of a series of broken promises, 
failed program s, and nearly two decades of government association with landlords 
interests. Many farmers simply did not trust the government's paper land deeds. Saigon 
had historically resisted land reform, and effacing its image as champion of landlord 
interests among the peasantry could not be accomplished in one or two seasons.
It is a crucial point that the NLFs land redistributions appear to have elicited the 
same response as Saigon's. Despite the popularity of the Front's land redistribution, it 
did not w in them  the profound popularity they sought, as Frances Fitzgerald, alone
85 'Land Reform,' Vietnam Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-ABH-885, p. 73.
86 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 391. Prosterman and Riedinger, Land Reform, 139. 'Land Reform/ Viet Nam  
Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-ABH-885, p. 65.
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among scholars, observed. 'I t made the new proprietors see the advantage of 
m aintaining an NLF presence somewhere in the neighborhood, but it did not by itself 
convince them of the necessity of an NLF government, nor did it often persuade them to 
give up their hopes for a quiet, secure life and go out to fight for the NLF.'87 As Chapter 
Two demonstrated, the Front only attracted the full-blooded participation of a minority of 
the southern population. Peasants gladly accepted their land titles from both sides, and 
never wholeheartedly supported either one.
Nevertheless, despite the increasing importance of credit and technology to 
Vietnamese farmers, despite their unwillingness to commit en masse to either side, land 
remained central both politically and economically. And, as we will see, the Hanoi 
government would discover in the post-war period that property rights remained both a 
deep concern to Vietnamese farmers of all regions and a key to economic success. South 
Vietnamese peasants, especially in the Mekong region, w anted land titles and the many 
peasants who profited from Saigon's reforms welcomed them. The meaningful 
questions are not those that most scholars have focused on, whether land redistribution 
succeeded economically or was popular, but whether it changed peasant sentiments 
toward the government. Plainly, it did not.
5.2 (iii) Economic Effects of Land Reform
Although we have only a few crop years to measure the economic effects of land reform, 
it appears that the program  contributed to South Vietnam's economic growth. As we 
have seen, the program  fared poorly in Central Vietnam relative to the far South. And 
in the flood plains of the western Mekong delta, where cultivation of 'floating rice' 
predom inated, the law 's three hectare limit proved damaging. Floating rice yielded less 
than transplanted rice, so the optimal farm size was four hectares. The fragmentation of 
holdings mandated by Land to the Tiller resulted in m any cases in declining farmer
income and welfare.88 Nevertheless, Vietnamese rice production was dom inated by
87 Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Boston, 1972), 157.
88 See Callison, Land to the Tiller, 196, and 'Land Reform/ Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN- 
ABH-885.
193
transplant rice in the M ekong/Saigon region, and the program fared well in that 
environm ent.
A 1972 USAID report based on a study of 44 villages in 9 delta provinces in the 
M ekong/Saigon region credits the reforms with increasing total output, income, demand 
for labor, investm ent in infrastructure, new technologies and farming methods, and 
decreasing village inequality by redistributing income downward to more farmers. The 
report also cites a growing market for consumer goods and building materials as rural
incomes rose.89 M arxian economist Rehman Sobhan criticized the 1970 law for not
redistributing w ealth profoundly enough, but found strong circumstantial evidence that 
land reform contributed to significant increases in peasant incomes.90 Prosterman found 
higher yields per hectare among land recipients than among non-recipients,91 probably, as 
this chapter will dem onstrate, because they were more willing than tenants to invest in 
new technology. Moreover, by severing the tie between tenant and landlord, the 
agricultural sector lost virtually nothing, since few landlords were investing in 
infrastructure or im proved production methods.92
The pursuit of a small farm strategy was primarily a political response to peasant 
sentiments. Moreover, South Vietnam's industrial sector was too small to absorb the 
excess agricultural labor that would have resulted from land consolidation and 
mechanization. As the previous chapter demonstrated, however, political and economic 
goals coincided in 1970. And, as Chapter Three explained, there is a general consensus 
among economists that smaller farms are more productive per unit of land than larger 
farms, given relatively low levels of mechanization. Hence, land redistribution in the 
small farm context was economically appropriate for South Vietnam in this period.
As established above, the government redistributed little land in Central Vietnam 
and the average farm size remained stable before and after 1970. In the M ekong/Saigon 
region, however, where population pressure was less, land reform reduced the average
89 Henry C. Bush et al., 'The Impact of the Land to the Tiller Program in the Mekong Delta,’ and 'Land 
Reform,’ Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-ABH-885, 82. See also Callison, Land to the Tiller, 
196, 292, 328-36.
90 Rehman Sobhan, Agrarian Reform and Social Transformation, 25.
91 Prosterman and Riedinger, Land Reform, 140.
92 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 329.
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size of land holdings by breaking up most of the remaining large and m edium  farms. 
Table 5.1 affords a rough comparison of farm size distribution between Central Vietnam 
and the far South. Please note that figures for Central Vietnam w ould have changed very 
little between this 1960-61 census and the early 1970s, since the Viet Minh had already 
driven most large and medium landlords to the cities. Southern region figures depict 
distribution before both NLF and Saigon government reforms. Table 5.2 depicts the pre- 
1970 distribution of operational farm size in the far South, after NLF redistribution and 
just before the Saigon reforms.
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Table 5.1
D istribution of Rice Farms by Farm Size and Region 
1960-61 (Agricultural Census, South Vietnam)93
Farm Size 
in ha.
18 Provinces of 
Southern Region 
% farms
9 Provinces of 
Central Lowlands 
% farms
<0.5 5.68 43.27
0.5 to 0.9 16.18 31.73
1.0 to 1.9 33.86 19.03
2.0 to 2.9 18.49 3.86
3.0 to 4.9 15.67 1.59
5.0 < 10.12 0.52
The Stanford Research Institute surveyed 440 farmers from the southern region 
provinces and found that in 1968 among both owners and tenants, the average farm size 
was 2.85 hectares. The distribution was as follows:
Table 5.2
Size D istribution of Rice Farms in Southern Region94
Hectares 0.1-0.4 0.5-0.9 1.0-1.4 1.5-1.9 2.0-2.9 3.0-3.9 4.0-4.9 5.0-7.4 7.5-9.9 10-19.9 20-29.9 30-49.9 50-99.9
% of owners 10.5 15.5 22.5 7.5 17.7 8.9 4.8 6.6 2.3 1.8 0.9 0.5 0.7
and tenants
Before 1970 in the southern region, roughly three quarters of farmers, both owners and 
tenants, farmed fewer than 2.9 hectares of land (the operational size of farms). Regional 
data are not available for the post-redistribution period and there is no way to make a 
direct comparison w ith the figures in tables 5.1 and 5.2. There is evidence, however, that 
the size of privately owned rice farms fell significantly. Callison studied three villages in 
the single transplant areas of the Mekong delta before the reforms in 1970 and again 
afterwards in 1972 and found the following. Whereas only 26.5% of privately owned 
ricelands in these three villages had been 2.99 hectares or smaller before reforms,
93 Source: 'Rice Cost of Production in Vietnam--1968/69. Rice Crop and Preliminary Estimates for 1970/ Ray S. 
Fox, United States Department of Agriculture, March 1971, USAID, VM 338-17318-F793.
94 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 361. Please note that these figures include farms growing floating broadcast 
rice, which averaged about 4 hectares before land redistribution, and therefore drive the average farm size 
well above the figures quoted for single transplant rice below.
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afterwards, 61.6% were smaller than 2.99 hectares.95 Again, these figures denote privately 
owned ricelands, not the operational size of farms depicted above for the pre-reform 
period. Many smaller farmers would have continued to supplem ent w hat they owned by 
renting extra land, and many larger farmers would have continued to rent portions out. 
Thus, in operational terms crucial to questions of optimal farm size, fewer than 61.6% of 
farms would have been smaller than 2.9 hectares. In any case, Callison's findings 
demonstrate that the num ber of small farms grew dramatically relative to larger farms in 
the Mekong region as a result of the 1970 land reforms. Moreover, sm aller farms were 
now more likely to be owned, rather than rented, and the greater productivity of owned 
land has been amply demonstrated.
Callison stressed that post-reform rice farm size in South Vietnam was efficient in 
terms of land productivity (he does not discuss total factor productivity) .9* Bray details 
the different economies of scale that affect wet rice farming versus dry-land rice farming, 
and argues that, while profitability and productivity of household labor m ay decrease 
with farm size, small farms tend to produce higher yields per unit of land than large 
farm s.97 The findings in Chapter Four buttress this contention for South Vietnam where 
productivity of household labor on small South Vietnamese rice farms increased after 
land reform, and was high compared to many other Asian countries. Frank Ellis 
contends that farm type is more important than farm size. Family farms, he notes, are 
most efficient -again, on a yield per hectare basis and not in returns to labor- because 
families are highly motivated workers on their own land, know their land 's 
idiosyncrasies better than a larger or commercial farmer would, and have flexibility in 
seasonal labor deploym ent.^
Available data suggests that the reduction in mean and modal farm size resulting 
from Land to the Tiller contributed to the growth of the national m ean for rice yields per 
hectare. Later research, including Ellis's, lends further plausibility to this hypothesis.
9 5
Ibid., 367-74. Callison also studied Hoa Binh Thanh village in the floating rice region from which he 
derived only partial data. In 1972, with about 40% of designated land redistributed in average parcels of 1.86 
ha, the average holding for title recipients was 4.18 ha and the average operational farm size was 5.5 ha. 
Please see pp. 175-87.
96 Ibid., 330.
97 Bray, The Rice Economies, 6, 115,164-5.
98 Ellis, Peasant Economics, 207.
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Post-1970 tenurial conditions appear to have been a considerable improvement over any 
tenure system extant in South Vietnam since the beginning of the colonial era. The 
complimentarity of developm ent program s played a significant role in the economic 
success of agrarian reform. Land redistribution was especially beneficial to farmers 
because it occurred just after the introduction of scale neutral and highly divisible 
m odern rice varieties which, as Chapter Four demonstrated, improved marginal returns 
to labor on South Vietnamese farms.
Table 5.3 below depicts rice and crop production in South Vietnam before and after 
the introduction of improved rice technology, as well as before and after agrarian reform.
It demonstrates a strong correlation between land reform and output increases. 
Attributing cause, however, is more difficult. Other factors such as increased security, 
m odern rice varieties, im proved infrastructure, price policies more advantageous to 
farmers, and greater availability of fertilizers and pesticides also helped increase gross rice 
production. In fact, Callison implies that new rice varieties were most responsible for 
these gains." The data in Table 5.3 support this, since in the post reform period only rice 
production per hectare increased while production of other crops, which generally had 
not gained from the introduction of modern seed varieties, rem ained stagnant. It is true 
that m odem  rice technology and concomitant production increases preceded land reform 
by four growing seasons. As Chapter Four demonstrated, gross rice output increased 
nearly 20%, from 4,366 metric tons in 1968 to 5,500 in 1970 and m odem  varieties may 
have accounted for over 90% of this increase. By then, South Vietnamese farmers had 
adopted m odem  rice varieties w idely while the legislature was still debating land reform. 
As Table 5.3 indicates, however, rice production continued to increase after the 1970-71 
season, in conjunction w ith agrarian reform, topping out at 7,165 metric tons for the 1973- 
74 harvest. At the very least, agrarian reforms and Green Revolution technology were 
highly complimentary endeavors. This contention is reinforced, as successive sections 
will show, by similar experiences in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. But clear evidence 
from South Vietnam exists, w here agrarian reform appears to have contributed to 
production growth both through increased farmer income, increased credit available for
99 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 202.
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investment, and through inducing a change of investment attitude. Thus, the degree to 
which land recipients became more willing to invest their surpluses in improvem ents 
such as dikes, irrigation, and inputs becomes a critical test of the success of the program.
199
Table 5.3
Crop Production in South Vietnam between 1956 and 1974 (thousand tons)
Total Per capita
Year Rice Other crops* Total Rice Other crops* Total
1956 3,412 1,337 4,749 0.28 0.11 0.39
1957 3,192 1,416 4,608 0.25 0.11 0.36
1958 4,235 1,429 5,664 0.32 0.11 0.43
1959 5,092 1,550 6,642 0.38 0.12 0.50
1960 4,995 1,795 6,750 0.36 0.13 0.49
1961 4,607 1,842 6,449 0.32 0.13 0.45
1962 5,205 1,934 7,139 0.36 0.13 0.49
1963 5,357 1,987 7,344 0.36 0.13 0.49
1964 5,185 1,929 7,114 0.33 0.12 0.45
1965 4,822 1,834 6,656 0.30 0.12 0.42
1966 4,336 1,613 6,949 0.26 0.10 0.36
1967 4,688 1,529 6,217 0.29 0.09 0.38
1968** 4,366 1,368 5,734 0.25 0.08 0.33
1969 5,115 1,253 6,368 0.29 0.07 0.36
1970*** 5,500 1,326 6,826 0.30 0.07 0.37
1971 6,100 1,429 7,529 0.32 0.08 0.40
1972**** 5,900 1,272 7,172 0.30 0.07 0.37
1973 6,600 0.33
1974 7,165 0.35
^Computed as 'rice equivalent' tonnages.
**First harvest of m odern rice varieties from 1,000 hectares.
***Promulgation of Land to the Tiller Law.
**** 1 9 7 2  was a drought year in the Mekong delta, and Central Vietnam suffered from 
extensive flooding.
Source: Douglas Dacy, Foreign Aid , War, and Economic Development, 74.
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Among 985 farm families in 44 Mekong delta villages and nine provinces, Bush et 
al. found that farmers who had received land in the 1970 reforms m ade 46% more 
investm ent per farm than tenants, and crucially, 17% more than wealthy 
ow ner/operators. Land title recipients were more likely than tenants to switch from 
single to double cropping, increase their use of fertilizer, construct irrigation canals and 
dikes, invest in new farm implements, raise fish as a protein source, and increase animal 
husbandry. They were also more likely to plant new secondary crops than both tenants 
and larger ow ner/operators. The authors believed, and Callison concurred, that the main 
force behind these increases in investment was not simply the increase in income or 
credit availability, bu t that ownership gave farm families the right to make their own 
operational decisions and assured that they would not be legally evicted, making it more 
likely that they would enjoy the fruits of their investments. Yet another factor creating 
incentive to invest would have been that as owners, peasants would receive 100% of the 
returns on investment, rather than a mere share. Indeed, Bush found that land title 
recipients were seven times more likely to name new agricultural techniques and 
investm ents as causes for improvements and nine times as many recipients as tenants 
claimed to be using these new techniques.100
Other research has bolstered Callison's findings for South Vietnam. Francesca Bray 
makes a strong case for land reform as a prerequisite to rural growth in rice economies.101 
Political scientist James Putzel asserted that land redistribution to break the dependence
of peasants on patrons 'is  a precondition to rural progress' and long term development.102
Gershon Feder, a W orld Bank economist, has found for Thailand a clear linkage between 
secure landed property rights and the increasing use of inputs and higher output.1^
While land redistribution is essential, it cannot stand alone if meaningful 
developm ent goals are to be achieved. The economist Yujiro Hayam i pointed out that 
m odem  crop varieties compliment the land reform process. Agrarian reforms such as
land distribution and institutional credit 'w ill have little chance of success to achieve
100 Bush et al., 'The Impact of the Land to the Tiller Program in the Mekong Delta, cited in Callison, Land-to- 
the-Tiller, 292-3.
101 Bray, The Rice Economies, 191.
102 James Putzel, The Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines (London, 1992), 33.
103 Feder, 'Land Ownership Security and Farm Productivity,’ 17.
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more equitable distributions of income and assets unless they are supported by the efforts
to counteract the decreasing return to additional labor applied per unit of land a r e a /1 0 4
Michael Lipton argued succinctly that 'redistributive and market reforms are not 
successive, nor rivalrous, but complimentary/i°5 And Rehman Sobhan, while he badly 
underestimated the positive effects of South Vietnamese agrarian reform, m ade a highly 
convincing case for radical land redistribution and secure property throughout the 
developing world, arguing that any country failing to do so has little chance of escaping 
the bottom of the global economic food chain. 'O nly those very few developing countries 
that have achieved reform sufficiently radical and egalitarian to eradicate effectively 
conditions of social differentiation in the countryside have m ade headway in achieving 
sustained economic growth, as well as rapid industrialization, and have thus m ade the 
greatest advances in eliminating both endemic hunger and relative deprivation.'106 In 
South Vietnam itself, Bush's extensive 1972 study for USAID found a high correlation
between land reform implementation and im proved economic conditions.107 The
combination of new technology and agrarian reform boosted the South Vietnamese 
economy as a whole because both produced increases in production which in turn  
resulted in increased marketable surpluses. Peasant families consumed more, bu t output 
increased by a greater degree.108
This may not have been a forgone conclusion. As Chapter Three m ade clear, 
increased foodgrain production has been observed to lead, indirectly, to decreased 
marketed surpluses by creating more 'm iddle peasants' who are wealthy enough to 
consume more of their produce and market less when prices rise.109 Although the easing
of price controls allowed the price of rice to rise even as production increased, there is
104 Hayami, Yujiro, 'Assessment of the Green Revolution/ in Agricultural Development in the Third World, 
eds. Carl K. Eicher and John M. Staatz (Baltimore,1990), 395.
105 Michael Lipton, 'Market, Redistributive and Proto-Reform: Can Liberalization Help the Poor?' Asian 
Development Review. Vol. 13, No. 1, 1995, 9.
106 Sobhan, Agrarian Reform and Social Transformation, 4.
107 See Henry C. Bush et al., 'The Impact of the Land to the Tiller Program in the Mekong Delta,’ 41-51.
108 Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller, 202-3.
109 P.N. Mathur and H. Ezekiel, 'Marketable Surplus on Food and Price Fluctuations in a Developing Economy,’ 
Kyklos, 1961, 316-406, and Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Indian Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
Report on an Enquiry into the Pace and Pattern of Market Arrivals of Food grains (Seasons 1958-9), cited in T. 
N. Krishnan, 'The Marketed Surplus of Food grains,’ in Readings in Indian Agricultural Development, ed. 
Pramit Chaudhuri (London, 1972), 99.
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evidence that m iddle peasants in South Vietnam did not suppress m arketed surplus.
Ngo Vinh Long estim ated that by 1975, approximately 70% of farmers in the Mekong 
region were m iddle peasants, and that they owned 80% of the cultivated surface.110 Had 
so large a portion of the country's farmers been reluctant to market their rice, national 
rice availability figures would have been far lower than the evidence indicates. Lacking 
sufficient data on pre-reform marketing habits of poor and m iddle peasants to make a 
quantitative case, we may conclude from the production data at hand that the confluence 
of new  technology and land reform increased participating peasants' production well 
beyond levels they could retain for their own consumption.
Moreover, land reform may have been one of those rare program s that helped to 
increase productivity where it was most needed. Callison found evidence that, after land 
redistribution, farmers in villages w ith the smallest increase in income and the least 
available credit were 70% more likely to invest in productive inputs than in villages 
enjoying m ean or greater increase. And farmers from poor provinces were more likely 
than those from wealthier provinces to credit land reform with improving their 
incomes, perhaps because there was more inequality in these provinces to begin with.111 
In an economic sense the combination of agrarian reform, especially land redistribution, 
and im proved, highly divisible agricultural technology, was the most successful 
endeavor of the era. As one USAID official marveled, 'Rice production even exceeded 
the previous highest production years (in the 1930s) when Vietnam was an im portant 
rice exporter—and this was done on only 60% of the paddy land used in the 1930s as the 
statistics then included both N orth and South V ietnam /11*
5.2 (iv) Post War Evidence of the Appropriateness of Secure Property Rights
Another indication of the economic and political appropriateness of both NLF and
Saigon governm ent land redistribution is the post 1975 history of agrarian practices and
land tenure in the Mekong delta region. The Hanoi government originally attem pted to 
110 Ngo Vinh Long, 'Some Aspects of Cooperativization in the Mekong Delta/ in David Marr and Christine 
Pelzer White, eds., Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development (Ithaca, NY, 1988), 169 
in  Ibid., 196.
112 'Crop Production/ Terminal Project Appraisal Report, March 1975, USAID, PD-AAF-584-D1.
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revoke NLF and government land titles and to communalize farming in the southern 
regions.113 But collectivization attempts brought about 'fierce resistance from the restive 
peasants of the Mekong Delta, including those who actively supported the communists 
during the war with the United States. This was evident from their boycotting of the co­
operative movement, refusing to harvest crops in time, abandoning large stretches of 
land, slaughtering livestock, destroying fruit trees, selling machines and farm 
implements before joining the production collectives, and even challenging the cadres- 
in-charge.'114 As a result of these land policies, as well as pricing and distribution policies 
unrelated to supply and demand, agricultural production in the Mekong region fell 
considerably after 1975 and had reached a crisis by 1978. Rice production in the south 
dropped 21% between 1976 and 1978.115 Even Secretary General of the Communist Party 
Truong Chinh later admitted that 'H ad  our policies. . . been rational, the peasants would 
certainly not have given up tilling.116
Peasant unrest and plunging production forced Hanoi to reverse its policies in the 
mid-1980s and reinstate a smallholding system resembling the Land to the Tiller 
campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s.117 Ngo Vinh Long found that in the Mekong delta 
region there was a large majority of middle peasants, and that even poor and landless 
peasants joined them in resisting the cooperativization of agriculture.118 Hanoi's own 
statistical services suggest that the cooperative system in the far South collapsed in the 
years 1979-80. By 1988 only 6.9 percent of Mekong farm households were registered as 
members of cooperatives, in contrast to 99.4 percent in the Red River delta in the
113 Vo Nhan Tri, Vietnam's Economic Policy Since 1975 (Singapore, 1990), 46, 76-81.
114 Ibid., 79.
115 Ibid., 80-5.
116 Ibid., 80.
117 Vo Nhan Tri, a Vietnamese economist and former Hanoi official, points out that the Hanoi government 
rationalized this reversal by claiming that production decreased because their policies were too progressive. 
Collective 'production relations [were] far more advanced than the level of productive forces. Ibid., 243. For 
Hanoi's policy changes, see 82-3. See also William J. Duiker, Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon, 2nd ed., ( 
Athens, OH,1989) 23, 56, 90, 97, 246-7. Jamieson, Understanding Vietnam, 368-370. Michael C. Williams, 
Vietnam at the Crossroads (London, 1992), 40-1. Tran Hoang Kim, Vietnam's Economy During the Period 1945- 
1995 and its Perspective by the year 2020 (Hanoi, 1996), 214-18.
118 Ngo Vinh Long, 'Some Aspects of Cooperativization in the Mekong Delta/ in David Marr and Christine 
Pelzer White, eds., Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development (Ithaca, NY, 1988), 166-9.
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N orth .119 Benedict Kerkvliet demonstrated conclusively that peasant farmers in the Red 
River delta of northern  Vietnam objected to agrarian collectivization as well, and resisted 
passively but effectively until the system shriveled in that region as well in the 1980s.120 
Socialist economists in Vietnam have been nearly as critical as their non-socialist 
colleagues of collectivized agriculture. In 1994, state Institute of Economics member Vu 
Tuan Anh term ed collective agriculture an uneconomic mode of production. He noted 
that peasants began behaving in a capitalist manner covertly in the 1980s and that this 
increased production so m uch that it induced the Hanoi government to codify the 
privatization of agriculture. During the 1980s, the government allocated land to peasant 
families and m ade them  'm asters of their own farming business.' Peasants were free to 
make productive and m arketing decisions in order to 'maximize their surplus. In the 
five years from 1981 to 1985, this model proved a major engine driving the country's 
agricultural production .'121 Another government economist, Nguyen Van Bich, stated at 
a 1989 Hanoi conference that in post war Vietnam 'there was an excessive emphasis on 
collectivization of the means of production and we did not encourage the household and 
individual economy or recognize the role of the private economy in agriculture.' Hence, 
productivity fell steeply. Partial reforms in 1982 improved productivity, bu t not enough. 
Thus in 1988 the governm ent undertook sweeping reforms which Bich term ed a 'm ulti- 
sector economy w ith  the socialist economy in the leading role.' This approach included 
recognizing private capital and individual 'sm all owners' in agriculture.122 Hanoi 
economist Tran Thi Que used equally careful language in proclaiming that his 
government had increased agricultural production by codifying the move away from 
cooperative labor, marketing, and land sharing practices in 1988, partly 'th rough the 
allocation of land for long-term use to households.’123 Thus, land policies favoring
119 Le Thanh Nghiep, 'Agricultural Development in Vietnam: Issues and Proposals for Reform, in Mya Than 
and Joseph L.H. Tan, eds., Vietnam's Dilemmas and Options: The Challenge of Economic Transition in the 
1990s (Singapore, 1993), 148.
120 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvleit, 'Village-State Relations in Vietnam: The Effect of Everyday Politics on 
Decollectivization,’ The Journal of Asian Studies, 54, No. 2, May 1995, see especially 402-7, 413-15.
121 Vu Tuan Anh, Vietnam's Economic Reform: Results and Problems (Hanoi, 1994), 140.
122 Nguyen Van Bich, 'Renewal of the Organization of and Policies for Agriculture/Forestry and Fisheries/ in 
Per Ronnas and Orjan Sjoberg, eds., Doi Moi: Economic Reforms and Development Policies in Vietnam, Papers 
and Proceedings from an International Symposium in Hanoi, December 12-15, 1989 (Stockholm, 1990),121-5.
123 Tran Thi Que, 'Economic Reforms and Gender Issues/ in Economic Reform and Development in Vietnam, ed. 
Vu Tuan Anh (Hanoi, 1995), 216-17.
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secure property rights similar to those of two decades earlier achieved similar production 
results.
Hie Hanoi government officially confined property rights to the governm ent and 
to collectives. There is significant evidence that in reality, m ost peasants in the Mekong 
region continued to farm the land they had held before reunification.124 Government 
policy increasingly reflected this reality. In 1981, collectives began allocating land plots on 
short term bases. In 1988 they expanded this practice and allocated long term  rights of 
usufruct on land plots. This system closely resembled the precolonial system of usufruct 
in that peasants maintained rights to their land as long as they paid  taxes on it and 
donated labor to collective land as well. In theory, these new rights of usufruct did not 
allow land transfers, and so land could not be used as collateral for loans. In reality, 
however, the Hanoi government has generally practiced benign neglect in the far South, 
and there has been something akin to a free market in land in the Mekong delta region 
throughout the postwar period.125 Through the techniques described by James Scott,126 
resistance, unrest, and daily practice, Vietnamese peasants in the far South again voted 
for secure property rights. Like the NLF and the Saigon governm ent the decade before, 
the communist government in Hanoi moved to supply those rights, and yet again 
Vietnamese agricultural production rose.
5.3 THE SECOND HALF OF LAND REFORM': CREDIT, RESEARCH, EXTENSION, 
AND MARKET REFORMS
The mere redistribution of land and introduction of new technologies were insufficient 
to foster economic development. Agrarian reform: affordable credit, crop insurance, 
appropriate research, effective extension services, and m arketing im provements were 
also necessary in order to realize potential gains from land reform and new technology. 
These programs came to be referred to among USAID staff as 'th e  second half of land
124 Ngo Vinh Long, 'Some Aspects of Cooperativization in the Mekong Delta/ 166-9.
125 For a cogent summary of actual versus theoretical land tenure practices in postwar Vietnam, see The World 
Bank, Vietnam: Transition to the Market (Washington, DC, 1993), 25-29.
126 Scott, James C. Scott, 'Everyday Forms of Resistance/ Every Day Forms of Peasant Resistance, ed. Forrest D. 
Colburn (Armonk, NY, 1989).
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reform .'127 W ithout sufficient affordable credit, farmers who wish to use new varieties 
may not be able to afford chemical fertilizers and pesticides or the water control that high 
yielding rice varieties require. W ithout some form of affordable crop insurance, farmers 
who teeter on the verge of subsistence crisis may not take the risks required to change to 
more productive techniques. As we will see, w ithout sufficient local, on-farm research, 
optim al practices under local conditions may not be found. W ithout widely available 
extension services, especially during times of technological change, farmers may not use 
new and sometimes dangerous inputs safely or efficiently, or may avoid them for lack of 
inform ation.128 W ithout reasonably efficient and accessible markets, incentives to 
produce may rem ain limp. As the following sections will show, U.S. development 
planners knew that these issues were vital to the success of land redistribution, but were 
unable to implement a sufficiently complete agrarian reform package.
5.3 (i) Agricultural Credit
Gabriel Kolko argues that, by 1970, credit and m arketing institutions were more 
im portant to the peasantry than land ownership. The oligopoly of about a dozen ethnic 
Chinese firms over rice m arketing and their domination, along w ith the landlords, of 
money lending had been a 'continuous source of exploitation.' After land reform, 
according to Kolko, the pow er of the ethnic Chinese merchants and lenders diminished, 
but expropriated landlords reestablished their hold over the agrarian economy through 
new means, by lending m oney to peasants at interest rates running 60-72% per annum 
and by buying and renting out tractors and rototillers. Because one third of South 
Vietnam's cultivated surface was planted with high yielding rice varieties which required 
credit for expensive inputs, and nearly half its cultivated surface was mechanically 
plowed, 'i t  was not long before real economic power in the Delta was based not on land 
but on ownership of horsepow er and control of credit.'129
Kolko is generally correct about the inadequate and usurious nature of money
127 'Land Reform/ 1 October 1975, USAID Terminal Project Appraisal Report, PNAAF-398-E1.
128 In this case, one of the inputs was DDT, which, of course, cannot be used safely in any circumstances.
129 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 393.
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lending as practiced by rice merchants and former large landlords, bu t he commits a 
dangerous error by not analyzing the rural credit market in South Vietnam in any depth. 
Few observers doubt the critical role that credit plays in agricultural development. But 
governments and economists generally assume that traditional sources of rural credit in 
the Third W orld are exploitative of the poor and an impediment to efficiency. The 
economic historians Gareth Austin and Kaoru Sugihara have dem onstrated that often 
this is an ahistorical view. There is ample and widespread evidence, they argue, that 
local ' informal' moneylenders in the Third World are often efficient given the context in 
which they operate, are adaptable to change, and in some cases able to contribute to 
general economic grow th.130 Anthropologist Polly Hill maintains that W esterners and 
Third W orld urban elites have a generally simplistic view of traditional rural credit. 
Money lenders are not necessarily an external force to the peasants. M any rural lenders 
are themselves cultivators. Richer peasants are sometimes obliged by custom to lend 
money, and many creditors are also debtors. Moreover, interest rates that may appear 
usurious to outsiders are often not strictly adhered to.131 Further complicating the issue, 
lenders and borrowers are frequently related, and interest 'ra tes ' can be difficult to
determine since repaym ent is often not formal.*^
No U.S. or South Vietnamese government source familiar to me displays detailed
knowledge of local credit markets, but it appears from peasant complaints that the major 
sources of 'inform al' rural credit were indeed the ethnic Chinese rice m erchants as well 
as landlords.133 According to Brocheux, Chinese merchants had long been a source of 
credit to Vietnamese cultivators large and small. In the precolonial era they had viewed 
rice trading as their main source of profit, and their rates of interest had been reasonable. 
But w hen the French introduced roads, improved canal and irrigation systems, and
130 Gareth Austin, Kaoru Sugihara, eds., Introduction, Local Suppliers of Credit in the Third World, 1750- 
1960 (London, 1993), 19.
131 Polly Hill, Development Economics on Trial: the Anthropological Case for a Prosecution (Cambridge,
1986), 83-7.
152 Ibid., 88-91.
133 See, for instance, Pacification Attitude Analysis Survey, Vietnamese Evaluations Field Operations 
Division, CORDS IV CTZ, Can Tho, Ba Xuyen Province, Survey conducted in 27 hamlets and 9 villages, 16 June 
1970, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 10, File 1602-01 (Hereafter MACCORDS PP&P followed by box and file 
number where appropriate).
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commercial agriculture early in the 20th century, it drove up both the demand for and 
the price of credit. Several French efforts to improve the availability of reasonably priced 
credit to Vietnamese cultivators failed.134 In the late 1960s and early 1970s the 
introduction of improved technology, infrastructure, and secure property rights 
continued this trend. The increased inputs required to produce m odem  rice varieties or 
diversify into other crops pu t trem endous pressure on an inadequate credit market.
Established commercial banks preferred to supply short term  urban industrial 
credit, a small part of South Vietnam's GNP. In 1969, commercial banks devoted only 
1.1% of their VN$ 30 billion lending capacity to farmers.1^  Nguyen Van Hao, the 
director of the Agricultural Developm ent Bank of South Vietnam and one-time Minister 
of Agriculture, complained to USAID officials in 1969 that small farmers, or 90% of the 
total, did not 'get the credit service they need because of the absence of sufficiently 
widespread banking and credit facilities readily accessible to them and sympathetic to
their n e e d s . This was the situation that Saigon and U.S. officials sought to rectify in
1970.
Kolko contends that Saigon and the U.S. ignored credit shortfalls: 'nothing was 
done about these traditional peasant grievances during the American occupation/137 But 
while his stress on the growing importance of rural credit is accurate, his assertion that 
nothing was done to address the problem  is patently false. Efforts to alleviate the credit 
problem fell short of need, but development planners in South Vietnam recognized the 
problem and attem pted to rectify it. First, by giving peasants title to the land they tilled, 
land reform itself removed the biggest obstacle to getting loans: lack of collateral. 
Moreover, the Saigon governm ent and USAID collaborated in setting up and funding the 
Agricultural Development Bank of Vietnam (ADBV). The governm ent founded the 
bank in 1967 w ith 48 branches, one in each of the 44 province capitals and the four major
cities.138 In order to decentralize lending efforts and bring them to rural areas, the bank
134 Brocheux, The Mekong Delta, 72-9.
135 D r. Nguyen Van Hao, President, National Economic Development Fund, 'Agricultural Credit Requirements 
of Vietnam/ undated, USAID PN-INJ16.
136 Memorandum from Mr. Nguyen Van Hao, Director General, Agricultural Development Bank, Saigon, to Mr. 
D.G. McDonald, Director, USAID Vietnam, 19 May 1969, USAID ISN-15874.
137 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 392.
138 'Rural Credit/ 31 December 1975, Vietnam Terminal Reports, vol. II, pt. II, USAID PN-AAX-018, 22-3.
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oversaw the opening of 84 small private rural banks between 1969 and 1974, and 25 more 
were planned for 1975.139 The ADBV offered South Vietnamese farmers comparatively 
affordable interest rates: 24% per annum on short term production loans (6-12 months)
and 14% per annum  on medium and long term loans (18 months and upwards).*40 This
was radically cheaper than credit available from most local sources. Robert Sansom 
reported that in 1967 farmers in Bac Lieu province borrowed from neighbors, rice 
merchants, or hui (village cooperative credit pools) at an average interest rate of 4% per 
m onth, or 48% per annum .141 According to USAID research, the num ber of loans made 
by the bank increased from 89,405 in 1969 to 580,177 in 1974.142 Clearly the ADBV aimed 
those loans at small farmers. As Chapter Four noted, the bank did not require collateral 
for most of its small rural loans between 1971 and 1974.143 In 1974, 484,777 of its loans, or 
84.1%, were for VN$ 100,000 or less and averaged VN$ 65,000.144 In an effort to cast its net 
wider, the bank also experimented with a pilot village credit program. The "Rural 
Development Credit Program / administered by CORDS, m ade its debut after 1968 in 260 
villages. Under its auspices village credit committees allocated and processed loans to 
small farmers on the bank's behalf, thus encouraging banks to lend to peasants by 
reducing the high transaction costs of making and m anaging num erous small loans in 
remote areas.*43
It is difficult to determine levels of credit demand with any precision. Nguyen 
Van H ao's report used Ministry of Agriculture estimates for cost of production per 
hectare for various crops, but most reports cite data w ithout revealing methodology. 
While the extent of the shortfall is unknown, num erous Saigon governm ent and USAID 
reports, as well as peasant surveys, attest that peasant demand for affordable credit
139 'Agricultural Credit/ Project Appraisal Report, 27 April 1975, USAID PD-AAF-353-C1.
140 'Rural Credit/ 31 December 1975, Vietnam Terminal Reports, vol. II, pt. II, USAID PN-AAX-018, 22-3.
141 'Two Revolutions in Bac Lieu,’ Robert L. Sansom, CORDS Economic Office, 24 August 1967, MACCORDS 
PP&P 1967.
142 For 1969 figures, see Ibid. For 1974 figures, see 'Agricultural Credit,’ Terminal Project Appraisal Report, 4 
September 1975, USAID PD-AAF-353-C1.
138 'Agriculture,' Vietnam Terminal Report, Volume II, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-AAX-018.
144 Ibid. At the official 1972 exchange rate of VN$ 270 to USD 1 the average loan was for USD 240.74. 
However, the real value of the U.S. dollar was far higher in South Vietnam, and the purchasing power of 
those loans were smaller than this rate suggests.
145 Ibid. See also 'Rural Credit/ 31 December 1975, Vietnam Terminal Reports, vol. II, pt. n, USAID PN- 
AAX-018, pp. 22-3.
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remained largely unsatisfied despite rural credit programs. A 1970 survey of 80 farmers 
from four hamlets of the lower Mekong delta province of Chong Thien revealed both a 
demand for and a shortage of official credit. Farmers noted that bank or government 
sponsored credit came w ith lower interest rates than 'inform al' loans, but complained 
that official credit was usually unavailable w hen needed. The timing of the loans to 
planting and harvesting cycles is critical, and often red tape rendered the loans untimely 
and necessitated expensive trips to fulfill m ultiple application procedures. One 
respondent complained, 'th is time is suitable for transplanting and m anuring, but [we] 
can't get money from the ADB [Agricultural Development Bank].' In a few months, he 
continued, 'th e  money may be available, and farm families would spend it on food and 
drink, rather than im proved cultivation m ethods.'146 A 1972 USAID report estimated 
that the various rural banks accounted for only about 10-14% of South Vietnam's rural 
credit demand between 1969 and 1971. The report predicted that, even given optimal 
growth of the formal rural credit market, it w ould supply only 35% of demand under 
prevailing conditions. USAID economists believed that there would be follow-on 
benefits even at these levels, estimating that if institutional credit accounted for 25% of
the rural market, it would drive down the price of informal rural credit.
Table 5.4
Credit Requirem ent and Formal-Sector Supply147
Year ADBV loans # loans Est. credit requirement % of requirement
(VN$ billions) (VN$ billions) fulfilled (by ADBV)
1969 4.6 89,405 46 10.0
1970 7.0 116,663 65 10.7
1971 ll.O148 170,611 80 13.7
1974 43.0 N.A. 120 35.8
Kolko asserts that, because of this shortfall, former landlords achieved 'virtual
146 Pacification Attitude Analysis Survey, Vietnamese Evaluations Field Operations Division, CORDS IV 
CTZ, Can Tho, Chong Thien Province, carried out 1 -9  July 1970, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 10,1602-01. 
Figures for 1973-4 were not given.
147 Source: 'Agricultural Credit/ Project Appraisal Report, 29 February 1972, USAID PD-AAF-354-F1.
148 Includes private and rural banks.
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dom ination' of the government banking system's credit supply. Having monopolized 
the credit market, these wealthy farmers then 'began to modernize their own farming 
and m oved to exploit changes which occurred in the South's agriculture as a result of the
introduction of miracle rice.'149 He cites no evidence in support of these claims,
however, and a mass of documentation as well as peasant response to m odem  variety 
introduction suggest that he is mistaken. As Chapter Four demonstrated, the average rice 
farm size in South Vietnam was approximately one hectare. Kolko himself claimed that 
one third of the country's rice crop (as opposed to hectarage planted) was produced from 
m odem  varieties by 1973.150 The conclusion is inescapable that South Vietnamese 
peasants m anaged to adopt new rice varieties in numbers far too large to support claims, 
even if by implication, that former landlords expropriated the advantages of green 
revolution technology by controlling credit. Plainly, the new technology was divisible 
enough that m any peasants were able to exploit it to their advantage. It is equally evident 
from the increased general prosperity in many rural areas that a fair percentage of small 
farmers were benefiting from increasing production. All of this suggests that small 
farmers were indeed gaining access to some forms of affordable credit in order to afford 
the inputs required to increase production.
However, Kolko's implication that the poorest farmers were left behind by the 
inadequate credit supply is almost certainly correct. W ith 84 Agricultural Development 
Banks concentrated in province and district capitals and village credit programs in their 
infancy, it seems a safe assum ption that more educated, less remote farmers had better 
access to institutional credit. Both the Saigon government and their American allies 
recognized this, and the fledgling rural credit market appeared to have some promise, but 
South Vietnam fell before the program s could be judged on a long term  basis.
5.3 (ii) Inadequate Agricultural Research and Extension
South Vietnamese and U.S. agricultural research efforts proved inadequate. The
149 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 393.
150 Ibid. Chapter Four demonstrated that the percentage was higher.
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Ministry of Agriculture and USAID made good use of Thai and Philippine rice variety 
research and planned a national research station at My Tho, in the Mekong delta, but, 
according to the USAID itself, did not pay enough attention to local, on site research. In 
March 1975, the m onth before Saigon fell, a USAID official lamented that agricultural 
performance would rem ain sub optimal 'unless and until host country officials properly 
understand the function of agricultural research /151 Another USAID report made clear 
w hat these functions were. It stressed that South Vietnam need not have waited for 
formal research institutions. Good adaptive research, that is, research carried out on local 
farms to test performance of various elements under specific conditions rather than at 
research stations, 'w ould  have been highly rew arding in terms of increased rice 
production/ A lack of fertilizer research was especially damaging. 'The failure to do on- 
farm fertilizer research in Vietnam early in the program  resulted in lower than potential 
production, the purchase by farmers of unneeded fertilizer elements and the import by 
USAID of fertilizer materials out-of-balance to that actually required for maximum rice 
production/ Nitrogen requirements in various conditions received inadequate attention, 
and agriculture officials carried out even less research on whether or not phosphorous
increased production in various Vietnamese conditions.152
Agricultural extension programs designed to increase productivity, output, and 
crop diversification, fared particularly badly. The Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture 
administered extension services through a num ber of sub-agencies and directorates, 
resulting in a fractured organization. Moreover, the national m anpow er shortage and 
low pay for civil servants led to an acute shortage of extension agents, or cadres as the 
government called them. By early 1975 the extension program  for the entire country was 
based on five 100 hectare demonstration areas.153
Agricultural extension services are no panacea, as Robert Chambers has pointed 
out. Extension agents in the developing world often bring outsiders' bias to their jobs, 
and their advice to farmers has suffered from a concentration on 'w hat is exotic rather
than indigenous, mechanical rather than hum an, chemical rather than organic,
151 'Crop Production—Research/ Terminal Project Appraisal Report, March 1975, USAID PD-AAF-584-F1.
152 'Crop Production/ Terminal Project Appraisal Report, USAID, PD-AAF-584-D1, p. 1.
153 Ibid., 8.
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m arketed rather then c o n s u m e d / ^  Moreover, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, many 
Vietnamese farmers, being well versed in the particulars of their lands and regions, grew 
m odem  rice varieties successfully while ignoring government guidelines and reckoning 
their ow n w ay.155 However, in the case of South Vietnam, as Chapter Four also 
dem onstrated, farmers had demonstrated strong demand for the chemical and exotic, 
which w ere disseminating rapidly to farmers. Poor extension services ham pered the 
dissem ination of vital information such as how, when, and w hat kind of fertilizers to 
apply to m odem  rice varieties and how best to use pesticides. This left a large percentage 
of farmers to learn by expensive trial and error.
5.3 (iii) M arket Reforms
Until the late 1960s, Saigon government policy and internal barriers to trade depressed 
rice prices and were a disincentive to production of Vietnam's most im portant economic 
product. The southern rice trade had traditionally been dominated by relatively few 
ethnic Chinese firms which had managed to keep farm gate prices low.156 In the post 
World W ar II era, Chinese firms began to lose their grip on the processing and trade of 
rice. For instance, from having owned over 80% of the rice mills in the Saigon region in 
1930, ethnic Chinese firms owned only about 25% in 1970.157 By this time, however, the 
governm ent had shouldered its way into the rice business, to keep consumer prices down 
and stem urban inflation. The Mekong delta region was a rice surplus area while most of 
the rest of the country ran rice deficits.158 Thus, inter-regional trade of Mekong rice was 
vital to the health of the country. The government, however, set up a series of 'resource 
control checkpoints' designed to deny rice to the NLF. The checkpoints became a source 
of harassm ent and extortion, kept the rice market unstable, and helped to prevent an
154 Robert Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First (London, 1984), 77, see 77-80.
155 'Report on IR Culture Development in Vinh Loi District, Bac Lieu Province/ Translation 20 July 1970, 
MACCORDS PP&P, Box 9, 1602-01.
156 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 392. See also Tran Khanh, The ethnic Chinese and Economic Development in 
Vietnam (Hanoi, 1993), 46-9, for the business networks of Chinese rice merchants.
157 Tran Khanh, The Ethnic Chinese, 65.
158 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam/ William J. C. Logan, USDA and William F. Doody, CIP 
Program, January 1971, USAID,VS338.17318. (Hereafter 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam,’ 
followed by date and file no.).
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efficient inter regional rice trade.159 In the 1960s rice production in South Vietnam fell 
well below national need, and the Saigon government began im porting American rice, 
which arrived mainly at Central Vietnamese ports. Im ported rice was kept below local 
rice prices partly to keep urban retail inflation in check, and partly for sale to families of 
soldiers and civil servants on fixed incomes who were especially vulnerable to urban 
i n f l a t i o n . In 1967 imported rice sold at subsidized prices 'dom inated the structure of 
local rice prices.'161 All of these factors combined to favor urban dwellers by depressing 
the price of rice at the farm gate and in town.
In the late 1960s, as both the Americans and the Saigon government increased 
their emphasis on the political importance of the peasantry, they began to see low rice 
prices as a disincentive to growth. They partly countered subsidy effects by raising the 
price of imported rice by 20% in March 1967.162 Moreover, government purchases of large 
portions of the rice crop drove rice prices up. In 1968/9, the government bought up 20% 
of domestic rice production; in 1970, it bought 40% of the crop.163
In 1970, under the new Minister for Economy, Pham  Kim Ngoc, market 
deregulation accelerated. With President Thieu's backing, Ngoc endeavored to diminish 
governm ent interventions, internal quotas, rationing, and price controls. Instead, the 
government attempted to increase the use of price mechanisms to encourage production 
and to ease licensing restrictions in industry and commerce.164 These reforms were an 
effort to 'get prices righ t/ and took three major forms: interest rate reforms, exchange rate 
reforms, and the diminution of governm ent economic controls such as transaction 
licensing and other internal trade restrictions. The governm ent attem pted to spur 
domestic savings interest rate reforms in September 1970. New regulations allowed 
banks to pay higher interest on time deposits, which until then had been shunned by
159 Dacy, Foreign Aid, 115.
160 Pham Kim Ngoc, interview with the author, 28 August 1994, Seven Comers, Virginia.
161 'Economic Context,’ Viet Nam Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-ABI-250.
162 Ibid.
163 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam,’ January 1971, USAID VS 338.17318 L831. Not 
surprisingly, wholesale rice prices nearly doubled from 1969 to 1970.
164 Ibid., Ngoc's assertions are supported by documentary evidence. For the easing of restrictions on rice 
milling, see 'Operation of Rice Mills/ Ministry of Economy Circular, 10 April 1970, Pham Kim Ngoc to all 
Prefect Mayors and Province Chiefs. Attached to 'Small Rice Mills in the Delta/ Memorandum for Assistant 
Chief of Staff for CORDS from W.E. Colby, 4 March 1970, Record Group 472, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 8. 
See also, 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam,’ January 1971, USAID VS 338.17318 L831.
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investors because they rendered a net loss against inflation. The government began 
selling bonds as well. In the same year Saigon devalued the piaster in order to limit the 
import of luxury goods.165
The easing of governm ent controls on trade and prices mitigated the problem of 
depressed rice prices, and of the urban bias in the South Vietnamese political economy. 
The producer price of rice and the purchasing power of rice producers increased, along 
with farmer prosperity, consumption, and output. As Chapter Five indicated, after 
privatization began in the input markets, the price per kilogram of rice to fertilizer had 
shifted in favor of farmers from 1:1 in 1967 to 2.5:1 in 1970, providing not only higher
farm incomes but also increased incentive to use fertilizer.166 Dacy claims that the
purchasing power of a kilogram of rice rose by nearly one third between 1968 and 1973.167 
As Chapter Four dem onstrated, increasing rice prices contributed to a significant 
proportion of the overall increase in rural incomes. W hen considered in light of 
increasing yields per hectare enjoyed by many farmers during this period, the rural 
income gains through government pricing policy changes begin to look substantial. One 
USAID economic officer who worked w ith Ministry of Economy officials on interest rate 
and exchange rate reforms felt that the policies contributed directly to the increased 
domestic savings, investm ent, and exports that followed.166 Nguyen Anh Tuan, Douglas 
Dacy, and W. W. Rostow support this view.169 But price disincentives were not the only 
obstacle to trade and production. Table 5.5 indicates that imported rice was falling as a 
percentage of the national rice availability. Nevertheless, its presence still depressed the 
price of Vietnamese rice, inhibited shipm ents from the delta region, and constrained 
production.
165 Dacy, Foreign Aid, 14.
166 Plans and Budget for FY 1972, 22 Aug. 1970, CORDS Country Field Submission, CMH DEPCORDS file.
167 Dacy, Foreign Aid, 116-18.
168 Peter Davis, USAID Economic Officer, Saigon, 1970-1972, telephone interview with the author, 10 August 
1994.
169 Nguyen Anh Tuan, South Vietnam Trial and Experience, 167. See Walt Whitman Rostow cited in Dacy, 
Foreign Aid, 85, 92-3.
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Table 5.5 Rice Imports as a Percentage of National Availability.170
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
28% 22% 12% 18% 2.8%
In 1971, imports represented 11.8% of deficit area rice needs. Ironically, by 1971 
South Vietnam produced enough rice, but internal barriers to trade and lack of transport 
infrastructure blocked nearly all trade between the Mekong region and rice poor Central 
Vietnam .171 Government licensing procedures were formidable barriers to trade of 
almost any kind, and until the late 1960s the government prohibited direct inter­
provincial rice trade in a futile effort to deny rice supplies to the NLF. All delta rice 
shipments of over 500 kilos had to physically pass through Saigon via rice traders.172 
Government Order 382 of September 1968 lifted that ban. Farmers and traders reported in 
1971 that some local governments were still refusing to allow rice shipm ents outside the 
usual barges and trucks to Saigon, supporting the assumption that local officials were 
collecting significant kickbacks for these rice shipments. A senior American adviser in 
the delta reported in 1969 that, although the NLF did their best to block trade and the 
movement of strategic materials, the Saigon government was 'a  bigger obstacle to 
economic growth than the Viet C ong/173 Rice market efficiency did, however, improve 
over time. By 1971 rice merchant and transporters in An Giang and Sa Dec provinces 
were reporting that restrictions had relaxed considerably in the delta generally. One 
exception was a district chief in Chuong Tien province, who refused to allow rice 
shipments to leave his area because his wife had an interest in local rice milling.174
Other substantial barriers to domestic trade existed. Delta traders did not have 
contacts in Central Vietnam, and had no idea how to go about selling rice there. Coastal 
ships needed to transport rice were scarce, though the governm ent purchased three
170 Source: 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam,' January 1971, USAID VS 338.17318 L831.
171 Ibid.
172 'Rice/ undated, Pacification Files, Safe #75, CMH.
173 Province Monthly Report for January 1969, An Xuyen Province, George M. Nagata, CMH.
174 'Trip Report: An Giang and Sadec Provinces, Memorandum from Arthur L Kobler, Sector Analysis Branch, 
JEO, to Mr. Willard D. Sharpe, Chief, Joint Economic Office, 16 April 1971, Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Economic Affairs, Box 15, Record Group 472, National Archives II (hereafter DCSEA).
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vessels in the early 1970s. Deep water loading facilities in the delta were inadequate.175 By 
1971, farmers were holding back rice sales in the face of dipping prices while imported 
American rice satisfied rice deficit areas in Central Vietnam.176 The Saigon government 
was not idle in the face of this. Minister of Economy Pham Kim Ngoc secured wide 
support in his efforts to facilitate an inter regional rice trade and transfer all rice 
marketing in Central Vietnam to the private sector.177 However, in 1972, according to 
Kolko, rice surpluses in the delta continued to m o u n ts  Economic policies, transport 
facilities, and m arket infrastructure, though improving, did not keep pace w ith rice 
production, and inhibited development.
To alleviate some of these problems, USAID attem pted to organize farmers' 
cooperatives and organizations. They hoped strong organizations would serve to 
rationalize and increase production, assure adequate supplies of essential inputs at 
reasonable prices, help to m arket produce, and not least, serve as a political alternative to 
the NLF’s farmers' organizations. The Saigon government, as usual, shunned extra- 
government organizations that might wield power over rural populations.179 USAID 
failed to interest Saigon's M inistry of Agriculture in supporting the program, let alone 
taking an active role. In late 1972, the government slapped a 45% tax on the 
organizations' savings, effectively destroying their ability to build assets or member 
equity.^o On top of that, farm ers' organizations could not get enough credit to guarantee 
a steady supply of inputs to their members.181 By 1971 there were 694 cooperatives and 
135 farm ers' associations registered in South Vietnam, but few of them actually met, let 
alone functioned. USAID called the effort to this point a 'near failure,' suggested its early 
termination, and the program  languished until the country fell.182
175 'Presentation on the Economic Situation in SVN by a Special National Security Council Committee Headed 
by Dr. Charles Cooper to Mission Council on 16 June 1970,' Memorandum for Record, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, 
Box 13 ,1601-11A to 1608-11.
176 'Rice Marketing and Situation Report, Vietnam,’ January 1971, USAID VS 338.17318 L831.
177 'Direct Shipment of Delta Rice to Central Viet Nam,’ Memorandum from Arthur L. Kobler, Sector Analysis 
Branch, JEO, to Mr. Willard D. Sharpe, Chief, Joint Economic Office,19 April 1971, DCSEA.
178 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 392.
179 'The USAID Program and Vietnamese Realities/ Staff Study, June 1968, USAID PN-ARE-177. 
iso 'Farmers' Organizations/ 31 Oct. 1973, USAID PN-AAF-353-F1.
1§l 'Attitude and Resource Survey of Twenty-Nine Farmers Organizations, Vietnam, 1971/ 15 Nov. 1971, 
USAID ISN 33941 see also 'Farmers' Organizations/ 31 Oct. 1973, USAID PN-AAF-353-F1.
!S2 'Farmers' Organizations/ 31 Oct. 1973, USAID PN-AAF-353-F1.
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In sum, the 'second half of land reform in South Vietnam fell short of most of its 
goals. Efforts to supply affordable credit to small farmers fell short of dem and, though it is 
a safe assum ption given available statistics that formal sector loans pu t dow nw ard 
pressure on the price of local credit. Agricultural extension was inadequate during a time 
of radical technological change. And probably more harmful yet, local agricultural 
research efforts were desultory at best. Incipient market reforms, however, did 
accomplish a good deal. Efforts by the ministry of the economy to minimize the 
obstructionist policies of the Saigon government and 'get the prices right' began to free 
up trade, improve access to markets, and propel the economy. These policies also helped 
redistribute wealth toward the rural sector, hitherto undervalued by successive Saigon 
regimes.
5.4 SOUTH VIETNAMESE LAND REFORM IN THE EAST ASIAN CONTEXT
The South Vietnamese Land to the Tiller law came in the second wave of Asian land 
reform. In the first wave, three other capitalist countries, Taiwan, Japan, and South 
Korea, carried out land redistribution schemes in the immediate post W orld W ar II era 
with United States backing. Some of the American planners w ho lobbied Saigon to 
implement land reform had worked on these earlier programs, and naturally used them 
as models. South Vietnamese agrarian reforms, especially land redistribution, compare 
well to these first wave experiences, which suggests that, had the Saigon government 
survived, land reform might have contributed to long term economic growth.
The first wave countries carried out agrarian reforms under tense conditions, but
with several advantages over South Vietnam. While South Vietnam's economy was
essentially preindustrial, Japan had long been industrialized and its agricultural sector
had already made significant contributions to that process. True, m uch of Japan's
industrial base had been destroyed during the Second World War. Even so, it enjoyed a
significant technical advantage over South Vietnam and began rebuilding at a rapid rate
soon after the w ar’s end. Taiwan and South Korea had, under Japanese colonial rule,
begun industrializing well before land reform as well. Japanese colonial administrations
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had formed farmers' cooperatives and gone to great lengths to disseminate scientific 
farming methods and inputs.183 Both Japan and Taiwan had workable tax systems, 
reasonably compliant populations, and were producing agricultural surpluses prior to 
agrarian reform.
South Vietnam was experiencing very different security situations than the first 
wave countries. Taiwan did exist in a state of high tension and military preparedness 
against the Chinese threat, but was not fighting an external or internal military force. By 
the time South Korea carried out the majority of its land redistribution in 1951-2, UN 
troops had fought to a military stalemate, and though communists still w ielded influence 
in the countryside, the threat of a m ilitary invasion was remote. Neither, by then, did 
Seoul face an internal military threat as did the Saigon government from the NLF.
South Vietnam also faced greater technological hurdles. The French, as Chapter 
Two explained, m ade little effort to bring technical improvements to Vietnamese peasant 
farmers. And the modicum of industrial investment that took place in Vietnam under 
the French was mainly confined to m ining regions and the H anoi/H aiphong area, all in 
the N orth.184 Thus, both agricultural and industrial sectors in Japan, Taiwan and South 
Korea were further developed than those in South Vietnam.
The four land reform experiences share several commonalities as well. All 
conducted reforms in a variation of post-war political chaos. Economic and social change 
accompanying war, revolution, industrialization, changes of government, or population 
increases, had pu t vested interests off balance, making far reaching reform easier to carry 
out. And all four program s had political as well as economic goals. The South Koreans 
were as desperate as the Vietnamese to effect radical change in order to w in influence 
among peasant society. Finally, reform did not stop at land redistribution, but was 
coupled with program s to increase availability of agricultural credit and introduce new 
technology through extension and education services.
183 Alice H. Amsden, 'Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency 
Theory/ in Toward a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective, ed. Robert Bates 
(Berkeley, 1988), 146.
184 Murray, Capitalism in Colonial Indochina, 213.
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Japan is generally regarded as a model for successful Asian land reform.185 
Reforms were similar to those later carried out in South Vietnam, except that farmers 
were required to pay for their land. The program reduced the proportion of cultivated 
land farmed by tenants, as well as the total percentage of tenants, as it increased farmers' 
incom es.186 Investment in agriculture, especially long term investment, expanded. This, 
combined with technical improvements, increased overall agricultural productivity and
agricultural production rose 13% between 1933 and 1955.187 The expanding domestic
consum ption m arket was especially good for Japanese industry, in which farmers spent 
most of their extra income. Partly because of generally improving Japanese incomes, 
staple food consum ption fell nationally while non-staple food consum ption increased, 
encouraging further crop diversification where non staple crops were more profitable to 
grow, and putting still more upw ard pressure on farm incomes.188
Agrarian reform in Taiwan achieved a good deal of success as well. Like Japan, 
Taiwan departed from a point of considerable advantage compared to South Vietnam. 
Taiwanese farmers had moved well beyond subsistence under Japanese colonial rule and 
the recently arrived Chinese Nationalist Government was virtually w ithout landed 
interests. As a result of land redistribution, the percentage of land cultivated by tenants 
dropped and the proportion of owner operators increased.18? Taiwanese agricultural 
production increased 18% in the aftermath of land reform, between 1953 and I960.190 
Obligatory land repaym ents inhibited the growth of farmer consumption, but 
consum ption of non-staple foods and industrial goods increased significantly.191
185 Hans Binswanger and Miranda Elgin call Japanese reforms 'outstanding', 'Reflections on Land Reform and 
Farm S ize/ in Agricultural Development in the Third World , 342. W.G. Beasley, The Rise of Modem Japan 
(New York, 1990), 223. See also Bray, The Rice Economies, 190-91, 215-16.
186 For decrease in proportion of land farmed by tenants from apx. 50% to apx. 10%, see R.P. Dore, Land Reform 
in Japan (London, 1959), 175-6. For the drop in the percentage of tenants from apx. 70% to apx. 30%, see 
Antonio J. Ledesma, 'Land Reform Programs in East and Southeast Asia: A Comparative Approach' (Madison, 
WI, 1976), 10. For increased farm incomes, see Kang Chao, 'Economic Effects of Land Reforms in Taiwan, 
Japan, and Mainland China: A Comparative Study' (Madison, WI, 1972), 22. See also Bray, The Rice 
Economies, 191 and Ledesma, 'Land Reform/ 8.
187 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 29.
188 Chao, 'Economic Effects of Land Reforms,' 22. Dore, Land Reform in Japan, 203-4.
189 Percentage of land farmed by tenants decreased from 46% to 15% between 1948 and 1956, while the 
percentage of owner-operators doubled to about 60%. Callison, Land to the Tiller, 25.
190 Ibid., 29.
191 Chao, 'Economic Effects of Land Reforms,’ 30.
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According to M artin Yang, rural incomes increased and income distribution in the 
agricultural sector began to level out. Rural nutritional and educational standards rose. 
Agricultural productivity and production grew, as did employment creation.192
The South Vietnamese land reform of 1970 compares reasonably well with 
Japanese and Taiwanese reforms of the 1940s, especially when viewed against the 
numerous advantages enjoyed by the latter countries. The num ber of workers that Japan 
particularly was able to dedicate to land reform far outnumbered Saigon's best efforts. 
Nonetheless, South Vietnam was able to reduce tenancy in the Mekong region from 
about 65% to 12% of farmers, and create a potentially prosperous smallholding sector.193 
As in Japan and Taiwan, much w ould have depended on ancillary program s had South 
Vietnam survived. In any case, the example of Taiwan especially underscores that 
thriving smallholders can contribute to early industrial development by creating 
agricultural surpluses, consuming m anufactured or processed goods, and providing a 
larger tax base.
The Korean land tenure system under Japanese rule was, according to James 
Putzel, particularly harsh. When the Japanese were banished in 1945, 2.7% of South 
Korean households owned two thirds of all cultivated land, 58% of farmers were 
landless, and tenants cultivated 65% of the land.194 The South Korean government was 
frantically attem pting to instigate land redistribution when w ar broke out in 1950. North 
Korea's occupation forces distributed land to farmers widely. After United Nations 
troops retook the South, the Syngman Rhee's southern governm ent re-confiscated the 
land and belatedly began their own redistribution system. Putzel asserted that between 
1951 and 1952, Rhee redistributed land 'w ith  a vengeance/ virtually w iping out the 
landlord classes. By December 1952 only 7% of South Korean farmers were landless and 
only 18% of the land was farmed by tenants.195
The rural economic effects of reform in South Korea were mixed. As table 5.6
192 Martin Yang, Socioeconomic Results of Land Reform in Taiwan (Honolulu, 1968), 276-385. Ledesma, 'Land 
Reform,’ 19.
193 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 191.
194 James Putzel, The Captive Land, 78, 82. Francesca Bray put at 49% the percentage of Korean tenants in 
1945. Bray, The Rice Economies, 191.
195 Putzel, The Captive Land, 82.
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illustrates, farm production increased significantly between 1953 and 1961. Bray claims 
that it is unclear why agricultural production was fairly stagnant during the immediate 
post reform period.196 Antonio Ledesma, however, identifies several problems that 
stunted agricultural growth in the aftermath of land redistribution. Seoul, he claims, 
confined its reform movem ent to land redistribution, made farmers' payments too steep 
and perpetuated a dangerous trend by breaking up holdings into minuscule plots from 
which families had difficulty making a living. Average farm size fell from 1.6 hectares to 
0.8 hectares from the 1930s to the late 1960s.197 The government compounded this error 
by officially banning tenancy, an unenforceable law that resulted in much disguised 
tenancy and actually made conditions worse for some farmers. Finally, the South Korean 
reform package did not sufficiently stress credit reform and technology introduction. The 
net result was that many South Korean land recipients were unable to pay off their new 
debts, and m any of those who managed to hang on to their small plots barely scratched
out a living, even as the industrial sector began to flourish.19^  Sociologist Norm an Jacobs
pointed out that holes in the Korean law allowed landlords to weaken reforms and 
collect rents secretly, resulting in an increase in tenancy during the 1960s of over 30%.199
Despite its shortcomings in the agricultural sector, South Korean land reform had 
an imm ediate positive effect on the industrial economy by providing a significant 
num ber of landlords w ith both capital and incentive to invest in industry, thus 
converting m any of them  to industrial actors.200 Albert Keidel called South Korean 
redistribution 'imperfect,' bu t argued that improvements in education and industrial 
infrastructure 'possibly formed the richest fuel for sustained and pervasive economic 
com bustion.'201 And finally, judging from the aftermath, it appears that the political 
effects of South Korean land reform were positive from the governm ent's point of view. 
Synghman Rhee was able to consolidate his hold over rural South Korea and create a 
stable platform  for the country's later economic successes.
196 Bray, The Rice Economies, 191.
197 Ledesma, 'Land Reforms/ 28.
19« Ibid.
199 Norman Jacobs, The Korean Road to Modernization and Development (Chicago, 1985), 84-5.
200 Putzel, The Captive Land, 82.
201 Albert Keidel, III, Korean Regional Farm Product and Income: 1910-1975 (Seoul, 1981), 23.
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The South Vietnamese law sidestepped some of the flaws of the Korean effort, but 
shared others. In Vietnam, unlike Korea, land recipients did not pay for their new plots, 
and so had more to invest and saw greater short term  gains. Moreover, average farm size 
in South Vietnam was reasonably appropriate, and productivity increased as a result. 
Thus, in the short term, though Saigon's formal agricultural credit netw ork was less 
successful than Seoul's own flawed effort, Vietnamese land reform had a greater positive 
effect on agricultural output.
Table 5.6 depicts a rough comparison of post W orld W ar II land reform ventures in 
East Asia. The South Vietnamese effort did relatively poorly politically, and there is no 
basis for comparison in industrial effects. But agriculturally Saigon's reforms compare 
favorably.
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Table 5.6 Asian Land Reform Comparisons202
Japan Taiwan S Vietnam S Korea
Tenancy reduction203 48% -12% 36% -15% 65% - 15% 65%-18%204
Rent reduction205 16% - 0.2% yes 15.9% - 0.5% yes
Farmer incom e increased yes yes yes yes206
Ag. output increased 13%207 18%2°8 30% 29%209
Investm ent increases2!0 yes yes yes yes211
R edistributed income yes yes yes no
Credit availability increased increased increased increased212
Extension and research improved im proved poor improved
Rural labor dem and increased2!3 increased increased n /a
Political participation2!4 greater greater little changed2!5 n /a
Ind. investm ent from  ag.2i6 increased increased insignificant2!7 increased218
202 Sources: Callison, Land to the Tiller, Dacy, Foreign Aid,War, and Economic Development, 74, Nguyen Anh 
Tuan, South Vietnam Trial and Experience. Putzel, The Captive Land.
203 Tenancy reduction = % farmers renting more than 50% of the land they cultivate.
204 Putzel, The Captive Land, 82.
205 % of gross output.
206 Farmer incomes would have increased by the amount of rent they saved immediately, but gains from greater 
marketed surplus were delayed for two years until after the war ended.
207 1933-1955.
208 1953-1960.
2091953-61. Measurement does not include 2 wartime years just after redistribution. Sung Hwang Ban, 
'Agricultural Growth in Korea, 1918-1971,' in Agricultural Growth in Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the 
Philippines eds. Yujiro Hayami, Vernon W. Ruttan, Herman M. Southworth (Honolulu, 1979), 92-3.
210 % of land recipients who reported making improvements since receiving titles.
211 Chemical pesticide and fertilizer use rose dramatically after 1953, Ban 'Agricultural Growth,’ 104-5.
212 According to Ledesma, however, credit reforms were insufficient, 'Land Reforms,’ 28.
213 The increase in rural labor demand was very slight, but unlike the periods considered for Taiwan and 
Vietnam, land reform in Japan was accompanied by dramatically increased agricultural mechanization.
214 Based on voter participation in elections. All four countries were undergoing major national political 
reforms, obscuring the role of land reform in political participation.
215 This assumption is based on the lack of evidence of significant post-land reform changes in peasant 
identification with the Saigon government.
216 Increased agricultural profits invested in domestic industry.
217 Again, this is an assumption. Since little industrial growth took place in South Vietnam at any time, it is 
fair to assume that little farmer investment in industrial ventures took place.
218 Putzel, The Captive Land, 82.
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5.5 CONCLUSIONS: THE POLITICAL FAILURE AND ECONOMIC APPROPRIATENESS 
OF AGRARIAN REFORM AND COMPLIMENTARY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
The USAID extensive Terminal Report on land reform concluded that it was 'a  major 
causal factor creating political support for and identification w ith national 
G o v e r n m e n t /2 1 9  Gabriel Kolko, at the other extreme, claimed that land reform had no 
real meaning for peasants. Both exaggerated.
By bringing new evidence to bear, and widening the scope of previous inquiries, 
this study has found that agrarian reform, in which land redistribution in a small farm 
context was the central pillar, was appropriate in light of the country's employment and 
technological situation. As a result, the reforms achieved m ost of their economic goals in 
impressive fashion. And though the program was clearly popular w ith the bulk of the 
peasantry in the M ekong/Saigon region, it met the same macro-political fate as NLF 
reforms. The government remained unpopular. Thus, the program  fell short of its 
central political goal.
However, the findings here underscore that property rights remain im portant to 
peasants, and that the contentions of analysts such as Rehman Sobhan that improving 
technology ameliorates the need for land redistribution require greater scrutiny. For 
highly divisible technologies at least, the contention is misplaced. These findings, 
combined with the post-war Vietnamese experience plainly refutes Kolko’s assertion that 
land availability in South Vietnam rendered reforms u n n e c e s s a r y .220 Far from 
marginalizing land reform or rendering it unnecessary, im proved agricultural 
technology combined with newly secure property rights to produce dramatic economic 
growth in South Vietnam. Rural polls provide persuasive evidence that peasant farm 
families welcomed secure titles to their land, both from the NLF and from the Saigon 
government: the more secure the title, the better. But production figures tell us more 
than any poll. By the 1970-71 crop season, the hectarage of m odem  rice nearly reached its 
maximum, and in the wake of land reform, production continued its steep climb for four 
years, until the country fell. Land owners, even of small plots, were more likely to invest
219 'Land Reform/ Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-ABH-885, 84.
220 Sobhan, Agrarian Reform and Social Transformation, 25, 136-7.
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in their farms. Tenant farmers, with no collateral, security, or fall back, were far less 
likely to venture the expensive and risky investments necessary for making 
improvements in their land or growing m odern rice varieties. And this study is no voice 
in the wilderness.
A preponderance of post-war research, by Bray, Hayami, Lipton, Putzel, Sobhan, 
and others, indicates that the approach to agrarian reform which the Saigon government 
and its USAID advisers took can contribute to greater economic growth and equality, and 
that such reforms rem ain popular among landless peasants. In the end, Callison was 
correct that in those countries w ith little industry to absorb excess rural labor, it is vital to
create an agricultural sector of smallholders using scientific techniques.221 Even when
land-saving and labor-using technologies result, as they often do, in decreasing returns to 
labor along w ith the expected increasing returns to land, the improvements can lead to 
general economic grow th and improve farmer welfare. Clearly, this is not an 
achievement to rest upon, but a stage of economic growth. However, as Chapter Four 
demonstrated, South Vietnam appears to have enjoyed a slight increase in returns to 
labor as well to land. In short, depending on a society's institutional structures, m odem  
varieties can help make small farms more profitable because the associated technology 
can be used on a small scale w ithout mechanization. W ithout such divisible input 
improvements, technological gain would accrue to larger farmers w ith better access to 
credit and mechanization, possibly reversing the inverse relationship of farm size and 
productivity discussed in Chapter Four, making larger farms more productive than 
smaller farms and encouraging land consolidation. This did not happen in South 
Vietnam. The performance of new divisible rice technology enhanced the results of land 
redistribution in South Vietnam, and the combination had the positive effect Hayami 
later lauded as a general approach to agrarian development.
Observable peasant behavior in Vietnam reinforces this assertion. Peasant farm
families had several growing seasons to observe the results of Green Revolution
technology, and voted for it with their extra investment and labor. They did the same
with most of the agrarian reform program  and the result was a general improvement in
221 Callison, Land to the Tiller, 190-91.
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peasant welfare, especially in the M ekong/Saigon regions. As Kolko himself admits, 
peasants accepted the 1970 land reform in South Vietnam, and they did so despite the 
N L Fs political opposition.222 The timid nature of that opposition demonstrates the 
NLF's recognition that the program was popular among their peasant constituency. 
Moreover, as this chapter has demonstrated, land reform contributed to improvements 
in peasant welfare in the most populous and agriculturally im portant region of the 
country.
This chapter has demonstrated that land redistribution and w ider agrarian reform 
were economically appropriate for the vast majority of the M ekong region, which held 
almost two thirds of South Vietnam's population and accounted for 85% of its staple food
production.2^  In the context of pre-1970 Vietnamese land tenure history, the law appears
to have created comparatively favorable tenurial conditions for peasants, at least in the 
Mekong region. Under the circumstances of the day, w ith a growing population and war- 
induced chaos, South Vietnamese agrarian reform, and especially land redistribution, 
was remarkably successful economically.
From the point of view of W ashington and Saigon, however, the goals of land 
reform and new farm technology were primarily political, and here they failed by and 
large in all regions. Despite some noteworthy misperceptions and exaggerations, then, 
the critics of USAID policy are correct in their final assessment; politically, agrarian 
reform in South Vietnam was too little too late. It failed to achieve its central goal, 
helping to w in a critical mass of the rural population over to the governm ent side. The 
Thieu regime never came near to popularity in rural Vietnam. The general 
unpopularity of the Saigon government, the behavior of its soldiers in the field, its 
association w ith a huge and unwelcome foreign presence in m any villages, the history of 
land tenure in South Vietnam in which the government was long the champion of the 
landlords, the historical focus of villagers on their local adm inistrations as a gauge of 
governm ent performance, the generally poor quality of Saigon's rural administrations, 
and the narrow  regional focus of the Land to the Tiller program , all m itigated against
222 Kolko, Anatomy of a War, 391.
^3 'Land Reform/ Terminal Report, 31 December 1975, USAID PN-ABH-885, 82.
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major gains in peasant goodw ill and cooperation.
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Chapter 6
Village Development:
Community Projects, Development Cadres, 
and Village Receptivity
By 1968 most South Vietnamese villages were in social, political, and economic 
chaos. In the majority of those villages the NLF wielded greater influence than 
did the Saigon government. Since its inception in the mid 1950s, the governm ent 
had managed its rural administrative operations from afar, at the province or 
district level. The National Liberation Front, on the other hand, based its 
operations in the villages, long the basic Vietnamese political unit. Hence, while 
local governm ent officials came and went in the villages, local NLF officials 
tended to remain in place, able to watch, woo, cajole, and intimidate. M any South 
Vietnamese and American officials recognized that they were on the losing side of 
this asymmetrical relationship to the villagers. The 'self developm ent' approach 
at the village level was an attempt to redress this problem. Its American planners 
hoped that villagers would coalesce around an opportunity for economic gain, 
thus strengthening the village government that would eventually adm inister the 
program  and creating a more unified polity.
This chapter explores two issues that have never received scholarly 
attention: the m ethods and problems of establishing a governm ent presence in the 
hamlets and villages of South Vietnam, and small scale economic developm ent 
within those villages. It does the latter by analyzing the performance of the 
flagship Village Self Development Program (VSDP). Much of the analysis is based 
on documents from the MACCORDS PP&P files (Policy, Planning & Programs). 
These files represent the richest source available for the CORDS village or
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community development campaign, and were declassified at the author's request. 
The VSDP was a nationwide scheme that implemented small scale economic 
developm ent projects at the local level. Since the role of the village was so crucial 
to rural attitudes and behavior in South Vietnam, this chapter sheds light on the 
claims of those like William Colby who believed that nation building succeeded 
in creating a stable, cohesive economy and polity in South Vietnam and that the
U.S. abandoned its ally as victory hove into view.1
The chapter also assesses the way in which peasant economic behavior
affected the implementation and performance of village development projects, 
something heretofore not attem pted in the case of South Vietnam. Previous 
chapters discussed long-established non-market arrangem ents in rice cultivation. 
This chapter considers such arrangem ents in village development, attempting to 
further illuminate the kind of society and economy in which South Vietnamese 
peasants operated. If something akin to a moral economy existed in Vietnam, one 
might expect peasants to have m ade some decisions within the Village Self 
Development Program on a reasonably collective basis. If they were operating 
w ithin the framework of a rational choice system, they would have tended to 
make decisions based on their own benefit and that of their family even while 
taking part in a cooperative venture.
The VSDP program  is useful for exploring peasant economic behavior in 
South Vietnam for two reasons. It required villagers to form cooperative groups 
and thus affords a view of peasant responses to collective economic activities. 
These groups constituted essentially non-market rural institutions and 
arrangements, which adherents to the moral economy school cite as evidence of 
economic behavior unique to peasants, behavior based on a moral adherence to 
the idea of the good of the whole over the good of the individual. This school of 
thought has criticized m ainstream economists for having been, until fairly
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recently, 'defiantly uninterested in' non-market arrangem ents.1 Economists and
historians of the rational choice school of thought, however, would see the 
cooperative unions -the  non-market institutions called for by the self 
development schem e- simply as an attempt to provide goods and services that the 
m arket failed to furnish for South Vietnamese peasants. Some of these goods and 
services were public, such as roads and school houses. Some were private, such as 
livestock projects. Earlier chapters on agricultural development dem onstrated 
that, in that context, South Vietnamese peasants operated in a m anner more 
consistent w ith the rational choice school of thought than that of the m oral 
economy. The evidence below will be analyzed to determine w hether the same 
can be said of peasant response to the village self development approach.
The Village Self Development Program is an apt vehicle for exploring other 
issues as well. It was the largest development program attem pted at the village 
level in South Vietnam. It was implemented nation wide and can be examined 
for both the central and southern regions, thus allowing some comparison w ith 
the larger scale rural development approach examined in earlier chapters.
When combined w ith previous chapters, this investigation of a small scale 
village or community development approach affords several useful comparisons. 
It allows a comparison of competing and very different U.S. bureaucracies and 
their general development philosophies: of a smaller scale, politically oriented, 
village based approach versus a larger scale, economically oriented, agrarian and 
infrastructural approach to development. It also sheds further light on the kinds 
of development approaches that tend to succeed or fail in insurgent or wartim e 
environments. Finally, the chapter finds some answers to a puzzling aspect of 
developm ent in South Vietnam, and indeed in all conflicts, that of the 
relationship of physical security and economic development. It is clear that
1 Samuel L. Popkin, 'Public Choice and Peasant Organization/ in Toward a Political Economy of 
Development: A Rational Choice Perspective ed. Robert Bates (Berkeley,1988), 146.
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although South Vietnamese villages were never terribly secure, m any experienced 
significant economic growth.
As the introduction to this study explained, village or community 
development, sometimes called project development, is here defined as small 
scale, economic and political projects implemented at the village or hamlet level.2 
The text uses the terms interchangeably. Such projects would include things like 
the construction of wells, small rice mills, animal husbandry projects, school 
rooms, and medical facilities, along w ith  the formation and election of village and 
hamlet governments.
In this chapter, the term peasant (carefully defined in this study 's 
introduction) is used interchangeably w ith 'villager' or 'ham leteer.' This is not 
precise usage, bu t prevents repetition. N ot all villagers were peasants. A small 
percentage were merchants, scholars, or religious officials. But the vast majority 
of rural villagers were peasants, and where they were not by reason of profession 
or demographics, the text makes clear.
In this chapter, Section One briefly reviews the general CORDS approach to 
village development, which Chapter Three introduced. The rem ainder of the 
section considers the character and practices of the agency in greater detail to place 
it in the context of the subject at hand. Section Two describes the Rural 
Development Cadres, the advance troops of the village pacification and 
development campaign. Section Three analyzes hamlet and village receptivity to 
CORDS program s in general. Section Four sets out the goals and specifics of the 
VSDP program. Section Five recounts the varieties of success and failure with 
which the program  met. Section Six considers the implications of the VSDP for 
peasant economic behavior. Section Seven draws conclusions for the VSDP
specifically and the village approach to development in general, then compares its
2 In a UNESCO paper, Dore and Mars described the 'community development' approach, which was 
summarized in Chapter Three. Ronald Dore and Zoe Mars, Community Development: Comparative 
Case Studies in India, the Republic of Korea, Mexico and Tanzania (Paris and London, 1981).
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efficacy to an infrastructural and agrarian approach to development.
6.1 CORDS AND ITS APPROACH TO VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT
As previous chapters detailed, the United States Agency for International 
Developm ent (USAID) initiated most of the infrastructural and agricultural 
developm ent and reform program s in South Vietnam. Village development, on 
the other hand, was the domain of the omnipresent pacification and development 
agency, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), which was 
m ade up of military, State Department, USAID, and Central Intelligence Agency 
personnel. The prim ary mission of CORDS was political: to help the Saigon 
governm ent win over the support of the majority of its people and defeat the 
insurgency so that the North Vietnamese threat could be m et from a position of 
strength. In its purview, CORDS counted on far more than economic and social 
development; it also ran intelligence and anti-insurgency program s and 
coordinated some military operations. Its director, William Colby, was a high CIA 
official and the agency's future director. His deputy was an Army Colonel. Thus, 
CORDS took a far more political approach to development as opposed to USAID's 
economic emphasis, and focused on village development projects as the quickest 
and highest impact approach to wooing the rural population away from 
comm unism  and tow ard the Saigon regime.3 Economic goals were clearly 
im portant in that more in a long line of failed rural program s would not impress 
the skeptical peasantry. But there is evidence that CORDS did not sufficiently 
em phasize economic results.
Not only did the two agencies bring different approaches to development,
they brought different training and expertise. Unlike USAID, CORDS employed
3 For comment on this political dimension, see Memorandum, Ambassador William Colby, Deputy for 
CORDS, to Mr. D.G. MacDonald, Director, USAID South Vietnam, 19 May 1970, GVN Economic 
Policies, DEPCORDS Files, United States Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC 
(Hereafter CMH).
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few economists or specialists in economic development, and its program s suffered 
as a result. A staff economist for the U.S. command complained in 1972 that 
'economic expertise w ithin CORDS is almost nonexistent.' The CORDS 
headquarters staff employed no professional economists, bu t relied on 'Mssrs. 
Cooper (U.S. Embassy) and Sharpe (USAID) for analysis and assessment of 
economic issues. . . . However, in a conversation w ith Mr. Sharpe, he indicated 
that his contact w ith CORDS is sporadic and often not too meaningful. He felt that 
CORDS is neither staffed nor oriented toward problems of economic 
developm ent.'4 This lack of economic emphasis worked from the top down 
within CORDS. A MACV staff economist attending a development sem inar in 
Central Vietnam returned to Saigon with the discouraging news that CORDS 
province and district advisers had 'only the most general knowledge of economic
developm ent/s
Despite this lack of economic and development expertise, CORDS village
development plans rightly attempted to empower villagers and m ade several 
accurate assumptions about South Vietnamese peasant economic behavior. For 
instance, the general idea behind m uch of the CORDS approach to village 
development was that it m ust be self directed and self sustaining from within the 
village, which required the fostering of political cohesiveness. Planners hoped to 
introduce development program s using specialized personnel while 
simultaneously improving village governments. As local administrations and 
institutions improved, they were to take over developm ent responsibilities from
4 Memorandum for General Wickham from Captain J.W. Helmuth, Staff Economist, Subject: The 
economic advisory infrastructure of CORDS-USAID, 28 July 1972, Record Group 472, Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Deputy Chief of Staff for Economic Affairs, Box 8, National 
Archives and Record Administration, Archives II, College Park, Maryland (Hereafter MACV 
Economic Affairs followed by Box number and File where available).
5 Memorandum for: Deputy Chief of Staff, Economic Affairs, Subject: Trip Report: USAID/CORDS 
Industrial Seminar—MR 11,16 July 1971, MACV Economic Affairs, Box 15.
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the visiting specialists.6 Moreover, CORDS planners correctly identified the desire 
among villagers for public goods such as schools, roads, bridges, and medical 
facilities. They also correctly assessed the danger of the 'free rider' problem.
Samuel Popkin defined the free rider problem as the central disjunction between 
w hat may be good for a society and what the individual might feel is in his or her 
best interest. That is, while all citizens may be better off with such projects 
completed, a rational individual economic choice might be to take advantage of 
public goods w ithout contributing to their formation. Thus, according to Popkin, 
it is necessary to create and enforce institutions that dampen this disjunction.7 As 
this chapter will demonstrate, CORDS identified this disjunction and attem pted to 
create institutions and practices both to control the profits of public goods and to 
induce participation in their creation. It will also demonstrate, however, that 
w hatever the strengths and weaknesses of the CORDS approach, the atmosphere 
for village developm ent was inhospitable.
6.2 ESTABLISHING A PRESENCE IN THE VILLAGES: A PREREQUISITE FOR 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
South Vietnamese and American planners in Saigon were well aware of the 
problematic nature of the U.S. presence in South Vietnam's countryside and made 
substantial efforts to give pacification and development efforts a Vietnamese face. 
To accomplish this, and to compensate for weak village governments, they created 
an organization that sent teams of 30-50 young Vietnamese m en from hamlet to 
ham let introducing various development programs. This spear point of the civil 
campaign was the Revolutionary Development Cadre (or RD Cadre). One of the
originators of the specialized Vietnamese development cadres was Tran Ngoc
6 Talking Points for President ThieiTs Visit to the National Training Center at Vung Tau, undated, 
Record Group 472, Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Directorate of 
Community Development, Box 11, File 1602-09, National Archives and Records Administration, 
Archives II, College Park, Maryland (Hereafter Archives II).
7 Samuel L. Popkin, 'Public Choice and Peasant Organization/ Popkin drew his ideas mainly from 
Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action ( Cambridge, Mass, 1965), 242.
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Chau, a former Viet Minh officer, governor of hotly contested Kien Hoa Province 
and National Assembly member who was for a time in charge of training RD 
Cadres.8 Each year the Saigon government's Central Pacification and 
Development Council chose a num ber of the approxim ately 12,800 hamlets as 
priority pacification areas. Theoretically, these were contested and 
underdeveloped hamlets. Once military units had established a m odicum  of 
security and local militia forces were in place, cadre teams went in. 9 There they 
attem pted to initiate defense and development projects, organize citizen's groups 
to perpetuate this work after their departure, generally create identification with 
the government among the hamleteers, and possibly m ost im portantant, to 
improve local administrations that would do away w ith the need for roving 
development cadres. They had a checklist of '11 criteria and 97 points or tasks' to 
be accomplished during a few months before they could list the ham let as a 
'Com pleted New Life Hamlet' (Ap Doi Moi) and move on.™ (See Chart 6.1 below).
The 97 tasks assigned to the cadre teams were more a wish list than a 
realistic expectation. Chau originally hoped to keep the RD mission in the 
political and economic realm, but the CIA pressured the governm ent to convert 
the cadres to a counter-insurgency mechanism.11 Thus, the official program  goals 
became unwieldy. The first criterion was the elimination of the National 
Liberation Front's political apparatus, or 'Viet Cong Infrastructure/ a mission 
impossibly beyond their capabilities. RD Cadres were charged not only with 
developing intelligence on the local NLF, but w ith 'app rehend ing / 'destroying/ 
or 'annihilating ' them where exhortation or argum ent failed to w in over the
communists. Since few RD Cadre had more than cursory intelligence or military
8 Zalin Grant, Facing the Phoenix: The CIA and the Political Defeat of the United States in Vietnam 
(New York, 1991), 286-9. Tran Ngoc Chau, Interview with the author, June 21-23 1996, University of 
Colorado, Boulder, CO.
9 For doctrine on pacification immediately prior to the introduction of Revolutionary Development 
Cadres, see Vinh Long Province—General Information, RG 472, MACCORDS 101463.
10 'Vinh Long Province—General Information/1967, Record Group 472, MACCORDS 101463.
11 Grant, Facing the Phoenix, 287, Tran Ngoc Chau, Interview with the author, June 21-23 1996, 
University of Colorado, Boulder, CO.
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training, they rarely clashed with Front forces. More reasonably, cadres were 
expected to aid in the implementation of a plethora of civil programs run by 
various agencies. Thus, they assisted in land reform, the construction of school 
and medical facilities, rice programs, road building, well digging, and assorted self 
development projects. They were also expected to take an active role in civic 
affairs: hamlet elections, adult literacy and hygiene education, the organization of 
farmers and other associations. Finally, Saigon charged the teams w ith dozens of 
tasks that am ounted to social engineering and came under a criterion entitled 
'Develop a New Spirit/ RDC teams were to discourage drinking, gambling, and 
obscene dancing and songs, laud a scientific approach to life, quell superstitions, 
and ensure that children were courteous. In order that their good work should 
not be undone, the cadre sometimes left tem porary five man 'stay behind' teams. 
To avoid 'regression' of a hamlet, they attem pted to create 'Revolutionary 
Development Committees' and 'Peoples' Self Defense Forces' (PSDF) to carry on 
the program s after the team 's departure.
The perform ance of the Revolutionary Development Cadre was mixed at 
best. The most glaring weakness was a shortage of quality personnel and especially 
of good leaders. There were several reasons for this. First, the cadres received low 
pay and little prestige. Second, much of the rural population considered them 
draft dodgers and layabouts. Third, the job could be dangerous. Teams were 
lightly arm ed and vulnerable yet were often sent to insecure villages. Thus, RD 
Cadres had one of the highest desertion rates of all South Vietnamese field 
organizations.12 These factors, combined w ith manpower shortages, made good 
cadre leadership a rare commodity indeed. Out gunned, the cadres often had an 
implicit arrangem ent w ith the local NLF. Each left the other alone and the teams 
reported little enem y presence.
Beyond this general shunning of security duties, the RD Cadre mission
12 'RD Cadre Attrition/ CORDS Evaluation,10 May 1968, MACCORDS 101443.
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remained ill-defined. The struggle between Saigon proponents of security first 
and believers in development sometimes caught the RD Cadres in the middle. In 
1969, for instance, the Central Pacification and Development Council announced 
that the cadres would be more heavily armed and used as security teams, a job for 
which they were not trained. Colonel Nguyen Tai Lam, the director of the RD 
Cadre program , argued furiously against the change. 'W hat is the real aim of the 
1969 [pacification and development] plan? - to control people and territory by 
"occupying" D, E, and V hamlets? Clearly not. We can "control" 100% of the 
people and territory in Vietnam, but if we do not win the support of the people, 
we will lose this w a r /13 The cadres themselves evinced a good deal of resentment 
at being ordered to perform a military mission without proper training and 
weapons, but the plan went ahead. The cadre thwarted this effort to regulate their 
performance as they had done in the past. Finding this assignm ent unreasonable, 
most teams simply ignored it.14
Relationships with local governments posed another problem. The teams' 
job was to make themselves obsolete by helping to improve local governments. 
These governments theoretically had some authority over cadres assignments. 
Sometimes this arrangement worked well. But often, incom petent or corrupt 
local officials assigned the cadres to inappropriate areas, or, seeing them as 
interlopers, barred them from certain activities. There is evidence that in the early 
1970s some of South Vietnam's village administrations were taking on the jobs 
previously done by RD Cadres, but it is unclear whether this was due to successful 
cadre teams, shortages of such teams, or improving village governm ents.15 In any 
case, in the early 1970s the government began phasing the cadre teams out.
13 'CPDC Guidance to MORD on Employment of RD Cadre/ Memorandum for the Record, 12 April 
1969, MACCORDS PP&P 1969,1601-10A.
14 'RD Cadre Attrition/ CORDS Evaluation,10 May 1968, MACCORDS 101443.
15 Talking Points for President Thieu's Visit to the National Training Center at Vung Tau, undated, 
Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Directorate of Community 
Development, Box 11, File 1602-09, Record Group 472, Archives II.
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Chart 6.1, on the following page, contains the previously unpublished '11 
Criteria and 97 Points' that RD teams were charged w ith achieving in each hamlet. 
It is reproduced here in full.
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Chart 6.1. Revolutionary Development Cadre Teams: 
11 Criteria and 97 Points 16
Eliminate the VC Infrastructure:
1. Outline the VC infrastructure.
2. List the infrastructure membership.
3. List hamlet natives now with the VC.
4. List families with VC members or Sympathizers.
5. Convert, apprehend or annihilate VC.
6. Maintain surveillance over VC families.
7. Appropriate or destroy VC installations.
8. Map the hamlet to include structures, property boundaries, defense and topography.
9. List the hamlet's natural resources and manpower. Establish a family census booklet 
system
10. Establish population and resources controls.
11. Establish an intelligence net.
II. Eliminate Corrupt Practices and Discharge Corrupt Officials.
1. List officials accused of corruption.
2. Investigate thoroughly each accused official.
3. Investigations should he completed quickly and judiciously or referred to higher authority.
4. Establish an intelligence net to monitor the friendly infrastructure in the hamlet.
HI. Develop a New Spirit.
1. Reconcile differences between individuals, families, or groups.
2. Encourage families to work together for the good of the community.
3. Assist in the organization of a monthly 'Community Rally.'
4. Organize competition among hamlets and villages.
5. Assist families who return to the village.
6. Assist VC families and encourage returnees.
7. Encourage good candidates to stand for office in hamlet elections.
8. Encourage freely conducted community meetings.
9. Develop courtesy and national pride in the children.
10. Encourage the people to remain in the hamlets rather than migrating to the cities.
11. Discourage drinking and gambling.
12. Discourage prostitution and suppress obscene publications.
13. Encourage adult education.
14. Emphasize exclusive use of the Vietnamese language, teach the national anthem and 
discourage obscene music, songs and dances.
15. Honor national and local heroes with monuments, poems, and songs.
16. Encourage thrift.
17. Assist in the organization of the monthly 'Community Rally.'
18. Discourage superstition and encourage the scientific approach.
19. Encourage compliance with the draft regulations.
20. Urge young people to participate in people's groups.
21. Encourage prompt loan repayments ana government allowance payments.
IV. Establish Popular Government and Organization.
1. Encourage and assist qualified persons to assume leadership in government and people's 
organizations.
2. Organize people's groups.
3. Elect the hamlet RD committees.
4. Assist in the organization of a monthly 'Community Rally.'
5. Assist RD committee to establish a hamlet charter.
6. Assist in the election of a Hamlet Board of Administration and Village Council.
7. Train officials if requested to do so.
8. Organize a ceremony for the proclamation of the charter and for the empaneling of the 
Board and Committee.
V. Organize the People for Self Defense.
1. Encourage qualified people to lead the anti-VC organizations.
2. Organize the hamlet against the VC.
3. Assist in training and organizing the people against the VC.
4. Assist the RD committee to organize tne defense.
5. Advise the combat cells.
6. Establish an inter and intra-hamlet communications system.
7. 8. 9.10.11.12. (same as V.3).
13. Encourage nearby families to move into the hamlet.
14. Encourage young people to join RD teams and the Self Defense Force.
VI. Improve Literacy.
_______ 1. List illiterates between 10 and 45 and available teaching resources.
16 Source: Vinh Long Province, General Information 1967, R.G. 472, MACCORDS 101463.
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2. Organize classes.
3. Organize discussion meetings.
4. Organize the construction and improvement of classrooms.
VII. Eliminate Disease and Insanitary Conditions.
1. Teach hygiene.
2. Dig wells for potable water.
3. Build or improve the dispensary/maternity.
4. Provide transportation for the sick.
VIII. Implement Land Reform.
1. Formalize farm leases.
2. Keep rents within legal limits.
3. Publicize tax and rent exemptions.
4. Assist in the listing of abandoned lands and recommend their disposition.
5. Organize meetings to discuss land distribution and exploitation.
6. Assist in the adjustment of previous VC land distribution.
7. Assist in the adjustment of previous illegal claims on public land.
8. Assist in the adjudication of all land disputes.
9. Assist in issuing titles to land bought from dispossessed landlords.
XL. Develop Agriculture and Handicraft Industries.
1. Assist in the functional organization of the Farmers Association.
2. Assist the agriculture cadre in the hamlet.
3. Request provincial assistance for the agricultural program.
4. Request that the province assume responsibility for irrigation systems.
5. Assist in the improvement of agricultural production.
6. Establish agriculture pilot centers.
7. Assist trained farmers at agricultural pilot centers.
8. Recommend trained farmers for agricultural loans.
9. Assist in the negotiation of contracts between agricultural cadre and farmers.
10. Assist agricultural cadre and encourage equipment and money loans.
11. Assist agricultural cadre to collect loans ana to follow up agricultural development.
12. Encourage handicrafts and organize cooperatives.
X. Improve Communications.
1. Develop a road improvement program.
2. Organize the people to execute the road improvement program.
3. Recommend that the province maintain main roads and that recognition of individual 
participation in the road program be made.
4. Recommend that the province sell 3-wheeled vehicles on credit, sell radios cheaply and 
install a post office and information hall in the hamlet.
XI. Reward Deserving Soldiers. Public Servants And Citizens who have Contributed to R.D. 
Programs.
1. Compile a list of individuals who have contributed to revolutionary development.
2. Honor RD combatants at celebrations.
3. Recommend land distribution to RD combatants.
4. Recommend priority consideration for allowances and loans to RD combatants.
5. Recommend allowances for families of deceased RD combatants and use of their names for 
village streets.
2 4 2
Vietnamese evaluation teams from the Ministry of Rural Developm ent 
carried one American adviser and followed the RD Cadres, reporting on their 
progress. These advisers, however, often found their quality control job 
impossible. As one of the advisers complained, Vietnamese inspectors sometimes 
rubber stamped poor performances, many advisers were too busy to do more than 
confirm that the teams were in place, and most were anyway unequipped to do 
their jobs. 'Fluency of advisors in Vietnamese in this most Vietnamese of all 
CORDS program s is almost totally lacking/17
A 1967 evaluation of a hamlet in Gia Dinh province illustrates this 
problem. The ham let lay 5 kilometers from a Saigon suburb, had a strong 
governm ent presence, and was considered relatively secure. The RD Cadre team 
entered the hamlet in January 1967 and departed in October. Ministry of Rural 
Development inspectors and their American adviser visited in September. The 
inspectors reported to Saigon that nearly all the assigned projects had been 
satisfactorily completed and declared the hamlet completed, which was reflected in 
subsequent HES ratings. The accompanying American adviser had  refused to sign 
their final report, complaining to CORDS that inspectors questioned only the 
cadres, ignored the villagers, overlooked obvious lies, and reported slipshod and 
uncompleted tasks as satisfactory. 'These inspections are becoming a farce and are 
an insult to the intelligence of the U.S. personnel on the delegation/ In response 
to the adviser's complaint, a Vietnamese/American CORDS inspection team 
visited the hamlet a few weeks later and found that the NLF political 
infrastructure had not been touched. Viet Cong units still entered the village at 
will, development successes were not apparent, and the committees that the team
claimed to have created had ceased to function as soon as the cadres departed.^
According to some reports, not all the results were so abject. The senior
17 'RD Cadre Attrition/ CORDS Evaluation,!.!) May 1968, MACCORDS 101443.
18 'Completed ADM Tan Tao 13, Gia Dinh Province/ CORDS Evaluation, 29 January 1968, 
MACCORDS 101433.
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adviser in Vinh Binh lauded the RDC as "a very useful group. . . probably the most 
effective organization' involved in developm ent.1* The senior adviser in 
Chuong Thien province wrote in May 1969 that RD Cadre teams were the 
fundamental strength of the villages. "In spite of VC terrorism, and government 
ineptness the RD Cadre continue to march and exceed e x p e c ta t io n / 2 0  Two years 
later, his successor reported that only the efforts of the cadres prevented the 
development process from stagnating completely.
More often, however, the reports resembled that of Frederick Barbour, a 
district senior adviser in the Mekong delta region who believed the peripatetic 
cadres were achieving little.21 An even bleaker view came from the senior 
adviser for Quang Nam, who called RD Cadre leadership in his province as 
"useless as they are in c o m p e te n t / 2 2
Possibly even more damaging than poor personnel was the tem porary 
nature of the cadres commitment to each hamlet. While the NLF did target RD 
cadres for assassination, more often they simply went to ground when cadre teams 
appeared. Front agents often preserved influence by m aintained the ability to 
retaliate against villagers who informed against them. When the RD teams 
departed w ith their 'com pleted' checklists, the NLF reemerged. The following 
South Vietnamese evaluation of a ham let near Saigon is particularly revealing. 
One year after the certification of Ta Dien as a "New Life Ham let', "there is no sign 
of a "new life." The VC control two thirds of the hamlet day and night, the elected 
hamlet governm ent has dissolved and village officials cannot enter w ithout an 
escorting platoon.' Hamlet residents w ho had cooperated with the cadres had been 
punished by the Front. Much of what they built had been dismantled. A small 
stretch of new road remained, bu t the new  school house was w ithout teachers, the
19 'Province Senior Advisor Completion of Tour Report/ 12 February 1972, Robert C. Hallmark, 
Pacification Files IV CORPS (Closed Files), 1968-1972, CMH
20 Province Monthly Report for Chuong Thien, May 1969, Phillip W. Hamilton, CMH.
21 Province Monthly Report for Kien Tuong, July 1969, Frederick L Barbour, CMH.
22 Province Monthly Report for Quang Nam, 1969, Warren E. Parker, CMH.
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m aternity clinic lacked a medic, five crop sprayers had been destroyed, and the 
peoples' groups were mostly inactive.23
This problem of 'regression' was well known to high officials. The senior 
American RD Cadre adviser in the Mekong region informed his superior in 
Saigon: 'I t takes about as many forces to keep a hamlet pacified as it does to pacify 
it in the first place. Therefore, the idea of our cadres completing hamlets and 
m oving on to new  ones w ith their security forces, leaving only a small contingent 
behind, and being able to look over their shoulders after a time and see a long line 
of "completed" hamlets simply is not valid. . . . When we go into a hamlet, we 
have to stay in the hamlet.'24 The resources necessary for m aintaining RD Cadre 
presence were, however, unavailable. Hence, RD planners hoped to create 
effective local government and credit organizations to obviate the need for special 
visiting teams. The idea had merit, but its execution proved far beyond the 
capabilities of the RD program.
In short, the cadres sometimes served as a useful bridge between 
dysfunctional and improving village governments. But when viewed on a 
national scale, their job was impossibly large and their program 's resources and 
talents far too meager. South Vietnam recognized approximately 12,800 hamlets, 
the majority of which were contested and in need of economic help, but would 
never be the subject of an RD mission. A 1969 study noted that while 58% of 
South Vietnam's population was on the three tiered priority list for pacification 
and development, there were not the resources to satisfy the first priority
requirements, let alone the second and third.23 Clearly, needs far exceeded
resources in the 'o ther w a r/
In order to succeed, the CORDS village-level approach depended on
23 'Failure of Pacification in Ap Doi Moi Tan Dien/ Rural Technical Team Survey Report, RTT 
Reports, Long An Province, 1967-70, Pacification Files III CORPS (closed files), CMH.
24 Memorandum to Chief RDC/O, from Chief RDC/O South, 26 February 1967, MACCORDS,101559.
25 Pacification Priority Area Summary, Prepared for ACofS CORDS,undated, 1969, MACCORDS 
101720.
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numerous interlocking factors: well-conceived program s, competent local 
government and development personnel, dim inutive NLF presence, decent 
advisory relationships, reasonably effective local arm ed forces, and the resources 
to enter and remain in the villages until local governm ent could take over 
development tasks. These prerequisites were in short supply. This leaves perhaps 
the most vital variable: the receptivity of villages to the m inistrations of 
development planners. Subsequent sections will attem pt to determine to w hat 
extent South Vietnamese hamlets and villages were receptive to pacification or 
village development during the 1968-1972 period, especially w ith regard to the 
flagship Village Self Development Program.
6.3 VILLAGE AND HAMLET RECEPTIVITY TO THE CORDS COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH
The government and its American ally devoted insufficient resources to village 
security and development, even in the first priority areas of South Vietnam. But 
perhaps a more im portant issue to future research is w hether the village program s 
they did deliver were efficacious in the average ham let of South Vietnam.
CORDS planners seem to have believed that, where program s failed, internal 
factors were most to blame, a startling fact considering the existence of the NLF. A 
typical critique cited 'personality conflicts between advisors and counterparts.. . 
professional incompetence, corruption, cumbersome bureaucracy, political
instability and infighting, and the Viet Cong/26
The quality of program s and personnel was indeed vital, but the nature of a
given community appears to have been more im portant than South Vietnamese
or US inputs. If a local population was either fervently anti-communist or for
some reason already receptive to government ministrations, then village
development projects had a chance of succeeding. If villagers were resistant for 
26 Report on VSDP for Phong Dinh Province, 1969, MACCORDS, 101567.
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any reason, projects were likely to fail, even if they were planned and carried out 
competently.
A joint US/Vietnam ese CORDS evaluation of 1968 illustrates this concept. 
The evaluators used hamlet citizens' committees set up by RD Cadres as a proxy 
for public cooperation and support of the program. If those committees continued 
to function after the teams departed, RD programs had a chance of sustaining 
themselves, and the evaluators considered the population to have been at least 
somewhat supportive of the cadres' goals.
This enquiry confirmed that preexisting village attitudes and the
disposition of the local NLF organizations were more im portant variables than
the quality of governm ent inputs in the establishment of citizens' developm ent
and security organizations. The study suggested the type of hamlets most and least
likely to cooperate in the security and development effort and their relation to RD
Cadre teams of varying quality. 1) A competent, well led RD Cadre team and
fervently anti-communist populace (for instance Catholic, Hoa Hao, or Cao Dai,
religious groups to whom  communism was anathema) was found likely to lead to
the successful establishment of citizens' groups. 2) Likewise, an effective RD
team was likely to succeed by this criterion in a hamlet located near a district or
province capital w ith large security forces nearby, so long as hamlet leadership was
reasonably effective. 3) However, a hamlet with a good government and strongly
anti-communist populace was not a guarantee of success. A poorly led RD group
usually w ould be unable to form citizens' groups even in this environment.
Some program s m ight succeed w ith inferior inputs, but program s like the VSDP,
which depended on intensive education and organization efforts, stood little hope
without good Cadre leadership, the rarest commodity internal to the program . 4)
The following finding was the bleakest yet from the government's perspective.
Even Revolutionary Development Cadre teams of good quality were likely to fail,
not only in anti-governm ent hamlets, but in politically ambivalent ones as well,
247
which described most hamlets in South Vietnam.27
One consultancy study conducted after the demise of CORDS interpreted the 
efforts of RD teams differently. This report concluded that the most im portant 
variable in the success or failure of RD Cadres efforts was not their own quality, 
but the quality of the provincial and district governments under which they 
worked.28 Indeed, this study has presented a good deal of evidence to show that 
province and district officials smothered all kinds of village activities. In either 
case, the performance of even the better RD Cadre teams appears to have 
depended in large part on external factors over which they had no control.
Hence, the outlook for the VSDP program was grim; the vast majority of 
South Vietnamese hamlets were populated w ith Buddhists w ho tended to be 
more ambivalent about communism than Catholics, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai; 
province and district governments generally resisted decentralizing power to 
villages; and studies of South Vietnamese RD teams reveal a dearth of good 
personnel and even fewer good leaders. Where cadre teams or village 
governments implemented successful community developm ent projects, they 
may have been preaching to the converted rather than fulfilling the vital aspect of 
their mission: winning influence and loyalty for the governm ent in contested 
hamlets.
One example of a program  that failed primarily because villagers proved 
unreceptive was the 'People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) program . Local officials 
or visiting RD Cadres set up PSDFs. Self defense committees were to carry on the 
task of perpetuating the militias after government personnel had departed. Many 
critics have claimed that the self defense forces did not stand up to Viet Cong units
27 'Revolutionary Development Peoples' Groups in IICTZ/ Evaluation Report, 6 July 1968, 
MACCORDS, 101567.
28 The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam, Report to the Pentagon, submitted by The 
Institute for Defense Analyses, Chester Cooper Et al., Vol. 2,171-2, Microfiche Collection, AD-763 
953, RG 472, Archives II.
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and that the program  was therefore a failure.29 But the militias were, in the words 
of William Colby, 'basically a political device and not para-military.'3° The key 
question then is w hether villagers embraced the concept, whether the program  
invited the willing participation of villagers who wanted to protect their rights 
and property against the NLF, and strong evidence exists suggesting that few did.
In late 1969, research showed that the majority of South Vietnamese did not view 
the Peoples' Self Defense Forces as a popular movement -n o t in Saigon where the 
governm ent's constituents were concentrated, and especially not in rural South 
Vietnam, where the struggle for political influence was fiercest.31 The NLF 
infiltrated the militias w ith impunity. One American adviser informed Saigon 
that the South Vietnamese Province Chief in Phu Yen would not let the PSDF 
within rifle range of him .32 PSDF participants often led the NLF against their own 
members.33 A CORDS report noted that partly because of fear of Viet Cong 
retribution, 'there  is a distinct consensus among both GVN officials and U.S. 
advisors that a significantly large segment of the rural and urban population . . . 
does not w ant weapons. In all provinces there are rural New Life hamlets where a 
majority of the population would prefer that no active combat cells be formed, let 
alone arm ed.' There were even cases of villagers giving the weapons back in order 
to avoid antagonizing the Vietcong.34 Thus, the PSDF can be said to have failed 
not only militarily, b u t politically, and these findings have significant implications
29 See Province Monthly Report for Vinh Binh, January 1969, Paul E. Suplizio, LTC PSA. See also 
Province Monthly Report for Phuoc Thuy, December 1971, Frank C Gardner LTC, for Clifford C. Nunn, 
Jr. PSA, CMH.
30 See Memorandum from W.E. Colby, DEPCORDS/MACV, to ACofS, CORDS, 11 December 1970, 
MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 7.
31 Pacification Studies Group Report, Attitudes of People in Saigon Towards PSDF, 16 December 1969, 
MACCORDS 101723.
32 Province Monthly Report for Phu Yen, April 1970, James Engle, PSA, CMH.
33 See Province Monthly Report for An Xuyen, December 1971, Franklin F. Kelly FSR-3, Acting PSA, 
CMH. See also Province Monthly Report for Thua Thien, December 1970, William R. Blakely, Jr 
LTC, Acting PSA, CMH.
34 Evaluation Report, Revolutionary Development Peoples' Groups in IICTZ, 6 July 1968, 
MACCORDS, 101567. See also Evaluation Report, Revolutionary Development People's Groups in II 
CTZ, 6 July 1968, MACCORDS, 101567.
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for the village development approach preferred by CORDS.
Security issues are also critical to a hands-on approach such as community 
development. Previous chapters demonstrated that highly divisible agricultural 
technology and physical infrastructure could cross military and political frontiers 
w ith relative ease. Community development, however, and the VSDP in 
particular, required the presence of development or adm inistrative personnel, and 
often provided physical targets in the villages. Earlier in the war, as previous 
chapters explained, many policy makers had argued that developm ent would 
have to wait for the post war period. Indeed, before 1968, development had 
proved largely impracticable. And even in the post-1968 period, only a modicum 
of physical security existed.
Given that modicum of security, however, there is m uch evidence that a 
surprising degree of economic development can be achieved. Richard Haynes, an 
American staff economist in Saigon, noted in 1971, 'economic growth has taken 
place in the Republic of Vietnam largely without complete security / In the 
Mekong delta the economy grew dramatically after 1968. Conventional wisdom 
had it that increased security paved the way for this growth. Haynes, however, 
suggested that economic improvement also stimulated the need for adequate 
s e c u r it y .35 In other words, economic growth and security were symbiotic. Once 
agricultural m arketed surpluses began to increase, political pressure on the Saigon 
government to keep markets open increased as well.
In the realm of community development and security, an extensive study 
commissioned by the U.S. command indicated, as had several before it, that the 
RD Cadres could achieve some success in an insecure environm ent so long as the 
population was receptive. More striking, it found that the effect of economic 
strength on political influence, as measured by the Hamlet Evaluation system, was
strongest in areas of lower security. That is, in areas of relatively low security, 'the
35 Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Economic Growth and Security, 18 August 1971, Richard W. 
Haynes, Agricultural & Forestry Officer, MACV Directorate for Economic Affairs, Box 15.
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payoff of economic strength in terms of popular behavior was largely independent 
of s e c u r it y /3 6  Areas already experiencing high levels of security had probably 
already seen some economic gain as a result of markets reopening, which might 
explain the dim inishing political returns for economic improvements. But it 
points to the possibility that security-minded pacification planners underestim ated 
the positive effects of successful economic development, and calls into some 
question the almost universal assum ption that the local population w ould not 
cooperate with the Saigon government until their security could be all but 
assured. A note of caution is in order here. As the report pointed out, 'ham lets 
with really low security do not even get into the data, so the results should not be 
interpreted as a m andate to improve the economy of all hamlets w ithout any 
regard to enemy threat or safety of the RD cadre team given the job/37
6.4 THE VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: AN ATTEMPT TO WIN 
POLITICAL LOYALTY THROUGH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The Village Self Development Program was initiated by CORDS in June 1969 and 
was implemented by Saigon's M inistry of Rural Development through local 
Vietnamese governments. The program  was an effort to overcome the two major 
flaws of most previous village development efforts in South Vietnam, the lack of 
local participation and inappropriate project choices. In theory, each village under 
the self development program  received a checkbook drawing from a set budget. 
Villagers were to form cooperative unions, officially designated People's Common 
Activity Groups (and inevitably called PCAGs), which, by popular vote, would 
choose, implement, and m aintain small scale development projects using these
budgets. The governm ent funded entire projects in the VSDP's first year, but in
36 Final Report, vol. 1, Analysis of Vietnamization: Summary and Evaluation, November 1973, 
Bendix Corporation, Sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Vietnam 
Collection, Jack Taylor Donation, Box 4, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 
Washington, DC. 1 ,1-5, IV, 4.
37 Ibid.
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1970 required participants to donate approximately half the value of a project in 
labor, commodities, or cash while the government furnished the rest through 
grants. This sequence was calculated to elicit immediate participation and 
gradually create proprietary feelings among villagers toward their public and 
private enterprises. By 1972, Saigon planned to fund its half of all projects through 
local credit organizations. Projects varied by region, but the most commonly 
chosen were livestock cooperatives, wells, roads, bridges, school rooms, m edical 
facilities, electrical generators, small rice mills, and cooperatives for fertilizers, 
pesticides, farm equipm ent, and rice milling.38
In keeping w ith the CORDS approach to village development, Am erican 
planners designed the VSDP primarily with political goals in mind. O ne training 
manual w ent so far as to suggest that the economic results were a 'secondary 
consideration' to political results.39 A CORDS program description defined its 
goals as improving 'th e  security, economic, social and political standards of the 
country. . . .  to place greater administrative authority in the hands of village 
governm ents/ The democratic processes contained in the program  w ere m eant to 
involve people w ith their village authorities. Though conceived by Americans, 
the program  was to be 'essentially Vietnamese/ and U.S. participation 'peripheral 
and limited at all levels/ CORDS officials also hoped the program  w ould help 
lead to greater village economic self sufficiency.40
From the VSDP's inception, leadership training began to shift focus from 
the RD Cadres to village officials.41 Theoretically, as village governm ents
38 Situation Report, Village Self Development, Sector Project Guidance FY 71-74, submitted to 
USAID/CORDS, June 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 7, File 1601-09A, Record Group 472, 
Archives II. See also Province Report for Hau Nghia, August 1969, LTC Carl F. Bernard, CMH.
39 Training Seminar Outline—Village Self Development, 1969, RG 472, Headquarters, Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, 
Directorate of Community Development, Box 11, File 1602-09, National Archives II, College Park, 
Maryland, USA (Hereafter CORDS/DCD with Box and File numbers).
40 Sector/Project Guidance FY 71-74, CORDS/USAID Vietnam, June 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, 
Box 7, File 1601-09A, Archives II.
41 Talking Points for President Nguyen Van Thieu for his visit to the National Training Center, Vung 
Tau, 1969, CORDS/DCD, Box 11, File 1602-09.
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improved, the cadres were gradually w ithdraw n and development, including the 
VSDP, was increasingly administered by local personnel. Indeed, the South 
Vietnamese governm ent began training village and ham let adm inistrators at 
Vung Tau, the training center that turned out RD Cadres. Planners hypothesized 
that cooperative, and profitable projects would not only empower village 
governments, but promote people's participation in community affairs, habituate 
them to democratic processes, and collaterally increase the popularity of the 
Saigon g o v ern m en ts
The VSDP's economic goals were rather less clearly stated than its political 
goals. Nevertheless, it was economic gain that was m eant to attract villagers to 
participate. Projects focusing on private goods would enrich those villagers who 
took part, thus attracting enough interest to increase the wealth of the village as a 
whole. Projects for public goods w ould increase village amenities and perhaps 
benefit overall economic activity, and again lifting the village as a whole.43 Some 
CORDS documents mention village self sufficiency as a VSDP goal, bu t they never 
define the concept, which is not surprising given the paucity of professional 
economists on staff, and in any case would appear to conflict with a stronger 
national economy.44 CORDS recalibrated the program 's goals slightly for 1970, its 
second year, and made explicit the aim of reaching beyond 'a  few special interest 
groups/ The program  was to be applied 'w ithout discrimination between rich or 
poor in order that both people w ho have property and people who can furnish 
labor' could participate for the common good of their communities.45
 While the political and economic results of any program  w ere closely
42 Village Self Development, Situation Report, Sector Project Guidance FY 71-74, submitted to 
USAID/CORDS, June 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 7, File 1601-09A.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. Since CORDS never defines self sufficiency, and since the Americans hoped to interest 
peasants in improved markets generally, it is hard to see self sufficiency as a viable goal. One is 
tempted to conclude that the lack of economic expertise in CORDS ranks noted earlier in this chapter 
was at work here.
45 1970 Pacification and Development Plan, Annex XI, Village Self Development Program, attached 
to Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Congressional Proposal for Vietnam Local Programs, 10 
February 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 8, Fine 1601-10A.
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related, focusing especially on political goals may not have been entirely misplaced 
in the context of village and hamlet projects, because the political climate of a 
village appears to have been a vital determinant of success or failure in small scale 
rural development. However, this was a risky approach. Unlike USAID, CORDS 
appears to have undervalued economic results. In the wake of so m any failed 
program s over two decades, another economic failure could only deepen village 
cynicism tow ard the Saigon government.
6.4 (i) Performance of the Village Self Development Program
The VSDP generated high hopes among CORDS personnel. In late 1969 one 
senior U.S. adviser saw potential salvation for Kien Hoa, a hotly contested delta 
province, pronouncing it 'the  most satisfactory and worthwhile success story ' of 
his tenure. 'I t has all the elements required to mold the villages into cohesive 
social entities which will form the basic structure of a real nation/ He cited one 
district in which 242 projects had been completed and estimated that 40% of the 
province's population had benefited from the program, 20% substantially.46
In contrast to most village programs ushered in by Saigon, the VSDP 
captured the interest of a lot of villagers. One Vietnamese survey team reported a 
phenom enon that commonly appears in VSDP evaluations. Those villagers who 
did understand the Village Self Development Program were very interested in it, 
but where education efforts were poor, villagers showed little interest.47 In Kien 
Hoa province, the hom e of a potent National Liberation Front organization, VSDP 
appeared to be making significant inroads after a difficult start. 'The early
46 Province Monthly Report for Kien Hoa, October 1969, A.L. Kotzbeue, CMH.
47 Rural Survey Team Report, Cho Lach and Binh Minh districts, Vinh Long province, 4 November 
1969, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 9. See also Pacification Research Survey, Translation of a survey 
of Than Hung village, Kien Giang province, Vietnamese Evaluation Branch, 21 May 1970, 
MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 10, File 1602-01. Finally, see Pacification Studies Group Confidential 
Report, Village Self Development Program, Binh Duong, 8 October 1969, MACCORDS PP&P, 1969, 
File 1601-10A.
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skepticism w ith which many of the villagers greeted this program  has turned to 
enthusiastic acceptance/ The program  was 'surging forward' under sincere if 
inexperienced province and district governments. Wells, irrigation pum ps, 
school rooms and agricultural improvement projects were appearing even in the 
most contested districts, and local organization seemed to be playing a vital role.48 
Thus, early evaluations suggested that the VSDP showed a good deal of promise, 
and many discrete projects succeeded admirably. Reports by the dozen cite 
numbers of Village Self Development Projects completed, piasters spent, and 
estimated population benefiting49 But critical problems lurked beneath those 
simple statistics.
A particularly convincing illustration of the program 's overall failure came 
from An Giang, the most prosperous, peaceful, politically unified province in 
South Vietnam. In February 1970, a South Vietnamese survey team visited the six 
hamlets of My Hoa Hung, a physically secure, relatively wealthy, Hao Hao village 
of about 14,000 people. Statistically, village officials and RD Cadre leaders reported 
that 100% of My Hoa Hung VSDP projects had been completed for 1969. The 
survey team found, however, that village and hamlet governments had 
mishandled the program  and did not cooperate with RD Cadres. Villagers were 
unimpressed, and only a small minority had  benefited economically. Moreover, 
the program  had not increased identification w ith the national government.
Even those villagers who liked the program , had benefited from it, and recognized 
it as evidence that the central governm ent was interested in village development, 
did not alter their basic enmity toward Saigon. The report sum m ed up, 'th is 
program is very good on theory, but it was useless for practical purposes.'50
48 Province Monthly Report for Kien Hoa, June 1969, A.L. Kotzbeue, PSA, CMH.
49 Province Monthly Report for Kien Hoa, October 1969, A.L. Kotzbeue, CMH. See also Province 
Monthly Report for Binh Dinh, March 1970, Billy Mendheim, Col., PSA, CMH. And Province 
Monthly Report for Ba Xuyen, Dec. 1969, John D. Evans, JR. FSR3 PSA, CMH.
50 Report, Political Capacity of R.D. Cadres in My Hoa Hung Village of Chu Thanh District, An 
Giang Province, 18 February 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 7.
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The South Vietnamese context served up a variety of problem s that neither 
officials nor villagers could overcome. Such problems were most often perceived 
by rural survey teams composed partly or entirely of Vietnamese evaluators, and 
not all American advisers were impressed by the numbers. One U.S. adviser in 
Central Vietnam observed that the people seemed to like the program , but that it
was 'retarded  by administrative and procedural problem s/51 A delta adviser
reported that villagers seemed willing to participate, but that unnecessary red tape 
inhibited them  and unrealistic rules prevented them from taking part.5? Another 
adviser in Central Vietnam said that if lack of commodities and education 
continued in Binh Dinh province and bureaucratic requirements were not 
reduced, the VSDP w ould 'continue to be a miserable failure/55 By 1971, village 
officials and group members were doing a better job w ith the self development 
program  in Binh Dinh, but by then inflation was crippling the program .5*
The VSDP may have made some progress toward delegating more authority 
to some village administrations, but district and province authorities were often 
consum ed w ith m ilitary affairs or simply uninterested in village development. 
Alternatively, they sometimes smothered village administrations in an effort to 
defend their bureaucratic turf. In one Delta province, such attributes rendered all
developm ent efforts 'im mobilized or in a vacuum /55 Moreover, province and
district governments jealously guarded their power over village budgets and 
decision making, thw arting one of the major goals of the program. Often district 
governments chose projects themselves. And many, if not most, took a cut of 
VSDP money before it reached the villages. One U.S. adviser p u t the usual district
51 Kanh Hoa Province Overview, February 1970, Pacification Files 1968-1972 [Closed Files], CMH.
52 Province Monthly Report for Ba Xuyen, August 1969, John D. Evans, Jr., FSR3, CMH.
53 Province Monthly Report for Binh Dinh, August 1969, Clayton B. Gompf, Col., CMH.
54 Province Monthly Report for Binh Dinh, April 1971, Billy Mendheim, Col., CMH.
55 Province Monthly Report for Vinh Binh, May 1970, R.W. Ellison, CMH.
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cut at 10% off the top of the program.^ In other areas the cuts taken by various 
local governments, from province dow n to village, w ere far larger.57 Once the 
money got past district officials, it often ran afoul of village administrations. 
Weakened by province and district meddling, saddled w ith a baffling array of red 
tape, and inadequately trained for a radically new role, most village governments
failed to administer the Village Self Development Program  successfully.58
These perversions of the program  often m eant that its benefits did not reach 
the poorer villagers. A large percentage of village governments did not delegate 
power to the people's groups that were supposed to choose and run projects. One 
American adviser working in the Mekong delta noted at the 1972 cease fire that, 
'the people do not select projects, the village or district chief [chooses them]/59 A 
South Vietnamese rural survey team in the Mekong province of Vinh Long 
reported that 'just a small num ber of people have really participated in the VSDP, 
the others have not benefited by the program  because they have not been friends 
of the local governm ent/^ Still another report noted that, possibly because of 
officials and their cronies capturing the benefits of the VSDP, 'the program  was 
not very successful in reaching and involving poor fam ilies/61
In Bac Lieu province, near Saigon, village officials in Long Dien ran VSDP 
projects themselves, choosing to use government funds for pig and fish breeding
and an expansion of the market and school. A Vietnamese research team found
56 Province Senior Adviser Completion of Tour Report, 12 February 1972, Vinh Binh province, 
Advisory Team 72 HQ, LTC Robert C. Hallmark, Pacification Files IV Corps, 1968-1972 (closed 
files), United States Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC. (Hereafter CMH).
57 Village Self Development Program, Binh Duong Province, 8 October 1969, Pacification Studies 
Group, submitted by Mr. Phun Thanh Hai, and Mr. Stevenson Mcllvaine, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, 
Box 8, File 1603-01.
58 Talking Points for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker for his testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, 23 April 1970, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 6, File 1601-09A.
59 Province Senior Adviser Completion of Tour Report, 12 February 1972, Vinh Binh province, 
Advisory Team 72 HQ, LTC Robert C. Hallmark, Pacification Files IV Corps, 1968-1972 (closed 
files), CMH.
60 Local Survey Detachment Report, Vinh Long Province, 26 March 1970, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, 
Box 9 File 1602-01.
61 Problems as Posed by the Vinh Long Report on VSD for 1969, Pacification Files (closed files), Vinh 
Long Province, CMH.
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that the villagers had hoped for wells and medical facilities. While perhaps 
grateful for the things they did get, villagers complained to researchers that the 
breeding projects benefited very few people. The research team concluded that 
province and district officials had not adequately educated the village and hamlet 
administrations about the aims of the self development scheme. The Long Dien 
village governm ent in turn was unable to explain the program to its people.
Thus, according to the researchers, the people of Long Dien did not know that this 
self developm ent scheme was m eant to solicit their choice or participation .62 
Early misapprehensions about the program sometimes led to farcical 
results. In urban Phu Cuong village, whose government wrongly believed the 
program  to encompass only livestock cooperatives, participants complained to a 
research team that raising pigs in the city simply was not working out.63 Overall, 
villager participation in the program  was poor enough that ambassador Ellsworth 
Bunker carried talking points to W ashington for a 1970 Congressional hearing 
which read in part, 'm any of the people's common activity groups, formed to 
implement and m aintain projects, were mere paper formalities and not new 
political units of some vitality.'^
Because local officials tended to coopt the resources for self development, 
the spreading economic benefits envisioned by CORDS and the Ministry for Rural 
Development failed to materialize from many projects. A survey team in one 
Mekong village reckoned that only about 5% of the nearly 10,000 inhabitants 
enjoyed the benefit of the program, and most of those beneficiaries were military
62 Summary Report, Subject: To survey the people's knowledge of the Long Dien Village [Self] 
Development Program (Bac Lieu), undated, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 9, File 1602-01.
63 Village Self Development Program, Binh Duong Province, 8 October 1969, Pacification Studies 
Group, submitted by Mr. Phun Thanh Hai, and Mr. Stevenson Mcllvaine, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, 
Box 8, File 1603-01. Again, in Vietnam a village is merely a geographical designation that contains 
several settlements or hamlets. Thus, some villages, on the outskirts of fast growing cities or large 
towns, took on an urban character but maintained their political designation as a village.
64 Talking Points for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker for his testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, 23 April 1970, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 6, File 1601-09A.
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families, civil servants, village and hamlet officials, and their relatives.65
Some hard pressed South Vietnamese officials m ade progress in educating 
village leaders and citizens in the Village Self Development Program , and as the 
evidence demonstrates, a great many villagers liked the idea. But even as these 
improvements accumulated, problems associated w ith the w ar or, more often, 
w ith corrupt or inefficient elements of the Saigon governm ent, nullified gains. 
Sometimes scarcity of materials at the village level thw arted developm ent 
projects. In the delta province of Chong Thien, according to a U.S. adviser, the 
program  was coopted by vested interests during its inaugural year. Then, in its 
second year, when the populace was just beginning understand the VSDP and, 
more important, to accept and participate in it, the governm ent cut off all 
deliveries of construction materials and other commodities.66
Such gaffes were a common problem.67 One former District Senior Adviser 
remembers his tour of duty as months of telling people there was no more steel 
reinforcing bar or concrete to be had.6® Another Delta adviser complained in 
October 1970 that a 200 ton shortage of rebar in his province w as defeating all that 
the program  promised.
Some 334 bridges are included in the 842 VSDP projects for 1970.
These bridges reflect the aspirations of the people, and were selected 
as projects after discussions and meetings at the village level. We 
now understand that rebar will not be available to complete these 
bridges as no further rebar is scheduled for delivery in 1970. . . .The 
selection of VSDP projects w as m ade by  v illagers, fo llow ing 
guidelines furn ished  by GVN. No restric tions on rebar, or 
indications that rebar w ould not be available w ere included in the 
directions for project selection and approval.6*
65 Self Development Program at Tien Thuy village, Ham Long district, Kien Hoa province, Local 
Survey Detachment Report,11-18 February 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 7.
66 Province Monthly Report for Chong Thien, October 1970, Thomas J. Levasseur, Jr. LTC PSA, CMH.
67 See also Province Monthly Reports for An Giang, July 1970, author unknown, and for Gia Dinh, July 
1970, Roy W. Burley, COL, PSA, CMH.
68 Dan Strasser, former District Senior Adviser, Pacification Evaluator, Cease fire Observer, 1970- 
1973, Central Vietnam, interview with the author, 2 August 1994, Washington, DC.
69 Province Monthly Report for October 1970, Vinh Long Province, John H. Clary FSR-5 Acting PSA, 
CMH.
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Over-ambitiousness on the part of Saigon planners, poor technical 
support, and lagging education efforts in the villages resulted in a significant 
num ber of inappropriate projects. The glaring example of this is animal 
husbandry. M inistry and CORDS officials believed that profit generating projects 
would have the m ost immediate and dramatic political effect in the villages.
Local livestock, like local rice varieties, tended to be hearty but not prolific and 
thus were generally raised for subsistence rather than profit. By importing more 
productive varieties of swine and poultry, development officials hoped villagers 
could turn a profit. In its first year, the Village Self Development Program 
therefore placed heavy emphasis on livestock program s in the belief that projects 
generating quick profits w ould also generate quick political gain. But problem s 
plagued animal husbandry projects before and during the VSDP.
Villagers in Hoa Loa village began raising foreign chicks with prom ises of 
prolific growth and breeding in comparison to local breeds. The extra w ork and 
expense combined w ith high mortality rates, however, made the villagers 'less 
than enthusiastic7 about the whole effort, according to evaluators. The im ported 
chickens were not well suited to local conditions and 'required total 
m aintenance/ Villagers complained that foreign chickens would not eat rice, as 
local ones did. They required expensive foreign feed, medicine in their drinking 
water, and w arm ing lights, but still they died. One villager told evaluators that 'if 
foreign chickens were as easy to raise as domestic ones, every family in Hoa Long 
village would raise at least ten/™
Swine-raising fared equally poorly. Rural surveys revealed w idespread 
problems and dissatisfaction with imported livestock under the VSDP program .
In one delta village, people complained to evaluators of a shortage of sties, the
70 'Chick Raising in Hoa Long village/ Phuc Tuy province, RTT Field Survey Report, 30 December 
1968, DEPCORDS Files, folder: Agriculture 1969-1970, CMH.
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high price of swine feed, and mortality among livestocks U pland villagers 
reported that a quarter of their swine had died within the first y e a r s  In some 
villages people lost all but a few animals.75 Another survey stated bluntly that 
"pig breeding projects don 't bring any benefit to the people.'74
A province adviser took for granted the marginal effectiveness of such 
inappropriate projects when he reported that although Village Self Development 
statistics in his area were impressive, "it must be noted . . . that 80% of these are 
animal raising projects and therefore of doubtful lasting quality.'75 Higher officials 
were aware of these problems. In 1970, CORDS director William Colby was aghast 
to find that a recent visit of a Ministry of Agriculture livestock vaccination 
training team to Central Vietnam was the first in three years. "If this is any 
indication of the effectiveness of this operation,' he wrote, it illustrates some of 
"the difficulties w ith VSD animal projects.'76 Some enterprising or lucky people 
m ade their livestock projects work, but, as village officials and people's groups 
began to understand their range of choices better, they began to move away from
such projects and focus on more appropriate efforts.77 In short, CORDS perhaps
did not sufficiently heed lessons from previous imported livestock projects in 
which inadequate credit, technical support, training, and disease control resulted 
in high mortality rates.
Even w hen chosen projects were appropriate, Saigon's complicated 
bureaucratic requirements often obstructed their progress. Donald Colin, a
71 'Self Development Program at Tien Thuy village, Ham Long district, Kien Hoa province/ Local 
Survey Detachment Report, 11-18 February 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 7.
72 'Self Development Program and Political Organization in Four Villages of Phuoc Tuy/ Local 
Survey Detachment Report, 20 March 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 7, File 1602-01.
73 'Research of the VSDP/ Local Survey Detachment Report, Phuong Dinh province, MACCORDS 
PP&P 1970, Box 8, files 1602-01.
74 'Village Self Development in Long Dien Village, Bac Lieu Province/ Local Survey Detachment 
Report, undated, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 9, File 1602-01.
75 Province Monthly Report for Phuoc Long, October 1970, Robert T. Haydon, LTC, PSA, CMH.
76 Memo from William Colby to Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS, 6 May 1970, DEPCORDS Files, 
folder: Agriculture: 1969-70, CMH.
77 Province Monthly Report for Chuong Thien, Norman L. Olson, FSR-4, Acting PSA, CMH.
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Foreign Survive Officer and an experienced U.S. adviser in the Mekong delta, 
noted that the self development program , complicated to begin with, was even 
more difficult to adm inister because planners in Saigon were constantly tinkering 
with it. Moreover, 'm istakes often ended in jail terms. Therefore, village officials 
have largely avoided risk by ignoring the VSD program / Colin pointed out that 
an open and formal vote among people's groups did not work well in a culture 
which generally shunned open social confrontation.
Village officials m ore often seem to operate  th rough  inform al 
caucuses and polls while sipping tea or beer w ith village residents.
W hen a consensus develops, then a m eeting can be held w ith  a 
m inim um  risk of open disagreem ent. The PCAG is an adm irable 
concept for small, rural Verm ont villages, but it has always been 
viewed w ith suspicion in small, rural Vinh Binh villages.
Colin also believed that by simply handing village officials a budget and
telling them to choose projects, the VSDP was doing its citizens a disservice.
Villagers, he argued, knew w hat they wanted and needed in broad terms, such as
'education/ 'livestock/ or 'clean w ater/ but did not have the technical knowledge
to draw  up a detailed project. Colin suggested that development officials survey
each village and draw  up project plans from which villagers could choose. As the
VSDP was practiced, villagers had to 'rush  into projects to spend money with only
the vaguest notion of w hat will be accom plished/7^
Colin's suggestions never became policy. And while village governments
improved in the early 1970s, they never got out from under powerful provincial
and district governments to gain the autonomy CORDS planners had envisioned.
Both South Vietnamese and American evaluations of the VSDP reveal that
bureaucratic turf battles, corruption, and insufficient education were widespread.
The Village Self Developm ent program  m ight have had a positive
economic and political effect in a different environment. Many villagers showed 
78 Deputy Senior Province Adviser, Completion of Tour Report, 12 February 1972, Vinh Binh province, 
Advisory Team 72 HQ, FSO-4 Donald I. Colin, Pacification Files IV Corps, 1968-1972 (closed files), 
CMH.
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a willingness to participate, in contrast to almost all other hands-on program s.
The VSDP, however, failed to spread prosperity or win political influence among 
villagers on a scale necessary to declare it a success, and this was as m uch the effect 
of political and social conditions in South Vietnam's villages as of the program 's 
deficiencies.
Even successful rural programs were no guarantee of political gains for the 
government. We have seen evidence of this from both the NLF and governm ent 
land reform program s. And a Vietnamese evaluation of Rural Developm ent 
Cadres in An Giang province found that although the cadres themselves were 
popular among villagers, and that they had been partly responsible for introducing 
the popular m odem  rice program, none of this popularity had accrued to the 
national governm ent.79
6.4 (ii) Rural Receptivity and Regional Variations in VSDP Performance
As Section One suggested, local government and citizen receptivity, w hile not
sufficient alone, was integral to the outcome of the VSDP, and indeed to the
community developm ent approach as a whole. A Vietnamese survey of four
villages in Phuc Tuy province, just north of Saigon, illustrates this point. In the
program 's first year in Phuoc Tinh village, people's groups had chosen and begun
work on seven pig raising projects, one auditorium , and one fish sauce factory
using a VN$300,000 budget. This represented one project for each of the village's
nine hamlets. The hamlet people had evinced receptivity to the program  by
actively choosing the projects with the aid, but not the interference, of the village
chief, Ngo Minh Khang. Khang reported that he had received a good deal of
assistance, but again no interference, from higher officials at the district and
province level. The three other villages in the study reported similar successes.
79 Report, Political Capacity of R.D. Cadres in My Hoa Hung Village of Chu Thanh District, An 
Giang Province, 18 February 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 7.
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Villagers were especially pleased w ith the economic effects of road building carried 
out with program  funds, and the VSDP appears to have pleased m any of the area's 
inhabitants, although it is difficult to know how the popularity of this project 
might have affected their attitudes toward the Saigon governm ents
The performance of the assorted projects, however, varied widely in 
different hamlets w ithin Phuoc Tinh village. Commenting on this report, Martin 
Christie, the senior American adviser for Phuoc Tuy province concluded that 
hamlets made up of Catholic refugees from North Vietnam tended to rim 
successful self development projects, while those w ith Buddhist South 
Vietnamese populations tended to fail. In one Buddhist hamlet, Christie wrote, 
'grievances expressed by the respondents from Phuoc Huong were primarily of 
their own making. They look at every offer by GVN w ith suspicion, distrust their 
neighbors and therefore find it difficult to form groups that qualify for VSD funds. 
Principally they are open to hand-outs and prefer not to invest their own money 
[even though they are comparatively affluent].'si
Another V ietnam ese/Am erican research team found that VSDP tended to 
work well in villages that had either a sense of community or an 'effective, 
responsive local government.' Since many villages had been dislocated by the war 
and many more had poor governments, this presented a paradox. The villages 
that needed the program  most were least likely to profit from it. 'The critical 
problem is to make the sick healthy, not the healthy health ier/ Their report did 
see hope, but it would require commodities that were in short supply in South 
Vietnam in the early 1970s; 'Better information, better training, and time are the 
only cures available.'82
80 Self Development Program and Political Organization in Four Villages of Phuoc Tuy, Local Survey 
Detachment Report, 20 March 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 7, File 1602-01.
81 Ibid.
82 Village Self Development Program, Binh Duong Province, 8 October 1969, Pacification Studies 
Group, submitted by Mr. Phun Thanh Hai, and Mr. Stevenson Mcllvaine, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, 
Box 8, File 1603-01.
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These surveys indicate that the self development scheme could indeed 
succeed in certain conditions, but those conditions did not often exist in South 
Vietnam. The following subsection will examine the major productive regions of 
the country to determine whether self development fared differently in one or the 
other.
As noted in previous chapters, there were substantial climatic and 
socioeconomic differences between the M ekong/Saigon region and Central 
Vietnam. Because cooperative economic practices were more prevalent in Central 
Vietnam, one m ight expect the Village Self Development Program, which 
required cooperative economic unions, to fare better there. The docum entary 
evidence, however, reveals little difference in the performance of the VSDP 
between the regions, w ith the notable exception of the Central Vietnamese 
provinces that had been the site of especially heavy fighting.
Some reports from Central Vietnam boast statistical achievements in the 
program , just as they do in the M ekong/Saigon region.^ Others lament the lack 
of political and economic impact of the program. One evaluation report for 
Quang Nam noted that there was a lack of village leadership throughout the 
province in 1970. Combined with the cruel effects of an especially fierce guerrilla 
w ar and a great deal of conventional combat as well, this crumbling of village 
administrations had rendered all government programs, including VSDP, nearly 
useless. The enem y's forces had been decimated, but 'th e  GVN has m ade no 
progress whatever in solving underlying political and socioeconomic problem s/ 
The report ended on a what m ust have seemed a grim note, bu t one that later 
proved to have been optimistic. 'I t  is our opinion that in a province such as 
Quang Nam there will be no fundamental shift in allegiance to the GVN until the
83 For claims of success, see Province Monthly Report for September '70, Thua Thien Province, Robert 
H. Wenzel, PSA. See also Province Monthly Report for Dec. 1971, Thua Thien Province, Donald J. 
Zurbriggen, LTC, DPSA. Province Monthly Report for August 1969, Quang Nam Province, Frank W. 
Dixon LTC, acting PSA, who claimed that the VSDP was progressing at "high levels of success/ All 
references for CMH.
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war has ended.'84
Binh Dinh, another province in the Central Vietnam, saw far less 
conventional warfare but like Quang Nam was an NLF stronghold. There, 
according the the senior American adviser, the VSDP program  appeared to falter 
for reasons more familiar to evaluators in the far South: local governm ents failed 
to educate villagers, insisted on massive red tape requirements, and failed to 
deliver necessary commodities. The Adviser concluded that people were 
disinclined to participate for such bureaucratic reasons.85 He did not cite the 
influence or popularity of the NLF in this region, which may be a reflection of the 
American habit of underestim ating these vital factors.
The documentary evidence is sufficient to conclude that the VSDP fared no 
better in Central Vietnam than in the M ekong/Saigon region. It had the same 
bureaucratic problems and found villagers no more receptive on the whole. If 
anything, because of its greater exposure to combat and more potent NLF presence, 
Central Vietnam was a more hostile environm ent for the comm unity approach to 
development despite its tighter village structures.
Clearly, the VSDP found a largely hostile environm ent in both major 
agricultural regions and failed to achieve its goals. The vast majority of the 
South's rural population was Buddhist rather than the more politically cohesive 
and anticommunist communities of Catholics, Hoa Hao, or Cao Dai. Concerted 
but dubious efforts to revitalize village governments through W estern style 
democratic elections (examined briefly in Chapter Two) were just getting 
underway during the early days of the village development program , hence 
village politics were highly unsettled. Moreover, powerful district and province 
governments, a recent administrative invention, were too often 'gu ilty  of
^Special Evaluation, VSSG Study on Quang Nam Province, March 1970, Quang Nam Province 
Monthly Reports File, CMH.
85 Province Monthly Report for August 1969, Binh Dinh Province, Clayton B Gompf Col., PSA, CMH.
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dangerous negligence or suffocating control measures' over village affairs.86 A 
significant percentage of the rural population had been made refugees by the war 
or migrated to urban centers. And villagers had good reason for not trusting 
Saigon and American programs, since so many had prom ised m uch and delivered 
little. Nevertheless, Martin Christie, the American adviser from Phuoc Tuy 
quoted in the previous section, appears to have concluded that the South 
Vietnamese people, rather than some aspect of the VSDP, the local government, 
the American presence, or the effects of the war, were responsible for the 
program 's problems. To succeed, the program would have to make headway with 
those people whom  Christie described as suspicious and in search of hand outs, 
who lived w ith social and economic dislocation, who had seen governm ent 
program s come and go, who had grown accustomed to impotent village 
government, and some of whom had suffered or witnessed the worst excesses of 
behavior on all sides. The self development program would have to perform  in 
villages like Binh Nham, where 'th e  internal lack of cohesion amongst the 
people. . . produced a decisive defeat for the program. If anything, there is less 
cooperation than before and the village government has lost respect.'87 The 
program  did not succeed in eliciting the participation of most South Vietnamese 
villagers in such places, and deeper questions need to be addressed to determine 
w hy this was so.
6.5 THE VILLAGE SELF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND PEASANT 
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
6.5 (i) Evidence of Income M aximizing in the VSDP
86Village Self Development Program, Binh Duong Province, 8 October 1969, Pacification Studies 
Group, submitted by Mr. Phun Thanh Hai, and Mr. Stevenson Mcllvaine, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, 
Box 8, File 1603-01.
87 Ibid.
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While there is much to be learned from the adm inistrative failings of the Village 
Self Development Program, the question of peasant economic behavior is perhaps 
more important if lessons from the program  are to be generalized. Since the 
VSDP required villagers to work within cooperative groups, the program 's 
performance speaks to issues of cooperation and individuality in economic 
endeavors: that is, whether peasants tend to be maximizing economic actors, or 
generally cooperative members of a moral economy attuned to the good of the 
community. This section will attem pt to determine w hether the VSDP allows for 
a conclusive statement about peasant economic behavior in South Vietnam.
As was demonstrated above, Village Self Development projects could work 
where a village retained some social cohesiveness and had an effective local 
government operating w ithout undue interference from higher officials. Where 
these conditions did not exist, villagers tended to shun participation in the 
development schemes (and in m any cases were excluded by local officials). These 
were the most obvious reasons for either participating in or avoiding VSDP 
projects. But peasant behavior w ith regard to cooperative development projects 
may have been governed by a general approach to economic decision making. 
Samuel Popkin theorizes that peasants faced w ith an opportunity to participate in 
a common economic effort will make a calculated but also subjective decision 
based on possible risks and benefits to themselves and their families of allocating 
their scarce resources to a common interest. These decisions, he adds, will be 
based in large part on the credibility and capability of local leadership.88
There is evidence from village developm ent efforts that South Vietnamese 
villagers made economic choices as constrained maximizers in a m anner 
consistent with the rational choice school of thought. In fact, American reports 
regularly lamented such attitudes among villagers. For instance, one 
representative evaluation of the program  observed that 'popular m otivation has
88 Samuel L. Popkin, 'Public Choice and Peasant Organization/ 252.
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been for individual ga in / and deplored the failure to harness that 'm otivation for 
personal gain [to] guide individuals into community structures/89 The questions 
at hand are w hether that evidence is reasonably conclusive and w hether the 
central and southern regions evince any differences in their approach to the 
cooperative aspects of the program.
The Village Self Development Program asked peasants to take part in a 
new, non-m arket, rural institution: the development cooperative. Adherents to 
the moral economy school of thought tend to identify such a cooperative approach 
to economic ventures as part of an intrinsic belief system rather than an economic 
choice. Nevertheless, although the new institution was in large part non­
economic, and although a successful project would profit not merely an 
individual, bu t a group of villagers, the decision to participate or not appears to 
have been m ainly economic. For example, one farmer told a South Vietnamese 
research team  that he had w ithdraw n his name from a VSDP union because there 
were too m any participants. W ith only VN$ 30,000 to work with, a group of 
twenty w ould have to share the profits from six or seven piglets. That did not 
leave enough profit to go around after expenses and time in caring for the piglets 
was accounted for.90 Participation in the VSDP required an expenditure of scarce 
resources in  both time and money from peasants, and so each project had to 
overcome their aversion to risking these resources. The probability of rew ard had 
to be great enough to overcome that risk. In the estimate of this farmer, it was not.
In order to educate peasants in what was a radical new approach to 
development, explain the risks and rewards, and control the benefits, good 
leadership was indeed necessary. W ithout it, the projects naturally dissolved into 
mere grant program s, since villagers were required to spend their budgets
whatever the state of their development cooperatives. In other words, the bulk of
89 Problems as Posed by the Vinh Long VSD for 1969, undated CORDS document, Pacification Files,
IV CTZ, 1968-1972, Vinh Long Province (closed files), CMH.
90 'Understanding about the Self Development Program in the Villages of Vinh Thanh Van, Mong 
Tho, and Giuc Tuong/ Vietnamese Survey Report, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 10, File 1602-01.
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any profits had to be contained within the cooperative group. If villages were not 
able to prevent non-participants from benefiting from a collective project, such as 
a bridge or road improvement, w ithout making an investment, participation 
w ould dwindle and the universal problem of the 'free rider' w ould underm ine 
the program .91 South Vietnamese and American evaluations of the VSDP 
disclose that such problems were legion. One Vietnamese survey team  found that 
villagers in four relatively prosperous villages Phuc Tuy province were angling 
for hand outs and avoiding personal investment in VSDP projects.92 Another 
South Vietnamese study of two villages of Phong Dinh province found that in the 
second year of the program, the majority of cooperative members 'still thought 
[the VSDP] fund furnished by the government [was] for their personal use.'93 A 
CORDS inspection team made up  of one American and one Vietnamese evaluator 
found on one trip that in three of four villages the VSDP had dissolved into a 
'giveaway program / The public understanding of VSDP in one village seemed to 
be easily summed up: 'The government gives us pigs to raise.'94 The existence of 
free riders further suggests that many people were m aking economic choices about 
the Village Self Development Program rather than a value judgm ent about the 
intrinsic right and wrong of cooperative behavior.
Poor administration, besides creating opportunities for free riders, could 
debilitate the self development program  in other ways. Clearly in those villages 
where local governments were skimming heavily or directing resources to 
relatives or to their political superiors, most peasants opted not to participate. As 
one Vietnamese survey in Phuong Dinh province reported, 'th e  benefits brought
91 For a description of the free rider problem, see Samuel L. Popkin, 'Public Choice and Peasant 
Organization/ 252.
92 See for instance, 'Self Development Program and Political Organization in Four Villages of Phuoc 
Tuy/ Local Survey Detachment Report, 20 March 1970, MACCORDS PP&P,1970, Box 7, File 1602-01.
93 Local Survey Detachment Report, Research of the VSDP in Two Villages of Phong Dinh 
Province,10 May 1970, MACCORDS PP&P, 1970, Box 8, File 1602-01.
94 Confidential Report, Pacification Studies Group, CORDS, Village Self Development 
Program/Binh Duong Province, 8 October 1969, Stevenson Mcllvaine, Phan Than Hai, Field 
Evaluators, MACCORDS PP&P, 1969, File 1601-10A.
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in by the cooperatives is (sic) just for a small num ber of people. Generally, the 
projects do not bring realistic benefits for the populace/ In such villages, therefore, 
people tended to be reluctant to participate.95 But in those villages with decent 
local governments attem pting to run the program fairly, we have a good example 
of economic calculation taking place in non-market settings. Aside from the 
existence of the free rider problem, the best evidence that cooperative behavior 
w ithin the VSDP w as the result of calculation of benefit rather than inclination of 
values is the difficulty that even respected local governments had in convincing 
villagers to participate.
The overwhelm ing majority of South Vietnamese villagers in the southern 
region exposed to the VSDP program  resisted its cooperative aspect. Even in those 
cases where people did work together to some degree, they did so reluctantly and 
only after considerable prodding. A CORDS evaluation found that in 3 of 4 
villages, the potential for increased income did not overcome a distaste for the 
cooperative ventures. Even in the one village where the people were 
experimenting w ith  cooperative economic ventures, local officials had worked to 
overcome initial resistance.96 A Vietnamese research team reported that m any 
villagers were expressing dissatisfaction over the idea of collective or 'un ion ' 
group projects and that most were distrustful of cooperating so closely with 
neighbors in an economic venture.97 So marked was this resistance that U.S. 
development officials told President Nguyen Van Thieu in 1970 that the program  
was foundering partly because 'people preferred to work separately for their own
95 Local Survey Detachment Report, Research of the VSDP, Phuong Dinh province, MACCORDS 
PP&P 1970, Box 8, files 1602-01.
96 Confidential Report, Pacification Studies Group, CORDS, Village Self Development 
Program/Binh Duong Province, 8 October 1969, Stevenson Mcllvaine, Phan Than Hai, Field 
Evaluators, MACCORDS PP&P, 1969, File 1601-10A.
97 'Research Poll on the Village Self Development Program, Binh Duong Province, September 1969, 
Pacification Files III Corps, 1968-1972 (closed files), RTT Reports, Hau Nghia, 1967-70, CMH.
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interest rather than working in collectivity for community interest
Villagers evinced resistance to the cooperative nature of VSDP projects in 
projects w hether or not they were an economic success. One joint 
Vietnamese/U.S. research team working just north of Saigon com pared people's 
responses to cooperative projects in two contrasting villages. (It bears repeating 
here that a South Vietnamese village was a small region comprised of several 
settlements, whereas a hamlet was the sort of settlement that m ost westerners 
associate w ith the term village). Phu Cuong village encompassed several hamlets 
and a part of the Binh Duong province capital, a small urban area. The village 
'h ad  no apparent sense of comm unity/ and its leaders were enfeebled by the 
proximity of a m eddling province government. It is not surprising then that Phu 
Cuong's self development projects fared poorly and that its people were 'generally 
hostile to the idea of raising animals together/ This hostility to cooperative effort 
could be attributable to the urban nature of much of the village and the 'uncertain 
mix of rich and poor, urban and rural, typical of newly urbanized villages in 
Vietnam'. In Phu Cuong, therefore, the VSDP's failure comes as no surprise.
In contrast, in rural Tuong Binh Hiep and Tan Hao villages, whose hamlets 
had a greater sense of social and political cohesiveness, active and respected 
governments m anaged to guide several successful projects through the 
community. This led CORDS researchers to the same conclusions noted in 
previous sections. 'VSDP in Binh Duong is successful where the village has a 
sense of community an d /o r effective, responsive local governm ent/ This 
economic cooperation, however, does not appear to have sprung from an 
indigenous impulse. Even in this successful case, 'strong popular resistance to the 
concept of cooperative projects was evidenced' and was only overcome after
98 'Briefing documents on progress of pacification and development program for first quarter 1970/ 
Memorandum to William Colby from Harry T. Johnson regarding briefing for President Thieu, 20 May 
1970, RG 472 MACCORDS PP&P, Box 7,1970, File 1601-09A.
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considerable persuasive efforts by village officials."
Data for peasant response to the cooperative unions in Central Vietnam are 
not comprehensive enough to state conclusively w hether or not there were 
regional differences in peasant attitudes toward the VSDP. Central Vietnamese 
peasants did not embrace the program  and clearly resisted its cooperative 
elements. However, the insurgency and the conventional w ar may have 
prevented a community or project approach to development from succeeding, 
whatever peasant economic impulses may have been. Certainly the fierce nature 
of the war in that region makes it difficult to judge the program  there. It is clear 
that peasants in the far South resisted economic cooperation in the VSDP as well. 
Why peasants in all regions resisted cooperative behavior, however, a complex 
question.
6.5 (ii) Conclusions to Peasant Economic Behavior and the VSDP
While it is possible to identify a general resistance to cooperative ventures under 
the VSDP, it is difficult to determine the precise effect of each factor. Poor local 
government, social dislocation, and insecurity sapped community spirit in many 
villages. Moreover, the VSDP program  may have been trying to fabricate a form 
of cooperative behavior ill adapted to local custom. The cooperative practices 
around rice farming developed over generations. In contrast, the cooperative 
unions of the VSDP were im ported overnight by governm ent officials, had been 
spawned by foreigners, and contained at least some decision making processes 
foreign to the Vietnamese. Finally, as one evaluator noted in Central Vietnam, 
'the  rural population. . . have a long memory of unfulfilled prom ises' and 'deep-
"  Village Self Development Program, Binh Duong Province, 8 October 1969, Pacification Studies 
Group, submitted by Mr. Phun Thanh Hai, and Mr. Stevenson Mcllvaine, MAGCORDS PP&P 1970, 
Box 8, File 1603-01.
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seated suspicion of the government's ability and intentions.'100 The m arked 
resistance to cooperative self development projects, then, rather than precluding 
the existence of something akin to a moral economy, might have resulted from 
unique and tem porary wartime conditions.
Even allowing for the influence of these factors, however, it appears that a 
more fundam ental resistance to cooperative ventures existed among Vietnamese 
villagers. For instance, this resistance appeared in villages that retained social 
cohesion, had good governments, and in which villagers expressed a good deal of 
interest about the program. And villagers exhibited such resistance in all regions 
of South Vietnam, even those in which cooperative rice farming practices were 
still deeply rooted.
The willingness of large numbers of villagers to free ride coupled w ith  this 
resistance to cooperative behavior strongly indicates that villagers had their own 
good and that of their families in mind, rather than the good of their 
communities. It appears that, being reasonably efficient of their resources and 
efforts, peasants calculated in each case whether cooperative projects presented 
under the Village Self Development Program offered them a decent retu rn  on 
investment, just as they made these decisions in the cultivation of rice. They 
decided on the basis of subjective estimates of the credibility and capability of the 
particular venture and their village government. They were not purely rational 
individualists operating in perfect markets. Nor is there evidence that they were 
wholly unm indful of the good of their communities. But there is no evidence 
whatever that they were working first and foremost for the good of the 
community w ithin a moral economy framework. Apparently, no intrinsic and 
overriding belief in reciprocal and cooperative behavior for the good of the larger 
community was at work within the VSDP depicted in these studies. In fact, one
American researcher lam ented this individually maximizing approach to
100 CORDS Evaluation of the First Phase of the 1969 Pacification Program, Binh Dinh Province, 9-14 
June 1969, Mr. John S. Figueira, Pacification Files, II Corps, 1968-1972, CMH.
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economic decision making as a problem  for the nation as a whole: 'ru ra l economic 
development needs more dynamic governmental encouragement if it is to foster 
developing communities and not just family prosperity .'1 0 1
Despite the lack of evidence for a functioning moral economy element in 
the Village Self Development Program, there is not enough evidence here to 
dismiss it. The evidence for Central Vietnam, where communal rice farming 
practices were more deeply rooted, is insufficient to rule out a regional difference 
in economic behavior w ith regard to the program. Thus, the program  may not 
provide an apt platform for determ ining conclusively whether or not elements of 
a moral economy were at work in Central or southern Vietnam. The most 
conclusive statement to be made here is that no evidence for such a system has yet 
turned up, and that strong evidence exists for a family income maximizing ethic 
w ithin and w ithout the VSDP program  and throughout South Vietnam.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH AMIDST THE FAILURE OF 
INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS
The project approach to village development did not achieve its goals in the 1968- 
1972 period in South Vietnam. In order to succeed, it would have required several 
things that did not exist in sufficient quantities at that time: sufficient resources, 
qualified personnel, cooperative and competent district and province 
administrations, functioning village governments, significant dim inution of NLF 
political and social influence. M oreover, village development proved vulnerable 
to National Liberation Front tactics of physical threat and attack. Even where it 
was not popular, the Front did not need to destroy a lot of development projects in 
order to hamstring the campaign. It merely had to establish an implicit threat, 
intimidate vulnerable developm ent personnel, exploit villager cynicism about
101 CORDS Evaluation of the First Phase of the 1969 Pacification Program, Binh Dinh Province, 9-14 
June 1969, Mr. John S. Figueira, Pacification Files, II Corps, 1968-1972, CMH.
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government program s in general, and attack selected targets. Perhaps the NLF's 
greatest success in the assault on nation building in South Vietnam was its ability 
to enfeeble local governments. It may have been necessary to introduce 
development cadre teams and special projects, but these were insufficient for 
community development to sustain itself. Such success w ould have required 
village governments to improve dramatically, and this the Saigon governm ent's 
chequered history and the NLF prevented.
Some effort at improving the government's rural political presence was,
however, necessary. Programs like Village Self Development, as established
above, were not designed merely to create short term economic success, bu t to
foster political improvements in village government that w ould have prom oted
long term economic development. Development planners did not know how
long their program s would be able to function, but they realized that no one had
succeeded in creating potent village administrations in South Vietnam before
1968. However, familiar village government practices had been radically altered
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by French colonial policy, driven
underground by President Ngo Dinh Diem in the 1950s, and, w ith American
prodding, restored in a foreign guise in the 1960s and 1970s. These
administrations were highly vulnerable to NLF pressure, especially at night w hen
South Vietnamese and American troops returned to their relatively secure
compounds. U nder these circumstances, it is unrealistic to suppose the
governm ent could have forged a working village governm ent system that w ould
earn legitimacy among villagers within a few wartime years. Nevertheless, such
structures m ust exist and w in legitimacy among villagers or South Vietnam could
expect its social, political, and economic woes to persist. And some village
governments did begin to show signs of life in the early 1970s. Thus, com m unity
development, though politically doomed by poor performance, the unpopularity
of the Saigon government, the presence of Americans in the country, and the
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influence of the NLF, had a good deal of merit as an approach.
Economically, the village development campaign fared poorly as well. This 
was due partly to the lack of economic expertise which CORDS brought to its 
development planning. But more dam aging was the nature of the village 
development approach and its relationship to the political turm oil and insurgency 
in rural South Vietnam. Even with its dearth of economic talent, CORDS did 
manage to conceive a village development plan that compares well w ith later 
approaches and theories. VSDP planners saw the need for self-starting projects 
and the dangers of a foreign presence. They recognized the need for education and 
the potential for corruption. They tried to enlist village choice and participation 
by sharing out risk and limiting project profits to those who took part. Again, 
however, the circumstances under which the Saigon governm ent attem pted these 
programs all bu t assured failure in the short time it had to work. Village 
governments were not ready for the responsibilities VSDP required them  to 
accept, village development projects presented specific targets that the NLF was 
able to exploit, and the rural population was generally and rightly pessimistic 
about Saigon governm ent program s and their American sponsors.^2 Thus, 
village development projects could succeed where good local development 
personnel or effective village governments worked with a population that was 
predisposed to be receptive for political or religious reasons. This left the majority 
of rural South Vietnam unsusceptible to governm ent sponsored village 
development programs.
It is a salient point, however, that despite this overall failure, it proved 
possible to foster both general economic grow th and some village development in 
an insecure environm ent. Obviously, the rural agricultural boom occurred 
despite widespread physical insecurity and strong NLF influence. Indeed, village
102 CORDS evaluation of The First Phase of the 1969 Pacification Program, Binh Dinh 
Province.Visited 9-14 June 1969, Mr. John S. Figueira, Pacification Files, II Corps, 1968-1972, Binh 
Dinh Province. CMH.
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developm ent within the program  was possible, if not common, in areas of low 
security. The rural economic boom in South Vietnam during this period 
occurred, however, not merely because of village development projects. Security 
im provem ents after 1968, though far from comprehensive, m ade developm ent 
possible by reopening markets and releasing peasants from a more subsistence 
oriented economy to which they had been confined in part by the war. At the 
same time, governm ent m arket reforms, infrastructural development, 
agricultural development, and agrarian reform began to take hold. The 
dim inution of governm ent barriers to economic activity, the provision of inter 
village and inter-province roads and other infrastructure, the introduction of 
m odem  rice varieties, the development of an incipient official credit system, and 
land reform led to economic growth: not cooperative livestock projects, or village 
amenities.
A m ultitude of South Vietnamese and American docum ents produced in 
the early 1970s lament the failure of project after project while noting that 
economic activity was increasing strongly. In 1969 in the troubled province of 
Kien Hoa, for instance, the senior American adviser noted the ineffectiveness of 
local governm ent and specific programs, but marveled that 'th e  private sector is 
rebuilding at an amazing rate.'103 Also in 1969, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker 
informed President Thieu that, although pacification was generally progressing in 
the Mekong delta, and the economy was showing signs of strength, individual 
program s were 'd isappointing/ 'inadequate/ and 'lagging/ 104 In February 1973, 
the departing American senior adviser in Vinh Long province cited dramatic 
economic growth. These realizations among American officials predated the 1980s 
m ovem ent am ong development theorists, most prom inently from the W orld 
Bank, away from individual development projects and tow ard a 'structural
103 Province Monthly Report for Kien Hoa, June 1969, A.L. Kotzbeue, CMH.
104 CORDS to President Thieu, Possible Points, President's Trip to II CTZ - 25 April 1969,
MACCORDS PP&P, 1969,1601-10A.
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adjustment' approach in which general economic policies were to be m ade 
friendly to development. It should be noted here, however, that South Vietnam 
does not offer the best vehicle for judging the efficacy of the project approach to 
development, and that some synthesis between the general and project approaches 
appears to be emerging.
The VSDP had contributed bridges and schools, bu t real prosperity had 
resulted from a boom in farming and the spinoff activity it created. Agricultural 
equipment sales were surging, production and prices were both rising because of a 
combination of development and a lifting of governm ent regulations, rural 
banking was beginning to respond to unm et credit dem and, tenant farming was 
vastly decreased, and m odem  rice production was the highest in the country. As a 
result, farmers were m ore prosperous than anyone could remember, and the 
province had begun collecting taxes. A Vietnamese evaluation team working in 
Vinh Long province accurately exposed the overall trends in rural development. 
'VSDP projects have not satisfied people because m uch attention has been paid to 
formality while implementation has not been properly carried out. . . . Life in 1970 
is better than in 1969 due to good harvests of IR rice and improved security /105
Some of this success was due to the different natures of the USAID and 
CORDS approaches. The NLF found it increasingly difficult to block trade and 
collect taxes as new road nets appeared. Moreover, they found reform and 
agricultural development harder to oppose than village projects. Attacking new, 
divisible, generalized agricultural technology, such as new  rice varieties, was far 
more problematic than destroying a new school house, scaring off a teacher or 
extension agent, or burning a chicken coop. Project development, which required 
local government support, was therefore vulnerable to the NLF even after 1968. 
Moreover, overbearing Saigon government regulation and red tape posed a lesser
obstacle to general rural development than to village projects. Bureaucratic
105 Format for Pacification Research Team Reports, 26 March 1970, MACCORDS PP&P 1970, Box 9, 
File 1602-01.
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requirements could be nullified by farmer-to-farmer seed and technology sharing 
and weakened by improving road and communication nets. In contrast, a 
requirement for several hard-to-come-by signatures could kill a small livestock or 
village construction project, and the budgets for these discrete projects were easier 
to skim from.
Village developm ent efforts did not succeed economically in a general 
sense, and such success as it had did not sufficiently sway the rural population to 
have succeeded politically. Evidence was presented in throughout this study to 
suggest that villagers were willing to accept from anyone things that helped them, 
but generally m aintained their political ambivalence. If land reform, which 
positively affected the lives of m any more villagers than did comm unity 
development, failed to w in abiding support for either the NLF or the Saigon 
government, VSDP certainly had little chance politically.
In sum , this chapter has confirmed that the project approach to village 
development d id  not w in  the political support of the average South Vietnamese 
peasant for their government. N or was it significantly responsible for the rural 
economic grow th and more equitable income distribution that parts of South 
Vietnam enjoyed in the 1968-1972 period. Its success depended mainly on the 
predisposition of a given village population, and most South Vietnamese villages 
were not receptive to their governm ent's hands on ministrations.
Upon leaving Vietnam in 1973, an American adviser nam ed Wallace
Veaudry groped w ith w hat appeared to be a conundrum. The economy kept
growing, security seemed better in many ways, and yet the NLF hung on and on.
Colonel V eaudry lam ented that in the delta province of Vinh Long, South
Vietnamese forces had killed and captured thousands of Viet Cong, only to see
them replaced. Five years after the Tet Offensive, two thirds of the province was
still heavily contested. 'Despite this rather bleak picture, there are rays of
sunshine/ Colonel Veaudry wrote. The economy was booming and in the realm
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of economic development, 'progress is inevitable; only a catastrophe could stop
it/106
106 Province Senior Advisor Completion of Tour Report, Vinh Long Province, Wallace F. Veaudry, 
Col., 4 Jan. 1972 - 15 Feb. 1973, submitted 12 February 1973, Pacification Files Corps, 1968-1972 (Closed 
Files), CMH.
281
Chapter 7 
Conclusion
Two schools of thought have dom inated scholarship of the American w ar in 
Vietnam. The prevailing school suggests that the South Vietnamese/Am erican 
effort failed in nearly every sense: militarily, politically, socially, and economically. 
Revisionists argue that the United States abandoned its South Vietnamese ally 
just as the foundation for victory had been laid. Both are made on the basis of 
insufficient evidence, and both are mistaken.
Scholars have largely ignored the years after 1968, the period most vital to 
judging the accuracy of these assertions. They have given especially short shrift to 
rural society and economic issues. In an effort to fill these gaping holes in the 
literature, this study has demonstrated that the tru th  lies somewhere in between 
the two dom inant schools. Rural economic development achieved remarkable 
success and proved possible even in local environments which ranged from low 
intensity conflict to outright war. The nation building effort, however, foundered 
on its political goals. Nothing the Saigon government or its American ally 
attem pted created an environm ent for South Vietnam's survival. Even if it had 
been able to defend itself, the South Vietnamese government had little real 
support among its people.
This study has reached its conclusions by bringing to bear evidence from a 
multiplicity of sources. Previously unexploited documentation from the United 
States Agency for International Development revealed much about agrarian 
reform and the introduction of new agricultural technology. Material from the 
now-defunct nation building agency, CORDS, makes possible new and more 
comprehensive conclusions about community and village development, the
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nature of the American presence in South Vietnam, and the rural strength of the 
National Liberation Front during the last years of the war. Since the fall of Saigon, 
two decades of economic research has accumulated. Until now, it had  not been 
used to shed light on the nation building effort in South Vietnam. Interviews 
w ith former policy makers and participants was invaluable in bringing a sense of 
operational perspective to this inquiry.
Several of Saigon's development programs, especially land reform and the 
introduction of green revolution technology, were popular w ith a large portion of 
rural South Vietnamese, particularly in the Mekong region. Revisionists have 
often cited this as evidence that the government itself was gaining popularity, and 
therefore that nation building was therefore succeeding. But this claim has a lot in 
common w ith well-worn claims of strategic victory based on the adage that the 
Americans never lost a major military battle in Vietnam. Both have a basis in 
truth, and both are irrelevant. Just as military victories did not make the Saigon 
government strong, successful programs did not make the Saigon governm ent 
popular. As one senior American adviser observed, GVN and U.S. forces 
managed to occupy large areas, open new farmlands, introduce new  rice varieties, 
popularize new  technology, and instigate local elections in which people, though 
frightened, were willing to vote and rim. But, VI was troubled that the people felt 
as little identity w ith the national government. There was little popular 
responsiveness to [government ministrations]. I had hoped that given time, local 
democracy w ould grow up, and with education and experience there w ould be 
greater confidence in a national government. But it was weak while I w as there.'1
Part of the problem lay with the South Vietnam's governm ent and part 
w ith its American ally. The urban-dom inated Saigon governm ent alienated itself 
from its majority rural population. It was profoundly corrupt. Its dependence
1 Hugh Appling, oral history interview, Georgetown University Library, 26 January 1990, p.17. 
Appling was the Province Senior Adviser to Tay Ninh province in 1968-9, and the Deputy Chief of 
Mission at the U.S. embassy in Saigon in 1973-4.
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upon its ally emasculated the government in the eyes of its people and crippled its 
appeal to Vietnamese nationalism. Finally, it faced an implacable external foe in 
the North and a deeply-rooted internal enemy in the NLF. Hence, w ithout 
American support, the Saigon governm ent could not survive militarily. The 
American commitment, however, was extremely problematic. The presence of 
hundreds of thousands of American troops in a country they neither knew nor 
understood created a trem endous am ount of animosity among Vietnamese. 
Moreover, the US commitment was confined to a political w indow  of 
opportunity, and the w indow  proved far too narrow  for an immense nation 
building task that had not begun in earnest until 1968. Ronald Spector put it 
succinctly: for the United States this was a limited war, for the Vietnamese, it was 
an unlim ited w ar for survival.2
Additionally, the GVN faced a far more difficult job than did  the NLF. The 
government needed both influence and control in rural South Vietnam in order 
to w in the cooperation of its people and build a foundation for secure nationhood. 
The NLF needed only influence. With influence, the Front could deny Saigon 
victory and wait out the Americans. In this, they succeeded. This study has 
dem onstrated that Vietnam revisionists have underestim ated the degree of NLF 
influence over a large portion of South Vietnam's rural territory in the post-1968 
period. The Front, despite the intense loyalty of its core followers, was not 
especially popular w ith the majority of the South Vietnamese people; but then it 
did not have to be.
One of this study 's chief scholarly contributions is the discovery that 
physical insecurity affected different rural development program s in different 
ways. This makes the case of post-1968 South Vietnam an immensely valuable 
model for developm ent studies and economic history. The Americans and South 
Vietnamese attem pted an extraordinary num ber and variety of development
2 Ronald Spector, After le t: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York, 1983), 314.
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programs in a large assortment of conditions. They tried small-scale com m unity 
development, whose schemes required micro-management and local presence. 
They tried large-scale agrarian development and reform using m arket forces to 
disseminate ideas and technology. They also tried to provide infrastructure both 
on local and national levels. They attempted these things in combat zones, in 
low-intensity conflict conditions, and in regions so peaceful that program s there 
could be described as post-conflict reconstruction.
Insecurity and NLF influence damaged the Saigon governm ent's functions 
in the countryside and hampered hands-on government projects—the kinds of 
programs generally championed by the nation building agency, CORDS.
Insecurity, however, did not prevent all elements of the rural economic 
development effort, especially those generally advocated by USAID, from 
achieving some remarkable successes. Programs seeking to disseminate economic 
ideas, reforms, and technologies into the countryside achieved a rem arkable 
num ber of their economic goals. The programs and products that succeeded 
tended to share three critical commonalities; there was local dem and for them , 
they diffused through local market mechanisms (such as farmer-to-farmer seed 
exchange), and they did not require micro-management from governm ent 
personnel.
This study also found that the general economic approach underlying the
rural development campaign worked far better in the M ekong/Saigon regions of
the far South than in Central Vietnam. Development plans were tailored to
conditions in the far South, where almost two-thirds of the country's population
resided and which produced 85% of its staple food. In Central Vietnam,
agricultural, military, and political conditions created an environment that w as far
less susceptible to Saigon government and U.S. ministrations. While farm
families in Central Vietnam manifested demand for both green revolution
technology and, to a lesser degree, land redistribution, most developm ent plans
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proved inappropriate there.
The introduction of Green Revolution technology—m odem  seed varieties 
and chemical inputs—proved both economically successful and appropriate in 
South Vietnam. O utput and productivity increased, incomes rose for many farm 
families, and economically damaging rice imports plunged. Evidence of highly 
positive trends in total factor productivity is especially impressive. The fact that 
the technology introduced in the late 1960s persisted into the unification period is 
further testimony to its appropriateness in the Vietnamese context. 
Environmentally, however, some of the new chemical inputs introduced under 
the program  were terribly damaging. This study does not analyze environmental 
damage when judging the Accelerated Rice Program 's performance. The full 
damage to habitat and hum anity by these inputs, DDT among them, is yet to be 
understood, but it is clearly significant. It is a mitigating circumstance, however, 
that as the American commitment wavered, a real possibility of famine existed in 
wartime South Vietnam. It is also true that the purveyors of these inputs did not 
yet understand their potential for destruction.
Agrarian reform failed to w in abiding support for the Saigon government 
and thus proved a political failure. The program  was, however, a profound 
economic success in the circumstances, and proved extremely compatible with the 
concomitant introduction of new agricultural technology. Newly secure property 
rights for peasants in the small farm context changed the way m any people farmed 
and lived. Peasant families w ith land titles were far more likely to invest in 
improvements to their land, and take risks with new technology. This 
contributed to both increased agricultural productivity and production. The 
Hanoi government discovered this in the post-war years. As it dism antled its 
collective agricultural system in 1990, an official governm ent economic report 
proclaimed that a piece of land needs 'a n  actual, real person who values and
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protects it as one's own precious property /3
The present study has also confirmed that the community or project 
approach to rural development fared poorly. Projects that required micro­
m anagem ent generally found neither the local government competence nor the 
villager receptivity necessary to succeed. Moreover, discrete projects and their 
support personnel were more vulnerable to NLF subversion than was popular 
divisible technology. In the end, this finding does not stand as a general criticism 
of the community development approach, merely as evidence of its failure in 
South Vietnam.
W riting in 1988, Yujiro Hayami argued that two decades of research has 
dem onstrated that the best development policy in South East Asia has been a 
combination of labor-saving and land-using agricultural technology, land reform 
that establishes strong individual property rights in pursuit of a small farm 
strategy, and investment in public goods such as roads, irrigation, and research.4 
Twenty years after the fact, and on the basis of extensive research by a variety of 
scholars, Hayami prescribed for Southeast Asia that same development approach 
the USAID had cham pioned in South Vietnam.
Perhaps the greatest testimony to the economic success of agrarian reform 
and the introduction of new technology, however, comes from a persistent and 
articulate critic of the US presence in Vietnam. The Vietnamese scholar Ngo 
Vinh Long, a resident of the United States, has pointed out that from 1975 until 
Hanoi attem pted its collectivization policies in 1979, middle peasants dom inated 
the Mekong region. They m ade up 70% of the regional population and owned 
80% of the cultivated surface, 60% of the farm equipment, and over 90% of the 
draft animals. They produced significant rice surpluses after 1975, culminating in
3 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvleit, 'Village-State Relations in Vietnam: The Effect of Everyday Politics on 
Decollectivization,' The Journal of Asian Studies, 54, No. 2, (May 1995) 413.
4 Yujiro Hayami, 'Asian Development: A View from the Paddy Fields/ Asian Development Review, 
6, No. 1 (1988), 58.
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1979 with a surplus of 1.5 million metric tons out of a total crop of 2.39 million 
tons. Pierre Brocheux reports that Hanoi officials have recently come to the same 
socio-economic conclusions that Hayami and Long did: 'Today, realizing that the 
collectivization introduced after reunification in 1975 has failed, reformist 
communists and others are emphasizing the crucial role of the m iddle sized 
farmers of [the Mekong region] who still retain some knowledge and experience of 
export-oriented agriculture/5
It is noteworthy that the Hanoi government has come full circle in its views 
of peasant agriculture while many W estern scholars continue to argue that 
Saigon's land reform was a sham, that green revolution technology harm ed 
peasant farm families, and that peasants eschewed program s tendered by the 
South Vietnamese government. Both before and after the war, large num bers of 
South Vietnamese peasants signaled their dem and for and approval of public 
infrastructure, free markets for their produce, secure individual property rights, 
and improving agricultural technology. W hen denied these things, they produced 
less. When given access to these things, they produced more. They voted with 
their toil and risk-taking.
It is no less noteworthy that some scholars continue to argue that the 
United States should never have abandoned its ally in Saigon. But rural 
Vietnamese could hardly have displayed a stronger preference than they did for an 
end to foreign domination. Thus, governments and scholars too often have 
ignored peasant dem and and peasant preferences in Vietnam w ith almost 
uniformly disastrous results for policy and for scholarship, but especially for the 
people of Vietnam.
5 Pierre Brocheux, The Mekong Delta: Ecology, Economy, and Revolution, 1860-1960 ( Madison, WI, 
1995), 211.
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